First published by OR Books,
New York, 2010
Paperback published 2011
Copyright Norman G. Finkelstein
Paperback ISBN 978-1-935928-43-0
ebook ISBN 978-1-935928-44-7
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A CIP Record is available for this book from the
Library of Congress
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A CIP Record is available for this book from the
British Library
Printed by Book Mobile in the United States of
America
Printed in the United Kingdom by CPI Books Ltd
To Carl and Noam,
for being there
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Foreword
1/ Self-Defense
2/ Their Fear, and Ours
3/ Whitewash
4/ Of Human Shields and
Hasbara
5/ Inside Gaza
6/ Ever Fewer Hosannas
7/ Goldstone
Epilogue: After the Mavi
Marmara
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Notes
Index
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Colin Robinson was instrumental in the book’s
conception and Maren Hackmann in its execution. Cyrus Veeser lent his golden
touch during the final stage of editing. I am grateful for the Biosocial
Research Foundation’s support, and for the assistance of Rudolph Baldeo, Anna
Baltzer, Regan Boychuk, Noam Chomsky, John Dugard, Mirene Ghossein, Asma Ishak,
Mike Levy, Darryl Li, Sanjeev Mahajan, Frank Menetrez, Allan Nairn, Mouin
Rabbani, Sara Roy, Feroze Sidhwa, Jamie Stern-Weiner, and Eugenia Tsao. I also
greatly benefited from references forwarded to me by correspondents.
It’s not that you’re out to carry out a massacre, but
...
Israeli commander briefing soldiers on eve of Gaza
invasion (1)
FOREWORD
Alongside many others I have devoted much of my adult
life to the achievement of a just peace between Israel and Palestine. It cannot
be said that Palestinians living under occupation have derived much benefit
from these efforts. The Israeli juggernaut proved unstoppable. The changes that
have occurred have only been for the worse. Under the guise of what is called
the “peace process” Israel has effectively annexed wide swaths of the West Bank
and shredded the social fabric of Palestinian life there and in the Gaza Strip.
It would nonetheless be unduly pessimistic to say
that no progress has been made. Israel can no longer count on reflexive support
for its policies. Public opinion polls not only outside but also inside Jewish
communities around the world over the past decade reveal a growing unease with
Israeli conduct. This shift largely stems from the fact that the public is now
much better informed. Historians have dispelled many of the myths Israel
propagated to justify its dispossession and displacement of Palestine’s
indigenous population; human rights organizations have exposed Israel’s
mistreatment of Palestinians living under occupation; and a consensus has
crystallized in the legal-diplomatic arena around a settlement of the conflict
that upholds the basic rights of Palestinians.
The simmering discontent with Israeli conduct reached
boiling point in December 2008 when Israel invaded Gaza. The merciless Israeli
assault on a defenseless civilian population evoked widespread shock and
disgust. Deep fissures opened up in the Jewish communities, especially among
the younger generations. Many of Israel’s erstwhile supporters who did not vocally
dissent chose to remain silent rather than defend the indefensible.
The first part of this book analyzes the motives
behind Israel’s assault on Gaza and chronicles what Amnesty International called
“22 days of death and destruction.” The least that we owe the people of Gaza is
an accurate record of the suffering they endured. No one can bring back the
dead or restore the shattered lives of those who survived, but we can still
respect the memory of their sacrifice by preserving it intact.
This book is not just a lament, however; it also sets
forth grounds for hope. The bloodletting in Gaza has roused the world’s
conscience. The prospects have never been more propitious for galvanizing the
public not just to mourn but also to act. We have truth on our side, and we
have justice on our side. These become mighty weapons once we have learned how
to wield them effectively. The challenge now is twofold: to master, and inform
the public of, the unvarnished record of what happened in Gaza; and then to
mobilize the public around a settlement of the conflict that all of enlightened
opinion has embraced—but that Israel and the United States, standing in virtual
isolation, have rejected. It is my hope that this book will help meet this
challenge and, ultimately, enable everyone, Palestinian and Israeli, to live a
dignified life.
1/ SELF-DEFENSE
Question: What do you feel is the most acceptable solution
to the Palestine problem?
Mahatma Gandhi: The abandonment wholly by the Jews of
terrorism and other forms of violence. (1 June 1947) (1)
On 29 November 1947 the United Nations General
Assembly approved a resolution dividing British-mandated Palestine into a
Jewish state incorporating 56 percent of Palestine and an Arab state
incorporating 44 percent of it. (2) In the ensuing war the newly born State of
Israel expanded its borders to incorporate nearly 80 percent of Palestine. The
only areas of Palestine not conquered comprised the West Bank, which the
Kingdom of Jordan subsequently annexed, and the Gaza Strip, which came under
Egypt’s administrative control. Approximately 250,000 Palestinians driven out
of their homes during the 1948 war and its aftermath fled to Gaza and
overwhelmed the indigenous population of some 80,000.
Today 80 percent of Gaza’s inhabitants consist of
refugees from the 1948 war and their descendants, and more than half of the
population is under 18 years of age. Its current 1.5 million inhabitants are
squeezed into a sliver of land 25 miles long and five miles wide, making Gaza
one of the most densely populated places in the world. The panhandle of the
Sinai Peninsula, Gaza is bordered by Israel on the north and east, Egypt on the
south, and the Mediterranean Sea on the west. In the course of its
four-decade-long occupation beginning in June 1967, and prior to Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon’s redeployment of Israeli troops from inside Gaza to its perimeter
in 2005, Israel had imposed on Gaza a uniquely exploitive regime of
“de-development” that, in the words of Harvard political economist Sara Roy,
deprived “the native population of its most important economic resources—land,
water, and labor—as well as the internal capacity and potential for developing
those resources.” (3)
The road to modern Gaza’s desperate plight is paved
with many previous atrocities, most long forgotten or never known outside
Palestine. After the cessation of battlefield hostilities in 1949, Egypt kept a
tight rein on the activity of Fedayeen
(Palestinian guerrillas) in Gaza until February 1955, when Israel launched a
bloody cross-border raid into Gaza killing 40 Egyptians. Israeli leaders had
plotted to lure Egypt into war in order to topple President Gamal Abdel Nasser,
and the Gaza raid proved the perfect provocation as armed border clashes
escalated. In October 1956 Israel (in collusion with Great Britain and France)
invaded the Egyptian Sinai and occupied Gaza, which it had long coveted. The
prominent Israeli historian Benny Morris described what happened next:
Many Fedayeen
and an estimated 4,000 Egyptian and Palestinian regulars were trapped in the
Strip, identified, and rounded up by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], GSS
[General Security Service], and police. Dozens of these Fedayeen appear to have been summarily executed, without trial.
Some were probably killed during two massacres by the IDF troops soon after the
occupation of the Strip. On 3 November, the day Khan Yunis was conquered, IDF
troops shot dead hundreds of Palestinian refugees and local inhabitants in the
town. One U.N. report speaks of “some 135 local residents” and “140 refugees”
killed as IDF troops moved through the town and its refugee camp “searching for
people in possession of arms.”
In Rafah, which fell to the IDF on 1–2 November,
Israeli troops killed between forty-eight and one hundred refugees and several
local residents, and wounded another sixty-one during a massive screening
operation on 12 November, in which they sought to identify former Egyptian and
Palestinian soldiers and Fedayeen
hiding among the local population....
Another sixty-six Palestinians, probably Fedayeen, were executed in a number of
other incidents during screening operations in the Gaza Strip between 2 and 20
November....
The United Nations estimated that, all told, Israeli
troops killed between 447 and 550 Arab civilians in the first three weeks of
the occupation of the Strip. (4)
In March 1957 Israel was forced to withdraw from Gaza
after U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower applied heavy diplomatic pressure and
threatened economic sanctions.
Current conditions in Gaza result directly from the
events of 1967. In the course of the June 1967 war Israel reoccupied the Gaza
Strip (along with the West Bank) and has remained the occupying power ever
since. Morris reported that “the overwhelming majority of West Bank and Gaza
Arabs from the first hated the occupation”; that “Israel intended to stay...
and its rule would not be overthrown or ended through civil disobedience and
civil resistance, which were easily crushed. The only real option was armed
struggle”; that “like all occupations, Israel’s was founded on brute force,
repression and fear, collaboration and treachery, beatings and torture
chambers, and daily intimidation, humiliation, and manipulation”; and that the occupation
“was always a brutal and mortifying experience for the occupied.” (5)
From the start, Palestinians have fought back against
the Israeli occupation. Gazans have put up particularly stiff unarmed and armed
resistance, while Israeli repression has proven equally unremitting. In 1969
Ariel Sharon became chief of the IDF southern command and not long after embarked
on a campaign to crush the resistance in Gaza. A leading American academic
specialist on Gaza recalled how Sharon
placed refugee camps under twenty-four-hour curfews,
during which troops conducted house-to-house searches and mustered all the men
in the central square for questioning. Many men were forced to stand waist-deep
in the Mediterranean Sea for hours during the searches. In addition, some
twelve thousand members of families of suspected guerrillas were deported to
detention camps ... in Sinai. Within a few weeks, the Israeli press began to
criticize the soldiers and border police for beating people, shooting into
crowds, smashing belongings in houses, and imposing extreme restrictions during
curfews.... In July 1971, Sharon added the tactic of “thinning out” the refugee
camps. The military uprooted more than thirteen thousand residents by the end
of August. The army bulldozed wide roads through the camps and through some
citrus groves, thus making it easier for mechanized units to operate and for
the infantry to control the camps.... The army crackdown broke the back of the
resistance. (6)
In December 1987 a traffic accident on the
Gaza-Israel border that left four Palestinians dead erupted into a mass rebellion
or intifada against Israeli rule throughout the occupied territories. Morris
recalled, “It was not an armed rebellion but a massive, persistent campaign of
civil resistance, with strikes and commercial shutdowns, accompanied by violent
(though unarmed) demonstrations against the occupying forces. The stone and,
occasionally, the Molotov cocktail and knife were its symbols and weapons, not
guns and bombs.” However it could not be said that Israel reacted in kind.
Morris continued: “Almost everything was tried: shooting to kill, shooting to
injure, beatings, mass arrests, torture, trials, administrative detention, and
economic sanctions”; “A large proportion of the Palestinian dead were not shot
in life-threatening situations, and a great many of these were children”; “Only
a small minority of [the IDF] malefactors were brought to book by the army’s
legal machinery—and were almost always let off with ludicrously light
sentences.” (7)
By the early 1990s Israel had successfully repressed
the intifada. It subsequently entered into an agreement secretly negotiated in
Oslo, Norway, with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and ratified in
September 1993 on the White House lawn. Through the Oslo Accord Israel hoped to
streamline the occupation by removing its troops from direct contact with
Palestinians and replacing them with Palestinian subcontractors. “One of the
meanings of Oslo,” former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami wrote, “was
that the PLO was ... Israel’s collaborator in the task of stifling the [first]
intifada and cutting short what was clearly an authentically democratic struggle
for Palestinian independence.” (8) In particular Israel endeavored to reassign
Palestinians the sordid work of occupation. “The idea of Oslo,” former Israeli
minister Natan Sharansky observed, “was to find a strong dictator to ... keep the
Palestinians under control.” (9) “The Palestinians will be better at
establishing internal security than we were,” Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin informed skeptics in his ranks, “because they will allow no appeals to
the Supreme Court and will prevent [groups like] the Association for Civil
Rights in Israel from criticizing the conditions there.... They will rule by
their own methods, freeing, and this is most important, the Israeli soldiers from
having to do what they will do.” (10)
In July 2000 PLO head Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak joined U.S. President Bill Clinton at Camp David to
negotiate a settlement of the conflict. The summit collapsed amid acrimonious
accusations and counteraccusations. “If I were a Palestinian,” Ben-Ami, one of
Israel’s chief negotiators at Camp David, later commented, “I would have
rejected Camp David as well,” while a former director of the Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies concluded that the “substantial concessions” Israel demanded
of Palestinians at Camp David “were not acceptable and could not be
acceptable.” (11) Subsequent negotiations also failed to achieve a diplomatic
breakthrough. In December 2000 Clinton presented his “parameters” for resolving
the conflict, which both sides accepted with reservations. (12) In January 2001
talks resumed in Taba, Egypt. Although both parties affirmed that “significant
progress had been made” and they had “never been closer to agreement,” Prime
Minister Barak unilaterally “called a halt” to these negotiations, and as a result
“the Israeli-Palestinian peace process had ground to an indefinite halt.” (13)
In September 2000, amid these diplomatic parleys,
Palestinians in the occupied territories once again launched an open rebellion.
Like the 1987 rebellion this second intifada at its inception was
overwhelmingly nonviolent. However, in Ben-Ami’s words, “Israel’s
disproportionate response to what had started as a popular uprising with young,
unarmed men confronting Israeli soldiers armed with lethal weapons fuelled the [second]
intifada beyond control and turned it into an all-out war.” (14) It is now
largely forgotten that the first Hamas suicide bombing of the second intifada
did not occur until five months into Israel’s relentless bloodletting. (Israeli
forces fired one million rounds of ammunition in just the first few days, while
ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed during the first weeks was 20:1.) In
the course of the spiraling violence triggered by its “disproportionate response,”
Israel struck Gaza with particular vengeance. In a cruel reworking of
Ecclesiastes, each turn of season presaged yet another Israeli attack on Gaza
that left scores dead and much destroyed: “Operation Rainbow” (2004), “Operation
Days of Penitence” (2004), “Operation Summer Rains” (2006), “Operation Autumn
Clouds” (2006), “Operation Hot Winter” (2008). (15) In the recollection of
Israeli President Shimon Peres, however, this period was “another mistake—we restrained
ourselves for eight years and allowed [Gazans] to shoot thousands of rockets at
us ... restraint was a mistake.” (16)
Despite the Israeli assaults, Gaza continued to roil.
Already at the time of the Oslo Accord this intractability caused Israel to sour
on the Strip. “If only it would just sink into the sea,” Rabin despaired. (17)
In April 2004 Prime Minister Sharon announced that Israel would “disengage”
from Gaza, and by September 2005 both Israeli troops and Jewish settlers had
been pulled out. In an interview Sharon advisor Dov Weisglass laid out the rationale
behind the disengagement: it would relieve international, especially American,
pressure on Israel, thereby “freezing ... the political process. And when you
freeze that process you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.” Roy observed
that “with the disengagement from Gaza, the Sharon government was clearly
seeking to preclude any return to political negotiations ... while preserving
and deepening its hold on Palestine.” (18) Israel subsequently declared that it
was no longer the occupying power in Gaza. However, human rights organizations and
international institutions rejected this contention because in myriad ways
Israel still preserved near-total dominance of the Strip. “Whether the Israeli
army is inside Gaza or redeployed around its periphery,” Human Rights Watch
(HRW) concluded, “it remains in control.” (19) Indeed, Israel’s own leading authority
on international law, Yoram Dinstein, aligned himself with the “prevalent
opinion” that the Israeli occupation of Gaza was not over. (20)
The received wisdom is that the Oslo Accord was a
failure because it did not result in a lasting peace. But such a verdict misconstrues
the objective of the accord. If Israel’s goal was, as Ben-Ami pointed out, to
groom a class of Palestinian collaborators, then Oslo was largely a success for
Israelis. A look at the Oslo II Accord, signed in September 1995 and spelling out
in detail the mutual rights and duties of the contracting parties to the 1993
agreement, suggests what loomed largest in the minds of the Palestinian
negotiators: whereas four full pages are devoted to “Passage of [Palestinian]
VIPs” (the section is subdivided into “Category 1 VIPs,” “Category 2 VIPs,”
“Category 3 VIPs,” and “Secondary VIPs”), less than one page—the very last—is devoted to “Release of
Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees,” who numbered in the many thousands. (21)
The Oslo Accord allotted a five-year interim period
allegedly for “confidence building” between the former foes. This was curious,
given that when and where Israel genuinely sought peace the process moved swiftly.
Thus, for decades Egypt was Israel’s prime nemesis in the Arab world, and it
was Egypt that launched a surprise attack in 1973, killing thousands of Israeli
soldiers. Nevertheless, only a half year elapsed between the September 1978
Camp David summit convened by U.S. President Jimmy Carter that produced the
Egyptian-Israeli “Framework for Peace” and the March 1979 “Treaty of Peace” formally
ending hostilities. Only three more years passed before Israel’s final
evacuation from the Egyptian Sinai in April 1982. (22) There was no need for a
half decade of confidence building in Egypt’s case.
In reality the purpose of the protracted interim
period built into Oslo was not confidence building to facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian
peace agreement but collaboration building to facilitate a burden-free Israeli
occupation. It was rightly supposed that, after growing accustomed to the
emoluments of power and privilege, the handful of Palestinian beneficiaries would
be averse to parting with them; however reluctantly, they would do the bidding
of the power that meted out the largesse and “afforded them significant
perquisites.” (23) The interim period also enabled Israel to test the
reliability of these Palestinian subcontractors as crises periodically erupted.
In fact, by the end of the Oslo “peace process” Israel could count among its
many blessings that the number of Israeli troops operating in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories was at the lowest level since the start of the first
intifada. (24) The one holdout in the senior ranks of the Palestinian
leadership was Arafat who, for all his opportunism, seems to have carried in
him a residue of his nationalist past and would not settle for presiding over a
Bantustan. Once he passed from the scene in November 2004, however, all the
pieces were in place for the “Palestinian Authority” to reach a modus vivendi with Israel. Except that it was too late.
In January 2006, sickened by years of official
corruption and fruitless negotiations, the Palestinians elected the Islamic movement
Hamas into office. Israel immediately tightened its blockade on Gaza and the
U.S. joined in. It was demanded of the newly elected government that it
renounce violence and recognize Israel together with prior Israeli-Palestinian
agreements. These preconditions for international engagement were unilateral:
Israel wasn’t also required to renounce violence; Israel wasn’t required to
withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967 and to allow for Palestinians
to exercise their right to
self-determination; and whereas Hamas was required to recognize prior
agreements such as the Oslo Accord, which perpetuated the occupation and
enabled Israel to vastly increase its illegal settlements, (25) Israel was free
to eviscerate prior agreements such as the 2003 “Road Map.” (26)
In June 2007 Hamas foiled a coup attempt orchestrated
by the United States in league with Israel and elements of the prior Palestinian
regime and consolidated its control of Gaza. (27) Israel and the United States
reacted promptly to Hamas’s rejection of U.S. President George W. Bush’s
“democracy promotion” initiative by further tightening the screws on Gaza. In
June 2008 Hamas and Israel entered into a ceasefire brokered by Egypt, but in
November of that year Israel violated the ceasefire by carrying out a bloody
border raid on Gaza akin to its February 1955 border raid. The objective once
again was to provoke retaliation and thereby provide the pretext for an attack.
That border raid was only the preamble to a more
sustained assault. On 27 December 2008 Israel launched “Operation Cast Lead.” (28)
The first week consisted of air attacks, which were followed on 3 January 2009
by an air and ground assault. Piloting the most advanced combat aircraft in the
world, the Israeli air corps flew nearly 3,000 sorties over Gaza and dropped
1,000 tons of explosives, while the Israeli army deployment comprised several
brigades equipped with sophisticated intelligence-gathering systems and
weaponry such as robotic and TV-aided remote controlled guns. During the attack
Palestinian armed groups fired some 570 mostly rudimentary rockets and 200
mortars into Israel. On 18 January a ceasefire went into effect, but the
economic strangulation of Gaza continued. In the meantime international public
opinion reacted with horror at Israel’s assault on a defenseless civilian
population. In September 2009 a United Nations Human Rights Council Fact-Finding
Mission chaired by the respected jurist Richard Goldstone released a voluminous
report documenting Israel’s commission of massive war crimes and possible
crimes against humanity. The report also accused Hamas of committing similar
crimes, but on a scale that paled by comparison. It was clear that, in the
words of Israeli columnist Gideon Levy, “this time we went too far.” (29)
Israel officially justified Operation Cast Lead on
the grounds of self-defense against Hamas rocket attacks. (30) Such a rationale
did not however withstand even superficial scrutiny. If Israel had wanted to
avert the Hamas rocket attacks, it would not have triggered them by breaking
the June 2008 ceasefire with Hamas. Israel also could have opted for
renewing—and then honoring—the ceasefire. Indeed, as a former Israeli intelligence
officer told the International Crisis Group, “The ceasefire options on the
table after the war were in place there before it.” (31) More broadly, Israel
could have reached a diplomatic settlement with the Palestinian leadership that
resolved the conflict and terminated armed hostilities. Insofar as the declared
objective of Operation Cast Lead was to destroy the “infrastructure of
terrorism,” Israel’s alibi of self-defense appeared even less credible after
the invasion: overwhelmingly it targeted not Hamas strongholds but “decidedly
‘non-terrorist,’ non-Hamas” sites. (32) I will return to many of these points
presently. It is useful however to first put Israel’s claim of self-defense in
the wider context of its human rights record in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
just prior to the invasion.
The 2008 annual report of B’Tselem (Israeli
Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) (33) indicated
that between 1 January and 26 December 2008 Israeli security forces killed 455
Palestinians, of whom at least 175 did not take part in hostilities, while
Palestinians killed 31 Israelis of whom 21 were civilians. Thus, on the eve of
Israel’s so-called war of self-defense, the ratio of total Palestinians to Israelis
killed was almost 15:1 and the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli noncombatants
killed was a minimum of 8:1. In Gaza alone Israel killed at least 158
noncombatants in 2008 until 26 December, while seven Israeli civilians were
killed due to Palestinian rocket attacks from Gaza, which means the ratio was more
than 22:1. (Palestinian rocket attacks from Gaza killed 21 Israelis between
when they began in 2001 and January 2009. In the three-year period after its
2005 redeployment to Gaza’s perimeter, the Israeli army killed about 1,250
Gazans, including 222 children, while Palestinian rocket fire killed 11
Israelis.)
Israel loudly protested because Hamas held one
Israeli soldier who had been captured in June 2006, yet Israel held more than
8,000 Palestinian “political prisoners,” including 60 women and 390 children,
of whom 548 were held in administrative detention without charges or trial, 42
of them for more than two years. In addition, Israel exacerbated its “sweeping restrictions
on the freedom of movement of Palestinian residents of the West Bank”; expanded
illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which together
now contain nearly a half million illegal Jewish settlers; confiscated more
West Bank land causing “serious harm to Palestinians ... who are no longer able
to work their land and gain a livelihood from it”; “prevent[ed] any possibility
of development and construction” in Palestinian communities; distributed water
in a discriminatory manner (although the Palestinian population in the West
Bank is nine times the illegal Jewish settler population, its total water
allocation is much smaller); and continued construction of a wall that will
annex almost 12 percent of the West Bank despite the July 2004 International
Court of Justice advisory opinion declaring the wall illegal. (34)
As already noted, in January 2006 Hamas won
Palestinian elections that were widely recognized as “completely honest and
fair” (Jimmy Carter). (35) Israel and the U.S. reacted by imposing an economic
blockade on Gaza. In June 2007 Hamas foiled a putsch orchestrated by the U.S.,
Israel, and elements of the Palestinian Authority. (36) “When Hamas preempts
it,” a senior Israeli intelligence figure later scoffed, “everyone cries foul,
claiming it’s a military putsch by Hamas—but who did the putsch?” (37) Although
he reviled Hamas as “cruel, disgusting and filled with hatred for Israel,” an
editor at Israel’s largest circulation newspaper Yediot Ahronot nonetheless
observed that it “did not ‘seize control’ of Gaza. It took the action needed to
enforce its authority, disarming and destroying a militia that refused to bow
to its authority.” (38) After the abortive putsch Israel intensified its
blockade, which “amounts to collective punishment, a serious violation of
international humanitarian law.” (39)
In mid-December 2008 the United Nations Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published a study entitled “The
Impact of the Blockade on the Gaza Strip: A human dignity crisis.” (40) It
reported that Israel’s “18-monthlong blockade has created a profound human
dignity crisis, leading to a widespread erosion of livelihoods and a
significant deterioration in infrastructure and essential services.” As a
direct consequence of the blockade, many Gaza residents were left without electricity
for up to 16 hours each day and received water only once a week for a few hours
(80 percent of the water did not meet the World Health Organization standards for
drinking); nearly 50 percent of the population was left unemployed, and more
than 50 percent of the population was “food insecure”; 20 percent of “essential
drugs” were “at zero level” and more than 20 percent of patients suffering from
cancer, heart disease, and other severe conditions were unable to get permits
for medical care abroad. Many Palestinians, the study concluded, “reported a
growing sense of being trapped, physically, intellectually and emotionally.” To
judge by the human rights record, and leaving aside that it was Israel that
broke the June 2008 ceasefire, it would appear that the Palestinians had a much
stronger case than Israel for resorting to armed force in self-defense at the
end of December 2008.
2/ THEIR FEAR, AND OURS
The December 2008 invasion of Gaza would prove to be another
public-relations fiasco for Israel, on the order of its disastrous Lebanon
invasions of 1982 and 2006. The civilian casualties and destruction of civilian
infrastructure were so massive and evident that criticism of the assault crept
even into the mainstream media. What explains Israel’s willingness to prosecute
an attack against a civilian population that was bound to result in negative
publicity abroad?
Early speculation on the real impetus behind Israel’s
attack centered on the upcoming Israeli elections, scheduled to be held on 10
February 2009. Jockeying for votes was no doubt a factor in this Sparta-like
society consumed by “revenge and the thirst for blood.” (1) Polls during the
invasion showed that 80–90 percent of Israeli Jews supported it. (2) But as
Israeli journalist Gideon Levy pointed out on Democracy Now!, “Israel went through a very similar war ...
two-and-a-half years ago [in Lebanon], when there were no elections.” (3) In
fact the attack on Gaza responded to crucial state interests that Israeli
leaders would not jeopardize for narrowly electoral gains. Even in recent
decades, when the Israeli political scene has become more squalid, one would
still be hard-pressed to name a major military campaign launched for partisan
political ends. It is arguable that Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s decision to
bomb the Iraqi OSIRAK reactor in 1981 was merely an electoral ploy, but the
strategic stakes in the strike on Iraq were puny; contrary to widespread belief
Saddam Hussein had not embarked on a nuclear weapons program prior to the
bombing. (4) The main motives for the Gaza invasion were to be found not in the
election cycle but, first, in the need to restore Israel’s “deterrence
capacity,” and, second, in the need to counter the threat posed by a new
Palestinian “peace offensive.”
Israel’s “larger concern” in Operation Cast Lead, New
York Times Middle East correspondent Ethan Bronner reported, quoting Israeli
sources, was to “re-establish Israeli deterrence,” because “its enemies are
less afraid of it than they once were, or should be.” (5) Preserving its
deterrence capacity has always loomed large in Israeli strategic doctrine. In
fact it was a primary impetus behind Israel’s first strike against Egypt in
June 1967 that resulted in Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. To justify
the December 2008 onslaught on Gaza, Israeli historian Benny Morris wrote that
“many Israelis feel that the walls ... are closing in ... much as they felt in
early June 1967.” (6) (Several months later Gideon Levy mocked Israel’s
incessant fear mongering as “the devil’s refuge” that “explains and justifies
everything.”) (7) Ordinary Israelis were no doubt filled with foreboding in
June 1967, but Israel did not face an existential threat at the time—as Morris
knows (8)—and Israeli leaders were not apprehensive about the war’s outcome.
After Israel threatened and laid plans to attack
Syria in May 1967, (9) Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser moved Egyptian
troops into the Sinai and announced that the Straits of Tiran would be closed
to Israeli shipping. (Egypt had entered into a military pact with Syria a few
months earlier.) Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban emotively declared that
because of the blockade Israel could only “breathe with a single lung,” but
Israel actually made almost no use of the Straits (except for the passage of
oil, of which it then had ample stocks). Besides, Nasser did not even enforce
the blockade: vessels were passing freely through the Straits within days of
his announcement. What then of the military threat posed by Egypt? Multiple
U.S. intelligence agencies had concluded that the Egyptians did not intend to attack
Israel and that, in the improbable case that they did, alone or in concert with
other Arab countries, Israel would—in President Lyndon Johnson’s words—“whip the
hell out of them.” (10) The head of the Mossad told senior American officials
on 1 June 1967 that “there were no differences between the U.S. and the
Israelis on the military intelligence picture or its interpretation.” (11)
The predicament for Israel was rather the growing
perception in the Arab world, spurred by Nasser’s radical nationalism and
climaxing in his defiant gestures in May 1967, that it would not have to follow
Israeli orders. Thus, Divisional Commander Ariel Sharon admonished those in the
Israeli cabinet hesitant to launch a first strike that Israel was losing its
“deterrence capability... our main weapon—the
fear of us.” (12) In effect, “deterrence
capacity” referred not to warding off an imminent lethal blow but to keeping
Arabs so intimidated that they could not even conceive of challenging Israel’s
freedom to carry on as it pleased, however ruthlessly and recklessly. Assessing
the regional balance of forces, key U.S. presidential aide Walt W. Rostow
concurred on the imperative of “ Nasser’s being cut down to size.” (13) Israel
unleashed the war on 5 June 1967, according to Israeli strategic analyst Zeev
Maoz, in order “to restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence.” (14)
Hezbollah’s ejection of the Israeli occupying army
from Lebanon in May 2000 posed another challenge to Israel’s deterrence capacity.
The fact that Israel suffered a humiliating defeat, one celebrated throughout
the Arab world, made another war well-nigh inevitable. Israel almost
immediately began planning for the next round, (15) and in summer 2006 found a
pretext when Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers (several others were
killed during the operation) and demanded in exchange the release of Lebanese
prisoners held by Israel. Although Israel unleashed the fury of its air force
and geared up for a ground invasion, it suffered yet another ignominious
defeat. A respected American military analyst, despite being partial to Israel,
nonetheless concluded, “the IAF, the arm of the Israeli military that had once
destroyed whole air forces in a few days, not only proved unable to stop
Hezbollah rocket strikes but even to do enough damage to prevent Hezbollah’s
rapid recovery”; that “once ground forces did cross into Lebanon ... , they failed
to overtake Hezbollah strongholds, even those close to the border”; that “in
terms of Israel’s objectives, the kidnapped Israeli soldiers were neither
rescued nor released; Hezbollah’s rocket fire was never suppressed, not even
its long-range fire ... ; and Israeli ground forces were badly shaken and
bogged down by a well-equipped and capable foe”; and that “more troops and a
massive ground invasion would indeed have produced a different outcome, but the
notion that somehow that effort would have resulted in a more decisive victory
over Hezbollah ... has no basis in historical example or logic.” (16)
The juxtaposition of several figures highlights the
magnitude of the setback: Israel deployed 30,000 troops against 2,000 regular
Hezbollah fighters and 4,000 irregular Hezbollah and non-Hezbollah fighters;
Israel delivered and fired 162,000 weapons whereas Hezbollah fired 5,000
weapons (4,000 rockets and projectiles at Israel and 1,000 antitank missiles
inside Lebanon). (17) Moreover, “the vast majority of the fighters who defended
villages such as Ayta ash Shab, Bint Jbeil, and Maroun al-Ras were not, in
fact, regular Hezbollah fighters and in some cases were not even members of
Hezbollah,” and “many of Hezbollah’s best and most skilled fighters never saw
action, lying in wait along the Litani River with the expectation that the IDF
[Israel Defense Forces] assault would be much deeper and arrive much faster
than it did.” (18) Yet another indication of Israel’s reversal of fortune was
that, unlike in any of its previous Their Fear, and Ours 33 armed conflicts, in
the final stages of the 2006 war it fought not in defiance of a U.N. ceasefire
resolution but in the hope that a U.N. resolution would rescue it from an
unwinnable situation. “Frustration with the conduct and outcome of the Second
Lebanon War,” an influential Israeli think-tank reported, led Israel to
“initiate a thorough internal examination ... on the order of 63 different
commissions of inquiry.” (19)
After the 2006 Lebanon War Israel was itching to take
on Hezbollah again but was not yet confident it would emerge victorious on the
battlefield. In mid-2008 Israel desperately sought to conscript the U.S. for an
attack on Iran, which it believed would also decapitate Hezbollah (the junior
partner of Iran), and thereby humble the main challengers to its regional hegemony.
Israel and its quasi-official emissaries such as Benny Morris threatened that
if the U.S. did not go along “then nonconventional weaponry will have to be
used,” and “many innocent Iranians will die.” (20) To Israel’s chagrin and
humiliation, the U.S. vetoed an attack and Iran went its merry way, while the
credibility of Israel’s capacity to terrorize slipped another notch. It was
time to find another target, and Gaza, poorly defended as ever, fit the bill.
There, the feebly armed Islamic movement Hamas had defiantly resisted Israeli
diktat, crowing that in 2005 it had forced Israel to “withdraw” from Gaza, and then,
in June 2008, had compelled Israel to agree to a ceasefire. If Gaza was where Israel would restore its
deterrence capacity, one theater of the 2006 Lebanon War had already hinted at how it might successfully be done.
During the Lebanon War Israel flattened the southern suburb
of Beirut known as the Dahiya that was home to many poor Shiite supporters of
Hezbollah. In the war’s aftermath Israeli military officers began referring to
the “Dahiya strategy.” “We will wield disproportionate power against every
village from which shots are fired on Israel, and cause immense damage and
destruction,” IDF Northern Command Chief Gadi Eisenkot explained. “This isn’t a
suggestion. This is a plan that has already been authorized.” In the event of
hostilities Israel needed “to act immediately, decisively, and with force that
is disproportionate,” reserve Colonel Gabriel Siboni of the Israeli Institute
for National Security Studies declared. “Such a response aims at inflicting
damage and meting out punishment to an extent that will demand long and
expensive reconstruction processes.” “The next war ... will lead to the
elimination of the Lebanese military, the destruction of the national
infrastructure, and intense suffering among the population,” former chief of
the Israeli National Security Council Giora Eiland threatened. “Serious damage
to the Republic of Lebanon, the destruction of homes and infrastructure, and
the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people are consequences that can
influence Hezbollah’s behavior more than anything else.” (21)
It merits noting that, under international law, use
of disproportionate force and targeting of civilian infrastructure constitute war
crimes. Although the new strategy was to be used against all of Israel’s
regional adversaries that had waxed defiant, Gaza was frequently singled out as
the prime target for this approach. “Too bad it did not take hold immediately after
the [2005] ‘disengagement’ from Gaza and the first rocket barrages,” a
respected Israeli pundit lamented. “Had we immediately adopted the Dahiya
strategy, we would have likely spared ourselves much trouble.” If and when
Palestinians launched another rocket attack, Israeli Interior Minister Meir
Sheetrit urged in late September 2008, “the IDF should ... decide on a neighborhood
in Gaza and level it.” (22)
The operative Israeli plan for the attack on Gaza
could be gleaned from authoritative statements issued after it got underway:
“What we have to do is act systematically with the aim of punishing all the
organizations that are firing the rockets and mortars, as well as the civilians
who are enabling them to fire and hide” (reserve Major-General Amiram Levin); “After
this operation there will not be one Hamas building left standing in Gaza”
(Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Dan Harel); “Anything affiliated with Hamas is a
legitimate target” (IDF Spokesperson Major Avital Leibowitz); “It [should be]
possible to destroy Gaza, so they will understand not to mess with us.... It is
a great opportunity to demolish thousands of houses of all the terrorists, so
they will think twice before they launch rockets.... I hope the operation will
come to an end with great achievements and with the complete destruction of
terrorism and Hamas. In my opinion, they should be razed to the ground, so
thousands of houses, tunnels and industries will be demolished” (Deputy Prime
Minister Eli Yishai). The military correspondent for Israel Channel 10 News
commented, “Israel isn’t trying to hide the fact that it reacts
disproportionately.” (23)
In Israel the media exulted at the “shock and awe” (Maariv) of its opening air campaign, which
was designed to “engender a sense of dread.” (24) Whereas Israel killed a mere
55 Lebanese during the first two days of the 2006 war, it killed as many as 300
Gazans in four minutes on the first day of the invasion. Most of the targets
were located in “densely populated residential areas” while the bombardments
began “at around 11:30 a.m., a busy time, when the streets were full of civilians,
including school children leaving classes at the end of the morning shift and
those going to school for the second shift .” (25) Several days into the
slaughter an informed Israeli strategic analyst observed, “The IDF, which
planned to attack buildings and sites populated by hundreds of people, did not warn
them in advance to leave, but intended to kill a great many of them, and
succeeded.” (26) Benny Morris praised “Israel’s highly efficient air assault on
Hamas,” and an American military analyst marveled at the “masterful precision”
of the assault. (27) The Israeli columnist B. Michael was less impressed by the
dispatch of helicopter gunships and jet planes “over a giant prison and firing
at its people” (28) —for example, on that first day Israeli aerial strikes
killed or fatally injured at least 16 children while an Israeli drone-launched
precision missile killed nine college students (two of them young women) “who
were waiting for a U.N. bus” to take them home. (29)
As Operation Cast Lead proceeded apace, prominent Israelis
dropped all pretenses that its purpose was to stop Hamas rocket fire.
“Remember, [Israeli Defense Minister Ehud] Barak’s real foe is not Hamas,” a
former Israeli minister told the respected conflict-resolution organization
International Crisis Group. “It is the memory of 2006.” (30) Israeli
philosopher Asa Kasher, despite doing his utmost to defend the Gaza invasion, nonetheless
opined that “a democratic state ... cannot use human beings as mere tools to
create deterrence” because “human beings are not tools to be used,”
and—again—that “killing for the sake of deterrence is something akin to terrorism.”
(31) Other commentators positively gloated, however, that “Gaza is to Lebanon
as the second sitting for an exam is to the first—a second chance to get it
right,” and that this time around Israel had “hurled [Gaza] back,” not 20 years
as it promised to do in Lebanon, but “into the 1940s. Electricity is available
only for a few hours a day”; that “Israel regained its deterrence capabilities”
because “the war in Gaza has compensated for the shortcomings of the [2006]
Second Lebanon War”; and that “there is no doubt that Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah is upset these days.... There will no longer be anyone in the Arab world
who can claim that Israel is weak.” (32)
New York Times
foreign affairs expert Thomas Friedman joined in the chorus of hallelujahs.
Israel actually won the 2006 Lebanon War, according to Friedman, because it had
inflicted “substantial property damage and collateral casualties on Lebanon,” thereby
administering an “education” to Hezbollah: fearing the Lebanese people’s wrath,
Hezbollah would “think three times next time” before defying Israel. He
expressed hope that Israel was likewise “trying to ‘educate’ Hamas by inflicting
a heavy death toll on Hamas militants and heavy pain on the Gaza population.”
To justify the targeting of Lebanese civilians and civilian infrastructure
during the 2006 war Friedman asserted that Israel had no other option because
“Hezbollah created a very ‘flat’ military network ... deeply embedded in the
local towns and villages,” and that because “Hezbollah nested among civilians,
the only long-term source of deterrence was to exact enough pain on the
civilians ... to restrain Hezbollah in the future.” (33)
Let’s leave aside Friedman’s hollow coinages—what does
“flat” mean? Let’s also leave aside that Friedman not only alleges that the
killing of civilians was unavoidable but at the same time advocates targeting civilians as a deterrence strategy. Let’s just
consider whether it is even true that Hezbollah was “embedded in,” “nested
among,” and “intertwined” with the Lebanese civilian population. Here’s what
the respected human rights organization Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded after
an exhaustive investigation: “We found strong evidence that Hezbollah stored
most of its rockets in bunkers and weapon storage facilities located in
uninhabited fields and valleys, that in the vast majority of cases Hezbollah fighters
left populated civilian areas as soon as the fighting started, and that
Hezbollah fired the vast majority of its rockets from preprepared positions
outside villages.” And again, “in all but a few of the cases of civilian deaths
we investigated, Hezbollah fighters had not mixed with the civilian population
or taken other actions to contribute to the targeting of a particular home or vehicle
by Israeli forces.” Indeed, “Israel’s own firing patterns in Lebanon support
the conclusion that Hezbollah fired large numbers of its rockets from tobacco fields,
banana, olive and citrus groves, and more remote, unpopulated valleys.” (34)
A U.S. Army War College study based largely on
interviews with Israeli soldiers who participated in the Lebanon War similarly
found that “the key battlefields in the land campaign south of the Litani River
were mostly devoid of civilians, and IDF participants consistently report little
or no meaningful intermingling of Hezbollah fighters and noncombatants. Nor is
there any systematic reporting of Hezbollah using civilians in the combat zone
as shields.” On a related note, the authors report that “the great majority of
Hezbollah’s fighters wore uniforms. In fact, their equipment and clothing were
remarkably similar to many state militaries’—desert or green fatigues, helmets,
web vests, body armor, dog tags, and rank insignia.” (35)
Friedman further asserted that, “rather than
confronting Israel’s Army head-on,” Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel’s
civilian population to provoke Israeli retaliatory strikes, inevitably killing
Lebanese civilians and “inflaming the Arab-Muslim street.” Yet numerous studies
have shown, (36) and Israeli officials themselves conceded (37) that, during
its guerrilla war against the Israeli occupying army, Hezbollah only targeted
Israeli civilians after Israel
targeted Lebanese civilians. In the 2006 war Hezbollah began firing rockets
aimed at Israeli civilian concentrations only after Israel inflicted heavy
casualties on Lebanese civilians, while Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah avowed that it would target Israeli civilians “as long as the enemy
undertakes its aggression without limits or red lines.” (38)
If Israel targeted the Lebanese civilian population
and infrastructure during the 2006 war, it was not because it had no choice,
and not because Hezbollah had provoked it, but because terrorizing Lebanese
civilians appeared to be a lowcost method of “education.” This was much
preferred over tangling with a real foe and suffering heavy casualties,
although Hezbollah’s unexpectedly fierce resistance prevented Israel from
claiming a victory on the battlefield. Still, it must be said that Israel did
successfully educate the civilian Lebanese population, which is why Hezbollah
was careful not to antagonize Israel during the Gaza invasion two years later.
(39) Israel’s pedagogy also proved a success among the Gaza population. “It was
hard to convince Gazans whose homes were demolished and family and friends
killed and injured,” the International Crisis Group reported, “that this
amounted to ‘victory,’” as Hamas boasted in the wake of the invasion. (40) In
the case of Gaza, Israel could also lay claim to a military victory, but only
because— in the words of Gideon Levy—“a large, broad army is fighting against a
helpless population and a weak, ragged organization that has fled the conflict
zones and is barely putting up a fight.” (41)
The justification put forth by Friedman in the pages
of the New York Times amounted to
apologetics for state terrorism. (42) Indeed, Israel’s evolving modus operandi for restoring its deterrence
capacity describes a curve steadily regressing into barbarism. Israel won its victory
in June 1967 primarily on the battlefield—albeit in a “turkey shoot” (Rostow) (43)—while
in subsequent hostilities, mostly in Lebanon, it sought both to achieve a battlefield
victory and to bombard the civilian population into submission. But Israel
targeted Gaza to restore its deterrence capacity because it eschewed any of the risks of a conventional war;
it targeted Gaza because it was
largely defenseless. Israel’s resort to unalloyed terror in turn revealed its
relative decline as a military power while the celebration of its military
prowess during and after the Gaza invasion by the likes of Benny Morris
registered the growing detachment of mainstream Israeli intellectuals, and a
good share of the public as well, from reality.
A supplementary benefit of this deterrence strategy
was that it restored Israel’s domestic morale. A February 2009 internal U.N. document
concluded that the invasion’s “one significant achievement” was that it
dispelled doubts among Israelis about “their ability and the power of the IDF
to issue a blow to its enemies.... The use of ‘excessive force’... proves
Israel is the landlord.... The pictures of destruction were intended more for
Israeli eyes than those of Israel’s enemies, eyes starved of revenge and
national pride.” (44)
Beyond restoring its deterrence capacity, Israel’s
main goal in the Gaza invasion was to fend off the latest threat posed by
Palestinian pragmatism. The international community, apart from Israel and the
United States, has consistently supported a settlement of the Israel-Palestine
conflict that calls for two states based on a full Israeli withdrawal to its
June 1967 borders, and a “just resolution” of the refugee question based on the
right of return and compensation. (45) The United Nations General Assembly
annually votes on a resolution titled “Peaceful Settlement of the Question of
Palestine.” This resolution repeatedly includes these tenets for achieving a
“two-State solution of Israel and Palestine”: (1) “Affirming the principle of
the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”; (2) “Reaffirming
the illegality of the Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied
since 1967, including East Jerusalem”; (3) “Stresses the need for: (a) The
withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967,
including East Jerusalem; (b) The realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian
people, primarily the right to self-determination and the right to their
independent State”; (4) “Also stresses the need for justly resolving the
problem of Palestine refugees in conformity with its resolution 194 (III) of 11
December 1948.” (46) Here is the recorded vote on this resolution in recent
years:
1.
| Year | Vote [Yes-No-Abstained] | Negative
votes cast by |
2.
| 1997 | 155-2-3 | Israel, United States |
3.
| 1998 | 154-2-3 | Israel, United States |
4.
| 1999 | 149-3-2 | Israel, United States,
Marshall Islands |
5.
| 2000 | 149-2-3 | Israel, United States |
6.
| 2001 | 131-6-20 | Israel, United States,
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Tuvalu |
7.
| 2002 | 160-4-3| Israel, United States,
Marshall Islands, Micronesia |
8.
| 2003 |160-6-5| Israel, United States, Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Uganda |
9.
| 2004 |161-7-10| Israel, United States,
Australia, Grenada, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau |
10.
| 2005 |156-6-9| Israel, United States,
Australia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau |
11.
| 2006 | 157-7-10| Israel, United States,
Australia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau |
12.
| 2007 | 161-7-5| Israel, United States,
Australia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau |
13.
| 2008 | 164-7-3| Israel, United States,
Australia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau |
14.
| 2009 | 164-7-4| Israel, United States,
Australia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau |
15.
| 2010 | 165-7-4 | Israel, United States,
Australia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau |
At the regional level the March 2002 Arab League
summit in Beirut unanimously put forth a peace initiative echoing the U.N.
consensus, which it has subsequently reaffirmed (most recently at the March
2009 Arab League summit in Doha), while all 57 members of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC), including Iran, “adopted the Arab peace
initiative to resolve the issue of Palestine and the Middle East ... and decided
to use all possible means in order to explain and clarify the full implications
of this initiative and win international support for its implementation.” (47)
In the hands of propagandists for Israel this fact gets transmuted into “all 57
members of the OIC are virulently hostile to Israel.” (48) The Arab League
initiative commits it not just to recognize Israel but also to “establish normal
relations” once Israel implements the consensus terms for a comprehensive
peace.
In 2002 Israel started building a physical barrier
that encroached deeply into the West Bank and took a sinuous path incorporating
the large settlement blocks. The U.N. General Assembly requested that the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) clarify the “legal consequences arising
from the construction of the wall being built by Israel.” In 2004 the ICJ
rendered its landmark advisory opinion, which, in the course of ruling the wall
illegal, also reiterated the juridical framework for resolving the conflict. (49)
It inventoried the “rules and principles of international law which are
relevant in assessing the legality of the measures taken by Israel”: (1) “No
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be
recognized as legal”; (2) “the policy and practices of Israel in establishing
settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967” have
“no legal validity.” In its subsequent deliberations on “whether the
construction of the wall has violated those rules and principles,” the ICJ
found that:
Both the General Assembly and the Security Council
have referred, with regard to Palestine, to the customary rule of “the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by war”.... It is on this same basis that the
[Security] Council has several times condemned the measures taken by Israel to
change the status of Jerusalem.
...
As regards the principle of the right of peoples to
self-determination, ... the existence of a “Palestinian people” is no longer in
issue.
...
[Its] rights include the right to self-determination....
The Court concludes that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of
international law.
Not one of the 15 judges sitting on the ICJ
registered dissent from these basic principles and findings. It can scarcely be
said however that they evinced prejudice against Israel, or that it was a
“kangaroo court,” as Harvard law professor Alan M. Dershowitz alleged. (50)
Several of the judges, although voting with the majority, expressed profound
sympathy for Israel in their respective separate opinions. If the judges were nearly
of one mind in their final determination, this consensus sprang not from
collective prejudice but from the factual situation: the uncontroversial nature
of the legal principles at stake and Israel’s unambiguous breach of them. Even
the judge who voted against the 14-person majority condemning Israel’s
construction of the wall, Thomas Buergenthal from the U.S., was at pains to
stress that there was “much” in the advisory opinion “with which I agree.” On
the crucial question of Israeli settlements he stated: “Paragraph 6 of Article
49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention ... does not admit for exception on grounds
of military or security exigencies. It provides that ‘the Occupying Power shall
not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population in the territory it
occupies.’ I agree that this provision applies to the Israeli settlements in
the West Bank and that their existence violates Article 49, paragraph 6.”
A broad international consensus also exists upholding
the Palestinian “right of return.” It has already been shown that the annual
United Nations resolution, supported overwhelmingly by member States, calls for
a settlement of the refugee question on the basis of resolution 194, which
“resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace
with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,
and that compensation should be paid for property of those choosing not to
return.” (51) In addition, respected human rights organizations “urge Israel to
recognize the right to return for those Palestinians, and their descendants,
who fled from territory that is now within the State of Israel, and who have
maintained appropriate links with that territory” (Human Rights Watch), and
“call for Palestinians who fled or were expelled from Israel, the West Bank or
Gaza Strip, along with those of their descendants who have maintained genuine links
with the area, to be able to exercise their right to return” (Amnesty
International). (52) It will be noticed at this point that on all of the
allegedly controversial final status issues of the “peace process”—borders, settlements,
East Jerusalem, refugees— in actuality a broad consensus already exists and on each
of these issues Israel’s position is overwhelmingly rejected by the most
representative political body in the international community as well as the
most authoritative judicial body and human rights organizations in the world.
It is acknowledged on all sides that the Palestinian Authority
has not only accepted the terms of the global consensus but also expressed
willingness to make significant concessions going beyond it. (53) But what
about Hamas, which currently governs Gaza? A recent study by a U.S. government agency
concluded that Hamas “has been carefully and consciously adjusting its
political program for years and has sent repeated signals that it is ready to
begin a process of coexisting with Israel.” (54) Khalid Mishal, the head of
Hamas’s politburo, stated in a March 2008 interview, for example, that “most
Palestinian forces, including Hamas, accept a state on the 1967 borders.” (55)
Even right after the Gaza invasion Mishal reiterated that “the objective
remains the constitution of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its
capital, the return of the Israelis to the pre-67 borders and the right of
return of our refugees.” (56) In a complementary formulation Mishal told Jimmy Carter
in 2006 (and later reaffirmed in a Damascus press conference) that “Hamas
agreed to accept any peace agreement negotiated between the leaders of the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization] and Israel provided it is subsequently approved
by Palestinians in a referendum or by a democratically elected government.” (57)
From the mid-1990s onward Hamas “rarely, if at all” adverted
to its notoriously anti-Semitic charter and now “no longer cites or refers” to
it. (58) Israeli officials knew full well before they attacked Gaza that
despite the charter a diplomatic settlement could have been reached with Hamas.
“The Hamas leadership has recognized that its ideological goal is not attainable
and will not be in the foreseeable future,” former Mossad head Ephraim Levy
observed. “They are ready and willing to see the establishment of a Palestinian
state in the temporary borders of 1967.... They know that the moment a
Palestinian state is established with their cooperation, they will be obligated
to change the rules of the game: They will have to adopt a path that could lead
them far from their original ideological goals.” (59)
In recent times Israelis (and influential U.S. officials)
have demanded that Palestinians acquiesce not only in a two-state settlement
but also in the “legitimacy of Zionism and Israel,” “Israel’s Jewishness,” and
Israel being a “Jewish state.” (60) In June 2009 Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu beseeched Palestinians to “recognize the right of the Jewish people
to a state of their own in this land,” and in his September 2009 appearance at
the United Nations, he implored Palestinians “to finally do what they have
refused to do for 62 years: Say yes to a Jewish state.” (61)
Israel’s quarrel, however, appears to be not with
Palestinians but international law. The terms of the international consensus for
resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict do not require Palestinians’
recognition of the legitimacy of Zionism and the state of Israel. Indeed,
according to a prominent scholar of the question, even Israel’s admission to
the United Nations did “not confer political legitimacy... or remove the
defects in the original title of Israel. The meaning of the Balfour
Declaration, the validity of the Partition Plan approved in resolution 181
(II), and the moral basis of the State of Israel are still a real cause for
debate,” although—the caveat is critical—“this debate does not affect Israel’s
position as a State in the international community, entitled to the benefits
and subject to the burdens of international law.” (62) Nonetheless, according
to Netanyahu, Palestinians must recognize “Israel as the national state of the Jewish
People” because “in 1947 David Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary, and I quote, ‘the
state to be established will be ... a state for the Jews, for the Jewish
people.’” (63) To exercise their right of self-determination must Palestinians
now affirm Ben-Gurion’s diary entries?
True, the 1947 U.N. Partition Resolution divided
Palestine into what it designated “independent Arab and Jewish states.” (64)
However, the resolution stipulated that the prospective states must guarantee
“all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic
and religious matters,” and prohibited “discrimination of any kind ... on the
ground of race, religion, language or sex.” (65) If Israel wants to lean on this
resolution to exact Palestinian recognition of it as a Jewish state, then it
would perforce also have to repeal all discriminatory legislation,
which—according to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel—“has existed as
long as the State itself” while “this past year [2009] has seen a wave of
racist statements, bills and initiatives threatening the freedom of political
activity of the Arab minority” and “some of the Arab minority’s most basic
rights—to equality, education and employment—as well as their very
citizenship.” (66) Although Netanyahu proclaims that non-Jewish Israelis enjoy
“equal rights,” (67) polls show that fully half the Israeli public believes
that Israeli Jews and Arabs are not treated equally and that Israeli Arabs suffer
from discrimination. (68)
Dennis Ross, the Middle East point man in the Clinton
and Obama administrations, grouses that even those moderate Arab states that
are “prepared to accept Israel’s existence ... deny the Zionist enterprise any
moral legitimacy. For them Israel exists as a fact, not a right.” (69) Yet, it
might be recalled that although Mahatma Gandhi recognized the division of India
as an “accomplished fact” that he was “forced to accept,” he adamantly refused
to “believe in” a distinct Muslim nationalism and India’s “artificial
partition”; in fact right up to his death he held the British partition of
India to be “poison” and the notion of Pakistan to be a “sin.” (70) One is
hard-pressed to make out a distinction on this point between Gandhi’s stance
and that of moderate Arab states—or even of Hamas, which “draws a very clear
distinction between Israel’s right to exist, which it consistently denies, and
the fact of its existence, and it has
stated explicitly that it accepts the existence of Israel as a fait accompli,” an “existing reality,”
and an “established fact.” (71) It is also hard to fathom on what legal or
moral principle Israel’s “Jewishness” must be recognized or why it must be
recognized as a “Jewish state” when one in four Israeli citizens is not Jewish.
It seems that in order to obtain their own rights Palestinians living outside
Israel’s borders are obliged to forfeit the claims to Israeli citizenship and
identity of their brethren living inside Israel. Furthermore, when Israel
signed peace treaties with President Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1979 and King
Hussein of Jordan in 1994 neither instrument recognized Israel’s legitimacy or
Jewishness. (72) Nonetheless Netanyahu recently hailed their “brave leadership”
as auspicious precedents for the “peace process.” (73) So why does he insist
that Palestinian leaders validate Israel as a “Jewish state”?
It is also passing strange that Palestinians are
allegedly obliged to give Israel unqualified recognition as a “Jewish state”
when even former Israeli Supreme Court president Aharon Barak acknowledges that
its signification remains elusive: “We still have not worked out properly the
interrelationship between the Jewishness of the state and the fact that it is a
state of all its citizens.” (74) According to Netanyahu, a “Jewish state” signifies
that whereas non-Jewish citizens of Israel are guaranteed “civil rights,” only
Jews enjoy “national rights.” (75) But if Palestinians are denied such rights, then Israel is in breach not only
of the Partition Resolution (76) but also of Ben-Gurion’s own avowals to the
United Nations. In 1947 he was interrogated on the meaning of a “Jewish state”
by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), the majority of
which subsequently recommended partitioning Palestine. It was “simply a State
where the majority of the people are Jews,” Ben-Gurion replied, “not a State
where a Jew has in any way, any privilege more than anyone else ... we will fight
any privilege accorded to a Jew because he is a Jew.” And again: “We cannot
conceive that in a State where we are ... the majority of the country, there
should be the slightest discrimination between a Jew and a non-Jew.” (77)
Let’s return now to the events leading up to the
December 2008 Gaza invasion. After having rejected Hamas’s ceasefire proposals
for months, Israel finally agreed to them in June 2008. (78) Hamas was “careful
to maintain the ceasefire,” a semiofficial Israeli publication reported,
despite Israel’s reneging on the crucial quid
pro quo that it substantially lift the economic blockade of Gaza. “The lull
was sporadically violated by rocket and mortar shell fire, carried out by rogue
terrorist organizations,” the Israeli source continued. “At the same time, the [Hamas]
movement tried to enforce the terms of the arrangement on the other terrorist
organizations and to prevent them from violating it.” (79) The Islamic movement
had on this occasion stood by its word, making it a credible negotiating partner.
And unlike the hapless Palestinian Authority, which was doing Israel’s bidding
but getting no returns, Hamas appeared to extract concessions from Israel. As a
result, Hamas’s stature among Palestinians was further enhanced.
Hamas’s acceptance of the two-state settlement and
the ceasefire proved a daunting challenge for Israel. It could no longer justify
shunning Hamas; it would be only a matter of time before the Europeans renewed
dialogue and relations with the organization. The prospect of an incoming U.S.
administration negotiating with Iran and Hamas, and moving closer to the international
consensus for settling the Israel-Palestine conflict, which some U.S.
policymakers now advocated, (80) would have further highlighted Israel’s
intransigence. Thus, in its 2008 annual assessment, the Jewish People Policy
Planning Institute, headquartered in Jerusalem and chaired by Dennis Ross,
cautioned: “The advent of the new administration in the U.S. could be
accompanied by an overall political reassessment ... the Iran issue could come
to be viewed as the key to the stabilization of the Middle East, and ... a
strategy seeking a comprehensive ‘regional deal’ may be devised, which would
include a relatively aggressive effort to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict.” (81)
In an alternative scenario, speculated on by Hezbollah’s Nasrallah, the
incoming American administration planned to convene an international peace
conference of “Americans, Israelis, Europeans and so-called Arab moderates” to
impose a settlement. The one obstacle was “Palestinian resistance and the Hamas
government in Gaza,” and “getting rid of this stumbling block is ... the true
goal of the war.” (82) In either case Israel needed to provoke Hamas into
resuming its attacks, and then radicalize or destroy it, thereby eliminating it
as a legitimate negotiating partner or as an obstacle to a settlement on
Israel’s terms.
It was not the first time Israel had confronted such
a threat—an Arab League peace initiative, tentative Palestinian support for a two-state
settlement, and a Palestinian ceasefire— and not the first time it had embarked
on provocation and war to overcome it. “By the late 1970s,” Israeli scholars
Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela recall, “the two-state solution had won the support
of the Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories as well as that of
most Arab states and other members of the international community.” (83) In
addition PLO leaders headquartered in Lebanon strictly adhered to a ceasefire
with Israel negotiated in July 1981. (84) In August 1981 Saudi Arabia unveiled,
and the Arab League subsequently approved, a peace plan based on the two-state
settlement. (85)
Reacting to these developments Israel stepped up
preparations in September 1981 to destroy the PLO. (86) In his analysis Their
Fear, and Ours 51 of the build-up to the 1982 Lebanon War, Israeli strategic
analyst Avner Yaniv reported that PLO leader Yasser Arafat was contemplating a
historic compromise with the “Zionist state,” whereas “all Israeli cabinets
since 1967” as well as “leading mainstream doves” opposed a Palestinian state.
Fearing diplomatic pressures Israel maneuvered to sabotage the two-state settlement
by eliminating the PLO as a potential negotiating partner. It conducted
punitive military raids “deliberately out of proportion” against “Palestinian
and Lebanese civilians” in order to weaken “PLO moderates,” strengthen the hand
of Arafat’s “radical rivals,” and guarantee the PLO’s “inflexibility.”
Israel eventually had to choose between a pair of
stark options: “a political move leading to a historic compromise with the PLO,
or preemptive military action against it.” To fend off Arafat’s “peace offensive”—
Yaniv’s telling phrase—Israel embarked on military action in June 1982. The
Israeli invasion “had been preceded by more than a year of effective ceasefire with
the PLO,” but after murderous Israeli provocations, the last of which left as
many as 200 civilians dead (including 60 occupants of a Palestinian children’s
hospital), the PLO finally retaliated, causing a single Israeli casualty.
Although Israel used the PLO’s resumption of attacks on northern Israel as the
broad pretext for its invasion (“Operation Peace in the Galilee”), Yaniv concluded
that the “raison d’être of the entire
operation” was “destroying the PLO as a political force capable of claiming a Palestinian
state on the West Bank.” (87)
Fast forward to the present. In early December 2008 Israeli
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni stated that although Israel wanted to create a
temporary period of calm with Hamas, an extended truce “harms the Israeli
strategic goal, empowers Hamas, and gives the impression that Israel recognizes
the movement.” (88) Translation: a protracted ceasefire that spotlighted
Hamas’s pragmatism in word and deed and that consequently brought to bear
international pressure on Israel to negotiate a diplomatic settlement would
undermine Israel’s strategic goal of retaining the valuable parts of the West
Bank. Israel had resolved to attack Hamas as far back as March 2007 and only acquiesced
in the June 2008 truce because “the Israeli army needed time to prepare.” (89)
Once all the pieces were in place Israel needed only
a pretext to abort the ceasefire. A careful study covering the period 2000–2008
demonstrated that “overwhelmingly” it was “Israel that kills first after
conflict pauses.” (90) After the Gaza redeployment in late 2005 it was Israel
that broke the de facto truce with
Hamas that began in April 2005, and after Hamas won the 2006 elections it was
Israel that persisted in its illegal practice of “targeted assassinations”
despite a Hamas ceasefire. (91) Again on 4 November 2008, while the American public
and media were riveted to the election-day returns, Israel broke the ceasefire
by killing Palestinian militants on the spurious pretext of preempting a Hamas
raid, knowing full well that it would provoke Hamas into hitting back. (92) “A ceasefire
agreed in June between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza held for
four-and-a-half months,” Amnesty observed in its annual report, “but broke down
after Israeli forces killed six Palestinian militants in air strikes and other attacks
on 4 November.” (93)
The predictable sequel to Israel’s attack was that
Hamas resumed its rocket attacks—“in retaliation,” as the Israeli Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center wrote. (94) Still, Hamas was “interested in
renewing the relative calm with Israel,” according to Israeli internal security
chief Yuval Diskin, and Hamas would have accepted a “bargain” in which it “would
halt the fire in exchange for easing of ... Israeli policies [that] have kept a
choke hold on the economy of the Strip,” according to former IDF commander in
Gaza Shmuel Zakai. (95) But Israel tightened yet again the illegal economic
blockade of Gaza while demanding a unilateral and unconditional ceasefire by Hamas.
Even before Israel intensified the blockade former U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights Mary Robinson decried its effects: Gaza’s “whole civilization has
been destroyed, I’m not exaggerating.” (96) By December 2008 Israel had brought
Gaza’s infrastructure “to the brink of collapse,” according to an Israeli human
rights organization. (97) “Food, medicine, fuel, parts for water and sanitation
systems, fertilizer, plastic sheeting, phones, paper, glue, shoes and even
teacups are no longer getting through in sufficient quantities or at all,”
Harvard political economist Sara Roy reported. “The breakdown of an entire society
is happening in front of us, but there is little international response beyond
U.N. warnings which are ignored.” (98)
If Hamas had not reacted after the 4 November
killings, Israel would almost certainly have ratcheted up its provocations, just
as it did in the lead-up to the 1982 war, until restraint became politically
untenable for Hamas. In any event, faced with the prospect of an asphyxiating
Israeli blockade even if it ceased firing rockets, forced to choose between
“starvation and fighting,” (99) Hamas opted for resistance, albeit largely
symbolic. “You cannot just land blows, leave the Palestinians in Gaza in the
economic distress they’re in, and expect that Hamas will just sit around and do
nothing,” the former IDF commander in Gaza observed. (100) “Our modest,
home-made rockets,” Hamas leader Khalid Mishal wrote in an open letter during
the invasion, “are our cry of protest to the world.” (101) But Israel could now
enter a plea of self-defense to its willfully gullible Western patrons as it
embarked on yet another murderous invasion to foil yet another Palestinian
peace offensive. Apart from minor adaptations in the script—the bogey was not
“PLO terrorism” but “Hamas terrorism,” the pretext was not shelling in the
north but rocket fire in the south—the 2008 reprise stayed remarkably faithful
to the 1982 original, derailing a functioning ceasefire and preempting a
diplomatic settlement of the conflict. (102)
3/ WHITEWASH
Recognizing that images of dead civilians and massive
destruction in Gaza had flooded the world media during the invasion, Israel and
its defenders set out to win the spin wars. Shortly after a ceasefire went into
effect on 18 January 2009, Anthony H. Cordesman published a report titled The “Gaza War”: A strategic analysis. (1)
Because Cordesman is an influential military analyst in academia, the political
establishment, and the media, (2) and his study in effect synthesizes Israel’s
makeshift rebuttals to criticism of the invasion, it merits close scrutiny.
Cordesman reached the remarkable conclusion that “Israel did not violate the
laws of war.” (3) His analysis was based on “briefings in Israel during and
immediately after the fighting made possible by a visit sponsored by Project
Interchange, and using day-to-day reporting issued by the Israeli Defense
Spokesman.” (4) Cordesman omitted mention that Project Interchange is an
institute of the fanatically “pro”-Israel American Jewish Committee.
Meanwhile, apart from adverse media coverage Israel
had to cope with a mountain of human rights reports condemning its crimes in
Gaza that began to accumulate after the ceasefire. Because of the sheer number
of them, the wide array of reputable organizations issuing them, and the
uniformity of their major conclusions, these reports could not easily be
dismissed. (5) Although the reports made significant use of Palestinian
witnesses, these testimonies also could not easily be dismissed as Hamas-inspired
propaganda or tainted by Hamas intimidation because “delegates who visited Gaza
during and after Operation ‘Cast Lead,’ as on many other occasions in recent
years, were able to carry out their investigations unhindered and people often
voiced criticisms of Hamas’s conduct, including rocket attacks.” (6)
The proliferating denunciations eventually compelled
the Israeli government itself to issue a “factual and legal” defense of “the
operation in Gaza.” It alleged that these human rights reports “too often”
amounted to a “rush to judgment” because they were published “within a matter
of hours, days or weeks” after the invasion. (7) In fact most of the reports
came out months later. To be sure, Israel was not wholly dismissive of human rights
reports. It did cite one that condemned Hamas suicide bombings. (8)
Rejecting the main thrust of the reports, the Israeli
brief claimed that “Israel took extensive measures to comply with its
obligations under international law” and that the Israel Defense Forces’
(IDF’s) “mode of operation reflected the extensive training of IDF soldiers to
respect the obligations imposed under international law.” (9) The critical
evidence adduced in the brief consisted largely of testimonies extracted from
Palestinian detainees during “interrogation.” It would surely be querulous to
cast doubt on such confessions just because, according to the Goldstone Report, Palestinian detainees rounded up
during the Gaza invasion were “subjected ... to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment throughout their ordeal in order to terrorize, intimidate and
humiliate them. The men were made to strip, sometimes naked, at different
stages of their detention. All the men were handcuffed in a most painful manner
and blindfolded, increasing their sense of fear and helplessness”; “Men, women
and children were held close to artillery and tank positions, where constant
shelling and firing was taking place, thus not only exposing them to danger,
but increasing their fear and terror. This was deliberate.” Detainees were “subjected
to beatings and other physical abuse that amounts to torture”; “used as human
shields”; subjected to “methods of interrogation [that] amounted not only to
torture ... but also to physical and moral coercion of civilians to obtain
information”; and “subjected to torture, maltreatment and foul conditions in the
prisons.” (10)
Another unimpeachable source for the Israeli brief
was reportage from the Italian journalist Lorenzo Cremonesi. (11) The brief did
not however cite his most spectacular scoop that a total of “not more than
500–600” Palestinians died in Gaza during the invasion—which meant that not
only had human rights organizations grossly exaggerated the Palestinian death toll
but Israel itself had as well. (12) Other authoritative sources cited by the
Israeli brief included an “Internet user” and “a participant on a Fatah
Internet forum.” (13)
In his defense of Israel, Cordesman put full faith in
the pronouncements of Israeli officialdom. But in recent years respected
Israeli analysts have invested less confidence in government sources. “The
state authorities, including the defense establishment and its branches,” Uzi
Benziman observed in Haaretz, “have
acquired for themselves a shady reputation when it comes to their credibility.”
The “official communiqués published by the IDF have progressively liberated
themselves from the constraints of truth,” B. Michael wrote in Yediot Ahronot, and the “heart of the
power structure”—police, army, intelligence—has been infected by a “culture of
lying.” (14) During the Gaza invasion Israel was repeatedly caught lying about,
among many other things, its use of white phosphorus. (15) On 7 January 2009 an
IDF spokesman informed CNN, “I can tell you with certainty that white
phosphorus is absolutely not being used,” and on 13 January 2009 IDF Chief of
Staff Gabi Ashkenazi told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, “The
IDF acts only in accordance with what is permitted by international law and
does not use white phosphorus.” (16) Even after numerous human rights
organizations irrefutably documented Israel’s illegal use of white phosphorus,
an Israeli “military inquiry” persisted in its prevarications. (17) Recalling
Israel’s train of lies during both the 2006 Lebanon War and the Gaza invasion,
a former senior Pentagon analyst and current senior military analyst with Human
Rights Watch (HRW) rhetorically asked, “How can anyone trust the Israeli
military?” (18)
A chunk of Cordesman’s “strategic analysis” consisted
of reproducing verbatim the daily press releases of the Israeli air force and
army spokespersons, which he then dubbed “chronologies” of the war. He alleged
that these statements offer “considerable insight” into what happened. (19)
Some of these statements provided so much insight that he reproduced them multiple
times. For example he repeatedly recycled versions of each of these statements:
“The IDF will continue operating against terror operatives and anyone involved,
including those sponsoring and hosting terrorists, in addition to those that
send innocent women and children to be used as human shields”; “The IDF will
not hesitate to strike those involved both directly and indirectly in attacks
against the citizens of the State of Israel”; “The IDF will continue to operate
against Hamas terror infrastructure in the Gaza Strip according to plans in
order to reduce the rocket fire on the south of Israel”; “IDF Infantry Corps,
Armored Corps, Engineering Corps, Artillery Corps and Intelligence Corps forces
continued to operate during the night against Hamas terrorist infrastructure
throughout the Gaza Strip.” (20) Much of Cordesman’s report was, in other
words, simply a repackaging of the Israeli military’s PR materials.
Thus Cordesman reproduced, without comment, the 30 December
2008 Israeli press release claiming that Israel hit “a vehicle transporting a
stockpile of Grad missiles,” (21) although a B’Tselem investigation at the time
found that they were almost certainly oxygen canisters. (22) Subsequent
investigations confirmed, and the IDF eventually conceded, B’Tselem’s finding. Eight
civilians were killed in this precision drone-missile attack on the vehicle
even though, according to HRW, “the drone’s advanced imaging equipment should
have enabled the drone operator to determine the nature of the objects under
surveillance. The video posted online by the IDF indicates that this was the
case.” (23) Cordesman alleged that official Israeli data are “far more
credible” than non-Israeli data, such as that from U.N. sources, one reason
being that “many Israelis feel that such U.N. sources are strongly biased in
favor of the Palestinians.” (24) Following this logic, Israel’s allegation that
two-thirds of those killed in Gaza were Hamas fighters should be credited (25)—just
as Israel’s claim that 60 percent of those killed in the 2006 Lebanon War were
Hezbollah fighters should be credited, (26) even if all independent sources put
the figure at closer to 20 percent. (27)
Although Cordesman’s report exculpated Israel of any
wrongdoing, he entered the “key caveat” that he was not passing a “legal or
moral” judgment on Israel’s conduct and that “analysts without training in the
complex laws of war” should not render such judgments. (28) Cordesman’s
exculpation and caveat did not sit well together. He averred that neither the
“laws of war” nor “historical precedents” barred “Israel’s use of massive amounts
of force,” while he cautioned that he would not pass legal or moral judgment on
the “issue of proportionality.” (29) In essence, he denied absolving Israel
even as he clearly did so. Cordesman also alleged that the laws of war were “often
difficult or impossible to apply.” (30) If so, whence his certainty that
“Israel did not violate the laws of war”? He further alleged that the laws of
war were biased because they “do not bind or restrain non-state actors like
Hamas.” (31) It is not immediately apparent, however, that the laws of war have
bound or restrained Israel either. And in fact “the laws of war ... favor conventional
over unconventional forces in asymmetric warfare,” according to Harvard law
professor Duncan Kennedy. (32) For instance, state-of-the-art technology
readily available only to conventional armies effectively sets the standard for
whether or not a weapon is “discriminate” and its use therefore legal.
Cordesman trumpeted the exceptional care Israel took during
the invasion to limit civilian casualties and damage to civilian
infrastructure. He alleged that “every aspect” of the Israeli air force’s
targeting plan “was based on a detailed target analysis that explicitly
evaluated the risk to civilians and the location of sensitive sites like
schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, and other holy sites,” while the
“smallest possible weapon” coupled with precision intelligence and guidance systems
were used to “deconflict military targeting from damage to civilian
facilities.” (33) And again: “Israel did plan its air and air-land campaigns in
ways that clearly discriminated between military and civilian targets and that
were intended to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage.” (34) He knew
these things because that is what his Israeli hosts told him and that is what
the Israeli press releases repeatedly stated.
In its own brief, The
Operation in Gaza, the Israeli government alleged that Israeli forces
directed their attacks “solely against military objectives” and endeavored to ensure
that “civilians and civilian objects would not be harmed”; that “where
incidental damage to civilians or civilian property could not be avoided, the
IDF made extraordinary efforts to ensure that it would not be excessive”; that
the IDF “used the least destructive munitions possible to achieve legitimate
military objectives” as well as “sophisticated precision weapons to minimize
the harm to civilians”; and that the IDF “carefully checked and cross-checked
targets ... to make sure they were being used for combat or terrorist
activities, and not instead solely for civilian use.” (35)
Based on what journalists and human rights
organizations found, and what Israeli soldiers in the field testified, however,
a radically different picture comes into relief. Because “Israelis would have
trouble accepting heavy Israel Defense Forces losses,” Haaretz reported, the army resorted to “overwhelming firepower....
The lives of our soldiers take precedence, the commanders were told in briefings.”
The General Staff anticipated before the onslaught that “600–800 Palestinian
civilians” would be killed. (36) “We’re going to war,” a company commander told
his soldiers before the attack. “I want aggressiveness— if there’s someone
suspicious on the upper floor of a house, we’ll shell it. If we have suspicions
about a house, we’ll take it down.... There will be no hesitation.” (37) “When
we suspect that a Palestinian fighter is hiding in a house, we shoot it with a
missile and then with two tank shells, and then a bulldozer hits the wall,” a
senior IDF officer told Haaretz. “It
causes damage but it prevents the loss of life among soldiers.” (38)
Whereas the official Israeli brief alleged that “the
protection of IDF troops did not override all other factors,” (39) soldiers recalled
after the invasion how the IDF “used a huge amount of firepower and killed a
huge number of people along the way, so that we wouldn’t get hurt and they
wouldn’t fire on us” (squad commander); “We were told: ‘any sign of danger,
open up with massive fire’” (member of a reconnaissance company); “We shot at
anything that moved” (Golani Brigade fighter); “Despite the fact that no one fired
on us, the firing and demolitions continued incessantly” (gunner in a tank
crew); “Not a hair will fall off a soldier of mine, and I am not willing to
allow a soldier of mine to risk himself by hesitating. If you are not
sure—shoot” (soldier recalling his battalion commander’s order); “If you face an
area that is hidden by a building—you take down the building. Questions such as
‘who lives in that building[?]’ are not asked” (soldier recalling his brigade
commander’s order); “If the deputy battalion commander thought a house looked
suspect, we’d blow it away. If the infantrymen didn’t like the looks of that
house—we’d shoot” (unidentified soldier); “As for rules of engagement, the
army’s working assumption was that the whole area would be devoid of civilians....
Anyone there, as far as the army was concerned, was to be killed” (unidentified
soldier). (40) “Essentially, a person only need[ed] to be in a ‘problematic’ location,”
a Haaretz reporter found, “in
circumstances that can broadly be seen as suspicious, for him to be
‘incriminated’ and in effect sentenced to death.” (41) A year after the
invasion an officer who served at a brigade headquarters recalled that IDF
policy amounted to ensuring “literally zero risk to the soldiers,” while a
combatant remembered a meeting with his brigade commander and others where it
was conveyed that “if you see any signs of movement at all you shoot. This is
essentially the rules of engagement.” (42)
Beyond the civilian casualties, Israel destroyed or
damaged 58,000 homes (6,300 were completely destroyed or sustained severe
damage), 280 schools and kindergartens (18 schools were completely destroyed
and six university buildings were razed to the ground), 1,500 factories and
workshops (including 22 of Gaza’s 29 ready-mix concrete factories), several buildings
housing Palestinian and foreign media (two journalists were killed while
working, four others were also killed), electrical, water and sewage
installations (more than one million Gazans were left without power during the
invasion and a half million were cut off from running water), 190 greenhouse
complexes, 80 percent of agricultural crops, and nearly one-fifth of cultivated
land. (43) It is nonetheless alleged that Israel took every precaution not to
damage civilian objects. Indeed, who can doubt that the IDF “carefully checked
and cross-checked targets ... to make sure they were being used for combat or
terrorist activities” (Israeli brief) when it launched an “intentional and
precise” attack destroying the “only one of Gaza’s three flour mills still
operating” which produced “the Whitewash 63 most basic staple ingredient of the
local diet”?(44) Who can doubt that the IDF “clearly discriminated between
military and civilian targets” (Cordesman) when it “systematically and
deliberately” “flattened” a large chicken farm that supplied 10 percent of the
Gaza egg market “and 65,000 chickens were crushed to death or buried alive”? (45)
The United Nations Development Program reported that “over 4,000 cattle, sheep
and goats and more than one million birds and chickens (broilers and egg layers)
were killed during Operation Cast Lead, with evidence of livestock being the
direct target of Israeli machine guns.” (46) After the invasion was over Israel
alleged that the death and destruction appeared indefensible only because
“there is a limit to the amount of intelligence it can share with commissions of
inquiry without compromising operational capabilities and intelligence
sources.” (47) If the world only knew what was in those chickens ... (48) The
only reported penalty Israel imposed for unlawful property destruction during
the invasion was an unknown disciplinary measure taken against one soldier. (49)
Some 600,000 tons of rubble were left after Israel’s
“mega display of military might” (IDF General Staff officer). (50) The total direct
cost of the damage to Gaza’s civilian infrastructure was estimated at $660–900
million, while total losses from the destruction and disruption of economic
life during the invasion were put at $3–3.5 billion. (51) By comparison Hamas
rocket attacks on Israel damaged “several civilian homes and other structures...
, one was almost completely destroyed,” (52) while total damages came to $15
million. (53)
In postinvasion testimonies IDF soldiers recalled the
macabre scenes of destruction in Gaza: “We didn’t see a single house that
remained intact.... Nothing much was left in our designated area. It looked
awful, like in those World War II films where nothing remained. A totally
destroyed city”; “We demolished a lot. There were people who had been in Gaza
for two days constantly demolishing one house after the other, and we’re
talking about a whole battalion”; “One night they saw a terrorist and he
disappeared so they decided he’d gone into a tunnel, so they brought a D-9
[bulldozer] and razed the whole orchard”; “There was a point where D-9s were
razing areas. It was amazing. At first you go in and see lots of houses. A week
later, after the razing, you see the horizon further away, almost to the sea”;
“The amount of destruction there was incredible. You drive around those
neighborhoods, and can’t identify a thing. Not one stone left standing over
another. You see plenty of fields, hothouses, orchards, everything devastated.
Totally ruined. It’s terrible. It’s surreal.” (54) One veteran of the invasion designed
a T-shirt depicting a King Kong–like soldier clenching a mosque while glowering
over a city under attack, and bearing the slogan “If you believe it can be fixed,
then believe it can be destroyed!” “I was in Gaza,” he elaborated, “and they kept
emphasizing that the object of the operation was to wreak destruction on the
infrastructure.” (55)
The Israeli brief alleged that its “overall use of
force against Hamas during the Gaza Operation was ... proportional to the
threat posed by Hamas.” (56) The postinvasion testimonies of Israeli soldiers
vividly depicted what such “proportional” use of force felt like: “This was firepower such as I had never known ... there
were blasts all the time ... the earth was constantly shaking”; “On the ground
you hear these thunderous blasts all day long. I mean, not just tank shelling,
which was a tune we’d long gotten used to, but blasts that actually rock the outpost,
to the extent that some of us were ordered out of the house we were quartered
in for fear it would collapse.” (57)
“Much of the destruction” of civilian buildings and infrastructure,
according to Amnesty, “was wanton and resulted from deliberate and unnecessary
demolition of property, direct attacks on civilian objects and indiscriminate attacks
Whitewash 65 that failed to distinguish between legitimate military targets and
civilian objects.” (58) The timing and pace of the devastation buttressed
Amnesty’s finding and further undermined official Israeli explanations. Fully
90 percent of the destruction of civilian buildings and
infrastructure—including the destruction of juice, ice cream, biscuit, and
Pepsi-Cola factories—reportedly took place in the last days of the invasion in
areas fully controlled by the IDF where it met limited resistance, and much of
the destruction was wrought by Israeli troops as they withdrew. (59) Using
satellite imagery “taken at intervals during the conflict,” Human Rights Watch
documented numerous cases “in which Israeli forces caused extensive destruction
of homes, factories, farms and greenhouses in areas under IDF control without
any evident military purpose. These cases occurred when there was no fighting
in these areas; in many cases, the destruction was carried out during the final
days of the campaign when an Israeli withdrawal was imminent.” For instance, in
the Izbt Abd Rabbo neighborhood the “vast majority” of the “wholesale
destruction of entire blocks of buildings” took place “after the IDF exercised
control.” (60)
The official Israeli brief alleged that “IDF orders
and directions ... stressed that all demolition operations should be carried out
in a manner that would minimize to the greatest extent possible the damage
caused to any property not used by Hamas and other terrorist organizations in
the fighting.” (61) Yet, according to the International Crisis Group, an
expanse in eastern Gaza including farms, factories, and homes was “virtually flattened,”
and according to a military expert Israel’s “deliberate and systematic”
destruction of that sector through a combination of bulldozers and antitank
mines “took at least two days of hard labor.” (62) The HRW study found that
“virtually every home, factory and orchard had been destroyed within certain
areas, apparently indicating that a plan of systematic destruction was carried
out in these locations.” (63) It might be contended that Israel targeted so
many homes because— according to an IDF spokesman whom Cordesman uncritically quotes—“Hamas
is booby-trapping every home that is abandoned by its residents.” (64) But after
the invasion this already implausible argument was fatally undermined when the
IDF itself conceded that the “scale of destruction” was legally indefensible. (65)
Still, Deputy Prime Minister Eli Yishai declared, “Even if the [Hamas] rockets
fall in an open air [sic] or to the sea, we should hit their infrastructure,
and destroy 100 homes for every rocket fired,” and a security official beamed
with pride that by “flattening buildings believed to be booby-trapped,” Israel
had broken “the DNA of urban guerrilla fighting.” (66)
Israel targeted not only civilian buildings and
infrastructure but also Gaza’s cultural inheritance. Fully 30 mosques were
destroyed and 15 more damaged during the Israeli assault. Cordesman knew that
“IDF forces almost certainly were correct in reporting that Hamas used mosques
and other sensitive sites in combat” (67) because that is what his
“chronologies” based on IDF press releases stated. It seems telling, however, that
although Israel initially alleged secondary explosions after mosques were hit,
it subsequently dropped this defense altogether while it continued to target
mosques. (68) In the Goldstone Mission’s investigation of an “intentional”
Israeli missile attack on a mosque that killed at least 15 people attending
services, it found “no evidence that this mosque was used for the storage of
weapons or any military activity by Palestinian armed groups.” (69) Israel did
not even attempt to refute this particular finding of the Mission (70) until it
came under withering criticism, when it belatedly discovered that—surprise,
surprise—the missile was “directed at two terrorist operatives standing near
the entrance to the mosque.” (71) In general the case Israel mounted to justify
its targeting of mosques didn’t cohere. It alleged that Whitewash 67 Hamas used
mosques to stash weapons, but—as the Goldstone Mission’s military expert
observed—with “abundant hideaways in the labyrinthine alleyways of Gaza,” Hamas
would have been foolhardy to “store anything in an open building like a mosque,
which had been pre-targeted and pre-registered by Israeli intelligence.” (72)
Israel also alleged that Hamas placed weapons in mosques because, on the basis
of prior experience, it “assumed that the IDF would not attack them,” but in
fact Israel had damaged or destroyed 55 mosques in Gaza between 2001 and 2008.
(73) Going one step further, Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz
alleged—alas, without evidence—that “Hamas leaders boast of” having stored
weapons in mosques. (74) Israel’s various alibis also could not account for its
systematic targeting of minarets, which, being too narrow for snipers to
ascend, had no military value. The final report of a fact-finding committee headed
by South African jurist John Dugard concluded that “mosques, and more
particularly the minarets, had been deliberately targeted on the grounds that
they symbolized Islam.” (75) Postinvasion IDF testimony confirmed the
indiscriminate targeting of mosques. (76)
Israel justified its targeting of educational
institutions on the grounds that Hamas “did in fact make use” of them. (77)
However, when challenged in a specific instance to provide proof for its
allegations, Israel conceded that its photographic evidence was from 2007. (78)
In extenuation of its attack on the Islamic University, Israel alleged that it
was the nerve center of Hamas’s “weapons research and development” and
“military terrorist activities.” One searched in vain however for evidence to
substantiate this claim. (79) It might also be wondered why “virtually all
universities sustained damages,” (80) not just the supposed terrorist hub at
Islamic University. The Goldstone Report
“did not find any information about [educational institutions’] use as a
military facility or their contribution to a military effort that might have
made them a legitimate target in the eyes of the Israeli armed forces.” (81)
The official Israeli brief alleged that, after his arrest, a Palestinian
detainee “admitted” under interrogation that “Hamas operatives frequently
carried out rocket fire from schools ... precisely because they knew that
Israeli jets would not fire on schools.” (82) Why would he make such a
confession when, over and over again, Israeli weaponry did precisely that?
Although the devastation of Gaza was wanton, there
was nonetheless a near-perfect synchronization of method to this madness. If,
as Israel asserted and investigators found, it possessed fine “grid maps” of
Gaza and an “intelligence gathering capacity” that “remained extremely effective”;
and if it made extensive use of state-of-the-art precision weaponry; and if “99
percent of the firing that was carried out [by the Air Force] hit targets
accurately”; and if it only once targeted a building erroneously: then, as the
Goldstone Report logically concluded,
the massive destruction Israel inflicted on Gaza’s civilian infrastructure must
have “resulted from deliberate planning and policy decisions throughout the
chain of command, down to the standard operating procedures and instructions
given to the troops on the ground.” (83) In other words, Israel was able to pinpoint
its targets on the ground and, by its own admission, could and did hit these
designated targets with pinpoint accuracy. It thus cannot be said that the
criminal wreckage resulted from mishap or from a break in the chain of command.
What happened in Gaza was meant to happen—by everyone from the soldiers in the field
who executed the orders to the officers who gave the orders to the politicians
who approved the orders. “The wholesale destruction was to a large extent
deliberate,” Amnesty similarly concluded, “and an integral part of a strategy at
different levels of the command chain, from high-ranking officials to soldiers
in the field.” (84)
In the face of this wholesale assault on Gazan
society it was still alleged that Israel sought to limit civilian casualties.
Cordesman highlighted, for example, that Israel “distributed hundreds of
thousands of leaflets and used its intelligence on cell phone networks in Gaza
to issue warnings to civilians.” (85) In its official brief the Israeli
government pointed up its “extraordinary steps to avoid harming civilians in
its Gaza Operation” and “significant efforts to minimize harm to civilians”
such as dropping “leaflets warning occupants to stay away from Hamas strongholds
and leave buildings that Hamas was using to launch attacks” and attempting “to
contact occupants by telephone, to warn of impending attacks on particular
buildings.” (86)
In reality the leaflets and phone calls “failed to
give details of the areas to be targeted,” according to human rights reports, “and
conversely which areas were safe.” Moreover, because of the extensive aerial
bombardment across the whole of the Gaza Strip, and because the borders with
Israel and Egypt were sealed, there was “nowhere for the civilian population to
have gone.” The intended or foreseeable consequence of these socalled warnings
amid the indiscriminate and sustained bombing and shelling of Gaza was to
create “a state of terror, confusion, and panic among the local population.” (87)
Interior Minister Meir Sheetrit alleged that “the army called [sic] 250,000 telephone calls to the
people to leave their houses”—causing Amnesty International to observe, “There
are barely 250,000 households in Gaza. If indeed the Israeli army called that
many families to tell them to leave their homes, this would mean that virtually
every family was told to do so.” (88) Still, deeply impressed by the quantity
of Israeli warnings, an American law professor contended in a novel
interpretative twist that these warnings should be credited even if
Palestinians could not heed them: “the law contains no requirement that the
civilian population be able to act on the warnings in order to find them effective.”
(89) Is it “effective” to post signs warning “In case of fire, use emergency
exit” if a building lacks an emergency exit?
In addition to emphasizing its prior warnings, Israel
played up its relief efforts during the invasion. The official brief alleged
that “during the Gaza Operation ... Israel ... sought to provide and facilitate
humanitarian assistance” and implemented a “far-reaching effort to ensure that
the humanitarian needs of the civilian population in Gaza were met.” (90) Lest Israeli
solicitude be doubted, Cordesman repeatedly cited Israeli press statements as
well as “Israeli Ministry of Defense claims” affirming it. (91) He also
included an unimpeachable statement from none other than Defense Minister Ehud
Barak that “we are well aware of the humanitarian concerns; we are doing and
will continue to do everything possible to provide all humanitarian needs to
the residents of Gaza.” (92)
The facts on the ground, however, looked rather different.
“U.N. agencies and humanitarian NGOs continued to carry out operations despite
extreme insecurity,” the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) observed. “In the course of the three weeks of
hostilities, five UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] staff and three
of its contractors were killed while on duty, and another 11 staff and four
contractors were injured; four incidents of aid convoys being shot at have been
reported; at least 53 United Nations buildings sustained damage.” (93) Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni’s assertion in the midst of the attack that “no
humanitarian crisis” existed in Gaza provoked a rebuke from UNRWA’s director of
operations: “We have a catastrophe unfolding in Gaza for the civilian
population.... They’re trapped, they’re traumatized, they’re terrorized.” (94)
Although entering some generic caveats acknowledging Israel’s “delays and
mistakes,” (95) Cordesman could not find the space amid the countless Israeli press
releases he cited to quote this or countless other critical statements by
relief organizations and U.N. officials. The Goldstone Report concluded that Israel “violated its obligation to allow free
passage of all consignments of medical and hospital objects, food and
clothing”; that “the amounts and types of food, medical and hospital items and
clothing [allowed in] were wholly insufficient to meet the humanitarian needs
of the population”; and that from its tightening of the blockade in June 2007
to the end of the invasion Israel prevented passage of sufficient goods “to
meet the needs of the population.” (96)
Even after the mid-January 2009 ceasefire went into effect,
Israel continued to block humanitarian assistance, including shipments of
chickpeas, dates, tea, macaroni, sweets, jam, biscuits, tomato paste,
children’s puzzles, and plastic bags to distribute food. (97) “Little of the
extensive damage [Israel] caused to homes, civilian infrastructure, public
services, farms and businesses has been repaired,” 16 respected humanitarian and
human rights organizations reported in a comprehensive study released one year after
the invasion. “This is not an accident; it is a matter of policy. The Israeli
government’s blockade ... not only forbids most Gazans from leaving or
exporting anything to the outside world, but also only permits the import of a
narrowly-restricted number of basic humanitarian goods.” The study found that
as a direct result of the continuing Israeli blockade “all kinds of
construction materials—cement, gravel, wood, pipes, glass, steel bars,
aluminum, tar—and spare parts are in desperately short supply or completely
unavailable”; “90 percent of the people of Gaza continue to suffer power cuts
of four to eight hours a day—while the rest still have no power at all”;
thousands were left “to an existence without piped water”; and there were “long
delays in or denial of entry of basic educational supplies such as textbooks
and paper,” while “children, already traumatized by the military offensive,
cannot learn and develop in these unsafe and unsanitary conditions.” (98)
Israel’s interference with humanitarian relief efforts
during the Gaza invasion was part and parcel of its broader attack on U.N.
agencies. After visiting an UNRWA building that had been set ablaze when Israel
fired white phosphorus shells at it, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said,
“I am just appalled ... it is an outrageous and totally unacceptable attack against
the United Nations.” (99) A U.N.-commissioned Board of Inquiry that
investigated assaults on multiple U.N. sites during the Gaza invasion found
Israel culpable inter alia for a “direct and intentional strike” that killed
three young men at an UNRWA school sheltering some 400 people; firing a “series
of mortar shells” that struck the immediate vicinity of an UNRWA school,
killing and injuring scores of people; a “grossly negligent” white phosphorus attack
amounting to “recklessness” on the “hub and nerve center for all UNRWA
operations in Gaza”; and a “highly negligent” white phosphorus attack amounting
to “reckless disregard” on an UNRWA school sheltering some 2,000 people,
killing two children and injuring 13. It also found that in one incident a U.N.
warehouse was damaged by a Qassam-type rocket that “had most likely been fired from
inside Gaza by Hamas or another Palestinian faction.” The Board of Inquiry
concluded that “no military activity was carried out from within United Nations
premises in any of the incidents”; that Israel “must have expected” that
Palestinians would respond to the “ongoing attacks by seeking refuge within UNRWA
premises, on the assumption that United Nations premises would be immune from attack”;
and that Israel “continued” to make false allegations that Hamas militants had been
firing from U.N. premises even “after it ought to have been known that they
were untrue.” (100) Dismissing the U.N. report as “unfair and one-sided,”
Israeli President Shimon Peres declared, “We will never accept it. It’s
outrageous.” Defense Minister Barak alleged that an internal IDF investigation
“irrefutably” belied the allegations, proving that “we have the most moral army
in the world.” (101)
In addition to impeding humanitarian relief, Israel blocked
medical assistance to Palestinians. Cordesman presented as fact the Israeli
accusation that during the invasion Hamas “prevent[ed] medical evacuation of
Palestinians to Israel,” (102) even though Hamas had no control over medical referrals
to Israel. (103) Prior to the invasion Israel deprived ailing Gazans of access
to medical care abroad and held them hostage to collaborating with Israeli
intelligence in exchange for an exit permit. (104) While the official Israeli
brief boasted that during the invasion many chronically ill patients left Gaza
for treatment abroad, (105) human rights organizations reported that Israel
created nearly insuperable obstacles to prevent these patients from accessing
such treatment. (106) (Since the Israeli siege began in 2006 nearly 300 Gazans
seeking health care have died because of the border closure.) (107) The
normally discreet International Committee of the Red Cross issued a public reprimand
to Israel after a “shocking incident” during the invasion in which Israeli
soldiers turned back a Red Cross rescue team dispatched to aid injured
Palestinians, leaving them to die. (108) Cordesman insisted that Israel
“coordinated the movement” (109) of ambulances, and the official Israeli brief
highlighted that “a special medical coordination center was set up ... which dealt
with assistance to civilians in danger and with evacuation of the wounded and
dead from areas of hostilities.” (110) Neither mentioned that “even where
coordination was arranged, soldiers reportedly fired at ambulances.” (111) At
least 258 Palestinians who died during the Gaza invasion did so after Israeli forces
obstructed medical access to them. (112)
Cordesman alleged, without any evidence beyond that provided
by Israeli press releases, that Hamas made “use of ambulances to mobilize
terrorists.” (113) As it happens, “the argument that Palestinians abused
ambulances has been raised numerous times by Israeli officials ... , although
Israel has almost never presented evidence to prove it.” (114) During the 2006
Lebanon War Israel targeted clearly marked Lebanese ambulances with missile fire,
even though, according to HRW, there was “no basis for concluding that
Hezbollah was making use of the ambulances for a military purpose.” (115) In
the course of Operation Cast Lead, direct or indirect Israeli attacks damaged or
destroyed 29 ambulances and almost half of Gaza’s 122 health facilities,
including 15 hospitals. A total of 16 medical personnel were killed and a
further 25 injured while on duty. (116)
After the invasion Physicians for Human Rights-Israel
documented Israeli attacks on medical crews, ambulances, and medical
installations, as well as “countless obstacles” that Israel created “for the rescue
teams in the field who attempted to evacuate trapped and injured persons.” It
did not find “any evidence supporting Israel’s official claim that hospitals
were used to conceal political or military personnel.” (117) An independent
team of medical experts commissioned by Physicians for Human Rights-Israel and
the Palestinian Medical Relief Society produced a supplementary report
containing copious evidence of Israel’s denial of evacuation (“a number of
patients died as a result of the delay in transportation to a medical
institution”), attacks on rescue crews (“a number of ambulance personnel told
their stories of repeated attacks on their ambulances over the last year”), and
attacks on medical facilities. The report also noted that “the patterns of injuries,
many of which were apparently caused by antipersonnel weapons, are
characterized by a high proportion of maiming and amputations, which will cause
lifelong disabilities for many.” The “underlying meaning of the attack on the
Gaza Strip,” the team of medical experts concluded, “appears to be one of
creating terror without mercy to anyone.” (118)
Whereas Israel contended that “vast amounts of ...
information, from both intelligence sources and reports from IDF forces on the
ground, show that Hamas did in fact make extensive military use of hospitals
and other medical facilities,” (119) Amnesty reported that Israeli officials
did not provide “evidence for even one such case” and Amnesty itself “found no evidence
during its on-the-ground investigation that such practices, if they did occur,
were widespread.” The Goldstone Mission “did not find any evidence to support
the allegations that hospital facilities were used by the Gaza authorities or
by Palestinian armed groups to shield military activities or that ambulances
were used to transport combatants or for other military purposes.” (120) In its
official brief Israel gave much space to defending its lethal assaults on
ambulances and medical facilities. It alleged that Hamas made “extensive use of
ambulances bearing the protective emblems of the Red Cross and Red Crescent to
transport operatives and weaponry” and “use of ambulances to ‘evacuate’
terrorists from the battlefield.” The only independent “proof” it could muster
was the article by the Italian journalist who also reported that only several
hundred Palestinians were killed during the assault on Gaza, and the testimony
of one Palestinian ambulance driver who recounted that some Hamas militants attempted
to commandeer his ambulance but did not succeed.
The Israeli brief goes so far as to allege that “the
IDF refrained from attacking medical vehicles even in cases where Hamas and
other terrorist organizations were using them for military purposes”—which
causes one to wonder why the IDF repeatedly targeted ambulances not used for
military purposes. Even Magen David Adom, Israel’s national emergency medical, disaster,
ambulance, and blood bank service, testified that “there was no use of PRCS
[Palestinian Red Crescent Society] ambulances for the transport of weapons or
ammunition.” The Israeli brief further alleged that the IDF “refrained from attacking
Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, despite Hamas’s use of an entire ground floor wing
as its headquarters during the Gaza Operation, out of concern for the inevitable
harm to civilians also present in the hospital.” Toeing the party line Benny
Morris likewise declared that “the Hamas leaders sat out the campaign in the
basement of Gaza’s Shifa Hospital, gambling—correctly— that Israel would not
bomb or storm a hospital.” The sole source in the Israeli brief for this
allegation, apart from the ubiquitous Italian reporter, was the confession of a
Palestinian detainee during “interrogation.” (121) It is again cause for wonder
why Israel did not target this hospital, where Hamas’s senior leadership was
allegedly ensconced, but did target many other Palestinian hospitals—for
example, the two top floors of Al-Quds Hospital along with its adjacent
administrative building and warehouse were completely destroyed; Al-Wafa
Hospital sustained direct hits from eight tank shells, two missiles and
thousands of bullets; the European Hospital of Khan Yunis sustained artillery damage
to its walls, water mains and electricity; the emergency room of Al-Dorah
Hospital was hit twice; and Al-Awda Hospital sustained damage from two
artillery shells that landed near the emergency room. (122) Nor can it be
argued that the IDF was returning enemy fire when these hospitals were hit
because Israel maintains that it did not target “terrorists” who launched attacks
“in the vicinity of a hospital.” (123)
To justify the magnitude of the devastation, Israel
and its defenders endeavored to depict the Gaza invasion as a genuine military
contest. Cordesman delineated in ominous detail enhanced by tables, graphs, and
figures the vast arsenal of rockets, mortars, air defense missiles, and other
weapons that Hamas allegedly manufactured and smuggled in through tunnels (including
“Iranian-made rockets” that could “strike at much of Southern Israel” and “hit
key infrastructure”), and the “spider web of prepared strong points,
underground and hidden shelters, and ambush points” Hamas allegedly
constructed. (124) He reported that according to “Israeli senior officials”
Hamas had 6,000–10,000 “core fighters.” (125) He compared the “Gaza war” with
the June 1967 war, the October 1973 war, and the summer 2006 war. (126) He
expatiated on Israel’s complex war plans and preparations, and he purported
that Israel’s victory was partly owing to its “high levels of secrecy”—as if
the outcome would have been in doubt had Israel not benefited from the element
of surprise. (127)
Similarly, in its brief the Israeli government
asserted that Hamas had “amassed an extensive armed force of more than 20,000
armed operatives in Gaza,” “obtained military supplies through a vast network
of tunnels and clandestine arms shipments from Iran and Syria,” and “acquired
advanced weaponry, developed weapons of their own, and increased the range and lethality
of their rockets.” It included evidence of the sophisticated weaponry alleged
to be found in Hamas’s arsenal, such as the photograph of an ominous-looking
“Hamas operative” in a ski mask firing a rudimentary machine gun—which is
captioned as an “anti-aircraft
machine gun.” (128)
Nonetheless, even Cordesman was forced to
acknowledge, if only indirectly, that what Israel fought was scarcely a war. He
conceded that Hamas was a “weak non-state actor” whereas Israel possessed a
massive armory of state-of-the-art weaponry; that the Israeli air force “faced
limited threats from Hamas’s primitive land-based air defense”; that “sustained
ground fighting was limited”; that the Israeli army avoided engagements where
it “would be likely to suffer” significant casualties; and that “the IDF used
night warfare for most combat operations because Hamas did not have the
technology or training to fight at night.” (129)
Israel had shown that it could fight “an air campaign
successfully in crowded urban areas,” according to Cordesman, and “an extended
land battle against a non-state actor.” (130) But its air campaign was not a
“fight” anymore than shooting fish in a barrel is a fight. As if to bring home
this analogy, he quoted a senior Israeli air force officer: “the IAF had flown
some 3,000 successful sorties over a small dense area during three weeks of fighting
without a single accident or loss”—unsurprisingly, insofar as “the planes
operated in an environment free of air defenses, enjoying complete aerial
superiority.” (131) Neither did Israel “fight” a land battle. The other side
was poorly equipped, barely present in the conflict zones, and engaged by
Israeli forces only when it could not fight back.
Not all Israelis celebrated their country’s
overwhelming victory in this non-war. “It is very dangerous for the Israel Defense
Forces to believe it won the war when there was no war,” a respected Israeli
strategic analyst warned. “In reality, not a single battle was fought during
the 22 days of fighting.” (132) The International Crisis Group reported that
Hamas “for the most part avoided direct confrontations with Israeli troops,” and
that “consequently, only a limited number of fighters were killed.” According
to a former Israeli foreign ministry official quoted by the Crisis Group,
“There was no war. Hamas sat in its bunkers and came out when it was all over,”
while one Israeli officer noted, “Not even light firearms were directed at us.
One doesn’t see [Hamas] that much, they mostly hide.” (133)
The postinvasion testimonies of IDF soldiers repeatedly
confirmed the near absence of an enemy in the field: “There was nothing there.
Ghost towns. Except for some livestock, nothing moved”; “Most of the time it
was boring. There were not really too many events”; “Some explosives are found
in a house, weapons, significant stuff like that, but no real resistance”; “I
did not see one single Arab the whole time we were there, that whole week”;
“Everyone was disappointed about not engaging anyone”; “Usually we did not see
a living soul. Except for our soldiers of course. Not a soul”; “Go ahead and ask
soldiers how often they encountered combatants in Gaza— nothing”; “There was
supposed to be a tiny resistance force upon entry, but there just wasn’t”;
“Nearly no one ran into the enemy. I know of two encounters during the whole
operation. The soldiers, too, were disappointed for not having had any encounters
with terrorists.” (134)
The Goldstone Mission noted that it “received
relatively few reports of actual crossfire between the Israeli armed forces and
Palestinian armed groups.” (135) The Palestinian resistance did not manage even
to fully disable a single Israeli tank. (136) (In this light Israel’s
allegation that Hamas had amassed “thousands” of “advanced ... anti-tank
rockets” appears farfetched.) (137) In his defense of IDF conduct during the
Gaza invasion, Hebrew University professor of philosophy and New York
University professor of law Moshe Halbertal pointed up the challenge facing an
Israeli soldier who had to “decide whether the individual standing before him
in jeans and sneakers is a combatant or not,” and rationalized the number of
Palestinian civilian deaths “under such conditions—Gaza is an extremely densely
populated area.” (138) But judging by the soldiers’ testimonies the really daunting
challenge in Gaza was not differentiating between friend and foe but
encountering any foe: no battles occurred in densely populated or, for that matter,
sparsely populated areas. In addition, most Palestinian victims “were not
caught in the crossfire of battles between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces,
nor were they shielding militants or other legitimate targets” (Amnesty). (139)
On the basis of extensive field research,
nongovernmental organizations put the total number of Palestinians killed at nearly
1,400, of whom up to four-fifths were civilians and 350 children. (140) On the
other side, total Israeli casualties amounted to ten combatants (four killed by
friendly fire) and three civilians. (141) In its official brief Israel alleged
that, were it not for its extensive warning and shelter system, “the human
casualties from Hamas’s bombardment undoubtedly would have been substantially
greater.” (142) It must be said that, were it not for the heroism of two UNRWA
employees, Palestinian casualties would also have been much higher. Hundreds of
Palestinians taking shelter in the UNRWA Headquarters Compound would have been
killed if the employees had not prevented the white phosphorus that Israel
dropped on it from reaching the fuel tanks. (143) It is also passing strange
that the Hamas rocket attacks inflicted such negligible damage on Israeli
civilian infrastructure if they were potentially so destructive. The ratio of
total Palestinians to Israelis killed was more than 100:1, and of Palestinian to
Israeli civilians killed as high as 400:1. Still, Israeli philosopher of
professional ethics Asa Kasher declared, “I am deeply impressed with the
courage displayed by each and every one of the soldiers who participated in
Operation Cast Lead and their commanders.” (144) Eight Israeli soldiers were
subsequently awarded medals for “heroism.” (145)
When confronted by a BBC reporter who observed that Israel
“imposed 100 times more casualties on Gaza in three weeks than they did on
you,” Interior Minister Sheetrit shot back: “That’s the idea of the operation,
what do you think?” (146) A poll taken one month after the invasion ended found
that two-thirds of Israeli Jews believed Operation Cast Lead should have
continued until Hamas surrendered. (147) Israelis rued that the invasion’s
goals had not been reached because—in Gideon Levy’s paraphrase—“we didn’t kill
enough.” (148) Eager for “round two,” a member of Israel’s regional council
adjoining Gaza exhorted the military that next time they should “flatten Gaza into
a parking lot, destroy them.” (149)
The casualty figures attested not to a war but to a
massacre— or, as Duncan Kennedy put it, they were “typical of a particular kind
of ‘police action’ that Western colonial powers ... have historically
undertaken to convince resisting native populations that unless they stop
resisting they will suffer unbearable death and deprivation.” (150) Indeed, an
Israeli soldier posted in the Gaza Strip later recollected how Operation Cast
Lead was largely conducted by remote control. “It feels like hunting season has
begun,” he mused. “Sometimes it reminds me of a Play-Station [computer] game.”
“You feel like a child playing around with a magnifying glass,” another
remembered, “burning up ants.” (151) New Republic literary editor Leon
Wieseltier nonetheless opined that use of the phrase “pulverization of Gazans” to
describe the Israeli assault was “calculatedly indifferent to the wrenching
moral and strategic perplexities that are contained in the awful reality of
asymmetrical war.” (152) A year after the invasion, two IDF combat soldiers
recalled: “Most casualties were inflicted on Palestinians by air strikes,
artillery fire, and snipers from afar. Combat victory? Shooting fish in a
barrel is more like it.” (153) The modus
operandi of Operation Cast Lead pointed up the aptness of the soldiers’
metaphors.
An HRW study homed in on Israel’s “unlawful” use of white
phosphorus in Gaza. Although it is used primarily to obscure military
operations on the ground—white phosphorus ignites and burns on contact with
oxygen, generating a dense white smoke—it can also be used as an incendiary
weapon. When making contact with skin white phosphorus causes “horrific burns,”
sometimes to the bone, as it reaches temperatures of 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit
(816 degrees Celsius). HRW concluded that Israel “repeatedly exploded white
phosphorus munitions in the air over populated areas, killing and injuring civilians,
and damaging civilian structures, including a school, a market, a humanitarian
aid warehouse and a hospital,” and that such use of white phosphorus “indicates
the commission of war crimes.” It further found that, insofar as Israel wanted
an obscurant for its forces, it could have used smoke shells (manufactured by
an Israeli company); that Israel’s persistent use of white phosphorus where no
Israeli forces were present on the ground indicated it was being used as an
incendiary weapon; that in its targeting of the UNRWA headquarters in Gaza
City, which warehoused vast quantities of humanitarian food and medical
supplies, the IDF “kept firing white phosphorus despite repeated warnings from
U.N. personnel about the danger to civilians”; that Israel targeted the U.N.’s
school in Beit Lahiya despite the fact that “the U.N. had provided the IDF with
the GPS coordinates of the school prior to military operations”; and that
Al-Quds Hospital, also a target, was “clearly marked and there does not appear
to have been fighting in that immediate area.” It deserves special emphasis
that the U.S. manufactured “all of the white phosphorus shells” recovered by
HRW in Gaza. (154)
The PlayStation-like nature of the massacre was
underscored in another HRW study documenting Israel’s high-tech assaults on
Gaza’s population. “Israel’s drone-launched missiles,” it reported, “are
incredibly precise. In addition to the high-resolution cameras and other
sensors on the drones themselves, the missile fired from a drone has its own
cameras that allow the operator to observe the target from the moment of firing....
If a last-second doubt arises about a target, the drone operator can use the
missile’s remote guidance system to divert the fired missile, steering the
missile away from the target with a joystick.” In the six attacks killing 29
civilians (eight of them children) that it investigated, HRW found that no
Palestinian fighters were “present in the immediate area of the attack at the
time,” and that five of the six attacks “took place during the day, when
civilians were shopping, returning from school, or engaged in other ordinary
activities, which they most likely would not have done had Palestinian fighters
been in the area at the time.” (155)
The devastation wrought on Gaza clearly went beyond the
declared mission of eliminating “terrorists” and “terrorist infrastructure” or
even collective punishment of Palestinian civilians. The systematic destruction
of houses, schools, colleges, farms, mosques, and so on, which seemed to be
aimed at making Gaza literally unlivable, raises the question, What was Israel
really trying to do? In fact the massive destruction was both critical and
integral to the success of Operation Cast Lead. The goal, according to
Cordesman—and here the evidence, for a change, supports him—was to “restore
Israeli deterrence, and show the Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria that it was too
dangerous to challenge Israel.” (156) But Israel could not restore its
deterrence by inflicting a military defeat because Hamas was manifestly not a
military power. To quote Cordesman, it “is not clear that any opponent of
Israel felt Hamas was really strong enough to be a serious test of Israeli
ground forces.” (157) Thus Israel could only reinstate the region’s fear of it
by demonstrating the amount of sheer destruction it was prepared to inflict. It
“had [to] make its enemies feel it was ‘crazy’” (Israeli official) and was
ready to cause devastation on a “scale [that] is unpredictable” and heedless of
“world opinion” (Cordesman). (158) In other words, and in direct contradiction
of the official assertion that the use of force in Gaza was “proportional,”
Israel intentionally raised the level of destruction to a degree that was
unpredictable, even insane.
The description is not exaggerated. As the invasion
wound down Foreign Minister Livni declared that it had “restored Israel’s
deterrence ... Hamas now understands that when you fire on [Israel’s] citizens
it responds by going wild—and this is a good thing.” The day after the ceasefire
she bragged that “Israel demonstrated real hooliganism during the course of the
recent operation, which I demanded.” (159) Later, Livni declared that she was
“proud” of her decisions during the Gaza invasion and would “repeat” every one
of them because they were “meant to restore Israel’s deterrence and did restore
Israel’s deterrence.” (160) A former Israeli defense official told the
International Crisis Group that “with an armada of fighter planes attacking Gaza,
Israel decided to play the role of a mad dog for the sake of future
deterrence,” while a former senior Israeli security official boasted to the
Crisis Group that Israel had regained its deterrence because it “has shown
Hamas, Iran and the region that it can be as lunatic as any of them.” (161)
“The Goldstone Report, which claimed
that Israel goes crazy when it is being attacked, caused us some damage,” a
leading Israeli commentator on Arab affairs observed, “yet it was a blessing in
our region. If Israel goes crazy and destroys everything in its way when it’s being
attacked, one should be careful. No need to mess with crazy people.” (162) In
postinvasion testimony an IDF soldier mused that “there was no need for such
intense fire, no need to use mortars, phosphorus ammunition.... The army was
looking for the opportunity to hold a spectacular maneuver in order to show its
muscle.” (163)
After the invasion Israeli and American Jewish
philosophers engaged the subtle moral quandaries supposedly prompted by
Israel’s conduct. Hawkish Philosopher A posited that Israel “should favor the
lives of its own soldiers over the lives of the neighbors of a terrorist,” (164)
while dovish Philosophers B and C rejoined that in the war against “terrorism”
it did not suffice that Israel was “not intending” to kill civilians, “its soldiers
must ... intend not to kill civilians.” (165)
It appears that both sides in this learned
disputation on the right balance between preserving the life of a soldier and the
life of an enemy civilian somehow missed the crux of what happened: upon
invading, the IDF intentionally and indiscriminately blasted and reduced to rubble
everything in sight. Thus, the Goldstone Report
makes clear that a fine assessment of whether or not Israel properly applied
the international humanitarian law principle of “proportionality” was beside the
point because “deeds by the Israeli armed forces and words of military and
political leaders prior to and during the operations indicate that, as a whole,
they were premised on a deliberate policy of disproportionate force aimed not
at the enemy but at the ... civilian population.” The Report also makes clear that
a fine assessment of whether or not Israel properly applied the international
humanitarian law principle of “distinction” (between combatants and civilians)
was beside the point because “the effective rules of engagement, standard
operating procedures and instructions to the troops on the ground appear to
have been framed in order to create an environment in which due regard for
civilian lives and basic human dignity was replaced with disregard for basic
international humanitarian law and human rights norms.” (166) While
philosophers debated the correct interpretation of the laws of war and both sides
tacitly imputed to Israel the honorable motive of wanting to obey them, in
reality the premise of Israel’s assault on Gaza and the essential precondition
for its success was the wholesale breach of these laws.
The cumulative evidence against the official and unofficial
Israeli versions of Operation Cast Lead points to Israel’s criminal liability
both in its decision to launch and its conduct during the Gaza invasion.
Indeed, far from reckoning the death and destruction as “collateral damage,”
the postinvasion reports of human rights organizations and the confessions of
Israeli soldiers make clear that the goal of the Gaza invasion was precisely to
demonstrate to Palestinians and neighboring states that Israel was ready,
willing, and able to inflict disproportionate violence—what Israeli officials
themselves called “mad” and “lunatic” levels of violence—on a civilian
population.
4/ OF HUMAN SHIELDS AND HASBARA
A close look at Israeli actions during Operation Cast
Lead sustains the conclusion that the massive death and destruction visited on
Gaza were not an accidental byproduct of the invasion, but its barely concealed
objective. To deflect culpability for this premeditated slaughter Israel
persistently alleged that Palestinian casualties resulted from the use by Hamas
of civilians as “human shields.” Indeed, throughout its attack Israel strove to
manipulate perceptions by controlling press reports and otherwise tilting
Western coverage in its favor. But the allegation that Hamas used civilians as
human shields was not borne out by human rights investigations, while the gap between
Israel’s claim that it did everything possible to avoid “collateral damage” and
the hundreds of bodies of women and children dug out of the rubble is too vast
to bridge.
To extenuate the horrors it inflicted on Gaza, Israel
pointed to Hamas’s “massive use of civilians as human shields.” (1) Yet, in one
of the most extensive postinvasion human rights reports Amnesty International
found that the worst that could be said of Hamas was that it “launched rockets
and located military equipment and positions near civilian homes, endangering the
lives of the inhabitants by exposing them to the risk of Israeli attacks. They
also used empty homes and properties as combat positions during armed
confrontations with Israeli forces, exposing the inhabitants of nearby houses
to the danger of attacks or of being caught in the crossfire.”
Whereas Israel alleged that Hamas “chose to base its operations
in civilian areas not in spite of, but because of, the likelihood of
substantial harm to civilians,” and that “Hamas operatives took pride in
endangering the lives of civilians,” Amnesty contrarily concluded that there
was “no evidence that [Hamas] rockets were launched from residential houses or buildings
while civilians were in these buildings”; that “Palestinian militants often
used empty houses but ... did not forcibly take over inhabited houses”; that
Hamas “mixed with the civilian population, although this would be difficult to
avoid in the small and overcrowded Gaza Strip”; and that “Palestinian fighters,
like Israeli soldiers, engaged in armed confrontations around residential homes
where civilians were present, endangering them. The locations of these
confrontations were mostly determined by Israeli forces, who entered Gaza with
tanks and armored personnel carriers and took positions deep inside residential
neighborhoods.”
On the most explosive allegation, Amnesty
categorically exonerated Hamas:
Contrary to repeated allegations by Israeli officials
of the use of “human shields,” Amnesty International found no evidence that
Hamas or other Palestinian fighters directed the movement of civilians to
shield military objectives from attacks. It found no evidence that Hamas or
other armed groups forced residents to stay in or around buildings used by fighters,
nor that fighters prevented residents from leaving buildings or areas which had
been commandeered by militants.
...
Amnesty International delegates interviewed many
Palestinians who complained about Hamas’s conduct, and especially about Hamas’s
repression and attacks against their opponents, including killings, torture and
arbitrary detentions, but did not receive any accounts of Hamas fighters having
used them as “human shields.” In the cases investigated by Amnesty
International of civilians killed in Israeli attacks, the deaths could not be explained
as resulting from the presence of fighters shielding among civilians, as the
Israeli army generally contends. In all of the cases investigated by Amnesty
International of families killed when their homes were bombed from the air by
Israeli forces, for example, none of the houses struck was being used by armed
groups for military activities. Similarly, in the cases of precision missiles
or tank shells which killed civilians in their homes, no fighters were present
in the houses that were struck and Amnesty International delegates found no
indication that there had been any armed confrontations or other military activity
in the immediate vicinity at the time of the attack.
According to Israel’s official brief the rules of
engagement of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the Gaza assault strictly
prohibited the “use of civilians as human shields” and “the IDF took a variety
of measures to teach and instill awareness of these rules of engagement in
commanders and soldiers.” Nevertheless if Amnesty found no evidence that Hamas used
human shields (and other postinvasion investigations echoed Amnesty’s
conclusions), it did find that Israeli soldiers “used civilians, including
children, as ‘human shields,’ endangering their lives by forcing them to remain
in or near houses which they took over and used as military positions. Some were
forced to carry out dangerous tasks such as inspecting properties or objects
suspected of being booby-trapped. Soldiers also took position and launched attacks
from and around inhabited houses, exposing local residents to the danger of attacks
or of being caught in the crossfire.” Other human rights investigations—in
particular the graphic accounts in the Goldstone Report—and testimony of soldiers corroborated the IDF’s use of
human shields. (2)
Still, it was axiomatic for respected philosophers
Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer that although Israel’s enemies “intentionally
put civilians at risk by using them as cover, Israel condemns those practices.”
(3) In a book that “explores the myths and illusions” about the Middle East,
Dennis Ross inveighed against Hamas because it used “the civilian population as
human shields” and made “extensive use of human shields.” He also reported in
his “reality-based assessment” that Hamas “rejects the very idea of a two-state
solution”; that it was Hamas that “chose to end” the June 2008 ceasefire
(Israel’s murderous 4 November border raid vanishes in his account); and that “an
uneasy quiet was restored only after the IDF had destroyed nearly all Hamas
military targets.” (4) British colonel Richard Kemp, who was commander of
British forces in Afghanistan, variously alleged that Hamas “deliberately
positioned behind the human shield of the civilian population”; “ordered, forced
when necessary, men, women and children from their own population to stay put
in places they knew were about to be attacked by the IDF”; “deliberately
[tried] to lure [the Israelis] into killing their own innocent civilians”;
and—in a yet more colorful accusation—“of course” deployed “women and children”
suicide bombers. These allegations bore equal relationship to reality as his
ubiquitously quoted proclamation that “during Operation Cast Lead the IDF did
more to safeguard the rights of civilians in a combat zone than any other Army
in the history of warfare.” (5) Pity the civilian population in his theater of
operations.
As already indicated, the circumstances under which
many Palestinians died underscored the untenability of Israel’s alibi that the
high civilian death count resulted from human shielding by Hamas. “The attacks
that caused the greatest number of fatalities and injuries,” Amnesty found in
its postinvasion inquiry,
were carried out with long-range high-precision
munitions fired from combat aircraft , helicopters and drones, or from tanks
stationed up to several kilometers away—often against pre-selected targets, a
process that would normally require approval from up the chain of command. The
victims of these attacks were not caught in the crossfire of battles between
Palestinian militants and Israeli forces, nor were they shielding militants or
other legitimate targets. Many were killed when their homes were bombed while
they slept. Others were going about their daily activities in their homes, sitting
in their yard, hanging the laundry on the roof when they were targeted in air
strikes or tank shelling. Children were studying or playing in their bedrooms
or on the roof, or outside their homes, when they were struck by missiles or
tank shells. (6)
It further found that Palestinian civilians,
“including women and children, were shot at short range when posing no threat
to the lives of the Israeli soldiers,” and that “there was no fighting going on
in their vicinity when they were shot.” (7) A study by Human Rights Watch (HRW)
documented Israel’s killing of Palestinian civilians who “were trying to convey
their non-combatant status by waving a white flag,” and where “all available
evidence indicates that Israeli forces had control of the areas in question, no
fighting was taking place there at the time, and Palestinian fighters were not
hiding among the civilians who were shot.” In a typical incident “two women and
three children from the Abd Rabbo family were standing for a few minutes outside
their home—at least three of them holding pieces of white cloth—when an Israeli
soldier opened fire, killing two girls, aged two and seven, and wounding the
grandmother and third girl.” (8) The official Israeli brief meanwhile
proclaimed that because IDF soldiers adhere to “purity of arms” they do “not
use their weapons and force to harm human beings who are not combatants or
prisoners of war.” (9)
The Goldstone Report
concluded that “the Israeli armed forces repeatedly opened fire on civilians
who were not taking part in the hostilities and who posed no threat to them,” and
that “Israeli armed forces had carried out direct intentional strikes against
civilians” in the absence of “any grounds which could have reasonably induced
the Israeli armed forces to assume that the civilians attacked were in fact
taking a direct part in the hostilities.” (10) The postinvasion testimonies of
IDF soldiers corroborated this wanton killing of Palestinian civilians in an
“atmosphere” where “the lives of Palestinians, let’s say, is something very,
very less important than the lives of our soldiers”: “You see people more or
less running their life routine, taking a walk, stuff like that. Definitely not
terrorists. I hear from other crews that they fired at people there. Tried to kill
them”; “People didn’t seem to be too upset about taking human lives”; “Everyone
there is considered a terrorist”; “We were allowed to do anything we wanted.
Who’s to tell us not to?”; “I understood that conduct there had been somewhat
savage. ‘If you sight it, shoot it’”; “You are allowed to do anything you want ...
for no reason other than it’s cool”—even firing white phosphorus “because it’s
fun. Cool.” (11)
Unabashed and undeterred, the official Israeli brief
still sang paeans to the IDF’s unique respect for the “supreme value of human
life,” and Israeli philosopher Asa Kasher lauded the “impeccable” values of the
IDF such as “protecting the human dignity of every human being, even the most
vile terrorist” and the “uniquely Israeli value ... of the sanctity of human
life.” (12) Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz averred that “Israel went to
great lengths to protect civilians” during the assault, and Human Rights Watch
founder Robert Bernstein proposed that “the press might consider praising”
Israel for its “successful attempts to minimize civilian casualties,” while in
a New Yorker cover story on “what really happened” in Gaza, Lawrence Wright
reported that “the Israeli military adopted painstaking efforts to spare civilian
lives in Gaza.” Wright also discovered while in Gaza that Palestinians felt a
special affinity with an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas: “[Gilad] Shalit’s
pale features and meek expression haunt the imagination of Gazans. Though it
may seem perverse, a powerful sense of identification has arisen between the
shy soldier and the people whose government holds him hostage. Gazans see
themselves as like Shalit: confined, mistreated, and despairing.” (13) This
resolves the mystery as to why one Gazan family after another has christened their
newborn Gilad ...
The charges and countercharges over the use of human
shields were symptomatic of Israel’s attempt to obfuscate what actually happened
on the ground. In fact Israel began its hasbara (propaganda) preparations six
months before the invasion was launched in December 2008 and a centralized body
in the prime minister’s office, the National Information Directorate, was specifically
tasked with coordinating Israeli hasbara. (14) Nonetheless, Anthony H. Cordesman’s
diagnosis after world opinion turned against Israel was that it had not sufficiently
invested in the “war of perceptions”: Israel “did little to explain the steps
it was taking to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage on the
world stage”; it “certainly could— and should—have done far more to show its
level of military restraint and make it credible.” (15) In the opinion of
Haaretz.com Senior Editor Bradley Burston, the problem was that Israelis “are
execrable at public relations,” while according to respected Israeli political
scientist Shlomo Avineri the world took a dim view of the Gaza invasion because
of “the name given to the operation, which greatly affects the way in which it
will be perceived.” (16)
But if the micromanaged PR blitz ultimately did not
convince, the problem was not that Israel failed to convey adequately its
humanitarian mission or that the whole world misperceived what happened.
Rather, it was that the scope of the massacre was so appalling that no amount
of propaganda could disguise it. This was especially true after the invasion was
over when foreign reporters could no longer be barred on the specious pretexts
Israel had concocted to impose “the most draconian press controls in the
history of modern warfare” (17)— controls that “put the state of Israel in the
company of a handful of regimes around the world which regularly keep
journalists from doing their jobs” (Foreign Press Association) and that were
“outrageous and should be condemned by the international community” (Reporters
Without Borders). (18) More than a half year after the invasion Israel
continued to obstruct the passage of human rights organizations such as
Amnesty, HRW, and B’Tselem into Gaza. “If Israel has nothing to hide,” HRW
asked, “why is it refusing to allow us in?” (19)
Soon after the invasion ended, and to the chagrin of Cordesman
and Israeli officialdom, several Israeli media outlets circulated the
testimonies of combat pilots and infantry soldiers who either committed war
crimes or witnessed them in Gaza. A few months later the Israeli organization
Breaking the Silence published another compilation of damning IDF testimonies. In
its official brief Israel reassuringly alleged that “Israel is an open and
democratic society which fully respects the freedom of speech.... Information
on possible misconduct of soldiers reaches the IDF authorities in various
ways.” (20) But after publication of the critical IDF testimonies the Israeli
foreign ministry called on European governments that funded Breaking the
Silence to terminate their support. (21)
Apart from official denials that carried little
credibility— what would induce the soldiers to lie? (22)—the reaction to these
IDF testimonies oscillated between shock and minimization. (23) Like the film
character Captain Louis Renault, who was “shocked, shocked!” to discover that
people were gambling in Casablanca, officials expressed disbelief that Israeli
soldiers could have engaged in criminal conduct. But such behavior was “the
natural continuation of the last nine years, when soldiers killed nearly 5,000
Palestinians, at least half of them innocent civilians, nearly 1,000 of them
children and teenagers,” Gideon Levy observed, mocking the feigned official
consternation. “Everything the soldiers described from Gaza, everything, occurred
during these blood-soaked years as if they were routine events.” (24)
Israeli officials sought to minimize the PR damage of
these confessions by asserting it was much ado about a few rotten apples—or, as
Dershowitz spun it, “rogue soldiers are a fact of war.” (25) But such a
pretense also lacked credibility. The criminal behavior of individual soldiers
was the inexorable consequence and part and parcel of the criminal nature of
the enterprise itself: to restore Israel’s deterrence capacity by using massive
lethal force against a defenseless society. “These are not instances of ‘errant
fire,’” Levy continued, “but of deliberate fire resulting from an order.” (26)
“The stories of this publication prove that we are not dealing with the
failures of individual soldiers, and attest instead to failures in the
application of values primarily on a systemic level,” the Israeli editors of
the incriminating IDF testimonies observed. “The massive and unprecedented blow
to the infrastructure and civilians of the Gaza Strip [was] a direct result of
IDF policy.” (27) “Hundreds of civilians were not killed ‘by mistake’ or by a
handful of ‘rotten apples,’” the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel
concurred in its extensive study. (28) “Declarations made by officials together
with accumulating data,” the Association for Civil Rights in Israel noted in
its annual report, “reveal that the strikes on civilians and civilian
structures were generally not the result of a spontaneous, low-level decision,
but rather of decisions and directives made by senior echelons in the
government and the IDF.” (29) Partly on the basis of Israeli soldiers’
testimonies, the Goldstone Report
concluded that “the repeated failure to distinguish between combatants and
civilians appears ... to have been the result of deliberate guidance issued to
soldiers ... and not the result of occasional lapses,” and that “the outcome
and the modalities of the operations indicate ... that they were ... to a large
degree aimed at destroying or incapacitating civilian property and the means of
subsistence of the civilian population.” (30)
No doubt some IDF soldiers exploited the occasion of
the massacre to give free rein to their sadistic impulses while others were
brutalized by the environment. Thus, IDF testimonies recalled “the hatred and
the joy,” and “fun” and “delight” of killing Palestinians, the wreaking of
destruction “for kicks” and to “make [oneself] happy.” And thus soldiers
bantered, “I killed a terrorist, whoa.... We blew his head off ”; “Fortunately
the hospitals are full to capacity already, so people are dying more quickly”;
and “He just couldn’t finish this operation without killing someone.” (31) But
it was the criminal nature of the enterprise that enabled and unleashed these
“excesses.” It was furthermore absurd to focus on sadism or, for that matter,
rowdy or uncouth behavior when the most egregious crimes were manifestly those
executed in a disciplined, orderly fashion. One interlocutor of the confessing
Israeli soldiers expressed disgust that they did not restore order and
cleanliness in Palestinian homes they occupied: “That’s simply behaving like
animals.... You are describing an army with very low value norms, that’s the
truth.” (32) However he displayed much less unease over the fact that these
pilots and infantrymen damaged and destroyed thousands of Palestinian homes and
left 100,000 Palestinians homeless.
In a bid to pin culpability for the massacre on
fundamentalist zealotry, other commentators latched onto soldier testimonies quoting
the bigoted and incendiary statements of IDF rabbis and recruits from religious
schools. The criminality was the work of “religious nationalists,” the New York
Times’s Ethan Bronner suggested, who “have moved into more and more positions
of military responsibility” and replaced the “secular, Western and educated”
kibbutzniks who once dominated the army. (33) This explanation conveniently
overlooked, however, that the criminal thrust of Operation Cast Lead—deploying,
as one soldier after another after another testified, “insane” amounts of firepower
(34)—was the brainchild of Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his secular cohorts,
and that Israel had committed many a massacre long before religious zealots entered
its military ranks. (35)
The IDF promised an investigation after the first
round of soldier testimonies but closed its probe some ten days later, having
concluded that these accounts of widespread illegal killings and destruction
were just “rumors.” (36) A subsequent IDF “internal investigation” found that
“no civilians were purposefully harmed by IDF troops during Operation Cast
Lead.” Barak lauded the probe because it “once again proves that the IDF is one
of the most moral armies in the world.” The official Israeli brief alleged that
“Israel’s legal and judicial apparatus is fully equipped and motivated to
address alleged violations of national or international law by its commanders
and soldiers.” According to HRW, however, “the investigative results make clear
that the Israeli military will not objectively monitor itself,” while Amnesty
noted that “the army’s claims appear to be more an attempt to shirk its
responsibilities than a genuine process to establish the truth.” The Goldstone Report concluded that “there are serious
doubts about the willingness of Israel to carry out genuine investigations in
an impartial, independent, prompt and effective way.” (37) It is emphatically
untrue, however, that no Israeli was punished for crimes committed during the Gaza
invasion: one soldier was sentenced to prison time for stealing a Palestinian’s
credit card. (38) Two years after the Gaza invasion a couple of Israeli
soldiers were convicted of using a nine-year-old Palestinian as a human shield,
but received only suspended three-month sentences. (39) In a touching gesture
of atonement Israeli Information Minister Yuli Edelstein declared, “I am
ashamed of the soldier who stole some credit cards.” (40)
As the human rights reports quoted here demonstrate, the
brazenness of Israel’s attack on Gaza and the barefacedness of Israel’s attempt
to spin public perceptions ultimately backfired. One important sign of the
unintended consequences of Operation Cast Lead for Israel came in an
unprecedented move by Amnesty International in the wake of the attack on Gaza. Among
the human rights reports documenting the death and destruction, the Amnesty
publication Fueling Conflict: Foreign arms supplies to Israel/Gaza merits
special attention. (41) This landmark study called for a cessation of arms
supplies to the parties to the conflict as well as the imposition by the United
Nations of a comprehensive arms embargo: “Amnesty International is calling on
the U.N., notably the Security Council, to impose an immediate, comprehensive
arms embargo on all parties to the conflict, and on all states to take action
individually to impose national embargoes on any arms or weapons transfers to
the parties to the conflict until there is no longer a substantial risk that
such arms or weapons could be used to commit serious violations of
international law.” Amnesty proceeded to inventory the foreign-manufactured
weapons used by Israel during the Gaza invasion, such as the U.S.-made white
phosphorus shells, tank ammunition, and guided missiles, as well as the scheduled
U.S. arms deliveries to Israel just before and during the invasion. It reported
that “the USA has been by far the major supplier of conventional arms to
Israel”; that “the USA has provided large funding each year for Israel to
procure arms despite U.S. legislation that restricts such aid to consistently gross
human rights violators”; and that “Israel’s military intervention in the Gaza
Strip has been equipped to a large extent by U.S.-supplied weapons, munitions
and military equipment paid for with U.S. taxpayers’ money.” The report also
briefly inventoried the supply of foreign-made weapons to Palestinian armed
groups (“on a very small scale compared to ... Israel”).
Amnesty’s call for a comprehensive arms embargo on Israel
and Palestinian armed groups marked a milestone in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Taking note that Israel used U.S.-manufactured weapons when it committed
violations of the laws of war, human rights organizations have in the past
called on the U.S. to restrict both military assistance to Israel and Israel’s
use of specific weapons so long as it systematically violated the law. (42)
However, no human rights organization had ever produced such a detailed
accounting of foreign weapons’ suppliers to Israel or called so aggressively for
a comprehensive arms embargo by these suppliers. Predictably, the Obama administration
rejected Amnesty’s call43 and Amnesty came under attack from Abraham H. Foxman
of the Anti-Defamation League for its “pernicious and biased report” that “is
doing nothing short of denying Israel the right to self-defense.” (44) It might
be speculated that Amnesty’s unprecedented call for an embargo reflected a
broader revulsion at the Gaza massacre among the international community, not
least among liberal American Jews. I will return to this point presently, but first
I want to briefly report on my own trip to Gaza after the invasion.
5/ INSIDE GAZA
To preserve my sense of purpose, and keep the
Palestine struggle from becoming a lifeless abstraction, I need periodically to
recharge my moral batteries by reconnecting with the actual people living under
occupation and by witnessing firsthand the unfolding tragedy. From each trip I
invariably carry away a handful of stark images that I fix in my mind’s eye to dispel
the occasional hesitations about staying the course. When the memories begin to
fade I know it is time to return.
And so, in June 2009, six months after the invasion,
I joined a delegation that journeyed to Gaza for a brief visit. Though I had
been to Gaza before, most of my time during previous trips to the region was
spent with friends in the West Bank. (1) Israel has prohibited me from entering
the country for ten years, thereby making it impossible for me to visit the
West Bank, allegedly because I am a “security” risk. An editorial in Haaretz
titled “Who’s Afraid of Finkelstein?” cast doubt on the decision’s
premise—“Considering his unusual and extremely critical views, one cannot avoid
the suspicion that refusing to allow him to enter Israel was a punishment rather
than a precaution”—and went on to argue against banning me. (2) Nonetheless it
is unclear if or when I will be able to see my Palestinian friends again. In
the meantime, going to Gaza via Egypt at least enabled me to get some feeling for
developments on the ground.
Having just spent several months perusing Mahatma
Gandhi’s collected works, and deeply inspired by his commitment to living the
life of the impoverished masses, I had resolved to rough it in Gaza. But this
was easier said than done. Along with several other delegates I volunteered to
stay at a Palestinian family’s home rather than a hotel. Dressed to the nines,
hair gelled, and reeking of cologne, several Palestinian youths met our group
to select their home-stays. They departed with first one young female member of
our delegation, then another, then another. The only candidates left hanging at
the end of the evening were middle-aged men. We checked into the hotel.
It would be untrue to say that I was terribly jolted
by the devastation that I encountered everywhere in Gaza. During the first
intifada I had passed time with families in the West Bank living in tents
beside the rubble of their former dwellings. Israel would routinely detonate
the family residence of an alleged activist in the dead of night after giving
the occupants just minutes to evacuate. Soon after the 2006 war I toured
Lebanon. Many of the villages in the south had been flattened. The Dahiya
district of Beirut resembled photographs from bombedout cities during World War
II: large craters where apartment houses and offices once stood, the occasional
shell of a building in the distance. So by now I have become somewhat inured to
Israel’s calling card to its Arab neighbors.
Nonetheless a few memories from that trip to Gaza remain
etched in my mind with particular sharpness. I remember an 11-year-old girl
peering out of thick-lensed glasses while she lingered beside the American
International School that had been demolished. Speaking in perfect English (her
father was a physician and her friends ranked her the top student in the class)
the girl wistfully remembered that it had been the best school in Gaza. I also
recall the evening we met with government officials in a tent beside what had
previously been the Palestinian parliamentary building and was now just a pile
of smoldering rubble. Although the devastation was apparently designed not just
to subdue Hamas but also to humiliate it, the representatives seemed oblivious
to any slight to their dignity from having to convene in such reduced
circumstances. And I can still see the huge rectangular depression in the heart
of the Islamic University campus where the science and technology building once
stood. An administrator recalled with pride tinged by melancholy that, just
prior to the attack, the university had installed cutting-edge equipment for
biological research in the building.
No Palestinian I met evinced anger or sorrow at what
happened. People appeared calmly determined to resume life, such as it was,
before the invasion, although the continuing blockade plainly weighed heavily
on them. A young hijab-clad guide sitting next to me on a bus one night
casually mentioned that her fiancé had been killed on the last day of the
invasion, and then punctuated her statement by staring, dry-eyed, into my
pupils. It was neither an accusation nor an appeal for pity. It was as if Israel’s
periodic depredations were now experienced as a natural disaster to which
people had grown accustomed; as if Gaza were situated in the path of tornadoes,
except that in Gaza every season is tornado season. Some demented mind in an air-conditioned
Tel Aviv office conjures up poetic names for its numberless “operations.” Why
not a little truth in advertising just this once and call them “Operation Attila
the Hun,” “Operation Genghis Khan,” or “Operation Army of Vandals”?
The female head administrator of a children’s library
housed in a magnificent edifice that would be the envy of any major city in the
United States offered some painful reflections. (Watching the children hard at
work in the library, I secretly breathed a sigh of relief that whether wittingly
or by miracle Israel had not inflicted on it the same fate as the American International
School’s.) She was one of seven siblings all of whom had obtained advanced
degrees, and, apart from her, had left for greener pastures abroad. She had
studied in Great Britain but against her parents’ recommendation decided to return
to her home. She recalled questioning her decision when, on her way to work one
day, Israeli soldiers forced her to wade waist-deep in mud to get past a
checkpoint.
Our delegation consisted mostly of Americans.
Originally I assumed that I was the only Jew on the delegation, but after making
several discreet inquiries I began to wonder whether anyone on the delegation
was not Jewish. So far as I could tell Gazans did not care much about our
pedigrees, although, to my mortification, the rector at the Islamic University
introduced me as a “Holocaust survivor.” I politely corrected him: “tenurebattle
survivor.” Did I really look 90 years old?!
Hamas has a fearsome reputation, but it met its match
with the feisty feminists leading our delegation. Among their complaints,
forthrightly expressed, was that Hamas did not allow the delegation sufficient
freedom of movement at night. Although Hamas eventually gave ground my
sympathies went out to them, and not just because in these verbal bouts they
appeared the underdogs. It is not as if Gaza had a lively nightlife. Furthermore,
Israeli ships still fired on Gaza every night, and Hamas feared that Israel (or
its Palestinian underlings) might create an incident to discredit it. It is
also not as if Hamas’s security concerns lacked plausibility: after all we were
Americans, and U.S. intelligence agencies have been complicit in the repression
of Hamas.
I had several meetings with Hamas officials and
cadre. It was later conveyed to me that those I met were mostly from Hamas’s
“moderate” wing, although I cannot say exactly what distinguished them from
members of the “hard-line” wing, and a lot of the speculation on this matter
appears poorly informed. In his dispatch from Gaza the New Yorker’s Lawrence Wright
knowingly told readers that Gaza-based Hamas leader and Prime Minister Ismael
Hanniya is a “moderate” who has “spoken of negotiating a long-term truce with
Israel,” whereas Damascus-based head of the Hamas politburo Khalid Mishal is a
“hard-liner” who is “more likely to initiate radical, destabilizing actions.” (3)
But Mishal, the “hard-liner,” has repeatedly called for a diplomatic settlement
with Israel. (4)
At each of the parleys with Hamas members I repeated the
same message: the current diplomatic posture of Hamas seemed in alignment with
representative political organizations, respected juridical institutions, and
major human rights groups. Many Hamas members appeared genuinely surprised when
I rattled off the “pro-Palestinian” positions espoused by these mainstream
bodies. If I was correct, then Hamas should couch its political platform in
their language because the chink in Israel’s armor is its diplomatic isolation.
Hamas must hammer away the critical point that Israel is the real outlier in
the international community and obstacle to peace: not “Hamas says,” but “the
U.N. General Assembly resolution supported by 160 nations says”; not “Hamas
says, but “the International Court of Justice says”; not “Hamas says” but
“Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International say.”
My interlocutors seemed earnest and willing to
listen. (They even heard out in good humor the head of the delegation when she
implored them to shave their “scary beards” to improve Hamas’s image in the
West.) Although Hamas sought to emulate Hezbollah’s victory in 2006, after the
massacre it perhaps sunk in that Israel cannot be defeated by shooting firecrackers
and Roman candles at it. When I was leaving Gaza, U.S. President Barack Obama
had just arrived in Cairo to deliver his landmark address. Hamas sent a letter
to him partly informed by our conversations. (A copy of this letter can be
found in an appendix to this book.)
For most of the time in Gaza, our delegation was
guarded by young Hamas militants. As we parted ways at the end of the visit I
felt moved and obliged to state publicly that in my opinion none of them was
deserving of the death Israel has attempted to inflict on them. I am aware that
according to the “laws of war” they are “legitimate” military targets. But in a
rational world the locution “laws of war” would make as much sense as “etiquette
of cannibals.” It is probably true that violent conflicts would be more lethal
and destructive in the absence of these laws, but it is also true that, in
their pretense of neutrality, they obscure fundamental truths. Whether from
conviction, frustration, or torment, these young men have chosen to defend
their homeland from foreign marauders with weapon in hand. Were I living in
Gaza, still in my prime and able to muster the courage, I could easily be one
of them.
6/ EVER FEWER HOSANNAS
Public outrage at the Gaza invasion did not come out
of the blue but rather marked the nadir of a curve plotting a steady decline in
support for Israel. As polling data of Americans and Europeans, both Gentiles
and Jews, suggest, the public has become increasingly critical of Israeli
policy over the past decade. The horrific images of death and destruction
broadcast around the world during and after the invasion accelerated this
development. “The increased and brutal frequency of war in this volatile region
has shift ed international opinion,” the British Financial Times editorialized
one year later, “reminding Israel it is not above the law. Israel can no longer
dictate the terms of debate.” (1) One poll registering the fallout from the
Gaza attack in the United States found that American voters calling themselves
supporters of Israel plummeted from 69 percent before the attack to 49 percent
in June 2009, while voters believing that the U.S. should support Israel
dropped from 69 percent to 44 percent. (2)
Consumed by hate, emboldened by self-righteousness, and
confident that it could control or intimidate public opinion, Israel carried on
in Gaza as if it could get away with mass murder in broad daylight. But while official
Western support for Israel held firm, the carnage set off an unprecedented wave
of popular outrage throughout the world. (3) Whether it was because the assault
came on the heels of the devastation Israel wrought in Lebanon, or because of
Israel’s relentless persecution of the people of Gaza, or because of the sheer cowardice
of the assault, the Gaza invasion appeared to mark a turning point in public
opinion reminiscent of the international reaction to the 1960 Sharpeville
massacre in apartheid South Africa.
In the Jewish diaspora official communal
organizations with longstanding ties to Israel predictably lent blind support. But,
at the same time, newly minted progressive Jewish organizations distanced
themselves to a lesser or greater degree. Whereas in the past mainstream Jews
actively supported Israeli wars, most registered ambivalence during the
invasion, apart from a contracting older minority that came out swinging in
Israel’s defense, and an expanding younger minority that scathingly denounced
it. Between the increasing estrangement of younger Jews from Israeli
bellicosity and the increasing qualms of Jews generally about supporting it,
the Gaza massacre signaled the break-up of hitherto blanket Jewish support for Israeli
wars.
In addition, whereas the antiwar demonstrations in
most Western countries were ethnically heterogeneous (including significant
numbers of Jews), the “pro”-Israeli demonstrations were composed almost
exclusively of Jews. The fact that active opposition to Israeli policy, say, on
college campuses, has spread beyond the Arab-Muslim core towards the
mainstream, whereas active support for Israel has shrunk to a fraction of the
ethnic Jewish core, is a telling indicator of where things are headed.
The era of the “beautiful” Israel has passed, it
seems irrevocably, and the disfigured Israel that in recent years has replaced it
in the public consciousness is a growing embarrassment. It is not so much that
Israel’s behavior is worse than it was before, but rather that the record of
that behavior has, finally, caught up with it. The truth can no longer be
denied or dismissed. The documentation of the Arab-Israeli conflict set out by
respected historians fundamentally conflicts with the version popularized in
the likes of Leon Uris’s Exodus. The evidence of Israeli human rights
violations compiled by respected mainstream organizations cannot be reconciled
with its vaunted commitment to “purity of arms.” The deliberations of respected
judicial and political bodies cast severe doubt on Israel’s avowed commitment to
a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Fretting over Israel’s increasing
international “delegitimization,” an influential Israeli think-tank speculated
that “the Jewish world is growing more distant from Israel” because “a growing
number of Jews do not have enough historical knowledge.” (4) The reverse would appear
to be closer to the truth: Jews have become alienated from Israel precisely
because they know too much.
For a long while Israel’s “supporters” deflected the
impact of this accumulating documentary record by wielding the twin swords of
The Holocaust (5) and the “new anti-Semitism.” (6) It was purported that Jews
could not be held to conventional moral/legal standards after the unique suffering
they endured during World War II, and that criticism of Israeli policy was motivated
by an ever-resurgent hatred of Jews. However, apart from the inevitable dulling
that comes of overuse, these weapons proved much less efficacious once
criticism of Israel broke into the mainstream of public opinion.
Unable to deflect criticism of Israel, apologists now
conjure bizarre theories to account for its ostracism. Reaganomics guru George
Gilder posits that a free-market system singularly unleashes human potential,
and that under such a system Jews are and must be “represented
disproportionately in the highest ranks” because they are the most gift ed. Inversely,
if Jews do not rule the roost, it must be because a less-than-ideal economic
system holds sway. Anti-Semitism springs from resentment of “Jewish superiority
and excellence” and “the manifest supremacy of Jews over all other ethnic groups,”
while the hatred of Israel springs from the fact that it has evolved (under the
inspired tutelage of Benjamin Netanyahu) into the perfect free-market system
that “concentrates the genius of the Jews,” making it “one of the world’s
leading capitalist powers” and the envy of the world: “Israel is hated above
all for its virtues.” If Jews figure prominently among critics of Israel, it is
because they “excel so readily in all intellectual fields that they outperform
all rivals in the arena of anti-Semitism.” The West in turn must preserve and
protect Israelis from the “world of zero-sum chimeras and fantasies of jihadist
revenge and death” and the “barbarian masses” because Jewish endowments have
enabled humanity to “thrive and prosper”: Jews are “crucial to the human race.”
Indeed, “if Israel is destroyed, capitalist Europe will likely die as well, and
America, as the epitome of productive and creative capitalism spurred by Jews,
will be in jeopardy”; “Israel is at the forefront of the next generation of
technology and on the front lines of a new racial war against capitalism and
Jewish individuality and genius”; “Just as free economies are necessary for the
survival of the human population of the planet, the survival of the Jews is
vital to the triumph of free economies. If Israel is quelled or destroyed, we
will be succumbing to forces targeting capitalism and freedom everywhere.” (7)
Across the Atlantic, Robin Shepherd, director of
international affairs at the London-based Henry Jackson Society, asserts that
Israel has come under strong criticism in the West not because of its human
rights record but because it is a democratic, capitalist state fighting on the
front lines alongside the U.S. against the “civilizational” threat posed by
radical Islam: “Israel had become an enemy not because of anything it had done”
but “because it was on the wrong side of the barricades.” The “primary
energizing platform in the West” for this “tidal wave of hysteria, deception
and distortion against the Jewish state” consists of totalitarian Marxists and
left -liberal fellowtravelers who, disappointed by the Western proletariat and Third
World liberation struggles, have made common cause with “militant Islam” to
destroy the liberal-capitalist world order. Although these critics of Israel
are not anti-Semitic in the traditional “subjective” sense of despising Jews
per se, they are guilty of “objective” anti-Semitism because Israel is so
central to Jewish identity in the contemporary world. But opposition to Israel
also emanates from ancien régime bluebloods who want to restore the old-world
hierarchies before arriviste Jews disrupted them. This far-flung
“neo-anti-Semitic” conspiracy embraces “most” of those who accuse Israel of
committing war crimes and otherwise violating international law. Thus, it is to
be understood that behind the condemnation of Israel by Amnesty International
and the International Court of Justice, Nobel peace laureates Jimmy Carter and
Mairead Corrigan Maguire, the Financial Times and the BBC, lurks the evil hand
of the radical left ist-fanatic Islamic-landed aristocratic nexus. For those
who want to learn more, Shepherd “highly” recommends Alan M. Dershowitz’s The Case for Israel. (8)
Although such explanations for Israel’s isolation
lack credibility, it cannot be doubted that Israel’s stock has fallen precipitously.
Whereas Israel won many adherents in the West after its lightning victory in
June 1967, (9) in recent years it has been reduced almost to the status of a
pariah state, especially in Europe. A 2003 poll of the European Union named
Israel the biggest threat to world peace. (10) A 2008 survey of global opinion named
Israel the biggest obstacle to achieving peace in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
(11) In a BBC World Service poll taken on the eve of the Gaza invasion, fully
19 of the 21 countries surveyed held a predominantly negative view of Israel. (12)
Meanwhile, under the title “Second Thoughts about the Promised Land,” the
Economist reported in 2007 that although “most diaspora Jews still support
Israel strongly ... their ambivalence has grown.” (13) Dissenting Jewish voices
have begun to coalesce in Great Britain, Germany, and elsewhere, challenging
the hegemony of official Jewish organizations that parrot Israeli propaganda. (14)
In the United States the overall picture and trends
are perhaps not as pronounced but are no less noteworthy. Judging by poll data
it can broadly be said that Americans have consistently viewed Israel favorably
(15) and have sympathized much more with Israel than with the Palestinians. (16)
But Americans also overwhelmingly support an evenhanded U.S. approach to the
Israel-Palestine conflict, and have sometimes expressed “equal levels of
sympathy” for both sides, (17) while a substantial minority believe that U.S.
policy tilts (or tilts too much) in favor of Israel (18); a robust majority of
Americans “think Israel is not doing its part well in making efforts to resolve
the conflict” (19); and Americans have occasionally supported the use of
sanctions to rein in Israel. (20) Significantly, a majority of Americans have
also supported a two-state settlement on the June 1967 borders, meaning full
Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied in the June war. (21)
“Yes, the polls show strong support for Israel,” M.
J. Rosenberg, director of policy analysis for the Israel Policy Forum observed
in 2007 apropos of recent trends; however, “that support for Israel, such as
there is, is broad but it is not very deep.”
This phenomenon can be seen almost every day in “Letters
to the Editors” columns. Every time an op-ed about Israel appears, especially
if it is critical, there are a slew of letters to the editor. Most support the
Israeli position. And almost without exception, they are written by Jews. That
vast majority [of non-Jewish Americans] out there which supposedly is so
supportive of Israel virtually never chimes in. (22)
According to a 2007 poll by the Anti-Defamation
League (ADL) the favorable opinion of Americans towards Israel was markedly
less than their favorable opinion toward Great Britain and Japan, while roughly
equal to their favorable opinion of India and Mexico. Nearly half of the
respondents believed that the U.S. should work with “moderate” Arab states
“even at the expense of Israel.” (23) Polls during the summer 2006 Lebanon War
showed that half or more of Americans held Israel and Hezbollah equally to
blame and supported a (more) neutral U.S. stance. (24) A 2010 poll found that
only one third of Americans felt that Israel was “very important” to the U.S.,
placing it just above Mexico and well below China, Great Britain, Canada and
even Japan in importance. (25) In addition, in recent years, influential
religious constituencies such as the Presbyterian Church USA, the World Council
of Churches, the United Church of Christ, and the United Methodist Church have
all supported initiatives, including corporate divestment, to force an end to
Israel’s occupation. (26)
A 2005 survey by respected Jewish pollster Steven M. Cohen
found that “the attachment of American Jews to Israel has weakened measurably
in the last two years ... , continuing a long-term trend.”
Respondents were less likely than in comparable
earlier surveys to say they care about Israel, talk about Israel with others or
engage in a range of pro-Israel activities. Strikingly, there was no parallel
decline in other measures of Jewish identification, including religious
observance and communal affiliation. The survey found 26% who said they were “very”
emotionally attached to Israel, compared with 31% who said so in a similar survey
conducted in 2002. Some two-thirds, 65%, said they follow the news about Israel
closely, down from 74% in 2002, while 39% said they talk about Israel
frequently with Jewish friends, down from 53% in 2002
....
Israel also declined as a component in the
respondents’ personal Jewish identity. When offered a selection of factors, including
religion, community and social justice, as well as “caring about Israel,” and
asked, “For you personally, how much does being Jewish involve each?,” 48% said
Israel matters “a lot,” compared with 58% in 2002. Just 57% affirmed that
“caring about Israel is a very important part of my being Jewish,” compared
with 73% in a similar survey in 1989. (27)
A 2007 American Jewish Committee poll found that 30 percent
of Jews felt “fairly distant” or “very distant” from Israel, and a 2010
Brandeis University poll found that only 33 percent of Jews felt “very much”
connected to Israel while the other 67 percent felt “somewhat” (30 percent), “a
little” (23 percent) or “not at all” (14 percent) connected to Israel. “In the
long run,” Cohen predicts “a polarization in American Jewry: a small group
growing more pious and attached to Israel, while a larger one drift s away.” (28)
A 2006 poll found that, among American Jews under 40,
fully one-third felt “fairly distant” or “very distant” from Israel, while a
2007 poll found that among Jews under 35 fully 40 percent registered a “low attachment”
to Israel (only 20 percent registered a “high attachment”). Astonishingly, less
than half responded affirmatively that “Israel’s destruction would be a
personal tragedy.” (29) The former chairman of the Jewish Agency recently
sounded the alarm that “less than 24 percent of young Jews in North America
belong to Jewish organizations. Less than 50 percent of North American Jews
under the age of 35 feel a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people. Less
than 25 percent of North American Jews under age 35 define themselves as
Zionists.” (30) On the nation’s campuses support for Israel is confined not
only to Jewish students but also mostly to the Zionist faithful gathered in the
Hillels. “Jewish college students are clearly less attached to Israel than in
previous generations,” a study commissioned by Jewish advocacy organizations reports.
“Israel is losing the battle for the hearts and minds of this cohort.” (31)
Indeed, of the nearly half million Jewish students attending institutions of
higher education, “only about five percent have any connection to the Jewish
community.” (32)
Ambivalence towards Israel verging on disaffection
can also be discerned among influential sectors of American society, the
bellwethers of U.S. intellectual life, and the reading public. A recent poll
found that a majority of opinion leaders in the U.S. view support for Israel as
a “major reason for discontent with the U.S.” around the world. (33) In a 2003
New York Review of Books essay, noted Jewish historian Tony Judt asserted that
“Israel today is bad for the Jews” and he doubted both the viability and
desirability of a Jewish state. (34) John J. Mearsheimer of the University of
Chicago and Stephen M. Walt of the Harvard Kennedy School coauthored an influential
paper in 2006 debunking the idealized image of Israel’s history and asserting
that Israel has become a “strategic liability” for the United States. (35) A
book by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, provocatively titled Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, deplored
Israeli policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and put the blame for the impasse
in the peace process squarely on Israel. (36)
Although the Israel lobby launched vitriolic
counterattacks to these interventions, its usual smears alleging anti-Semitism
and Holocaust denial did not adhere. When in 2006 the lobby’s pressures led to
cancellation of one of Tony Judt’s speaking engagements, he became an instant cause célèbre in American intellectual circles. (37) His critics, such as
Abraham H. Foxman of the ADL, were derided for “slinging the dread charge of
anti-Semitism” and for being an “anachronism.” (38) Carter, meanwhile, was said
to be a plagiarist, in the pay of Arab sheikhs, an anti-Semite, an apologist
for terrorism, a Nazi sympathizer, (39) and a borderline Holocaust denier. (40)
Yet his book landed on the New York Times bestseller list and remained there for
months, selling an estimated 300,000 copies in hardback. Although snubbed by
Brandeis University’s president, Carter still received standing ovations from
the student body when he came to speak at the historically Jewish institution.
(Half the audience walked out when Harvard law professor Alan M. Dershowitz rose
to answer Carter.) (41) Mearsheimer and Walt negotiated a book deal with the
prestigious publishing house Farrar, Straus and Giroux, and their book, The
Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, also went on to become a Times
bestseller. (42) It is further testament to Israel’s waning fortunes that,
during Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s term of office, even Foxman and perennial Israel
supporter Elie Wiesel took to publicly rebuking Israel for its failure to
pursue peace. (43)
The simmering public discontent with Israeli policy
in recent years reached a boiling point of indignation during the Gaza
invasion. Despite Israel’s carefully orchestrated propaganda blitz; despite the
overwhelmingly “pro”-Israel bias of mainstream media coverage, especially
during the first few days of the attack (44); and despite official support in
the West for the assault—despite all this, large popular protests throughout Western
Europe (Spain, Italy, Germany, France, and Great Britain) dwarfed in size
demonstrations supporting Israel. (45) A wave of student occupations swept
across Great Britain including Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, Birmingham,
London School of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies, Warwick, King’s,
Sussex, and Cardiff.
Even in traditional bastions of support for Israel
such as Canada, where the “pro”-Israel bias of the extreme right-wing political
establishment and media is unusually intense, (46) a plurality of public
opinion disapproved of the assault and the Canadian Union of Public Employees
passed a motion calling for an academic boycott of Israel. (47) Declaring after
the ceasefire that “the events in Gaza have shocked us to the core,” a 16-strong
group of the world’s most experienced investigators and judges—including
Antonio Cassese (First President and Judge of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Head of the U.N. Inquiry on Darfur) and
Richard Goldstone (Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and Chairman of the U.N. Inquiry on
Kosovo)—called for an “international investigation of gross violations of the
laws of war, committed by all parties to the Gaza conflict.” (48)
Unsurprisingly Israel’s apologists attributed the
widespread outrage at the Gaza invasion to anti-Semitism. (49) It might be
posited as a general rule that the lower the depths to which Israel’s criminal
conduct sinks the higher the decibel level of the shrieks of anti-Semitism.
Jews are confronting “an epidemic, a pandemic of anti-Semitism,” Abraham H.
Foxman declared. “This is the worst, the most intense, the most global it’s been
in most of our recent memories.” (50) Such fear mongering was nothing new from
Foxman, who had portended back in 2003 that anti-Semitism was posing “as great
a threat to the safety and security of the Jewish people as the one we faced in
the 1930s.” (51)
Just as in the past, (52) poll data used to
substantiate these exaggerations tallied “indicators” of “the most pernicious notions
of anti-Semitism,” such as the finding that “large portions of the European
public continue to believe that Jews still talk too much about what happened to
them in the Holocaust.” (53) According to Parisian media philosopher Bernard-Henri
Lévy, anyone doubting that the Nazi holocaust was a “moral watershed in human
history” should be reckoned an anti-Semite. (54) Few of the alleged
anti-Semitic incidents in Europe went beyond merely unpleasant manifestations,
such as emails and graffiti, (55) while European anti-Semitism, notwithstanding
the hype, paled beside anti-Muslim bias. (A rise in animus towards Jews and Muslims—in
recent years the two curves tend to correlate—appears partly due to a
resurgence of ethnocentrism among older, less educated, and politically
conservative Europeans.) (56)
Nonetheless it is most probably true that the
execution by a self-proclaimed Jewish state of consecutive murderous rampages in
Lebanon and Gaza, and the vocal support lent these rampages by official Jewish
organizations around the world, caused a regrettable—if entirely
predictable—“spillover” (57) whereby Jews generally were in some quarters held
culpable. If, as the Israeli Coordination Forum for Countering Anti-Semitism
asserted, there was “a sharp rise in the number and intensity of anti-Semitic
incidents” during the Gaza massacre; and if “with the ceasefire there has ...
been a marked decline in the number and intensity of anti-Semitic incidents”;
and if “another flare-up in the region, similar to the Gaza operation, will
probably lead to an even more severe outbreak of anti-Semitic activity against
communities worldwide,” then an efficacious method to fight anti-Semitism would
appear to be for Israel to stop committing massacres. (58)
It is also true that the growing rift between official
support of Israeli war mongering and popular revulsion against it might feed anti-Semitic
conspiracy theories. “A significant gap has been exposed between Israel’s
status among the world’s political leaders, on the one hand, and within civil
society, on the other,” an influential Israeli study observed. “Israel is under
continuous attack within the same countries with which it maintains close
relations.” (59) In Germany for example the political establishment and
mainstream media do not brook any criticism of Israel (60) because of the
“special relationship” growing out of Germany’s “historic responsibility,” and
Chancellor Angela Merkel surpassed other European leaders in her embrace of
Israel during the Gaza invasion. Yet recent polls have shown that 60 percent of
Germans reject the notion of a special German obligation to Israel (70 percent
of young people reject it), 50 percent believe that Israel is an aggressive
country, 68 percent regard its influence in the world as mainly negative (only
13 percent regard it as mainly positive), and 60 percent believe that it
pursues its interests ruthlessly. (61) More generally, Gideon Levy recalled
“the surreal scene at the height of the brutal assault on Gaza when the heads
of the European Union came to Israel and dined with the prime minister in a show
of unilateral support for the side wreaking the killing and destruction.” (62)
And although it was Israel that broke the ceasefire and launched the invasion,
European leaders parleyed with the U.S. (and Canada) on how to thwart
rearmament not of the perpetrators but of the victims. (63) It is only a matter
of time before Europeans begin to wonder—if they haven’t already—at whose
behest their foreign policy is being made.
The ascription of popular Gentile outrage over the
Gaza massacre to anti-Semitism appeared all the more preposterous in the face
of widespread and vocal Jewish dissent. Whereas established communal Jewish
organizations issued statements supporting Israel, ad hoc Jewish organizations
and petitions deploring the invasion proliferated. (64) Most significantly,
Jews prominent in communal Jewish life criticized Israel, albeit mostly in
muted language. (65) As Israel stood poised to launch the ground offensive after
a week of aerial attacks, a group of Britain’s most distinguished Jews,
describing themselves as “profound and passionate supporters” of Israel,
expressed “horror” at the “increasing loss of life on both sides” and called on
Israel to cease its military operations in Gaza immediately. (66)
On a more acerbic note, British MP and former shadow foreign
minister Gerald Kaufman declared during a House of Commons debate on Gaza, “My
grandmother was ill in bed when the Nazis came to her home town of Staszow. A
German soldier shot her dead in her bed. My grandmother did not die to provide
cover for Israeli soldiers murdering Palestinian grandmothers in Gaza.” He went
on to indict the Israeli government for having “ruthlessly and cynically
exploit[ed] the continuing guilt among Gentiles over the slaughter of Jews in
the holocaust as justification for their murder of Palestinians.” (67) Meanwhile
in France the popular Jewish writer Jean-Moïse Braitberg called on the Israeli
president to remove his grandfather’s name from the memorial at Yad Vashem
dedicated to victims of the Nazi holocaust “so that it can no longer be used to
justify the horror which is visited on the Palestinians.” (68) In Germany
Evelyn Hecht-Galinski, daughter of a former president of the Central Council of
Jews in Germany, wrote, “Not the elected Hamas government, but the brutal
occupier ... belongs in the dock at the Hague,” while the German section of
European Jews for a Just Peace issued a statement headlined “German Jews Say NO
to Israeli Army Killings.” (69) In Canada eight Jewish women occupying the
Israeli consulate called on “all Jews to speak out against this massacre,” and
celebrated Canadian pianist Anton Kuerti declared, “The unbelievable war crimes
that Israel is committing in Gaza ... make me ashamed to be a Jew.” (70) In
Australia two award-winning novelists and a former federal cabinet minister
signed a statement by Jews condemning Israel’s “grossly disproportionate
assault.” (71)
The Bush administration and the U.S. Congress lent unqualified
support to Israel during the invasion. A resolution laying full culpability on
Hamas for the resulting death and destruction passed unanimously in the Senate
and 390 to 5 in the House. (72) Much of the mainstream media in the U.S.
likewise shamelessly toed the Israeli party line. “By New Year’s Day, Israel’s
cheering squad had turned the opinion pages of major American newspapers into
their own personal romper room,” blogger Max Blumenthal observed. “Of all the
editorial contributions published by the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal,
and the New York Times since the Israeli war on Gaza began, ... only one offered
a skeptical view of the assault.” (73) The New York Times’s conception of op-ed
balance was achieved by juxtaposing Jeffrey Goldberg’s reverie on the
unregenerate evil of Hamas (74) with Thomas Friedman’s counsel to Israel that
it inflict “heavy pain on the Gaza population.” (75) Its hometown rival the New
York Daily News ran an op-ed by Rabbi Marvin Hier that urged world leaders “not
... to rebuild Gaza again” even though “many civilians will suffer” because
“terrorists and those who support them are not entitled to receive VIP booty
for their inhumanity, misdeeds and silence.” (76) Hier is the founder and dean
of the Simon Wiesenthal Center and its Museum of Tolerance. In the midst of
this lynch-mob atmosphere even human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch
reserved their strongest condemnations for Hamas. (77)
These venomous elite outpourings notwithstanding, public
opinion polls showed that, although harshly critical of Hamas, only about 40
percent of Americans approved of the Israeli attack, while among those voting
Democratic (the party affiliation of most Jews) approval dropped to 30 percent.
(78) In a dramatic display of independence reminiscent of Jimmy Carter’s authorship
of Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, liberal icon Bill Moyers rebuked Israel on
his popular public affairs program Bill Moyers Journal, albeit in a context
that also took Hamas to task: “By killing indiscriminately the elderly, kids,
entire families, by destroying schools and hospitals, Israel did exactly what
terrorists do.” Like Carter, Moyers immediately came under fire from Abraham H.
Foxman, who accused him of “racism, historical revisionism and indifference to
terrorism,” and Harvard law professor Alan M. Dershowitz who decried Moyers’s
“false moral equivalence” between Hamas terrorism and the Israeli army that
“inadvertently kill[s] some Palestinian civilians who are used as human shields
by Hamas.” But again like Carter, Moyers managed to stand his ground and, as
fellow liberals rose to his defense, to emerge unscathed after the fusillade of
slanders. (79)
As the Gaza invasion unfolded, and the shocking
images of the carnage transmitted live by Al-Jazeera could no longer be
ignored, cracks started appearing in the moderate mainstream. Under the ominous
title “Time Running Out for a Two-State Solution?,” the most-watched U.S. news
broadcast 60 Minutes aired a devastating segment on Jewish settlers in the West
Bank, which included a harrowing scene of “Arabs [who] are occupied inside
their own homes” by Israeli soldiers. (80) The right-wing editorial page of the
Wall Street Journal ran a piece by law professor George E. Bisharat under the
headline “Israel Is Committing War Crimes.” (81)
The normally staid New York Times columnist Roger Cohen
confessed in a pair of columns to being “shamed by Israeli actions.” In the
second piece Cohen speculated that “Israel’s continued expansion of settlements,
Gaza blockade, West Bank walling-in and wanton recourse to high-tech force” was
“designed precisely to bludgeon, undermine and humiliate the Palestinian people
until their dreams of statehood and dignity evaporate.” (82) Former editor of
the New Republic and influential conservative blogger Andrew Sullivan judged
that the Israeli attack was “far from a close call morally.... This is an
extremely one-sided war,” and he labeled “thugs” the rightwing Jewish
apologists for “the terrible human carnage now being inflicted by Israel (and
paid for in part by Americans).” (83)
Philip Slater, author of the classic sociological
study The Pursuit of Loneliness, declared, “The Gaza Strip is little more than
a large Israeli concentration camp, in which Palestinians are attacked at will,
starved of food, fuel, energy—even deprived of hospital supplies.... It would
be difficult to have any respect for them if they didn’t fire a few rockets
back.” (84) Meanwhile the City Council of Cambridge, Massachusetts, a liberal
enclave and home to Harvard University, adopted a resolution “condemning the attacks
[on] and invasion of Gaza by the Israeli military and the rocket attacks upon
the people of Israel,” (85) and a group of American university professors launched
a national campaign calling for an academic and cultural boycott of Israel. (86)
A poll of American Jews found that 47% strongly
approved of the Israeli assault, but—in a sharp break with the usual wallto-wall
solidarity—53% were either ambivalent (44% “somewhat” approved or “somewhat”
disapproved) or strongly disapproved (9%). (87) Seasoned observers of the
American Jewish community pointed to a “post-Gaza sea change.” Apart from “the
more conservative segment of the pro-Israel community,” M. J. Rosenberg of the
Israel Policy Forum noted, “there was little show of support for this war. In
New York, a city where crowds of 250,000 have come out for ‘solidarity’ rallies
in the past, only 8,000 came to Manhattan for a community demonstration on a
sunny Sunday.” (88)
In a public clash with the traditional Jewish
leadership, mainstream if less-established Jewish organizations such as J
Street staked out a middle ground that “recognize[d] that neither Israelis nor
Palestinians have a monopoly on right or wrong,” and called for “shedding a
narrow us-versus-them approach to the Middle East.” (89) Founded in 2008, J
Street projects itself as a liberal counterweight to the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It is too soon to predict whether J Street—which
currently hews to a vaguely progressive political agenda, although it also defines
itself as “closest” to Kadima, the Israeli political party headed by Tzipi
Livni— will calcify into a “loyal opposition” or escalate its criticism of Israeli
policy as the gulf dividing American Jewry from Israel widens. (90) Meanwhile
“American Jews for a Just Peace” circulated a petition calling on “Israeli Soldiers
to Stop War Crimes,” “Jews Say No” demonstrated outside the World Zionist
Organization and Jewish Agency offices, and “Jews against the Occupation” dropped
a banner over New York City’s West Side Highway declaring “Jews Say: End
Israel’s War on Gaza NOW!” (91)
In the liberal Jewish intellectual milieu only
perennial apologists for Israel, most of whom came on board right after the
June 1967 war and are now in their 70s, ventured a fullthroated defense of the
invasion. It was obvious to moral philosopher Michael Walzer that Israel had
exhausted nonviolent options before it attacked and that Hamas bore
responsibility for the ensuing civilian deaths. To Walzer the only “hard
question” was whether Israel did all it possibly could to reduce these casualties.
(92) It was obvious to Alan M. Dershowitz that Israel made “its best efforts to
avoid killing civilians” and that it failed because Hamas pursued a “dead baby”
strategy of forcing Israel to kill Palestinian children in order to garner
international sympathy. (93) It was obvious to New Republic editor Martin Peretz
from his scrutiny of the Palestinians’ footwear that the Israeli blockade of
Gaza was benign: “You have to look closely at the sneakers, seemingly new and,
of course, costly.” (94) It was obvious to writer Paul Berman that if a
“possibility” exists that Hamas might threaten Israel someday in the future
with genocide “if Hamas were allowed to prosper unimpeded, and if its allies
and fellow-thinkers in Hezbollah and the Iranian government and its nuclear
program likewise prospered,” then Israel would have the right to launch an attack
now. (95) On such an accumulation of hypotheticals stacked on conditionals, it
is hard to conceive what country in the world would be safe from arbitrary attack,
and what country would not be justified in arbitrarily launching an attack.
If, apart from this coterie of robust Israel
defenders, Jewish liberals recognized that the Israeli onslaught was morally problematic,
they could not yet abide their dirty laundry being aired in front of the goyim.
Magazines and journals of opinion pitched to the upscale and urbane Jewish
public such as the New Yorker and the New York Review of Books accordingly sat out
the Gaza massacre. (96) However, one influential contingent of liberal Jewish
public intellectuals did not stay silent: the new generation of liberal Jewish
bloggers and regular contributors to liberal-Democratic web sites such as
Salon.com and the Huffington Post. Less in thrall to establishment Jewish
editors, advertisers, funders, and social networks, speaking as and for a
generation that came of age when to a large degree Zionist mythology had been
dispelled and displaced by sober historical research, when the Israeli
political establishment had grown squalid and reactionary, when Israel’s human
rights record had been subjected to piercing scrutiny by the human rights
community, and when Holocaust-induced paranoia and anti-Semitism-mongering palpably
collided with the quotidian reality of triumphant Jewish assimilation
everywhere from the Ivy League to Wall Street, from Hollywood to Washington,
and from the country club to the marriage altar—professionally, mentally, and
emotionally emancipated from the shackles of the past, these Jewish habitués of
the blogosphere went on the offensive denouncing the Gaza invasion from its
inception. The symbolism could scarcely be missed. Whereas diehard apologists
for Israel such as Walzer, Dershowitz, and Peretz climbed aboard the Zionist ship
while in their youths, the generation of youthful Jewish public intellectuals
now making their names on the Internet has been jumping off it. (97) “I pity
them their hatred of their inheritance,” Peretz hissed. “They are pip-squeaks.”
(98)
Here are the pip-squeaks in their own words. Ezra
Klein (age 25; blogger for American Prospect) posted on Day 2 of the invasion,
“The rocket attacks were undoubtedly ‘deeply disturbing’ to Israelis. But so
too are the checkpoints, the road closures, the restricted movement, the
terrible joblessness, the unflinching oppression, the daily humiliations, the
illegal settlement— I’m sorry, ‘outpost’—construction ‘deeply disturbing’ to
the Palestinians, and far more injurious. And the 300 dead Palestinians should
be disturbing to us all.” (99)
Adam Horowitz (age 35; blogger for Mondoweiss) posted
on Day 4 in response to Benny Morris’s op-ed in the New York Times, “It is
clear he can only see the reactions, but not the cause. He lists the responses
to Israel and to Israel’s ongoing Jewish colonization of historic Palestine,
without mentioning the elephant in the room, that the walls closing in on
Israel are all self-made.” (100)
Matthew Yglesias (age 28; blogger for Think Progress)
posted on Day 6, “While Israel has stated a desire to leave the Gaza Palestinians
alone in their tiny, overcrowded, economically unviable enclave, the [2005]
‘disengagement’ from Gaza has never entailed letting Palestinians control their
borders or exercise meaningful sovereignty over the area. The proposal has
basically been that if Palestinians cease violence against Israel, then the
Gaza Strip will be treated like an Indian reservation.” (101)
Dana Goldstein (age 24; blogger for American
Prospect) posted on Day 12, “I want to believe that the collective, historical
experience of Jewishness and Zionism leads to something better—something more
humane—than what we’ve witnessed in the Middle East this past week.” (102)
Glenn Greenwald (age 42; blogger for Salon.com)
posted on Day 13, “This is not so much of a war as it is a completely one-sided
massacre,” and on 30 January 2009, “It’s just not possible to make real
progress in the domestic aims of restoring the Constitution and reversing our
military and intelligence expansions if we are simultaneously enabling and
blindly supporting Israel’s various wars (and therefore dragging ourselves into
those wars).”
On 20 February 2009 Greenwald responded to an
insinuation by Jeffrey Goldberg that he was a Jew-hating Israelbasher, “People
like Jeffrey Goldberg ... have so abused, overused, manipulated and exploited
the ‘anti-Semitism’ and ‘anti-Israel’ accusations for improper and nakedly
political ends that those terms have become drained of their meaning, have
almost entirely lost their sting, and have become trivialized virtually to the
point of caricature.... Indeed, people like Goldberg are becoming extra rancid
and reckless in their rhetoric precisely because they know that these
rhetorical devices have ceased working.” “There is a definite sea change when
it comes to American policy debates toward Israel,” Greenwald concluded. “They
no longer possess the ability to stifle dissent through thuggish intimidation
tactics and they know that, which is why they can now do nothing but turn up
the volume on their name-calling attacks. The Israeli devastation of Gaza and
its trapped, defenseless civilian population—using American bombs, arms, money
and diplomatic cover—was so brutal and horrific to watch that it inevitably
changed the way people view that Middle East conflict.” (103) Soon after the Gaza
invasion ended, the phalanx of liberal Jewish bloggers again went tit-for-tat
with the Israel lobby when the lobby sought to block the Obama administration’s
appointment of Chas Freeman, an official critical of Israeli policy. (104)
Another straw in the wind was a sketch titled “Strip Maul”
that aired on Comedy Central’s Daily Show on 5 January 2009. The host of the
program, comedian Jon Stewart, is Jewish and has a huge following among young
people. To roars of approval from the studio audience, he ridiculed the
numbingly unanimous and cliché-ridden support for Israel among politicians (“It’s
the Möbius strip of issues—there’s only one side!”); adverted to “the
soul-crushing segmentation and blockading of Gaza”; and likened a Palestinian’s
plight to forcing someone “to live in my hallway and make him go through
checkpoints every time he has to take a s**t.” (105)
The generational metamorphosis regarding Israel was most
evident on college campuses. “A shift toward more visible pro-Palestinian or
anti-Israel sentiment has been profound on some campuses,” Inside Higher Ed
reported, “prompted, in part, by the winter war in Gaza.” (106) An Israel lobby
publication lamented that student supporters have been reduced to arguing, “Israel
doesn’t suck.” (107) Large halls filled to overflow for lectures deploring the
Gaza massacre. Whereas “pro”-Israel groups used to protest inside or outside
such lectures, they were now barely seen. Students at Cornell University lined pathways
with 1,300 black flags commemorating the dead in Gaza. (The display was later
vandalized.) Students at University of Rochester, University of Massachusetts,
New York University, Columbia University, Haverford College, Bryn Mawr College,
and Hampshire College held petition drives, protests, and sit-ins demanding financial
support for Palestinian students and divestment from arms companies and
companies doing business with the illegal Jewish settlements. Hampshire College
students successfully pressured the college’s trustees to divest from American
corporations that directly profit from the occupation.
Although “pro”-Israel organizations alleged that
“college and university campuses ... have become hotbeds of a virulent new
strain of anti-Semitism,” (108) at many campuses Jewish students have played a
leading role on the local “Students for Justice in Palestine” committees, and
creative and dedicated young Jewish activists in Birthright Unplugged and
Anarchists Against the Wall, alongside individuals such as Anna Baltzer, author
of the memoir Witness in Palestine, (109) have gone from school to school offering
personal testimony on the daily horrors unfolding in Palestine. The bonds of
solidarity being forged between young Jews and Muslims opposing the
occupation—the core group on many campuses consists of secular Jewish radicals and
observant Muslim women—give reason for hope that a just and lasting peace may
yet be achieved.
After speaking on the Gaza massacre at a Canadian
university, the sponsors presented me with a button reading “I ♥ GAZA.” I pinned the button to my backpack
and headed for the airport. As I stood on the queue to board the plane, a
passenger behind me whispered in my ear “I like your button.” Hmm, I thought,
the times they are a-changing. A couple of hours later I asked the airline attendant
for a cup of water. Handing me the cup he leaned over and whispered “I like your
button.” Hmm, I thought, there’s something happening here.
7/ GOLDSTONE
People should know who has committed what crimes. This
will show what is the truth and what is the untruth and the poison will come to
the surface. Just now people only make guesses while the poison works within.
Mahatma Gandhi (14 April 1947) (1)
In April 2009 the president of the United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) appointed a “Fact-Finding Mission” to “investigate
all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian
law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military
operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008
and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.” (2) Richard Goldstone,
former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
was named head of the Mission. The Mission’s original mandate was to scrutinize
only Israeli violations of human rights during the assault on Gaza, but
Goldstone made his acceptance of the job conditional on broadening the mandate
to include violations on all sides. The council president invited Goldstone to write
the mandate himself, which Goldstone did and which the president then accepted.
“It was very difficult to refuse ... a mandate that I’d written for myself,”
Goldstone later observed. Nonetheless Israel did not cooperate with the Mission
on the grounds of its alleged bias. (3) In September 2009 the longawaited report
of the Goldstone Mission was released. (4) It was a searing indictment not just
of the Gaza invasion but also of the ongoing Israeli occupation.
The Goldstone Report
found that much of the death and destruction Israel inflicted on the civilian
population and infrastructure of Gaza was premeditated. The assault was said to
be anchored in a military doctrine that “views disproportionate destruction and
creating maximum disruption in the lives of many people as a legitimate means
to achieve military and political goals,” and was “designed to have inevitably
dire consequences for the non-combatants in Gaza.” (5) The “disproportionate destruction
and violence against civilians” were part of a “deliberate policy,” as were the
“humiliation and dehumanization of the Palestinian population.” (6) Although
Israel justified the attack on grounds of self-defense against Hamas rocket attacks,
the Goldstone Report pointed to a different
motive. The “primary purpose” of the economic blockade Israel imposed on Gaza was
to “bring about a situation in which the civilian population would find life so
intolerable that they would leave (if that were possible) or turn Hamas out of
office, as well as to collectively punish the civilian population,” and
concomitantly the invasion was “aimed at punishing the Gaza population for its
resilience and for its apparent support for Hamas, and possibly with the intent
of forcing a change in such support.” (7) The Report concluded that the Israeli
assault on Gaza constituted “a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to
punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its
local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force
upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability.” (8) The
Report also paid moving tribute to “the resilience and dignity” of the Gazan
people “in the face of dire circumstances.” (9)
The Goldstone Report
found that in seeking to “punish, humiliate and terrorize” the Gazan civilian
population Israel committed numerous violations of customary and conventional international
law. It also ticked off a lengthy list of war crimes that Israel committed such
as “willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,” “willfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health,” “extensive destruction of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,” and
“use of human shields.” (10) It further found that Israeli actions that
“deprive Palestinians in the Gaza Strip of their means of sustenance,
employment, housing and water, that deny their freedom of movement and their
right to leave and enter their own country, that limit their access to courts
of law and effective remedies ... might justify a competent court finding that
crimes against humanity have been committed.” (11)
The Goldstone Report
pinned primary culpability for these criminal offenses on Israel’s political
and military elites: “The systematic and deliberate nature of the activities ...
leave the Mission in no doubt that responsibility lies in the first place with
those who designed, planned, ordered and oversaw the operations.” (12) It also
found that the fatalities, property damage, and “psychological trauma”
resulting from Hamas’s “indiscriminate” and “deliberate” rocket attacks on
Israel’s civilian population constituted “war crimes and may amount to crimes
against humanity.” (13) Because the Goldstone Mission (like human rights
organizations) devoted a much smaller fraction of its findings to Hamas rocket
attacks, critics accused it of bias. The accusation was valid, but its weight
ran in the opposite direction. If one considers that the ratio of Palestinian
to Israeli deaths stood at more than 100:1 and of dwellings ravaged at more
than 6000:1, then the proportion of the Goldstone Report given over to death and destruction caused by Hamas in
Israel was much greater than the objective data would have warranted. (14)
When it was subsequently put to Goldstone that the Report
disproportionately focused on Israeli violations of international law, he
replied, “It’s difficult to deal equally with a state party, with a
sophisticated army, with the sort of army Israel has, with an air force, and a
navy, and the most sophisticated weapons that are not only in the arsenal of
Israel, but manufactured and exported by Israel, on the one hand, with Hamas
using really improvised, imprecise armaments.” (15) Despite their relative
impotence, Palestinians are often taken to task in the West for not embracing a
Gandhian strategy that repudiates violent resistance. In 2003 then-U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told a Georgetown University audience that
“if the Palestinians would adopt the ways of Gandhi, I think they could in fact
make enormous change very, very quickly.” (16) Whatever the merits of this
contention it still should be recalled what Gandhi actually had to say on the
subject of nonviolence. He categorized forceful resistance in the face of impossible
odds—a woman fending off a rapist with slaps and scratches, an unarmed man
resisting torture by a gang, or Polish armed self-defense to the Nazi
aggression—as “almost nonviolence” because it was in essence symbolic and acted
more as a fillip to the spirit to overcome fear and allow for a dignified
death; it registered “a refusal to bend before overwhelming might in the full
knowledge that it means certain death.” (17) In the face of Israel’s infernal,
high-tech slaughter in Gaza it is hard not to see the desultory Hamas rocket attacks
falling into the category of token violence that Gandhi was loath to condemn. Even
granting that the rocket attacks did constitute fullfledged violence, it is
still not certain that Gandhi would have disapproved. “Fight violence with
nonviolence if you can,” he counseled, “and if you can’t do that, fight
violence by any means, even if it means your utter extinction. But in no case should
you leave your hearths and homes to be looted and burnt.” (18) Isn’t this what
Hamas did when it decided to “fight violence by any means,” even if it meant “utter
extinction,” after Israel broke the ceasefire and refused to relax the illegal blockade
that was destroying Gaza’s “whole civilization” (Mary Robinson) and causing
“the breakdown of an entire society” (Sara Roy)? (19)
The Goldstone Report
did not limit itself narrowly to the Gaza invasion. It broadened out into a
comprehensive, fullblown indictment of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians
during the long years of occupation. The Report condemned Israel’s fragmentation
of the Palestinian people, (20) and its restrictions on Palestinian freedom of
movement and access through the regime of closures, checkpoints, curfews, and
“Israeli-only” roads (21); its “institutionalized discrimination” against
Palestinians both in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in Israel (22); its
violent repression of Palestinian (as well as Israeli) demonstrators opposing
the occupation, and the violent attacks on Palestinian civilians in the West
Bank by Israeli soldiers and Jewish settlers enjoying legal impunity (23); its
wholesale detention of Palestinians (including hundreds of children as well as
Hamas parliamentary members) for political reasons, (24) the lack of due
process, and the violence inflicted on Palestinian detainees (25); its “silent
transfer” of Palestinians in East Jerusalem to ethnically cleanse it (26); its
“de facto annexation” of ten percent of the West Bank on the “Israeli side” of
the Wall that “amount[s] to the acquisition of territory by force, contrary to the
Charter of the United Nations,” (27) and its settlement expansion, land
expropriation, and demolition of Palestinian homes and villages. The Goldstone Report concluded that certain of these
policies constituted war crimes, (28) and also violated the “jus cogens” right
(i.e., peremptory norm under international law) to self-determination. (29)
Although it did not mark out a clear distinction
between those perpetrating and those resisting a brutal occupation, the
Goldstone Report nonetheless did not
pretend to a false equivalence between Israel and the Palestinians. It eschewed
“equating the position of Israel as the Occupying Power with that of the
occupied Palestinian population or entities representing it. The differences
with regard to the power and capacity to inflict harm or to protect, including
by securing justice when violations occur, are obvious and a comparison is neither
possible nor necessary.” (30)
The Goldstone Report
proposed several options to hold Israel and Gaza authorities accountable for
violations of international law during the Gaza invasion. Individual states in
the international community should “start criminal investigations in national
courts, using universal jurisdiction, where there is sufficient evidence of the
commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Where so
warranted following investigation, alleged perpetrators should be arrested and prosecuted
in accordance with internationally recognized standards of justice.” (31) It
also called on the U.N. Security Council to monitor the readiness of Israel and
Gaza authorities to “launch appropriate investigations that are independent and
in conformity with international standards into the serious violations of
international humanitarian and international human rights law.” If Israel and
Gaza authorities failed to undertake “goodfaith investigations,” the Goldstone Report recommended that the Security
Council should “refer the situation in Gaza to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court.” (32) It further recommended that Israel pay
compensation for damages through a U.N. General Assembly escrow fund. (33)
In regard to the Israeli occupation the Goldstone Report recommended that the High
Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention should convene in order to
“enforce the Convention” in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and to “ensure
its respect”; that Israel terminate its blockade of Gaza and strangulation of
Gaza’s economy, its violence against Palestinian civilians, its “destruction
and affronts on human dignity,” its interference in Palestinian political life
and repression of political dissent, and its restrictions on freedom of movement;
that Palestinian armed groups “renounc[e] attacks on Israeli civilians and
civilian objects” and release the Israeli soldier held in captivity; and that
Palestinian authorities release political detainees and respect human rights. (34)
The Israeli reaction to the Goldstone Report came fast and furious. Apart from
a few honorable (if predictable) exceptions, (35) it was subjected for months
to a torrent of relentless abuse across the Israeli political spectrum and at
all levels of society. Indeed, it was nearly impossible to find the actual Report
on the Web amid the avalanche of vicious postings. Ridiculing the Goldstone Report as a “mockery of history,” and Goldstone
himself as a “small man, devoid of any sense of justice, a technocrat with no
real understanding of jurisprudence,” Israeli President Shimon Peres proceeded
to set the record straight: “IDF [Israel Defense Forces] operations enabled
economic prosperity in the West Bank, relieved southern Lebanese citizens from
the terror of Hezbollah, and have enabled Gazans to have normal lives again.” (36)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu purported that the Goldstone Report was “a kangaroo court against
Israel,” (37) and Defense Minister Ehud Barak inveighed that it was “a lie, distorted,
biased and supports terror.” (38) Netanyahu subsequently proposed launching an
international campaign to “amend the rules of war” in order to facilitate the
“battle against terrorists” in the future. (“What is it that Israel wants?,”
Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell wondered aloud. “Permission to fearlessly attack
defenseless population centers with planes, tanks and artillery?”) (39) Knesset
Speaker Reuven Rivlin warned that the Goldstone Report’s “new and crooked morality will usher in a new era in
Western civilization, similar to the one that we remember from the [1938]
Munich agreement.” (40)
Former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni declared that the
Goldstone Report was “born in sin,” (41)
while current Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman declared that it had “no
legal, factual or moral value,” and current Deputy Foreign Minister Danny
Ayalon warned that it “provides legitimacy to terrorism” and risks “turning
international law into a circus.” (42) Former Israeli ambassador to the U.N.
Dan Gillerman ripped the Report for “blatant, one-sided, anti-Israel lies,” and
former Israeli ambassador to the U.N. Dore Gold deemed it “one of the most
potent weapons in the arsenal of international terrorist organizations,” while
current Israeli ambassador to the U.N. Gabriela Shalev castigated it as
“biased, one-sided and political.” (43) Israeli ambassador to the United States
and ballyhooed historian Michael Oren intoned in the Boston Globe that the
Goldstone Report “must be rebuffed by
all those who care about peace”; alleged in an address to the American Jewish Committee
that Hezbollah was one of the Report’s prime beneficiaries; and reckoned in the
New Republic that the Report was even worse than “ Ahmadinejad and the
Holocaust deniers.” (44) (Haaretz’s Gideon Levy dubbed Oren the
“ambassador-propagandist.” (45)) IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi dismissed
the Goldstone Report as “biased and
unbalanced,” while IDF senior legal advisor Avichai Mendelblit derided it as
“biased, astonishingly extreme, lack[ing] any basis in reality.” (46) The
Jerusalem Post editorialized that the Goldstone Report was “a feat of cynical superficiality” and was “born in bias
and matured into a full-fledged miscarriage of justice,” while former Haaretz editor-in-chief
David Landau lamented that the Report’s “fundamental premise, that the Israelis
went after civilians,” eliminated any possibility of “honest debate” (47)—although
that was not the Goldstone Report’s
premise but its conclusion reached after an honest search for truth. Settler
movement leader Israel Harel deemed the Goldstone Report “destructive, toxic,” more wretched than the Protocols of
the Elders of Zion, and misdirected “against precisely that country which
protects human and military ethics more than the world has ever seen,” while residents
of Sderot picketed U.N. offices in Jerusalem holding signs saying “ Goldstone
apologize” and “We’re sick of anti-Semites.” (48) A Tel Aviv University center
for the study of “antisemitism and racism” alleged that the Goldstone Report was responsible for a global
upsurge in “hate crimes against Jews” and “the equation of the war in Gaza with
the Holocaust.” (49) Comparing Goldstone’s accusations against Israel to those
leveled against Alfred Dreyfus, Professor Gerald Steinberg of Bar Ilan
University declared that “Israel had the moral right to flatten all of Gaza.” (50)
(Steinberg founded the university’s program on conflict resolution and
management.)
Fully 94 percent of Israeli Jews who were familiar
with the Goldstone Report’s content
held it to be biased against Israel, and 79 percent rejected its accusation
that the IDF committed war crimes. (51) Even after the Gaza massacre and the military’s
subsequent lies and cover-ups, fully 81 percent of all Israelis and 90 percent
of Israeli Jews ranked the IDF as the state institution they most trust,
placing it first among trusted institutions by a wide margin. (52) Since the
Report’s findings were beyond the pale, the only topic deemed worthy of
deliberation in Israel was whether it had been prudent for Israel to boycott the
Goldstone Mission. (53) But, as veteran peace activist Uri Avnery pointed out,
the “real answer” as to why Israel chose not to cooperate “is quite simple:
they knew full well that the mission, any mission, would have to reach the
conclusions it did reach.” It is notable that, unlike in the past, after the Gaza
invasion Israelis dispensed with the theatrical outpourings of angst—“shooting
and crying”—that Jewish cheerleaders abroad regularly used to tout as proof of
the uniquely sensitive Israeli soul. Brutalized and calloused, Israelis could
apparently no longer even conceive of a feeling of remorse. Although calling for
a ceasefire after the initial air assault, the icons of Israel’s “peace camp”—
Amos Oz, A. B. Yehoshua, and David Grossman— still alleged that Hamas was
“responsible” and the Israeli invasion “necessary” because Hamas leaders
“refused every Israeli and Egyptian attempt to reach a compromise to prevent this
latest flare-up.” (54)
Back in the U.S. the usual suspects rose (or sunk) to
the occasion of smearing the message and the messenger. In a posting on
Commentary’s web site Max Boot dismissed the Goldstone Report as a “risible series of findings,” and former U.S. ambassador
to the United Nations John Bolton opined in the Wall Street Journal that “the
logical response to this debacle is to withdraw from and defund” the Human
Rights Council. (55) Elie Wiesel condemned the Goldstone Report as not only “a crime against the Jewish people” but also
“unnecessary,” ostensibly because “I can’t believe that Israeli soldiers
murdered people or shot children. It just can’t be.” (56) Harvard’s Alan M.
Dershowitz alleged that the Goldstone Report
“is so filled with lies, distortions and blood libels that it could have been
draft ed by Hamas extremists”; that it recalled the “Protocols of the Elders of
Zion” and was “biased and bigoted”; that “every serious student of human rights
should be appalled at this anti-human rights and highly politicized report”;
that it made “findings of fact (nearly all wrong),” stated “conclusions of law
(nearly all questionable),” and made “specific recommendations (nearly all
one-sided)”; and that Goldstone was “a traitor to the Jewish people,” an “evil,
evil man” and—he said on Israeli television— on a par with Auschwitz “Angel of
Death” Josef Mengele. (57) The “essence” and “central conclusion” of the
Goldstone Report, according to
Dershowitz, was that Israel had a “carefully planned and executed policy of
deliberately targeting innocent civilians for mass murder”; that Israel’s “real
purpose” was “to target innocent Palestinian civilians—children, women and the elderly—for
death.” He repeated this characterization of the Goldstone Report on nearly every page—often multiple times on a single
page—of his lengthy “study in evidentiary bias,” and then handily refuted the
allegation. (58) The problem was that Dershowitz conjured a straw man: the
Goldstone Report never said or
implied that the principal objective of Israel’s attack was to murder
Palestinians. If the Goldstone Report
did allege this, it would have had to charge Israel with genocide—but it
didn’t. It is a commonplace that the more frequently a lie is repeated the more
credible it becomes. The novelty of Dershowitz’s “study” was that it kept
repeating a lie the more easily to discredit its purveyor.
Dershowitz and other Goldstone-bashers alleged that
the Palestinian witnesses were either coached and intimidated by Hamas or were
actually Hamas militants in disguise, without a jot of evidence being adduced,
(59) while Goldstone himself rejoined by offering “every assurance that it
didn’t happen.” (60) The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) called
the Goldstone Mission “rigged” and the Goldstone Report “deeply flawed,” (61) the American Jewish Committee deplored
it as a “deeply distorted document,” (62) and Abraham H. Foxman of the
Anti-Defamation League was “shocked and distressed that the United States would
not unilaterally dismiss it.” (63)
The Obama administration quickly fell into line with
the Israel lobby, but it probably did not need much prodding: one of Israel’s
talking points in Washington was that the Goldstone Report’s recommendation to prosecute soldiers for war crimes “should
worry every country fighting terror.” (64) State Department Spokesman Ian Kelly
alleged that whereas the Report “makes overly sweeping conclusions of fact and
law with respect to Israel, its conclusions regarding Hamas’s deplorable
conduct ... are more general”; Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Democracy
Michael Posner condemned it as “deeply flawed”; and Deputy U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations Alejandro Wolff faulted its “unbalanced focus on Israel.” (65)
In its 47-page entry for “Israel and the occupied territories,” the U.S. State
Department’s 2009 Human Rights Report devoted all of three sentences to the
Israeli attack on Gaza, then touched on the Goldstone Mission’s findings and
disparagingly concluded: “The Goldstone report
was widely criticized for methodological failings, legal and factual errors,
falsehoods, and for devoting insufficient attention to the asymmetrical nature of
the conflict and the fact that Hamas and other Palestinian militants were
deliberately operating in heavily populated urban areas of Gaza.” (66) New York
Democrat Gary Ackerman, chair of the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and
South Asia, mocked Goldstone as inhabiting a “self-righteous fantasyland” and
the Report as a “pompous, tendentious, one-sided political diatribe.” (67)
After suffering a relentless barrage of such attacks,
Goldstone finally challenged the Obama administration to justify substantively its
criticism of the Report, while Human Rights Watch (HRW) took to task the U.S.
government for having “resorted to calling the report ‘unbalanced’ and ‘deeply flawed,’
but providing no real facts to support those assertions.” (68) The U.S. House
of Representatives passed by a vote of 344 to 36 a non-binding resolution that
condemned the Goldstone Report as
“irredeemably biased and unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy.” (69)
Before the vote was taken Goldstone provided a point-by-point demonstration
that the House resolution was vitiated by “serious factual inaccuracies and instances
where information and statements are taken grossly out of context.” (70)
Meanwhile, the U.S. government reportedly planned to block or limit Security
Council action on the Goldstone Report,
while both the U.S. and Israel pressured the Palestinian Authority (PA) to drop
its support of the Report’s recommendations. “The PA has reached the point
where it has to decide,” a senior Israeli defense official pronounced, “whether
it is working with us or against us.” (71)
The answer was not long in coming. Acting on direct
instructions from President Mahmoud Abbas, the PA representative on the U.N.
Human Rights Council effectively acquiesced in killing consideration of the
Goldstone Report, but the decision
evoked such outrage among Palestinians that the PA was forced to reverse itself
and the council convened to consider the findings. (72) It approved a resolution
“condemning all targeting of civilians and stressing the urgent need to ensure
accountability for all violations” of international law, and it endorsed the
Goldstone Report’s recommendations and
urged the United Nations to act on them. (73) In November 2009 the U.N. General
Assembly passed by a vote of 114 to 18 (44 countries abstained) a resolution
also “condemning all targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure,” and
it called on both Israel and the “Palestinian side” to “undertake
investigations that are independent, credible and in conformity with
international standards into the serious violations of international ... law
reported by the Fact-Finding Mission.” (74) Israeli officials denounced the
resolution as “completely detached from realities” and a “mockery of reality,”
and alleged that the vote “proves that Israel is succeeding in getting across
the message that the report is one-sided and not serious.” (75)
In February 2010, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported
back to the General Assembly that still “no determination can be made on the
implementation” of its November 2009 resolution calling for credible
investigations. (76) Later in the month the General Assembly passed another
resolution by a vote of 98 to 7 (31 countries abstained) reiterating its call
on Israel and Hamas to “conduct investigations that are independent, credible
and in conformity with international standards,” and requesting that the
Secretary-General report back within five months on the implementation of the
resolution. (77) Despite intensive lobbying by European Jewish groups, the
European Parliament passed in March 2010 by a vote of 335 to 287 a resolution “demanding”
implementation of the Goldstone Report’s
recommendations and “accountability for all violations of international law,
including alleged war crimes.” The spokesman for the Israeli mission to the
European Union deplored the resolution as “flawed and counterproductive.” (78)
In January and July 2010 respectively, Israel
released “updates” on its own investigations. (79) Although scores of
investigations had been conducted according to these documents, the results
overwhelmingly exonerated Israelis of wrongdoing: a handful of soldiers suffered
disciplinary sanctions such as an officer who was “severely reprimanded”; to
date the one and only Israeli convicted on a criminal charge and sentenced to
prison remained the soldier who stole a credit card. (80) Even these risibly
token punishments evoked indignation in IDF ranks. (81) Still, the Israeli
investigations could not be faulted for lack of creativity. One soldier who
killed a woman carrying a white flag was exonerated on the grounds that the
bullet was actually a “warning shot” that “ricocheted” (82)—off a cloud? Despite
near-total vindication by these “investigations,” in a magnanimous gesture
Israel “adopted important new written procedures and doctrine designed to
enhance the protection of civilians ... and to limit unnecessary damage to civilian
property and infrastructure” in future conflicts (83)—as if the death and
destruction in Gaza had resulted from operational deficits and not from an
assault “designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population.” (84)
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights announced
in June 2010 the formation of an independent panel to “ensure accountability
for all violations of international humanitarian and international human rights
laws during the Gaza conflict.” (85) The committee was chaired by a former
member of the International Law Commission and included a former Justice of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York. The committee’s report, issued in
September 2010, (86) found that, although “certain positive steps ... have
resulted from Israel’s investigations,” the bottom line was that “the military
investigations thus far appear to have produced very little.” (87) Indeed, while
“the Committee cannot conclude that credible and genuine investigations have
been carried out by the de facto authorities in the Gaza Strip,” (88) Hamas
apparently convicted and sentenced to prison time more people than Israel. (89)
After release of this report Amnesty International urged the U.N. Human Rights
Council to “recognize the failure of the investigations conducted by Israel and
the Hamas de facto administration,” and to “call on the ICC [International
Criminal Court] Prosecutor urgently to seek a determination ... whether the ICC
has jurisdiction over the Gaza conflict.” (90)
In March 2010 the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center released a voluminous response to the Goldstone Report. (91) It was based largely on “interrogations of terrorist
operatives,” “reports from IDF forces,” “Israeli intelligence information,” and
unverifiable and indecipherable photographic evidence. Ignoring copious
evidence amassed by human rights organizations, the Center’s response denied
that Gazans were suffering a humanitarian crisis before the Israeli attack (it
blamed Hamas for the shortages that did arise); (92) denied that Israel’s 4
November 2008 raid on Gaza caused the breakdown of the ceasefire with Hamas; (93)
and denied that Israel used Palestinians as human shields. (94) It also falsely
alleged that the Goldstone Report
made “almost no mention of the brutal means of repression used by Hamas against
its opponents”; (95) falsely alleged that the Report devoted “just three
paragraphs” to Hamas’s “rocket and mortar fire during Operation Cast Lead” and
downplayed Israeli civilian deaths; (96) falsely alleged that the Report
“absolved” Hamas “of all responsibility for war crimes”; (97) falsely alleged
that the Report gave “superficial” treatment to “the terrorist organizations’
use of civilians as human shields”; (98) and falsely alleged that the Report
depended on “the unreliable casualty statistics provided by Hamas.” (99) On more
than one occasion the Israeli document tested the limits of chutzpah and
credulity: it rebuked not Israel but Hamas for “unwillingness to cooperate with
the [Goldstone] Mission,” (100) and purported that “Hamas operatives would
position innocent civilians near IDF tanks to prevent IDF soldiers from
shooting at them.” (101) So, Hamas dragged Palestinian civilians to Israeli tank
positions, ordered them to stay put, and then beat a swift retreat. It is not
revealed whether the civilians did stay put.
One might wonder why the Goldstone Report should have triggered so much
vituperation in Israel and set off a global “diplomatic blitz” to contain the
fallout from it. (102) After all the Goldstone Mission’s findings were merely
the last in a long series of human rights reports condemning Israeli actions in
Gaza, (103) and Israel has never been known for its deference to U.N. bodies. The
answer however is not hard to find. Goldstone is not only Jewish but is also a
self-declared “Zionist” who “worked for Israel all of my adult life,” “fully
support[s] Israel’s right to exist” and is a “firm believer in the absolute
right of the Jewish people to have their home there.” He headed up a Jewish
organization that runs vocational schools in Israel and sits on the Board of Governors
of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem (from which he also received an honorary
doctorate). Moreover, his mother was an activist in the women’s Zionist
movement, and his daughter made aliyah (Zionist emigration to Israel) and is an
ardent Zionist. (104) Goldstone has also claimed the Nazi holocaust as the
seminal inspiration for the international law and human rights agenda of which
he is a leading exponent. (105)
Because of Goldstone’s credentials, Israel could not
credibly play its usual cards—“anti-Semite,” “self-hating Jew,” “Holocaust
denier”—against him. In effect his persona neutralized the ideological weapons
Israel had honed over many years to ward off criticism. “This time,” in Gideon
Levy’s telling phrase, “the messenger is propaganda-proof.” (106) Dead-enders did
try to discredit Goldstone as an “anti-Semite” (Israeli Finance Minister Yuval
Steinitz) and the Report as “partially motivated by anti-Semitic views of
Israel” (philosophy professor Asa Kasher) and the “type of anti-Semitism” that
led to the Holocaust (Israeli Information Minister Yuli Edelstein). (107) A Google
search for the words “ Goldstone anti-Semite Gaza” one week after the Goldstone
Report’s publication brought up over 75,000
web sites. Still, the slanders collapsed under the weight of their own
absurdity.
The detractors then speculated that the Goldstone Report was a product of the author’s
overweening ambition— Goldstone was supposedly angling for a Nobel Peace Prize
or to head the United Nations—but once more his impeccable reputation easily
withstood the imputations. (108) It was then alleged that Goldstone had been
“suckered into lending his good name to a half-baked report.” (109) But the chief
prosecutor in multiple international war crimes tribunals was plainly no one’s
dupe. If Goldstone was not an anti-Semite, a self-hating Jew, or a Holocaust denier;
if he had never evinced animus towards Israel but in fact had demonstrated an
abiding affection for it; if he was manifestly a man of integrity who put truth
and justice above self-aggrandizement and partisanship; if he was neither an
incompetent nor a fool; then the only plausible explanation for the devastating
content of the document he authored was that it faithfully recorded the facts
as they unfolded during the 22-day invasion. “The only thing they can be afraid
of,” Goldstone later observed, “is the truth. And I think this is why they’re attacking
the messenger and not the message.” (110) Compelled to face the facts and their
consequences, disarmed and exposed, Israel went into panic mode. Influential
Israeli columnists expressed alarm that the Goldstone Report might impede Israel’s ability to launch military attacks in
the future, (111) and Prime Minister Netanyahu ranked “the Iranian [nuclear]
threat, the missile threat and a threat I call the Goldstone threat” the major
strategic challenges confronting Israel. (112) In the meantime Israeli officials
fretted that prosecutors might hound Israelis traveling abroad. (113) And
indeed, shortly after the Goldstone Report
was published, the International Criminal Court announced it was contemplating
an investigation of an Israeli officer implicated in the Gaza massacre. (114)
Then, in December 2009 Tzipi Livni cancelled a trip to London after a British
court issued an arrest warrant for her role in the commission of war crimes
while serving as foreign minister and member of the war cabinet during the Gaza
invasion, and in June 2010 two Belgian lawyers representing a group of
Palestinians charged 14 Israeli politicians (including Livni and Barak) with
committing crimes against humanity and war crimes during the invasion. (115)
“Months after it was published,” an Israeli columnist
rued, “the Goldstone Report still
holds the top spot in the bestseller list of Israel’s headaches.” (116) Unable
to exorcise his ghost, Goldstone’s detractors escalated the viciousness of
their ad hominem attacks. South African communal Jewish leaders exerted pressure
to prevent Goldstone from attending his grandson’s bar mitzvah, but after a
wave of embarrassing publicity abroad they were forced to reverse themselves. (117)
To justify this abortive attempt at ostracizing him, the chairman of the South
African Zionist Federation chastised Goldstone for his failure “to demand of
Hamas the unconditional release of Gilad Shalit or failing that to demand that
they recognize his status as a prisoner of war.” (118) But the Goldstone Report did “recommend that Palestinian
armed groups who hold Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in detention should release
him on humanitarian grounds. Pending such release they should recognize his
status as prisoner of war, treat him as such, and allow him ICRC visits.” (119)
Goldstone’s judicial tenure under apartheid rule in
South Africa was then dredged up by Israeli journalists and dutifully disseminated
by the usual suspects in the American media such as Jeffrey Goldberg (in
Atlantic magazine) and Jonathan Chait (in The New Republic). (120) Goldstone
was tagged a “hanging judge” for his blemished record of service with an
“entirely illegitimate and barbaric regime.” (121) But as Sasha
Polakow-Suransky, a senior editor at Foreign Affairs magazine and the author of
The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s secret relationship with apartheid South
Africa, pointed out, “By serving as South Africa’s primary and most reliable
arms supplier during a period of violent internal repression and external
aggression, Israel’s government did far more to aid the apartheid regime than
Goldstone ever did.” (122) During the peak of South Africa’s repression Defense
Minister Shimon Peres underscored that Israel’s cooperation with the apartheid
regime was “based not only on common interests, but also on the unshakeable
foundations of our common hatred of injustice,” while Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
toasted “the ideals shared by Israel and South Africa: the hopes for justice
and peaceful coexistence.” (123)
In last desperate bids to crucify him, Goldstone was ousted
from the Hebrew University’s Board of Governors, (124) and one-time AIPAC
executive director Neal Sher “urged American officials to bar former judge
Richard Goldstone from entering the country over his rulings during South
Africa’s apartheid regime.” The moral case Sher mounted was somewhat tainted however
by the fact that he himself had been disbarred after squandering Holocaust
compensation monies on his vacation sprees. (125)
The symbolism, indeed pathos, of Goldstone’s
condemnation of Israel was hard to miss. A lover of Zion was now calling for
Zion to be hauled before the International Criminal Court for an array of war
crimes and possible crimes against humanity. In effect Goldstone’s intervention
signaled the implosion of that unstable alloy—some would say oxymoron—called
liberal Zionism. Goldstone is the quintessence of the classical liberal Jew: a
renowned defender of the rule of law and human rights. He has also evinced a
deep affinity for Israel. But it has become progressively more difficult in
recent years for those who call themselves “liberals” to defend Israeli
conduct. The Gaza invasion marked the climax of Israel’s incremental descent
into barbarism—or, as the Goldstone Report
euphemistically put it, “a qualitative shift from relatively focused operations
to massive and deliberate destruction.” (126) Even if inclined by family and
faith to do so, Goldstone still could not defend what happened. He is a liberal
by sensibility and public reputation. He is constrained by the parameters of
the law, which for one acting in good conscience could not be stretched beyond
certain limits. He functions within a human rights environment that had already
rendered a devastating verdict on Israel’s actions and that he could not ignore
and still maintain his credibility in that community.
In the wake of the Goldstone Report it will be difficult for other Jews broadly of his ilk—which
means the overwhelming majority of American Jews, who “identify their long-term
interests with liberal policies” (127)—to brush aside even the harshest criticism
of Israel, just as Israel’s defenders will henceforth have a harder time
shielding it from such criticism. “Those groups who unquestioningly attack the
report’s veracity,” a British “friend and supporter of Israel” wrote in the
British Guardian, “find themselves further alienated from significant swaths of
Jewish opinion, especially among the younger generation.” (128)
The reaction in the bastions of American Jewish
liberalism to the Goldstone Report
was as notable for what was not said as for what was said: if newspaper
editorials and liberal commentary did not come out in Goldstone’s defense, they
also did not defend Israel against him. (129) It can fairly be said that the
Goldstone Report marked the end of
one era and the emergence of another: the end of an apologetic Jewish
liberalism that denies or extenuates Israel’s crimes and the emergence of a
Jewish liberalism that returns to its classical calling that, if only as an
ideal imperfectly realized, nonetheless holds all malefactors, Jew or non-Jew,
accountable when they have strayed from the path of justice. “The vicious
personal attacks on Judge Goldstone ... are profoundly disturbing,” Rabbi Brant
Rosen observed. “What is perhaps more interesting, however, is the fact that so
many in the American Jewish community are refusing to join the chorus....
American Jews ... are working to hold Israel to a set of Jewish values that are
more important than any political ideology.” (130)
Even if tempted, liberal Jews could not bury the
Goldstone Report because it has
resonated most in the milieus where they work and socialize. “Western
governments may ignore this damning report,” an Israeli commentator portended, “but
it will now serve as a basis of criticism against Israel in public opinion, the
media, on campuses and in think tanks, places where U.N. documents are still
taken seriously.” (131) An Israeli reserve officer who did double-duty as an
emissary for Israel on U.S. college campuses lamented to Haaretz that protesting
students “quote the Goldstone report....
It’s become their bible.” (132) Moreover, for those professing to be
enlightened, it could not seriously be contended that choosing between the credibility
of Israel’s cheerleaders and the likes of Goldstone was a close call. “Does it
then come down to a matter of whose reputation you trust?,” Antony Lerman,
former director of the London-based Institute for Jewish Policy Research,
rhetorically asked. “If so, would it be critics of human rights agencies like
Alan Dershowitz, the prominent American lawyer who thinks torture could be
legalized, or Melanie Phillips, a columnist who calls Jewish critics of Israel
‘Jews for Genocide’... ? Or Richard Goldstone, former chief prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, who is
putting his considerable reputation on the line in taking the UNHRC assignment?
Frankly, I don’t think there is a contest.” (133)
The Goldstone Report
also marked the emergence of a new era in which the human rights dimension of
the Israel-Palestine conflict moved center-stage alongside—and even temporarily
displacing—the fatuous “peace process.” During the first decades of Israel’s
occupation advocates of Palestinian human rights perforce had to rely on the
research and testimony of a handful of courageous but politically marginal Israelis,
(134) and their Palestinian clients and colleagues. Consider torture. In recent
times mainstream human rights organizations and Israeli historians have
acknowledged that Israel routinely tortured Palestinian detainees from the
start of the occupation. (135) However, until the 1990s, and despite a wealth of
corroborative evidence, respectable opinion treated Israeli torture gingerly
and when approaching the topic discreetly steered clear of using the locution
torture. (136) A reversal occurred after the first Palestinian intifada in
1987. On the one hand, the torture of Palestinian detainees reached epidemic
levels and, on the other, the newly founded Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem
(Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories)
irrefutably documented Israel’s use of torture on Palestinian detainees. (137)
No longer able to turn a blind eye, and having the moral and political cover of
Israeli organizations, the human rights community in the West began systematically
to document Israel’s egregious practice of torture and its many other human
rights abuses. However, most of these publications just collected dust as the
media scrupulously ignored them and instead pretended that, between Palestinian
accusation and Israeli denial, ferreting out the truth was futile. The
Goldstone Report catapulted Israel’s
human rights record into the court of public opinion, and concomitantly the
damning findings of human rights organizations have now become politically
consequential.
The stakes having risen, hysteria over the Goldstone Report unsurprisingly coincided with a
vicious campaign in Israel and the U.S. to discredit human rights
organizations. “We are going to dedicate time and manpower to combating these
groups,” the director of policy planning in the Israeli prime minister’s office
declared. (138) “For the first time,” the director of HRW’s Middle East
division rued, “the Israeli government is taking an active role in the smearing
of human rights groups.” (139) These groups and one of their benefactors (New
Israel Fund) came under virulent attack in Israel for allegedly providing the
data used by the Goldstone Mission to blacken Israel’s name. A Knesset subcommittee
was created to “examine the sources of funding” of Israeli-based human rights groups,
and a succession of Knesset bills proposed, respectively, to outlaw NGOs that
supplied information to foreign or international bodies leading to war crimes
accusations against Israel, and to compel members of Israeli NGOs to declare at
all public functions their foreign funders. (140) An Israel Democracy Institute
poll found that “half the general public (50%) agree with the statement that
‘Human and civil rights organizations, like the Association for Civil Rights in
Israel and B’Tselem, cause harm to the state,’” while a Tel Aviv University
poll found that nearly six in ten respondents agreed that human rights
organizations that expose immoral conduct by Israel should not be “allowed to
operate freely.” (141) Apparently in reaction Israeli human rights activists
trimmed their sails on the most politically volatile issues. Thus, B’Tselem
devoted more lines in its annual report to Palestinian breaches of international
law during the Gaza massacre than Israeli breaches; devoted twice as much space
to Hamas’s “grave breach” (or “war crime”) of taking Shalit “hostage” as to all
Israeli breaches (none of which it denoted as “grave” or a “war crime”) during
the Gaza massacre; and criticized key findings of the Goldstone Report but provided no evidentiary basis
for its criticisms. (142)
In the U.S. the Israel lobby mobilized against
“lawfare” (143) —that is, attempts to “isolate Israel through the language of human
rights.” (144) In non-ideological terms lawfare signified the novel idea that
Israel should be held legally accountable for its crimes. Pseudo-academic
conferences under the auspices of major law schools and professional
organizations convened on topics such as “The Goldstone Report: Lawfare & the threat to Israeli and American national
security in the age of terrorism” (Fordham University School of Law) (145) and
“Lawfare: The use of the law as a weapon of war” (New York County Lawyers
Association). (146) Outraged at the “scandal of the Goldstone report,” one learned opponent of
“lawfare” thusly corrected for its bias: “No armies in the history of warfare
have devoted greater attention or energy than those of Israel and the United
States to distinguishing and protecting civilians in warfare and ensuring that
the force they use in armed conflict is proportional to the threat faced.” (147)
Meanwhile, perennial apologists for the Holy State
such as Alan M. Dershowitz and Elie Wiesel orchestrated a witch-hunt against
HRW. (148) “I really hesitate to use words like conspiracy, but there is a
feeling that there is an organized campaign,” HRW’s program director contended.
“We have been under enormous pressure and tremendous attacks, some of them very
personal.” (149) HRW founder Robert Bernstein, who had long been rumored to be
muzzling HRW’s criticism of Israel from within the organization, soon jumped
in. After publication of the Goldstone Report
and in a highly public defection, Bernstein wrote an op-ed for the New York
Times that denounced HRW’s allegedly biased reporting on Israel. The only
testimony he could summon in Israel’s defense against reams of copiously documented
human rights reports was the ubiquitous Colonel Richard Kemp serenading Israel
for its historically unparalleled devotion to humanitarian law during the Gaza
invasion. (150) Bernstein’s broadside was followed a half year later by a
gossipy New Republic exposé of discontent within HRW over the organization’s
supposedly anti-Israel tilt. (151) The article failed to explore the only
substantive question prompted by its content: why did “pro”-Israel wealthy
Jewish donors with no expertise in either human rights or the Middle East—a
“legendary Hollywood mogul,” a “48-year-old who formerly worked on Wall Street,”
a “former stockbroker”—exercise power and influence over HRW’s Middle East
division?
It cannot be said, however, that HRW fully resisted
the hostile pressures exerted on it. HRW’s World Report 2010 stated for
instance that “reports by news media and a nongovernmental organization
indicate that in some cases, Palestinian armed groups intentionally hid behind
civilians to unlawfully use them as shields to deter Israeli counter-attacks.”
(152) It omitted mention that none of the fact-finding missions or human rights
organizations—including HRW itself—found evidence that Palestinian armed groups
engaged in human shielding. Desperate to placate the Israel lobby, and while
the merciless Israeli siege against the 1.5 million people of Gaza proceeded
without let-up, HRW then reduced itself to publicly condemning a Jordanian restaurant
owner who refused to serve two Israelis a meal. (153)
The Gaza invasion accelerated the dissolution of
blanket Jewish support for Israel. Because this reflexive Jewish support has
historically blocked the path to peace, the prospects for a just and lasting
resolution of the conflict are better now than ever before. The foundations for
such a settlement are the universal, consensual, legal principles ratified in
annual U.N. General Assembly resolutions, the 2004 advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice, and the standards of respected human rights organizations.
Were Israel to abide by these principles a resolution of the conflict would be
immediately within reach.
But Israel must also be held accountable for its
crimes in Gaza. For those in Gaza who lost loved ones, homes, and livelihoods, such
a reckoning is elementary justice, which it would be immoral to deny them. A
criminal proceeding would probably also put a brake on a military juggernaut
manifestly out of control. However, insofar as it is humanly possible, the
execution of justice should be free of rancor and vindictiveness, free of the
Schadenfreude that instinctively attends the humbling of an arrogant and ruthless
foe. It should not be lost from sight that the ultimate goal is—or ought to
be—a settlement enabling both parties, everyone, to live proud, productive, and
peaceful lives.
Gandhi called his doctrine of nonviolent resistance
satyagraha, which he translated as “hold on to the truth.” Herewith is our
challenge: to hold on to the truth that what Israel has done to the
Palestinians is wrong and indefensible; to hold on to the truth that Israel’s
refusal, backed by the U.S., to respect international law and the considered
opinion of humankind is the sole obstacle to putting an end, finally, to their
suffering. We can reach our goal if we hold on to the truth, and if, as the
African-American spiritual put it with cognate wisdom, we keep our eyes on the prize, and hold on. That is, if we keep remembering
what the struggle—the prize—is all about: not theoretical fad or intellectual
provocation, not holier-thanthou radical posturing, but—however humdrum,
however prosaic, by comparison—helping free the Palestinian people from their
bondage. And then to hold on, to be ready for sacrifice and for the long haul
but also, and especially, to be humble in the knowledge that for those of us
living in North America and Europe, the burdens pale next to those borne daily
by the people of Palestine.
The Caribbean poet Aimé Césaire once wrote, “There’s room
for everyone at the rendezvous of victory.” Late in life, when his political
horizons broadened, Edward Said often quoted this line. We should make it our
credo as well. We want to nurture a movement, not hatch a cult. The victory to which
we aspire is inclusive, not exclusive; it is not at anyone’s expense. It is to
be victorious without vanquishing. No one is a loser, and we all are gainers if
together we stand by truth and justice. “I am not anti-English; I am not
anti-British; I am not anti-any government,” Gandhi insisted, “but I am
antiuntruth— anti-humbug, and anti-injustice.” (154) Shouldn’t we also say that
we are not anti-Jewish, anti-Israel, or, for that matter, anti-Zionist? The
prize to which our eyes should be riveted is human rights, human dignity, and
human equality. What, really, is the point of the ideological litmus test: Are
you now or have you ever been a Zionist? A criterion of membership that would exclude
a Richard Goldstone from our ranks is transparently counterproductive.
Shouldn’t we use a vocabulary and points of reference that register and
resonate with the public conscience and the Jewish conscience, winning over the
decent many while isolating the diehard few? Shouldn’t we instead be asking:
Are you for or against ethnic cleansing, for or against discriminatory laws,
for or against house demolitions, for or against Jews-only roads and Jews-only
settlements, for or against torture, for or against massacres? And if the
answers come, against, against, and against, shouldn’t we then say: Keep your
ideology, whatever it might be—there’s room for everyone at the rendezvous of
victory?
The terrible death and destruction Israel visited on
the people of Gaza cannot be undone. Their suffering can however be vindicated.
Let us seize on the hope born of their martyrdom, redouble our commitment to a
just peace, and then let us meet, all of us, sooner not later, at the
rendezvous of victory.
Massacre of innocent people is a serious matter. It
is not a thing to be easily forgotten. It is our duty to cherish their memory.
Mahatma Gandhi (2 July 1947) (155)
EPILOGUE: After the Mavi Marmara
The Israeli commando raid on the Mavi Marmara and its
aftermath marked an accentuation of the trends traced in this book. The
decision by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak
to launch a violent assault on the flagship of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, and
the Israeli public’s overwhelming support of it, further confirmed that Israeli
society and the state are rapidly losing grip on reality. A distinct danger now
lurks that Israel will do something yet more unbalanced to compensate for the
succession of bungled operations that climaxed in the Mavi Marmara assault.
The international outrage provoked by the killing of
nine passengers aboard the ship further isolated Israel as yet more of its
erstwhile non-Jewish and Jewish supporters defected from the ranks. In an
unprecedented reversal, the international solidarity movement was for once setting
the political agenda and governments felt compelled to react. If world leaders
suddenly discovered on the morning after the flotilla bloodbath that Israel’s siege
of Gaza was “unsustainable” and had to be lift ed, it was because the
solidarity movement forced this revelation on them. The prospects of building a
broad movement in support of Palestinian rights appear brighter than ever
before although the potential of a devastating regional war must dim any such optimism.
We are now in a race against time, all of our futures
possibly hanging in the balance.
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
The massive destruction Israel inflicted on Gaza
during the 2008-9 invasion was designed in part to exacerbate the effects of an
illegal blockade that had already wreaked havoc for some three years. “I fully
expected to see serious damage, but I have to say I was really shocked when I
saw the extent and precision of the destruction,” the World Food Program
director for the Gaza Strip observed after the assault. (1) “It was precisely
the strategic economic areas that Gaza depends on to relieve its dependency on
aid that were wiped out.” The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) targeted critical
civilian infrastructure such as the only operative flour mill and nearly all of
the cement factories so that Gaza would be evermore dependent on Israeli whim
for staples and would not be able to rebuild after a ceasefire went into effect.
(2)
A year and a half after the Gaza invasion, major
humanitarian and human rights organizations uniformly attested that the people
of Gaza continued to suffer a humanitarian crisis on account of the Israeli
blockade: “Contrary to what the Israeli government states, the humanitarian aid
allowed into Gaza is only a fraction of what is needed to answer the enormous needs
of an exhausted people” (Oxfam); “The blockade ... has severely damaged the
economy, leaving 70 to 80 percent of Gazans in poverty” (Human Rights Watch);
“Israel is blocking vital medical supplies from entering the Gaza Strip” (World
Health Organization); “The closure is having a devastating impact on the 1.5
million people living in Gaza” (International Committee of the Red Cross). (3)
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was nonetheless emphatic
that there was “no humanitarian crisis” and “no lack of medicines or other
essential items” in Gaza. (4) “We mustn’t tire of reminding others,” Parisian
media philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy chimed in, that “the blockade concerns
only arms and the material needed to manufacture them.” (5) Mocking claims of a
humanitarian crisis Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon gestured to Gaza’s
“sparkling new shopping mall ... new Olympic-sized swimming pool ... five-star
hotels and restaurants.” (6) Israel circulated photographs of these lavish
scenes on the Internet. (7) It is true that tiny pockets of prosperity have flourished
in the Strip. Harvard political economist Sara Roy noted the emergence of an
economic stratum that had “grown extremely wealthy from the black-market
economy,” and the “almost perverse consumerism in restaurants and shops that are
the domain of the wealthy.” (8) But for students of the Nazi holocaust such a
juxtaposition, however repellent, should hardly surprise. Thus, a survivor of
the Warsaw Ghetto recalled:
The sword of the Nazi extermination policy hung over
all Jews equally. But a social differentiation arose in the ghetto, setting apart
substantial groups who had the means even under those infernal conditions to
lead a comparatively full, well-fed life and enjoy some kinds of pleasures. On
the same streets where daily you could see scenes of horrors, amid the swarms
of tubercular children dying like flies ... , you would come upon stores full
of fine foods, restaurants and cafés, which served the most expensive dishes
and drinks.... The clientele of these places consisted principally of Jewish
Gestapo agents, Jewish police officials, rich merchants who did business with
the Germans, smugglers, dealers in foreign exchange and similar kinds of
people.
He went on to note that “the Nazis made moving
pictures of such festive orgies to show the ‘world’ how well the Jews lived in
the ghetto.” (9)
Regrettably the ensuing debate on whether Israel had
put Gazans on a “starvation” or “starvation plus” regimen shifted attention
away from and obscured the more fundamental point: What right did Israel have
to put the people of Gaza on any diet?
It was also lamentable how even the sternest critics
of the blockade nevertheless seconded Israel’s right to prevent weapons from
reaching Gaza. Even if one accepts the highly debatable contention that, after
acquiescing in the international consensus for resolving the conflict, (10)
Palestinians still do not have the right of armed resistance to end the
occupation, the fact remains that, as Amnesty International has urged (if on different
grounds), an arms embargo should be imposed on both Hamas and Israel. (11) It
is a curious conception of justice that would deny the victims the means to
resist even as they support the legally mandated norms for achieving peace, but
allow the perpetrators to replenish their arsenal of repression even as they
reject these norms and ride roughshod over them. (12)
ETERNAL VICTIMS
On 31 May 2010 a humanitarian flotilla en route to
Gaza carrying some 10,000 tons of supplies and 700 passengers came under attack
in international waters by Israeli commandos. By the end of the dead-of-night
Israeli assault nine passengers aboard the flagship Mavi Marmara had been shot
to death. “If Cast Lead was a turning point in the attitude of the world toward
us,” Haaretz columnist Gideon Levy rued, “this operation is the second horror film
of the apparently ongoing series.” (13) Nonetheless, orchestrating a public
relations marvel, Israel managed to spin the commandos as the victims of the attack.
(14) In a solipsistic paroxysm, and with nary a peep of dissent, Israeli officials
and pundits across the political spectrum proclaimed that the commandos had
been “provoked,” “ambushed,” “duped,” “lynched,” and “lured” into a “trap” set by
a phalanx of “radical anti-Western,” “machete-wielding,” “bloodthirsty”
“jihadists” and “mercenaries” linked with “Al-Qaeda” and other terrorist
organizations; (15) and that the Israeli commandos were initially armed only
with “paintball rifles” and resorted to aggressive tactics “as a last resort”
in “selfdefense.”
“You fought morally, and showed valor in your acts,” Nobel
peace laureate and Israeli President Shimon Peres told the commandos afterwards.
“I salute you and admire your courage and restraint even in the face of danger
to your own lives.” “The soldiers were beaten,” he also solemnly proclaimed, “just
because they did not want to kill anyone.” (16) Israel’s ambassador to Spain
compared the Mavi Marmara passengers to Islamic terrorists who killed scores of
people on Madrid commuter trains in 2004, and juxtaposed the nine deaths on the
vessel with the “twenty-three Spaniards [who] died on the roads this weekend.”
(17) Some 90 percent of Israeli Jews supported the decision to stop the flotilla,
supported stopping future flotillas and believed that Israel used the right
amount or not enough force, while only 16 percent supported lift ing the siege.
(18) One of the commandos responsible for killing multiple passengers was
reportedly in line for a medal of valor, while Deputy Prime Minister Eli Yishai
called on Defense Minister Barak to award medals to all the commandos: “The
warrior’s courage is exemplary, and they deserve a citation.” (19)
As the hasbara
offensive began to unravel—mostly on account of intrepid bloggers (20)—Israelis
contended that if some people saw things differently, it was because of the
“eternal war against the Jewish people,” (21) and because Israeli officialdom had
dropped the ball on the PR front. (22) Public opinion turned against Israel,
according to the influential Reut Institute, because of “successful efforts to
brand it as an occupying and aggressive entity that ignores and undermines
human rights and international law,” whereas “the flotillas were branded in the
context of resistance to ‘occupation’ and ‘oppression,’ the promotion of peace
and human rights, a moral response to Gaza’s ‘humanitarian crisis,’ and in the
spirit of international law.” In other words, the problem was not the objective
reality but its “branding.” (23)
In fact, if so many Westerners swallowed the
topsy-turvy Israeli narrative, it was because the hasbara campaign had been so
minutely prepared and adeptly executed, (24) while the only witnesses able to
contest the official Israeli account had been imprisoned and their photographic
evidence confiscated, and a willfully gullible media uncritically recycled
Israeli spin. “In an operation reminiscent of the first week or so of the
Israeli offensive against Gaza in winter 2008-9,” Antony Lerman observed in the
Guardian, “the Israeli PR machine succeeded in getting the major news outlets
to focus on its version of events and to use the Israeli authorities’ discourse
for a crucial 48 hours.” (25)
The consensus among human rights and humanitarian organizations
was and remains that the Israeli blockade of Gaza constituted a form of
collective punishment in flagrant violation of international law. Israel
accordingly had no right to use force to enforce an illegal blockade. (26) To
the extent that Israel claims its attack on the Mavi Marmara was an act of
selfdefense, a tenet of law establishes that no legal benefit or right can be
derived from an illegal act (ex injuria non oritur jus). Thus Israel cannot
claim a right of self-defense that arises because of Israel’s illegal blockade.
On the other hand, the passengers aboard a convoy in international waters
carrying humanitarian relief to a beleaguered population had every right to use
force in self-defense against a pirate-like raid. (27)
Although the exact sequence of events on that fateful
night of the Israeli assault will probably never be known, (28) it scarcely
makes a difference. The flotilla leadership offered to have the humanitarian
nature of the cargo verified by a neutral body such as the Red Cross (the
contents had already been rigorously inspected at departure), while Israeli officials
neither expressed interest in searching the flotilla’s cargo nor even pretended
that the boats were transporting weapons to Gaza. (29) “A provocation took
place off the coast of Gaza, but the provocateurs were not the peace
activists,” veteran Israeli peace activist Uri Avnery declared. “The
provocation was carried out by navy ships and commandos ... blocking the way of
the aid boats and using deadly force.” (30)
Still, it merits notice that the vast preponderance
of offi-cial Israeli allegations were almost certainly false: far from
initially using only paintball pistols, Israeli combatants in Zodiacs abutting
the Mavi Marmara opened fire with tear gas, smoke and stun grenades and maybe
plastic bullets, and helicopters hovering above then opened fire with live
ammunition before any commando had rappelled on deck; (31) far from having set
a lethal trap, the passengers—none of whom were linked with a terrorist
organization at the time of the attack (32)—did not even prepare for injuries,
(33) did not carry monies paid them to murder Israelis, (34) and did not
possess firearms or discharge captured ones; (35) far from being lynched, the
captured Israeli commandos were given medical care and then escorted for release;
(36) far from firing with restraint and only in self-defense, the Israeli
commandos killed the nine passengers by shooting all but one of them multiple
times—five were shot in the head, and at least six of the nine were killed in a
manner consistent with an extra-legal, arbitrary and summary execution. (37)
“The conduct of the Israeli military and other
personnel towards the flotilla passengers was not only disproportionate to the
occasion,” a U.N. Fact-Finding Mission of distinguished jurists concluded, “but
demonstrated levels of totally unnecessary and incredible violence. It betrayed
an unacceptable level of brutality.” (38) Shortly after release of the
mission’s report Prime Minister Netanyahu “saluted” the Israeli commandos, deeming
their assault “crucial, essential, important and legal,” and praising them for
having acted “courageously, morally and with restraint” against “those who came
to kill you, and tried to kill you”: “There is no one better than you.” (39) To
be sure, Israeli officials did acknowledge room for operational improvement: “when
the next flotilla ... is boarded by the navy... , attack dogs will be the first
to board the decks, to prevent harm to soldiers ... they are strong and
merciless.” (40) It is unclear whether contingency plans are in place should
passengers “dupe” and “lynch” the canines.
Meanwhile, in mitigation of the killings, the semi-official
Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center alleged that as many as
seven of the nine dead passengers might have desired martyrdom; the last diary
entry of one of them, for example, expressed a willingness to die “for a noble
cause.” (41) Before being hung by the British in 1775, American revolutionary Nathan
Hale famously regretted having “but one life to lose for my country.” The
expectation of Mahatma Gandhi was that satyagrahis like himself would actively
seek martyrdom: “It would exhilarate me to hear that a co-worker ... was shot
dead or that another co-worker ... had had his skull broken.” (42) Did they
also deserve to be killed?
In a sudden yet simultaneous volte-face on the
morning after the flotilla bloodbath Western leaders such as U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton and British Foreign Secretary William Hague individually
discovered, and the United Nations Security Council collectively discovered,
that Israel’s siege of Gaza was “unsustainable” and had to be lifted. (43)
“International condemnation and calls for an inquiry will come easily,” the International
Crisis Group pointedly noted, “but many who will issue them must acknowledge
their own role in the deplorable treatment of Gaza that formed the backdrop” to
the Israeli assault. (44)
Three quarters of the damage and destruction Israel wrought
during the Gaza invasion had not yet been repaired or rebuilt 18 months later.
(45) Although Israel was forced to relax restrictions on some goods entering
Gaza after the international outcry, it still banned items necessary for
manufacturing and put onerous conditions on the entry of critical building materials.
(46) The “burdens on the entrance of construction materials,” an Israeli human
rights organization warned, could “turn the promise of allowing reconstruction
into a dead letter.” (47) U.N. officials estimated that under current Israeli
restrictions it would take “about 75 years” to bring in the needed materials to
rebuild Gaza. (48)
In late November 2010, nearly a half year after
Israel’s widely publicized promise to “ease” the siege, a consortium of more
than twenty respected human rights and humanitarian organizations operating in
Gaza reported that “there are few signs of real improvement on the ground as
the ‘ease’ has left foundations of the illegal blockade policy intact”: “Gaza requires
670,000 truckloads of construction material, while only an average of 715 of
these truckloads have been received per month,” “The private sector is excluded
from the possibility to import construction materials including concrete, steel
and gravel, hampering efforts of people in Gaza to rebuild their homes,
businesses and other property,” “Exports remain banned and except for the
humanitarian activity of exporting a small amount of strawberries, not a single
truck has left Gaza since the easing,” “[M]any humanitarian items, including
vital water equipment, that are not on the Israeli restricted list continue to
receive no permits,” “[O]rdinary Gaza residents are still denied access to their
friends and family, and to educational opportunities in the West Bank, East
Jerusalem and abroad,” “[T]here has been a decrease in the rate of permit
approvals for entry or exit of UN agencies’ national humanitarian Staff.” In addition,
“access to around 35 percent of Gaza’s farmland and 85 percent of maritime
areas for fishing remains restricted by the Israeli ‘buffer zone,’ with
devastating impact on the economy and people’s rights and livelihoods.” As a
“result” of the continuing Israeli siege, “39 percent of Gaza residents remain unemployed,”
and “80 percent of the population [remain] dependent upon international aid.”
“There cannot be a just and durable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,”
the report concluded, “without an end to the isolation and punishment of people
in Gaza.” (49)
ANOTHER BLOODBATH,
ANOTHER BACKLASH
The bloody Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara created
new fissures in Israel’s relations with the non-Jewish and Jewish worlds.
Hitherto friendly European governments came down hard on Israel while some of
its most vocal Jewish backers publicly distanced themselves. Already a few
weeks before the flotilla attack 3,000 European Jews including prominent media intellectuals
had coalesced in a spin-off of J Street named J Call. Deploring the occupation
and settlement expansion as “morally and politically wrong,” J Call asserted
that “systematic support of Israeli government policy is dangerous and does not
serve the true interests of the state of Israel.” (50)
If support for Israel did not go into free fall after
the commando raid, the incremental downward curve has almost certainly become
irreversible, and if Israel’s global image did not dramatically deteriorate, it
was only because Israel suffered “an already very negative media image.” (51) A
majority of respondents in a 2010 BBC global poll believed that, alongside Iran
and Pakistan, Israel exerted a mainly negative influence on world affairs.
(Even North Korea’s influence was viewed negatively by fewer respondents.) (52)
One vivid illustration of Israel’s reversal of fortune was that—in Uri Avnery’s
words—“the present generation of idealistic youngsters from all over the world ...
who would once have volunteered for the kibbutzim can now be found on the decks
of the ships sailing for downtrodden, choked and starved Gaza.” (53) The
challenge now confronting Israel is not to recoup its losses in public regard
but rather to stave off the “delegitimization” juggernaut pushing to isolate it
as a pariah state akin to apartheid South Africa.
After the commando raid the floodgates holding back criticism
of Israel flung wide open. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed “shock”
and called for a “full investigation,” while the coterie of past and present
world leaders known as The Elders (including Nelson Mandela, KofiAnnan, Jimmy Carter
and Desmond Tutu) condemned the Israeli attack as “completely inexcusable” and
declared that “the treatment of the people of Gaza is one of the world’s
greatest human rights violations.” (54) South Africa, Ecuador and Nicaragua
recalled their ambassadors while Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez denounced
Israel as a “damned, terrorist and murderous country.” (55) South Korean
protesters greeted a visit by President Peres with cries of “killer,” Vietnam
cancelled Peres’s planned visit, and large protests erupted across Australia
and New Zealand. (56) A Norwegian poll published two days after the commando raid
found that 40 percent of respondents supported a boycott of Israeli products,
while a government minister called on other governments to “follow the
Norwegian position which excludes trading arms with Israel.” (57) Two of
Italy’s largest supermarket chains stopped carrying Israeli products while Swedish
dockworkers, denouncing the “unprecedented criminal attack on the peaceful ship
convoy,” launched a weeklong blockade of Israeli ships and goods. (58)
The most fraught development for Israel was the
stinging criticism that emanated from its erstwhile faithful Western allies.
True, the 31 countries belonging to the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) voted unanimously in May 2010 to admit Israel as a
member. (Turkey had played an instrumental role in facilitating Israel’s
admission.) (59) But already before the flotilla attack the Israeli Foreign
Ministry was reporting that support for Israel was on the decrease even in
countries such as the Netherlands that had a “special relationship” with
Israel. (60) A July 2010 poll taken by the Israel Project found that only 24
percent of French respondents felt positively towards Israel versus 31 percent
who felt negatively, and in Sweden the corresponding percentages were 20
percent versus 49 percent. (61)
In a blistering editorial the London Financial Times
condemned Israel’s “brazen act of piracy” and the yet greater “outrage” of its
“illegal blockade of Gaza.” (62) Both Britain’s largest trade union (UNITE) and
its largest trade union for academics in higher education (UCU) called for a
comprehensive boycott of Israeli products. (63) The Methodist Church of Britain
called on its congregants to “support and engage with th[e] boycott of Israeli
goods emanating from illegal settlements.” (64) Right before and after the flotilla
massacre British performers such as Elvis Costello (along with American
performers Gil Scott-Heron and the Pixies) cancelled shows in Israel. (65) In
his July 2010 valedictory interview with the Jerusalem Post, the “well-liked”
British ambassador to Israel warned of a popular “drift of opinion away from
Israel” in Great Britain that better Israeli PR could not reverse: “You get a
lot of people in Israel who say, ‘Let’s launch a new hasbara campaign, change
our image in the West, hunky dory.’ No, it’s a problem of substance.” (66)
The most sobering news after the commando raid came however
from Germany, whose “historic guilt” and “historic responsibility” have
hitherto kept a tight lid on public criticism of Israel. But after the
bloodbath much media coverage swung sharply against it. The July 2010 Israel
Project poll found that only 19 percent of Germans felt positively toward
Israel versus fully 50 percent who harbored negative feelings. Even Germany’s Holocaust-mongering
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, was said to be “disconcerted” by the Israeli attack.
In a “rare cross-party motion” the German parliament criticized Israel for
“violating the principle of proportionality” in its raid and called on Israel to
lift the blockade of Gaza. “This marks a profound shift in policy towards
Israel in Germany,” the Left Party’s foreign policy spokesman noted. (67)
Indeed, as Avnery shrewdly observed, the biggest setback for Israel was loss of
the most potent weapon in its ideological arsenal: “In all the tumult this affair
has caused throughout the world, the Holocaust has not even been mentioned.” For
the new generation the Nazi holocaust has become “a thing of the remote past”
that no longer induces a philo-Semitic politics born of guilt. “The Israeli
public is shocked to see that the Holocaust has lost its power as a political
instrument,” he concluded. “Our most valuable weapon has become blunt.” (68)
The Obama administration and Congress lent strong backing
to Israel in its latest diplomatic crisis. But cracks did appear in the U.S.
elite consensus of support for Israel, and popular enthusiasm for Israel
reached a nadir as yet more prominent American Jews deserted the ranks of the
Israel lobby. Still, a sober reckoning of the balance sheet would also note
that the weight of elite opinion has not yet reached a tipping point against
Israel, while increasing popular disaffection with Israeli policy has not yet
been translated into an effective force capable of altering the political
calculation of elected officials who tally potential votes and campaign
contributions.
The Mavi
Marmara crisis erupted just as U.S. President Barack Obama was affirming
that “our bond with Israel is unbreakable” at a White House ceremony launching
“Jewish Heritage Month”—which might as well have been christened “Jewish Money
Month.” (69) Although it joined the chorus calling for Israel to lift the siege
of Gaza, the U.S. blocked for Israel at international forums while Obama
himself merely expressed “deep regret” at the loss of life and injuries. (70)
Indeed, the American representative at the Emergency Session of the U.N.
Security Council shamelessly denied that Israel had prevented vital supplies
from reaching Gaza: “mechanisms exist for the transfer of humanitarian
assistance to Gaza by member states and groups that want to do so.” (71)
Eighty-seven of one hundred U.S. senators signed a
letter to Obama declaring that they “fully support Israel’s right of
self-defense” after the Israeli commandos “arrived” on the Mavi Marmara and
“were brutally attacked.” The House of Representatives followed suit as 338 of
435 members signed a letter expressing “strong support for Israel’s right to
defend itself” after “passengers on the ship attacked Israeli soldiers with clubs,
metal rods, and iron bars.” (72) Acting at the behest of “Jewish groups,”
Congressional leaders moved to officially designate not the perpetrators of the
attack but the victims as terrorists, and the sponsors of the humanitarian
mission as a terrorist organization, and also to bar survivors of the bloodbath
from entering the country on the grounds that they “should not be allowed to
come to the United States and spill their propaganda and hatred and terrorist
rhetoric.” (73)
“Since the Palestinians in Gaza elected Hamas,” New York
Senator Chuck Schumer told a meeting of orthodox Jews after the attack, it made
sense “to strangle them economically until they see that’s not the way to go.”
(74) Although progressive bloggers deplored Schumer’s statement, it went
largely unnoticed that this notorious panderer almost certainly uttered it because
he knew his audience. Meanwhile, at the very moment Schumer proffered his
advice, mainstream news outlets were crucifying near-nonagenarian journalist
Helen Thomas for her off-the-cuff remark that Israeli Jews “should go back to Poland,
Germany... and America and everywhere else.” (75) But the just-shy-of-genocidal
incitement by among the most powerful members of the U.S. Senate was not
reported, let alone rebuked, in the print and broadcast media.
Whereas public officials stood virtually united
behind Israel, influential policy analysts and opinion-makers sharply divided.
True, the majority still echoed the hackneyed phraseology of former New York
Times columnist and president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations
Leslie Gelb, who opined that “only knee-jerk left -wingers and the usual legion
of poseurs around the world would dispute” Israel’s right to mount the raid. (76)
Nonetheless, Israel came under scathing mainstream criticism, and an
increasing, and increasingly vocal, minority began to register doubts whether
Israel still constituted an American strategic asset. In a highly unusual departure,
the normally stalwart editors of the New York Times declared that “there can be
no excuse for the way that Israel completely mishandled the incident”; endorsed
an “immediate and objective international investigation”; condemned the blockade
which had to be “permanently lift ed”; and chastised Obama for his “tepid
response” to the Israeli assault. (77) In the New York Times’s op-ed columns,
Roger Cohen not only persisted in his withering commentaries (78) but was now
joined by fellow columnist Nicholas Kristof, who denounced Israel’s “morally
repugnant,” “oppressive and unjust” occupation. (79) In the meantime, over at
Mondoweiss the popular blogger Philip Weiss noted the “staggering shift in
liberal American discourse” evidenced by criticism of Israel on the Huffington Post. (80)
The stage was already set for American policy
analysts to question Israel’s utility after General David H. Petraeus warned Congressional
lawmakers in early 2010 that “perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel ...
foments anti-American sentiment.” (81) Indeed, even Vice-President Joe Biden
had reportedly scolded Netanyahu for pursuing policies that “undermine the security
of our troops who are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.” (82) Still,
it would be hard to overestimate the significance of Anthony H. Cordesman’s
abrupt turnaround. An influential military analyst, Cordesman was Israel’s
chief apologist after the Gaza invasion. (83) But in a scorching commentary posted
right after the commando assault, Cordesman pointed to actions by Israel that
were making it a “strategic liability” for the U.S., and he put Israel on
notice “that it has obligations to the United States” and must become “far more
careful about the extent to which it test[s] the limits of U.S. patience and exploits
the support of American Jews.” (84) Cordesman’s ruminations found unexpected
support in Israel, where Mossad Chief Meir Dagan testified before members of
the Knesset that Israel had become “less of an asset to the United States” than
during the Cold War, and that on many crucial strategic questions, U.S. and
Israeli interests now diverged. (85)
Nearly half of American respondents in a poll taken
right after the flotilla bloodbath believed that the passengers were responsible
for it while only 20 percent believed Israel was to blame. (86) However, once
Israeli hasbara no longer monopolized the media and the testimonies of
passengers garnered some attention—albeit still minimal and mostly on the
Internet—the polls registered a shift in American public opinion: 56 percent agreed
that there was a humanitarian crisis in Gaza (43 percent believed that Gazans
were starving), while only 34 percent supported the Israeli attack and only 20
percent “felt support” for Israel after it announced that the blockade would be
eased. (87) The July 2010 Israel Project poll found that “American support for
Israel is waning.” Only 51 percent of respondents said that the U.S. needed to
support Israel, down more than 10 percentage points from just a year ago. (88)
In what might be an aberration or a harbinger of things to come, 79 percent of
Evergreen State College students in a campus-wide referendum voted in June 2010
for the school’s divestment “from companies that profit from Israel’s illegal
occupation of Palestine,” and later that month dockworkers in Oakland,
California, refused to unload an Israeli vessel for 24 hours. (89) In a vote
with larger immediate implications the Presbyterian Church USA at its July 2010
convention called for “the withholding of U.S. government aid to the state of
Israel as long as Israel persists in creating new West Bank settlements,” and
for the U.S. to leverage its aid, making it “contingent upon Israel’s
compliance with international law and peacemaking efforts.” (90)
Despite President Obama’s prickly relationship with Prime
Minister Netanyahu, and despite the growing disenchantment with Obama at home,
an August 2010 Brandeis University poll still found that 61 percent of American
Jews believed that the U.S. administration’s stance toward Israel was either
“about right” (52 percent) or “too supportive” (9 percent). (91) “A new rift is
beginning to develop between Israel and segments of Diaspora Jews,” respected
Israeli political scientist Shlomo Avineri observed just before the commando
raid. (92) In trendsetting Jewish circles the rift widened another notch or two
after the attack. Even in the “immediate aftermath of the flotilla incident”
when Israeli propaganda dominated news coverage, the Brandeis poll found that
less than half of American Jews “strongly agreed” with the Israeli version of
what happened (in the under-30 age cohort, the fraction fell to one third). (93)
To be sure, establishment Jewish organizations predictably lined up behind
Israel. The American Jewish Committee “condemned” the flotilla sponsors “for
deliberately provoking a violent confrontation with the Israeli navy,” the
World Jewish Congress (headquartered in New York) found it “deplorable ... that
much of the international media continues to portray such violent activists as
humanitarians,” while the Anti-Defamation League found it “deeply disturbing
that the leaders of the flotilla and their sponsors were willing to engage in
an elaborate sham as a pretext for ambushing and violently attacking Israeli military
personnel.” (94) “If there was any criticism of Israel at all from the
acknowledged leaders of the Jewish establishment,” the Forward reported, “it
came in the form of questioning whether the operation had been well planned.” (95)
On the other hand, the dovish organization Americans for Peace Now expressed
“outrage at the way Israel’s government is dealing with people who challenge
its policies,” and J Street opined that “the shocking outcome of an effort to
bring humanitarian relief to the people of Gaza is in part a consequence of the
ongoing, counterproductive Israeli blockade of Gaza.” (96)
The reactions of unaffiliated American Jews proved less
predictable and more telling. True, the usual suspects took their cues from a
time-worn script. “The deaths and injuries on board the Gaza flotilla,”
according to Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, “once again demonstrate how
easy it is for radical supporters of terrorism to provoke a democracy.” (97)
After a week’s worth of intensive research Elie Wiesel weighed in that the flotilla
was initiated by “the most militant wing of Hamas,” and that the passengers
“acted as a well-organized lynch mob. It was a set-up, a trap ... they were
mercenaries. We know that now.” (Was it a sign of the times that only a New
York tabloid would print this Nobel laureate’s lucubrations?) (98) The gaggle
of neoconservative pundits also offered no surprises: for John Podhoretz the
Jewish state “may have done what it did poorly, but it did no wrong” because
the “onus rests with the ... hateful terrorist sympathizer who has decided to
put his or her life on the line to front for Hamas”; for Elliott Abrams the
“moral equation is clear. This flotilla was an act of solidarity and support
for terrorism”; for Charles Krauthammer the “whole point” of the “blockade-busting
flotilla of useful idiots and terror sympathizers” was “to deprive Israel of
any legitimate form of self-defense” and “openly prepare a more final
solution.” (99) Former Israelfirster Andrew Sullivan chalked up the likes of
Krauthammer as “victims of Israel Derangement Syndrome.” (100) Still, it must
be said that they were the picture of subtlety next to Jewish Week associate
editor Jonathan Mark who advised Israel: “Next flotilla that violently resists
a search—just sink it. Torpedo it.” (101)
Even among the party faithful, however, an unease
with Zion could be discerned. “The first and most obvious thing to say,” Dissent
editor Michael Walzer declared, “is that Israel should have let the six ships
through to Gaza,” (102) while New Republic literary editor Leon Wieseltier,
dubbing the Israeli attack “Operation Make the World Hate Us,” declared that
“the important point is that the killing of civilians on the Mavi Marmara ...
cannot be extenuated by reference to ‘asymmetrical warfare’ and Israel’s right
to defend itself.” (103) But the most spectacular defection came from another
quarter just as the flotilla bloodbath was unfolding.
In a manifesto-cum-declaration of independence that reverberated
throughout the American Jewish community, Peter Beinart portended in the pages
of the New York Review of Books the coming demise of American Zionism and
pinned culpability for its untimely death on the American Jewish establishment.
The liberal ethos of American Jews could no longer be reconciled with Israeli
policy, Beinart contended, and when forced by apologetic American Jewish
leaders to choose between them, American Jews have opted to keep faith with their
homegrown values: “For several decades, the Jewish establishment has asked
American Jews to check their liberalism at Zionism’s door, and now, to their
horror, they are finding that many young Jews have checked their Zionism
instead.” (104)
What created such a stir was not so much the
article’s thesis, which could hardly stake a claim to originality, (105) but
who was proclaiming it and where it was being proclaimed. Beinart is a former
senior editor at the staunchly “pro”-Israel New Republic and an orthodox Jew;
the New York Review of Books is the bellwether of American intellectual—and
American Jewish intellectual—opinion. The skeptic might suppose that this spectacle
was less a case of “seeing the light” than of trimming the sails to take full
advantage of new tailwinds, but either way Beinart’s high profile defection
signaled the further decomposition of American Zionism, this time at its hard
core. After the flotilla bloodbath Beinart assigned primary blame to “Israeli leaders
who oversee the Gaza embargo” and “Israel’s American supporters, who have
averted their eyes.” In a stinging reproach to American Jews, he concluded that
“In the name of solidarity, we have practiced denial. In the name of
anti-terrorism we have justified the brutalization of innocents” and “enabled
Israel’s callous, reckless policy.” (106)
A slew of mea
culpas by other erstwhile American
Zionists followed on the heels of Beinart’s confession of a faith lost. “All the
talk of the complicated and tragic nature of the situation,” one self-described
member of the “younger generation” now came to realize, “was partially designed
to obscure certain stark realities that were, perhaps, not terribly complicated
at all: in particular, the fact that for decades the lion’s share of power has been
in the possession of one side, and the lion’s share of suffering has been borne
by the other.” (107) “Let’s separate truth from the bold-faced lies emanating
from the Israeli government and the organized American Jewish community that
repeats them,” a rabbi and veteran publisher of Jewish Journal began, and after
methodically exposing numerous falsehoods, he lamented that “Israel is going
down the path of no return to its own dismal future. As a lifelong Zionist, my
heart is breaking.” (108)
Meanwhile, influential Jewish pundits on the
blogosphere inveighed after the commando attack that in Gaza “the Epilogue 179 level
of human suffering—we’re talking about a place where 1.5 million people
live—being inflicted is just staggering” (Matthew Yglesias); that “this is an
insane use of disproportionate force” (Joe Klein); that “it hardly seemed
possible for Israel— after its brutal devastation of Gaza and its ongoing
blockade— to engage in more heinous and repugnant crimes. But ... Israel has
managed to do exactly that” (Glenn Greenwald). (109) Some of the most acid
commentary on the web came from the heart of the American Jewish community.
Vilifying the passengers because their prime objective was to break the
blockade not deliver supplies, a former director of the Israel Policy Forum pointed
out, was on a par with vilifying protesters sitting in at segregated lunch
counters in the South because their prime objective “was not really to get
breakfast. It was to end segregation”; and for commandos to board a civilian
vessel in international waters and then claim that they were attacked “without provocation”
was on a par with “a carjacker complaining to the police that the driver bashed
him with a crowbar that was under the seat.” (110)
By year’s end, even the editor of the influential New
Yorker magazine, the pages of which are periodically filled with puff pieces
for Israel, jumped ship. In a spontaneous—or was it calculated?— outburst,
David Remnick told a Hebrew daily that Israel’s “status of an occupier” had
been “happening for so long” that “even people like me ... can’t take it
anymore.” (111) One did not have to be a weatherman to know which way the wind was
blowing.
A reservoir of support for Israel can still be found
among American Jews, especially orthodox Jews and those who came of age during
Israel’s seemingly heroic period that commenced with the June 1967 “Six-Day
War” and climaxed with the October 1973 “Yom Kippur War.” But by now a lot of
dirty water— Lebanon 1982, the first and second intifadas, Lebanon 2006, Gaza
2008-9, the Mavi Marmara—has flowed under the bridge. Like the waning of global
support and American support generally for Israel, it is almost certain that
support for Israel among American Jews has entered a period of ineluctable
decline. Should it really surprise that American Jews weaned on liberal values
would prefer not to defend the firing of white phosphorus at hospitals and the
summary execution of passengers on a humanitarian flotilla?
GIVING WAR A CHANCE
Even if, for argument’s sake, one credits the right
of Israel to block passage of a humanitarian flotilla, the question remains, “why,
on a supposedly peaceful interception, its commandos chose to board the ship by
rappelling from a military helicopter, in the dark, in international waters,”
in a fashion practically designed to induce panic. (112) It could have
chosen—as Israeli offi-cials readily acknowledged—from an array of relatively
benign options such as disabling the propeller, rudder or engine of the vessel
and towing it to the Israeli port at Ashdod, or physically blocking the
vessel’s passage. (113) On Israel’s own terms, a commando raid was a bizarre
choice. After the bloodletting, Israel alleged on its behalf that it didn’t
anticipate violent resistance; that it was “expecting mild violence and mostly
curses, shoves and spitting in the face,” “a sit-down, a linking of arms,”
“passive resistance, perhaps verbal resistance,” or “to engage with the
passengers in conversation.” (114) But if it didn’t expect force to be used
against it, why didn’t it board the boat in broad daylight, indeed, with a full
complement of journalists brought along to show the world its peaceful
intentions; why did it disable the vessel’s communications beforehand, preventing
transmissions to the outside world; and why did it initiate contact by using
tear gas, smoke and stun grenades and possibly plastic bullets? And if it
didn’t intend violence, why did it deploy a commando unit trained to kill and
not a police unit accustomed to handling civil resisters?
Judging not by the ex post facto protestations of
Israeli leaders but by the options they elected in preparation for the assault,
the reasonable inference is that Israel wanted a bloody confrontation, although
probably not on the scale that ensued after the commandos panicked at the
passengers’ determined resistance and then exacted several more vengeful
murders. “What did the commandos expect pro-Palestinian activists to do once
they boarded the ships,” the British Guardian editorialized, “invite them
aboard for a cup of tea with the captain on the bridge?” (115) But the question
remains, Why? In fact, multiple factors converged to make a violent commando
raid the optimal modus operandi.
In recent years Israel has conducted a succession of
what it reckons to be bungled security operations. In 2006 it suffered a major
military setback in Lebanon. It tried restoring its deterrence capacity—i.e.,
the Arab-Muslim world’s fear of it—when it invaded Gaza in 2008-9. However, the
attack evoked not awe at Israel’s martial prowess but disgust at its lethal
cowardice. Israel then dispatched in 2010 a commando team to assassinate a
Hamas leader in Dubai but, although the mission was accomplished, the unit
ended up seeding a diplomatic storm on account of its amateurish execution.
Israel was now desperate to restore the IDF’s derring-do image of bygone years.
What better way than an Entebbe-like commando raid? (116)
The decision to launch the assault on the Mavi
Marmara was taken by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak. Both
had belonged to a commando unit in their youth. In fact Barak was Netanyahu’s
commander and mentor in the unit and they are still said to communicate with
each other in the coded language of their commando stint. (117) Barak made his reputation
on a commando raid in 1972 and Netanyahu basked in the reflected glory of his
brother Jonathan, who was the only Israeli casualty on the Entebbe raid in
1976. It should come as little surprise that the duo would opt for a violent
commando assault to burnish the IDF’s—and their own—reputation.
“Both the prime minister and the defense minister are
dyed-in-the-wool creatures of military operations,” Haaretz columnist Doron
Rosenblum observed after the flotilla raid. “Both were steeped in the
instant-heroism mentality and the commando spirit: the ethos in which a
military force shows up at the height of a crisis like a deus ex machina and in
a single stroke slices through the Gordian knot.” “Although decades have passed
since the moral high [of such operations] was injected into our veins,”
Rosenblum continued, “our leaders have never stopped trying to reconstruct it
to atone for their ineffectiveness as statesmen. And the greater the number of successive
failed missions, the greater the longing for the next redemptive mission that
would heal the trauma and the bad trip of its predecessor.... They are the
responses of addicts who are repeatedly denied their fix: the perfect IDF
operation, or the decisive war, which will stifle any question and complaints
(and any need for statesmanship).” (118)
Predictably, the Israeli resort to violent force was
most pronounced in the assault on the Mavi Marmara. Some twothirds of the 600
passengers on this vessel were Turkish citizens, while the core contingent was
alleged to be “a front for a radical Islamist organization, probably with links
to the ruling party in Turkey,” making the Mavi Marmara a yet more tempting target.
(119) In recent times Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has become
increasingly outspoken in his criticism of Israel and in his determination to
carve out an independent foreign policy. After the Gaza invasion Erdogan
publicly dressed down Israeli President Peres at the World Economic Forum in
Davos: “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.” In early 2010
Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon publicly humiliated the Turkish ambassador in
front of Israeli television cameras by refusing to shake his hand and placing
him in a low chair over which the Israeli deputy foreign minister towered. Erdogan
then acted in concert with Brazil to resolve diplomatically the conflict with
Iran over its nuclear program. Fixated as Israel has been on attacking Iran,
the Turkish démarche was another unwelcome interference. “Turkey thereby
strengthened its identification and cooperation with Iran,” Netanyahu later
bemoaned, “just days before the flotilla.” Further, Israeli entreaties “to the
most senior levels of the Turkish government” to preempt the Mavi Marmara’s launching went unheeded.
(120)
It was long past time to cut the Turkish upstart down
to size, and a sleek (if bloody) commando raid was just the reminder Ankara
needed of who was in charge in that corner of the world. Israel eschewed less
violent options to halt the flotilla, an Israeli strategic analyst breathlessly
explained, because it wanted “to tell the Islamizing Turkey... —no more. The
forces of the Ottoman Empire, who aspire to again rule the Middle East as they
did almost 500 years ago, will be stopped at Gaza’s shores.” (121) The ensuing
rift with its historic ally might appear to belie such speculation: why would
Israel risk such a steep diplomatic price? But Israel has grown accustomed to Arab-Muslim
leaders meekly absorbing its humiliating blows. If Israeli commandos had killed
nine Egyptians on a humanitarian convoy, who can doubt that Hosni Mubarak would
have pleaded for Israel’s forgiveness? Even Bashar al-Assad stayed mute after
the Israeli air assault on an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor. “I am certain the
Turkish reaction took the Zionist leaders by surprise,” Hezbollah
Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah declared after the bloodbath. (122)
The recourse to violent force was also Israel’s reflexive
response to stem the rising tide of vessels destined for Gaza. It initially
allowed humanitarian supplies headed for Gaza by sea to pass through, no doubt
hoping that the spirits of the organizers would peter out as public interest flagged.
When this didn’t deter them the Israeli navy rammed and intercepted vessels en
route to Gaza. (123) But more boats kept coming. Is it surprising that Israel
would then resort to violent force? After Israel prevented a humanitarian ship
from reaching Gaza in February 2009, a British-led delegation “worried” out
loud to U.S. embassy officials in Beirut “that the Israeli government would not
be as ‘lenient’ in the future should similar incidents occur.” (124) If the
assault on the flotilla couldn’t have shocked those in the loop, it also didn’t
shock seasoned observers of the Israeli scene. The “violent interception of
civilian vessels carrying humanitarian aid,” Israeli novelist Amos Oz reflected,
was the “rank product” of the Israeli “mantra that what can’t be done by force
can be done with even greater force.” (125) Denying that the commandos’
violence was premeditated, Israel purported that it had merely expected
“resistance like we encounter in Bil’in.” (126) But Israel has frequently
resorted to lethal force to put a stop to such civil resistance. What happened
on the Mavi Marmara, a Haaretz columnist observed, “is very similar to what
Israel has been doing every week for the past four years in Bil’in—injuring and
killing unarmed civilian protesters who are demanding their basic rights.” (127)
Since 2002, fully 27 Palestinians have been killed in popular resistance
activities. No member of the Israeli security forces has been killed at these demonstrations.
(128)
1967 REDUX/THE WAR TO END
ALL WARS
The fact that Israel bungled yet another operation
bodes ominously for the future. The once-vaunted IDF has become, as political
scientist John J. Mearsheimer put it, “the gang that cannot shoot straight.” (129)
It is hard to exaggerate the cost in Israeli eyes of this latest misadventure.
Although Israeli hasbara desperately sought to spin the raid as an “operational
success” (130) and the commandos as untarnished heroes, few were taken in. Israeli
pundits deplored this “disgraceful fiasco” and “national humiliation” in which
“deterrence took a bad blow.” (131) “The magic evaporated long ago, the most
moral army in the world, that was once the best army in the world, failed
again,” Gideon Levy half satirized. “More and more there is the impression that
nearly everything it touches causes harm to Israel.” (132)
The Naval Commandos constitute Israel’s “best fighting
unit”; (133) they had rehearsed the attack for weeks, even constructing a model
of the Mavi Marmara. (134) Nonetheless, when 30 of these commandos faced off
against an equal number of civilian passengers (135) possessing only makeshift
weapons, three of them not only allowed themselves to be captured but
photographs of them being nursed circulated throughout cyberspace. Israeli
soldiers—and commandos above all—are not supposed to be taken alive, especially
after Gilad Shalit’s capture turned into a national trauma. (136) One widely
quoted Mavi Marmara passenger who disarmed the commandos recalled afterwards that
“they looked like frightened children in the face of an abusive father.” (137)
A cohort of “frightened children” is not the image
Israel wants to project to foe or friend of the IDF. “The claim made by the IDF
spokesman that the soldiers’ lives were in danger and they feared a lynching,”
a Haaretz military analyst understatedly opined, “is hardly complimentary to
the men of the elite naval units.” (138) It was also not a comforting image for
its own domestic population, which cannot but be jittery about the ability of
the IDF after so many misadventures to fend off a seemingly endless list of
evermore potent enemies. “It’s one thing for people to think you’re crazy,” an
Israeli general rued, “but it’s bad when they think you’re incompetent and
crazy, and that’s the way we look.” (139) The results of a 2010 poll in the
Arab world showing that only 12 percent of the Arab public believed Israel was
“very powerful” while fully 44 percent believed it was “weaker than it looks”
validated, and probably exacerbated, the anxieties of Israeli leaders. (140)
Each disastrous mission ups the stakes of the next
throw of the dice. Israel must launch a yet more spectacular mission to
compensate for the long string of failures. It might target a Hezbollah leader
for assassination. (Except in the event of war, it most likely will not target
Nasrallah because assassinating him would provoke an incalculable craving for
vengeance.) But after so many embarrassing mishaps, the likelihood is that Israel
will set its sights on something more ambitious than a contained commando
operation to restore its deterrence. If Israeli leaders typically hark back to
the raid on Entebbe as the perfectly executed commando operation, they also
typically hark back to the June 1967 war as the perfectly executed military operation.
The temptation to launch another such blitzkrieg must run deep.
The aftermath of the flotilla bloodbath brought into sharp
relief a new configuration of power in the Middle East. Turkey refused to
buckle under Israeli (and American) pressure and had already sided with Iran on
the sanctions vote in the U.N. Security Council. (141) Syria’s al-Assad almost
immediately journeyed to Ankara in a show of support, and Hezbollah was
reportedly being supplied with Syrian missiles. “The axis of
Turkey-Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas is the rising power,” Avnery reckoned, “and
the axis of Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Fatah is in decline.” (142) Meanwhile,
international pressures were building on Israel to negotiate with Hamas, (143)
and global public opinion was turning against Israel.
These combined and consecutive developments could not
but conjure memories in Israel of the eve of the June 1967 war when—as
Netanyahu recalled in a recent speech—the Arabs had sought to “tighten a noose
around the neck of the State of Israel.” (144) Yet again Israel was being
“encircled” by a ring of enemies making haste to destroy it, while the world at
large was “abandoning” it. Just as in 1967, for ordinary Israelis it is a
frightening spectacle—“The noose is tightening around us,” an old Israeli
friend recently wrote me, echoing Netanyahu’s emotive remembrance of 1967—while
for Israeli leaders it is a fetching spectacle: it is, viscerally, the perfect
moment to launch a first strike. Of course there are kernels of truth in the
fears of ordinary Israelis but the overarching truth is that, if the noose is
tightening around Israel, it is Israel that is tightening it; if Israel now
evokes near-universal loathing, if, as a majority of Israeli Jews apparently
believe, “the whole world is against us,” (145) it is because of Israel’s
relentless bellicosity and brutality.
“Prejudice is not what motivates the vast majority of
those mobilizing in solidarity with the Palestinians,” Israeli foreign policy
specialist Daniel Levy observed. “The occupation is the oxygen of their
campaign.... An Israel that fails to appreciate this and which sustains the
occupation is the single most proximate cause of its own delegitimization.” (146)
“Our opponents are not motivated by anti-Semitism, as our political hacks like
to claim,” veteran Israeli columnist Yoel Marcus likewise commented. “If
patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, then anti-Semitism is the last
refuge of the occupier.” (147) Even the conspiracy-minded Reut Institute, which
has conjured up ramified global “networks” composed of “hubs” and “catalysts” singularly
dedicated to Israel’s destruction, recognized that “in the struggle against
delegitimization, it is essential that Israel adopts clear and consistent
policies ... which effectively reflect a sincere commitment to ending Israel’s
control over the Palestinian population and achieving peace.” (148)
It is a baseless conjecture that Israel’s neighbors,
singly or en masse, intend to attack. But for Israel that’s not the point. It
should be remembered that Israel did not face an existential threat in 1967 either.
It decided to launch a first strike after Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser
declared that he was closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. In fact
Israel barely used the Straits, and anyhow Nasser quietly let vessels pass after
a few days. (149) However, the verbal gesture in itself was for Israel a casus
belli. “The importance of denying Nasser political and psychological victory,”
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban later observed, “had become no less
important than the concrete interest involved in the issue of navigation.” (150)
Then and now, Israel won’t abide having its freedom of maneuver hemmed in by a
countervailing force, even a “political and psychological” one; it demands free
rein to act as ruthlessly and recklessly as it pleases, no checks, no balances.
A single shattering blow, Israeli leaders perhaps now fantasize, can retrieve
the glory days after the June 1967 war when Israel sat pretty atop occupied
Arab territories beyond all its borders while Moshe Dayan mocked, “We are awaiting
the Arabs’ phone call.”
The probable initial target of an Israeli attack is
Lebanon. Of late Israel has been busily preparing the ground for it. Even Israel’s
vulgar apologists such as Daniel Kurtzer, former U.S. ambassador to Israel,
concede that should hostilities break out, it is “more likely” that Israel will
have initiated them. He reports speculation that a war will occur in the next
12 to 18 months, and predicts that the U.S. won’t be willing—or able— to avert
it: “Israel would likely mobilize its supporters in the United States to push
back against the administration, and the Obama administration would face a firestorm
of pressure from Capitol Hill and the pro-Israel lobby organizations. It is not
clear that the administration could muster strong arguments for a policy
position calling for Israeli restraint or threatening diplomatic action against
Israel in case of war.” (151) The Israel lobby has already signaled where it
stands: “if war comes, Washington should not necessarily take immediate steps toward
ending it quickly.” (152)
The pretext for an Israeli first strike could be that
Hezbollah has amassed a huge arsenal of rockets and missiles targeting Israel.
It is almost certain that an Israeli assault would replicate the Gaza
invasion—which had “served to test the performance of units, doctrine, tactics,
and equipment for a major war in the north” (153)—but on a much grander scale.
An Israeli general proclaimed shortly after the Gaza invasion that the IDF will
“continue to apply” the so-called Dahiya doctrine of directing massive force
against civilian infrastructure “in the future.” (154) On the same day as the flotilla
bloodbath, the authoritative DefenseNews was reporting that a prospective
Israeli assault on Lebanon “would include attacks on national infrastructure; a
total maritime blockade; and interdiction strikes on bridges, highways,” while
“land forces would execute a ferocious land grab well beyond the Litani River.”
The essence of Israeli strategic doctrine, the IDF deputy chief of staff
elaborated, was that “each new round” of fighting “brings worse results than
the last” to Israel’s enemies. On one point Israel and its nemesis concur: IDF
officers predict that the next war will be “gamechanging”; Hezbollah’s
Nasrallah forecasts that “it will change the face of this region.” (155) The
Israel lobby’s think tank in Washington says it will be “transformational, even
fateful.” (156)
Israeli intelligence is reporting that Hezbollah has
now located weapons and its command centers in Lebanese villages. It might be
cause for wonder why this should be deemed newsworthy inasmuch as Israel
already alleged—falsely—that Hezbollah weapons and its command centers were
located in Lebanese villages when Israel targeted these villages in 2006. Thus
Haaretz’s senior military analysts, basing themselves on “valuable intelligence
information,” report that “Hezbollah has moved most of its bunkers, command
centers and rocket stores in southern Lebanon out of fields and into the 160
Shiite villages and towns in the area.” (157) But in their scholarly study of the
2006 Lebanon War, the very same writers reported that Hezbollah stored
ammunition in civilian homes and turned them into “observation and command
posts.” (158) The transparent purpose behind disseminating this latest Israeli
“intelligence” is not, as they claim, to “warn Hezbollah,” but rather to justify
in advance another massive assault on Lebanon’s civilian population and
civilian infrastructure. In fact, the United Nations force stationed in south
Lebanon (UNIFIL) “has not found any evidence of a new military infrastructure
in its area of operations.” (159)
Many Lebanese find some solace in the knowledge that
the next war cannot be worse than the last one. But despite inflicting massive
destruction in 2006, Israel still “spared most non-Shiite residential
neighborhoods and major infrastructure, such as telecommunications as well as
energy and water-related infrastructure.” (160) An Israeli strategic analyst
anticipated that “another violent Israel-Hezbollah confrontation would make the
Second Lebanon War of 2006 look like child’s play in comparison.” (161) Defense
Minister Barak told the Washington Post that should hostilities break out
again, “we will see it as legitimate to hit any target that belongs to the
Lebanese state, not just to the Hezbollah,” while former IDF general and
national security advisor Giora Eiland predicted that “another war between us and
Hezbollah will be a war between Israel and the State of Lebanon,” (162) one in
which Israel “wreaks destruction on the State of Lebanon” of a magnitude that
will have “the entire world crying for a ceasefire within two days.” (163)
It might be argued that after the defeat Israel suffered
in 2006 it won’t pick another fight with Hezbollah, let alone risk a regional
face-off. Israel has not however resigned itself to, or even entertained, the
notion that it no longer has the capacity to deliver a mighty blow to its foes;
that, as the commando fiasco yet again vividly illustrated, the Israeli fighting
force of today is not the fighting force of yesteryear; that the powers arrayed
against it are more formidable than the spent forces of radical Arab
nationalism running on hot air that it defeated in 1967. Tellingly, after each
successive bungled operation Israelis speak of “operational” errors, never
conceptual ones, the tacit assumption being that if these errors are corrected,
then next time around the goals still can and will be achieved.
It is an equally mistaken presumption that Israel
would only attack on the assurance that it could militarily defeat Hezbollah. In
a reversal of Clausewitz’s dictum, politics for Israel is war by other means.
Because it is so deeply ingrained in the Israeli psyche that “Arabs only
understand the language of force” and, concomitantly, because “Zionism” has
“traditionally conceived” violence as a “pedagogical device to convince Arabs”
of Israel’s “indestructibility,” (164) Israeli leaders repeatedly feel under
compulsion to unleash devastating displays of firepower. War is not a means to
an end, it is the end, whereas politics is merely the hiatus between wars. A
cardinal error Israeli leaders are said to have committed in 2006 was
announcing an overly ambitious goal: the incapacitation of Hezbollah. (165) (It
deserves an aside that the IDF fared so miserably against Hezbollah partly
because it had adopted a battle doctrine steeped in “postmodern French
philosophy” that many officers couldn’t understand.) (166) If the declared
objective of the 2006 war had been to deter Hezbollah from firing missiles at
it, Israel could have convincingly proclaimed victory. As it stood, the Israel-Lebanon
border was witness to unprecedented calm after the Israeli assault precisely
because of the massive death and destruction Israel had inflicted on Lebanese
society. (167)
At the outset of the Gaza invasion Israel carefully
limited its announced goal to the cessation of Hamas rocket fire. It was then
able to declare victory afterwards. Even then, the purported triumph was mostly
a sham: the number of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza after the invasion
was not lower than before Israel broke the ceasefire in November 2008. (168) Still,
Hamas did carefully observe the postinvasion ceasefire— despite the fact that
the illegal Israeli blockade wasn’t lift ed— partly because of the massive
devastation Israel wrought. In a war with Hezbollah, Israel might proclaim as
its goal degrading Hezbollah’s missile capabilities in the short term; then
launch a “shock and awe” blitzkrieg to destroy several thousand Hezbollah missiles;
and then declare victory. At the same time and just as it did in Gaza, Israel
would devastate Lebanese civilian infrastructure both to put the Arab-Muslim
world on notice should it contemplate constricting Israel’s room for maneuver,
and to turn the Lebanese population against Hezbollah.
Nasrallah has repeatedly declared that in the event
of another war, it will be tit-for-tat: “an airport for an airport, a port for
a port, a city for a city, a building for a building, a power station for a
power station, a factory for a factory,” and “if you besiege our shore and our
ports, all military and commercial ships heading towards the ports of Palestine
along the Mediterranean Sea will be under the fire of the Islamic resistance.”
(169) His entire reputation—and he must know it—rests on the fact that, unlike
Arab leaders from Nasser to Saddam Hussein, an exact correspondence exists
between his words and deeds. (170) Put otherwise, there’s every reason to
suppose that Nasrallah means what he says, and will—must—do what he promises.
It is frightening to conceive what Israel will do if
Hezbollah missiles target Israel’s unofficial capital. The head of Military
Intelligence warned the Israeli cabinet that the current “lull shouldn’t
mislead anyone,” and that, should a new war break out, “Tel Aviv could also
become a front.” (171) Asked if Israel would be deterred by international law,
“a senior officer in the General Staff replied without hesitation: ‘When
missiles fly at Tel Aviv in the next war, and we presume that they will, we
will respond with all the necessary force. Don’t delude yourselves that
anyone’s going to wait for the lawyers.’” (172) The prospect grows yet more
terrifying when one considers that an Israeli assault on Lebanon will perhaps
also draw in Iran and Syria, especially if Israel decides in a replay of June
1967 to knock out all its foes in one blow and thereby “fundamentally alter the
military equation,” (173) or if Iran and Syria perceive, rightfully, an attack
on Hezbollah and its defeat as the prelude to an attack on them. (174) The bottom
line is that Israel will not abide another defeat by Hezbollah and the U.S.
will almost certainly be pulled in if its defeat impends; and Hezbollah will
not abide a defeat by Israel and Iran and Syria will almost certainly be pulled
in if its defeat impends. (175) An Israeli attack on Hezbollah could trigger a
chain reaction the outcome of which no sane person would want to contemplate.
Hezbollah’s calculation appears to be that a prior,
publicly declared determination to retaliate against Israel’s own home front in
the event of an attack will deter it. (176) But Israeli leaders might be
willing to risk massive civilian deaths in order to deliver the knock-out punch—following
the 2006 Lebanon War Israel has invested massively in civil defense
infrastructure and annually conducted national civil defense drills as if bracing
its home front for such retaliatory strikes (177)—and anyhow Israel is
constitutionally incapable of relating to the Arab-Muslim world except as
masters and via the language of force. Israeli leaders might even perceive an attack
on the civilian population as an opportunity to whip up a domestic hysteria and
garner international sympathy for a murderous denouement. Having alienated so
much of international opinion after its consecutive ravagings of Lebanon in
2006 and Gaza in 2008-9, and after the Mavi Marmara bloodbath, Israel in fact positively
needs massive civilian casualties—which it would undoubtedly exploit to the
hilt in the media—in order to justify yet another annihilative assault and, if
the attack goes awry, to coax American intervention. (A 2010 poll found that a
clear majority of Americans opposed deployment of American military force in
support of Israel if it initiates and gets entangled in a war with Iran, and
fewer than half of Americans supported use of American military force to defend
Israel even against an unprovoked attack by a neighbor.) (178) If Hezbollah’s
retaliatory strikes continued to inflict civilian casualties nonstop, however, Israel
couldn’t declare a military victory after its blitzkrieg and the mutual
destruction could easily spin out of control.
If the Obama administration won’t stop Israel, and if
scenes of Israeli civilian deaths will neutralize hostile world public opinion,
it is also improbable that Israeli anxiety over the political repercussions of
an attack will deter it. After the Gaza invasion Israeli leaders did feel
constrained by the potential of the Goldstone Report to cast them as war criminals. But the Palestinian Authority
and members of the Arab League, preferring that the report die a quiet death,
let it languish in the U.N. bureaucracy, and Israel eventually figured out how
to neuter it. Denying any wrongdoing, Israel initially lashed out at the
Goldstone Report. But when the
pressures didn’t abate, it deft ly changed tack by administering a handful of
token punishments and, promising to mend its ways, professed that in future
wars it would heed the lessons of Goldstone. Anxious to rejoin the Israeli
consensus, Goldstone’s original supporters then claimed vindication and praised
Israel’s capacity (albeit belated) for self-criticism, (179) while the IDF
wailed out loud at the shackles allegedly being placed on it. (180)
By Act IV of these wretched histrionics U.N.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was praising Israel’s “significant progress investigating
allegations of misconduct by the IDF,” (181) and the U.N. Human Rights Council
was endlessly deferring action on Goldstone’s findings with the Palestinian
Authority’s acquiescence, (182) while Defense Minister Barak could confidently
predict that he was in the process of dispatching the “remnants of the
Goldstone report.” (183) Israel’s
“significant progress” and substantive reply to the Goldstone Report was showcased in September 2010
when the commander of the Gaza invasion was promoted to IDF chief of staff. (184)
The nine passengers murdered aboard the Mavi Marmara were the first casualties
of the Goldstone Report’s interment,
and those who expedited the Report’s burial must bear a share of responsibility
for these deaths. If it had not been effectively “vetoed,” human rights lawyer
Raji Sourani observed, “if the international community had fulfilled its
obligation to enforce international humanitarian law, and if the rule of law
were respected, it is almost certain that the unjustifiable bloodshed in the
Mediterranean could have been prevented.” (185)
In short order Israel also contained the rippling effects
of the Mavi Marmara bloodbath. It initially opposed an international investigation
but then reversed itself, proclaiming it had “nothing to hide,” (186) after Ban
Ki-moon eviscerated the proposed panel’s mandate (187) and appointed singularly
corrupt and criminal Colombian ex-president Alvaro Uribe, who is also an outspoken
proponent of closer military ties between Colombia and Israel, as vice-chair of
the panel. (188) (A former prime minister of New Zealand was designated the
chair.) Besides an impartial investigation of the Mavi Marmara assault, Erdogan
had demanded an apology from Israel. He will now be fortunate if, after its
deliberations, the panel does not demand an apology from him. Still, Israeli
opposition leader Tzipi Livni deplored the creation of a U.N. panel because
“international intervention in military operations carried out by Israel is unacceptable....
Israel is investigating the events of the flotilla itself, and that is enough.”
(189) Indeed, who can doubt that Israel’s killing of foreign nationals in
international waters is an internal Israeli affair?
It is, finally, open to question whether, as they
inch towards Armageddon, Israeli leaders can be counted on to act according to
a rational calculus. After the Gaza invasion Israeli officials proclaimed that
they “acted” lunatic to deter their enemies; after its bloody commando raid on
a humanitarian convoy, one wonders whether they have become lunatic. “Only a crazy
government that has lost all restraint and all connection to reality,” Avnery
observed right after the flotilla attack, “could do something like
that—consider ships carrying humanitarian aid and peace activists from around
the world as an enemy and send massive military force to international waters
to attack them, shoot and kill.” (190)
Feeling trapped and cornered, desperate to restore
its deterrence but appearing yet more inept after each successive attempt,
emancipated from the constraints of public opinion and legal repercussion, and
after repeatedly threatening to attack Iran and Hezbollah, making it ever
harder to back down and not lose credibility, an unhinged Israeli leadership just
might go for broke. It is not being a Cassandra to prognosticate an impending
doomsday, and it is far from premature to sound the alarm that at bare minimum
Israel must be compelled to join the regional consensus supporting a WMD-free zone
in the Middle East. (191) It deserves underscoring that Israel’s refusal to
fully withdraw from the territories it conquered in 1967 has blocked a
diplomatic settlement with the Palestinians and Syria that would drastically
reduce the likelihood of regional war.
MAVI MARMARA SHOWS THE
PATH FORWARD
Despite the irretrievable loss of human life and the
dire prospects of regional conflagration—indeed because of them—the historic
achievement of the Freedom Flotilla should not be lost from sight. A
nonviolent, international grassroots initiative proved able to force the hands
of the world’s mightiest powers. Only on the day after the bloody Israeli assault
did the powersthat-be suddenly awaken to the realization that the Israeli siege
was “unsustainable”—as these complacent, hypocritical cowards uttered singly
and in chorus—and had to be lift ed; in fact Netanyahu himself had to concede
the existence of the Israeli siege and the necessity of terminating it. (192)
The prison gates of Gaza have so far been pried open only a few inches at most,
(193) but those inches manifest the latent power of a movement built on the
simple truth that the occupation is inhuman and unjust.
True, the international community would probably not have
pressured Israel were it not for the Turkish state’s high decibel intervention.
The grassroots movement in and of itself, and however many its mortal sacrifices,
is not yet able to inflect state policy. The murder of Rachel Corrie on its own
did not rattle American complicity, or the murder of Tom Hurndall rattle
British complicity, with the Israeli occupation, and the heroic resistance in
West Bank villages like Bil’in has not yet stirred the world’s conscience. But
the movement is still in a nascent stage and has yet to draw on its vast
reserves. It can only be imagined the potential of a movement that taps the dormant
talent and ingenuity of its ever-expanding ranks; of a committed leadership
that harnesses this restless but diffuse energy and doesn’t let petty
jealousies, turf wars and ego aggrandizement obscure the common objective; of
one, two, three, many flotillas determined to break the cruel siege, once and
for all. Energizing as these prospects might be, it must simultaneously be
borne in mind the magnitude of the will that must be summoned, how
concentrated, tenacious and sustained this collective will must be, to extract
even the most meager concession from those ruthlessly wielding power. Despite
the universal condemnation of Israel’s commando raid, and the concerted calls
by world leaders for Israel to lift the siege of Gaza, a half year later there
was still “no tangible change for the people on the ground” (194) while the
humanitarian crisis again vanished from the headlines.
The fact that the murders of Rachel Corrie and Tom Hurndall
still resonate and that the murder of nine foreigners aboard the Mavi Marmara
evoked global condemnation should serve as a fillip to the solidarity movement.
However unfair, it remains true that a higher value is attached to some lives— and
deaths—than others; that Palestinian lives are expendable, while the lives of
foreigners are not. The Civil Rights Movement immortalized the names Schwerner
and Goodman, and who can deny the nobility of their sacrifice? Yet, a forgotten
Black person was killed in Mississippi in each of the five months preceding the
deaths of these two white (and Jewish) volunteers in Freedom Summer. (195) The
inequality in valuating life should outrage, but it should also prod us to
redouble our commitment because the presence of a “higher-graded” life can
direct attention to an atrocity that would otherwise go unnoticed.
A skeptic might wonder whether the bloody spectacle aboard
the Mavi Marmara proved the power of nonviolence or in fact of violence. Would
the world have paid heed if the passengers had not forcefully resisted and the
Israeli killings had not ensued? But such a reading of what happened doubly
errs. At some point Israel’s resort to massive bloodshed was inevitable. The
death toll on the Mavi Marmara was probably greater than Israel intended, but
ultimately Israel has no recourse except to lethal force against determined
nonviolent resistance. Moreover, nonviolent resistance does not preclude but in
fact is predicated on the prospect of self-sacrifice. Gandhi demanded of satyagrahis
that they seek out martyrdom at the hands of their oppressors: for, the whole
point of nonviolent resistance was to prick the public conscience into action
against injustice. (196) No sight was more likely to arouse respect than
innocents willing to die for their basic rights, and no sight was more likely
to arouse indignation than innocents being killed for such aspirations; indeed,
the willingness to die nonviolently in pursuit of these rights affirmed the
victims’ worthiness of them. Although it appalled grassroots activists, some
leaders of the Civil Rights Movement were “elated” when Southern
segregationists sicked dogs on nonviolent demonstrators. “They said over and
over again,” James Foreman bitterly recounted, “‘We’ve got a movement. We’ve
got a movement. They brought out the dogs. We’ve got a movement!’” (197) The
promise of nonviolence is not that it won’t entail suffering and death but, as
Gandhi never tired of repeating, it could achieve the same results as violence at
a far lesser cost. Or, as a Hamas legislator put it, “The Gaza flotilla has
done more for Gaza than 10,000 rockets.” (198)
The overarching lesson of the Mavi Marmara is to
focus not on meaningless sideshows like the “peace process” but on summoning
forth our own capacities. The process inaugurated at Oslo in September 1993 has
not brought Palestinians one step closer to an independent state but has
brought Israel many steps closer to annexing the West Bank. Between 1993 and
2010 the number of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
doubled from 250,000 to 500,000, while Israel expropriated nearly half of West
Bank land for the settlements, effectively evicted thousands of Palestinians
from their homes and revoked the Jerusalem residency permits of thousands more
Palestinians. Although the total Palestinian population in the West Bank has
expanded by fully 50 percent since 1993, the total water allocation for
Palestinians has contracted from the already exiguous level set in the Oslo
Accord, while in the Jordan Valley an estimated 9,000 illegal Jewish settlers have
used one-quarter the total amount of water consumed by all the 2.5 million
Palestinian residents of the West Bank. (199) Judging not by words but—as a
rational person does—by outcomes or results, what began at Oslo was not a peace
process but an annexation process, while the “peace process” has been the
complementary façade behind which the annexation process has proceeded.
“Negotiations,” Middle East political analyst Mouin Rabbani concisely observed,
“have become nothing but an alternative to accountability, the mechanism of
choice to deflect and neutralize efforts to confront Israeli lawlessness.” (200)
If it is pointless to speculate on the prospects of
the “peace process,” it is no less idle to speculate on “What does Obama want?”
One would have to be blinder than King Lear to still invest hopes in his
presidency. The highpoint of Obama’s tenure over the “peace process” was
engineering a ten-month Israeli “settlement freeze” in November 2009 to coax
the Palestinian Authority into resuming negotiations. But Prime Minister Netanyahu
only promised to suspend new housing construction. Having received ample notice
from the government, Jewish settlers worked “at full speed to lay as many
foundations as possible” in advance of the freeze announcement, enabling construction
of new homes to proceed virtually unimpeded during the next ten months. The
freeze “was a fiction right from the outset,” according to Dror Etkes, an
Israeli authority on the settlements. At the same time Israel ground into rubble
at a faster pace “than ever before” Palestinian homes in the West Bank. (201) “
Netanyahu will probably not win the Nobel Peace Prize but he is certainly
likely to win the Nobel Prize for Physics, or at least Chemistry,” Etkes
observed in Haaretz, because he “discovered that—contrary to what scientists had
thought until now—water is not the only substance that expands instead of
contracting when it freezes.” (202)
The fact that Israel’s settlement expansion was still
subject to negotiation attested to the bankruptcy of the “peace process.” The
consensus of the most respected and representative international institutions
is that the Israeli settlements are illegal. (203) Indeed, according to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, these settlements constitute
a “war crime.” (204) It is a curious peace process that would debate whether
Israel should be allowed to continue committing war crimes pending the conflict’s
resolution: does a convicted thief get to continue stealing until the judge
hands down a sentence? Were it truly a peace process, the only question worthy of
deliberation would be whether Israel must commit itself to dismantling its
illegal settlements as a precondition for resuming peace talks.
When the ten-month “settlement freeze” terminated in late
September 2010, the Netanyahu government in a repeat performance (205) offered
to renew it only on condition that the Palestinian leadership “recognizes
Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people” because “affirmation of Israel’s
Jewishness ... is the very foundation of peace, its DNA.” (206) But whereas respected
Israeli commentators ridiculed this “major diversionary ploy,” (207) the Obama
administration fell into line, declaring, “It is a state for the Jewish people.
It is a state for other citizens of other faiths as well.” (208) To be sure,
it’s not exactly coherent to denote a state as simultaneously belonging
exclusively to one religion and inclusively to all religions, but that is the
occupational hazard of trying to square bigotry with democratic principles.
In exchange for a 90-day extension of the (nonexistent)
settlement freeze, the Obama administration in late 2010 reportedly offered
Israel an automatic veto at the U.N. of any resolutions hostile to Israel, a
promise not to demand any future halt in Israeli settlement expansion, and
billions of dollars in military assistance. (209) Israel however rejected these
terms. With the “peace process” at an impasse, the Obama administration laid
out in December 2010 its parameters for resolving the conflict. Rather than
calling for Israel’s withdrawal to the internationally recognized June 1967
borders, it stated that the borders of a future Palestinian state must “protect
Israel’s security” and “not leave Israel vulnerable”; rather than affirming the
internationally recognized right of Palestinian refugees to return and
compensation, it stated that a resolution of the refugee question must meet
“the needs of both sides”; rather than affirming the internationally recognized
principle that Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories are
illegal, it only called for a halt to “continued” settlement growth, thereby
tacitly legitimating the illegal Jewish settlements already in place; and
rather than affirming the internationally recognized principle that East
Jerusalem is occupied Palestinian territory, it called for a solution on East Jerusalem
that “realizes the aspirations for both sides.” (210) In other words, the Obama
administration conditioned the realization of indefeasible Palestinian rights
on the approval and subject to the deductions of Israel.
Frustrated at Israeli recalcitrance, and American
acquiescence in it, the international community proceeded to act on its own. In
December 2010 a clutch of South American countries— Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador, Uruguay—recognized a Palestinian state on the June 1967 borders. The
Council of the European Union formally stated that “settlements, including in
East Jerusalem, ... are illegal under international law,” and that it “will not
recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders, including with regard to
Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties.” (211) Going one step
further, senior former European leaders—including seven former prime ministers,
three ex-presidents and seven former foreign ministers—urged the Council to
“identify concrete measures to operationalize its agreed policy” such as
referring the matter to the “international community,” presumably meaning the
Security Council, and making privileged Israeli trade relations with the E.U.
contingent on a settlement freeze. (212) Even Ban Ki-moon was moved at a year’s
end press conference to take Israel to task: “I repeat: Israel must meet its
obligation to freeze all settlement activity, including in East Jerusalem.” (213)
Meanwhile, The Elders called for a “rights-based approach” to the conflict
entailing a “future Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, including its
capital in East Jerusalem” (with a possible “one-to-one land swap to allow for
minor adjustments”). Urging “citizens” to “step up pressure on their leaders,” The
Elders also lent “support to nonviolent protest and creative civil action for
peace.” (214)
Instead of hoping against hope that President Obama
will yet redeem himself, our challenge is to muster sufficient political will
so that he does the right thing—or at any rate doesn’t keep doing the wrong
thing—regardless of what he wants. Focusing on the powers-on-high or waiting
for a messiah is a confession of impotence. The simple but fundamental truth of
politics, which even the most resolute of atheists would hasten to affirm, is
that God helps those who help themselves.
Norman G. Finkelstein
31 December 2010
New York City
APPENDIX 1:
Letter from Hamas to
U.S. President Barack Obama
Palestinian National Authority
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Deputy Office
Fax: +972 8 2868971
Tel: +972 8 2822937
His Excellency President Barack Obama,
President of the United States of America.
June 3rd 2009
Dear Mr. President,
We welcome your visit to the Arab world and your
administration’s initiative to bridge differences with the Arab-Muslim world.
One long-standing source of tension between the
United States and this part of the world has been the failure to resolve the
Israel-Palestine conflict.
It is therefore unfortunate that you will not visit
Gaza during your trip to the Middle East and that neither your Secretary of
State nor George Mitchell have come to hear our point of view.
We have received numerous visits recently from people
of widely varied backgrounds: U.S. Congressional representatives, European
parliamentarians, the U.N.-appointed Goldstone commission, and grassroots
delegations such as those organized by the U.S. peace group CODEPINK.
It is essential for you to visit Gaza. We have
recently passed through a brutal 22-day Israeli attack. Amnesty International observed
that the death and destruction Gaza suffered during the invasion could not have
happened without U.S.-supplied weapons and U.S. taxpayers’ money.
Human Rights Watch has documented that the white phosphorus
Israel dropped on a school, hospital, United Nations warehouse and civilian
neighborhoods in Gaza was manufactured in the United States. Human Rights Watch
concluded that Israel’s use of this white phosphorus was a war crime.
Shouldn’t you see firsthand how Israel used your arms
and spent your money?
Before becoming president you were a distinguished
professor of law. The U.S. government has also said that it wants to foster the
rule of law in the Arab-Muslim world.
The International Court of Justice stated in July
2004 that the whole of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem are occupied
Palestinian territories designated for Palestinian selfdetermination, and that
the Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories are illegal.
Not one of the 15 judges sitting on the highest
judicial body in the world dissented from these principles.
The main human rights organizations in the world, Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, have issued position papers supporting
the right of the Palestinian refugees to return and compensation.
Each year in the United Nations General Assembly
nearly every country in the world has supported these principles for resolving
the Israel-Palestine conflict. Every year the Arab League puts forth a peace
proposal based on these principles for resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Leading human rights organizations such as Human Rights
Watch have also stated that Israel’s siege of Gaza is a form of collective
punishment and therefore illegal under international law.
We in the Hamas Government are committed to pursuing a
just resolution to the conflict not in contradiction with the international
community and enlightened opinion as expressed in the International Court of
Justice, the United Nations General Assembly, and leading human rights
organizations. We are prepared to engage all parties on the basis of mutual
respect and without preconditions.
However, our constituency needs to see a
comprehensive paradigm shift that not only commences with lift ing the siege on
Gaza and halts all settlement building and expansion but develops into a policy
of evenhandedness based on the very international law and norms we are prodded
into adhering to.
Again, we welcome you to Gaza which would allow you
to see firsthand our ground zero. Furthermore, it would enhance the U.S.
position, enabling you to speak with new credibility and authority in dealing
with all the parties.
Very Truly Yours,
Dr. Ahmed Yousef
Deputy of the Foreign Affairs Ministry
Former Senior Political Advisor
to Prime Minister Ismael Hanniya1
APPENDIX 2: What Happened
on the Mavi Marmara? An analysis of the Turkel Commission Report
In January 2011 a commission appointed by the Israeli
government and chaired by former Israeli Supreme Court Justice Jacob Turkel
released the first half of its report on the “maritime incident of 31 May 2010”
when Israeli commandos assaulted the Gaza Freedom Flotilla and killed nine
passengers aboard the flagship Mavi Marmara. (1) The Report, running to nearly
300 pages, exonerated Israel of culpability for the bloodbath and instead
pinned it on a cadre of passengers who had purportedly plotted and armed
themselves to kill the Israeli commandos. The Report divides into two principal
sections: (1) a legal analysis of the Israeli blockade and (2) a factual
reconstruction of the events that climaxed in the violence. It begins however by
recounting the historical context of the Israeli blockade. These passages of
the Report provide instructive insight into its objectivity.
SKEWED CONTEXT
The Report states that “in October 2000 violent
incidents broke out in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which were given the name
‘the Second Intifada’ .... In these, suicide attacks were restarted in cities
in Israeli territory.” (2) Its capsule description of the second intifada omits
mention that Palestinians did not resort to suicide attacks until five months after
Israel had started using massive, indiscriminate and lethal firepower to quell
largely nonviolent demonstrations. (3) Similarly the Report begins by
highlighting that “since the beginning of 2001, thousands of mortars and rockets
of various kinds have been fired in ever growing numbers from the Gaza Strip”
at Israel. (4) But this depiction ignores Israeli attacks on Gaza during the
same period that killed many times more Palestinians than projectiles launched
from Gaza killed Israelis. (5)
Although conceding that human rights and humanitarian
organizations, as well as a leading Israeli jurist, have concluded that
Israel’s 2005 redeployment in Gaza didn’t end its occupation, the Report
nevertheless sustains the Israeli government contention that after 2005 Israel
no longer occupied Gaza. (6) The Report asserts that the June 2008 ceasefire
between Israel and Hamas “collapsed in December 2008, when the rocket and
mortar attacks against Israel recommenced.” (7) In fact—as Amnesty
International observed—the lull “broke down after Israeli forces killed six
Palestinian militants in air strikes and other attacks on 4 November [2008].” (8)
HUNGER YES, STARVATION NO
The Report upholds the legality of the Israeli
blockade of Gaza on dual grounds: (a) the people of Gaza didn’t experience
starvation and their physical survival wasn’t at risk; (b) whatever hardships
Gaza’s civilian population did endure were the “collateral” and “proportional”
damage of a blockade directed at Hamas’s military capabilities.
The Report juxtaposes the consensus opinion of human rights
and humanitarian organizations that Israel’s siege of Gaza had caused a
humanitarian crisis (9) against Israel’s denial of such a crisis. (10) It
resolves these “two very different perceptions of reality” (11) by concluding,
for example, that although 60 percent of Gazans did experience “food
insecurity”—i.e., “people lack sustainable physical or economic access to
adequate[,] safe, nutritious and socially acceptable food to maintain a healthy
and productive life” (12)—Israel had met its legal responsibi lities insofar as
the people weren’t dying of starvation but were merely hungry. Thus, the Report
approvingly quotes Israeli officials that “no one has ever stated ... that the
population of the Gaza Strip is ‘starving.’” And again, in the Report’s own
words defending the siege: “‘Food insecurity’ does not equate to ‘starvation.’”
(13)
Prima facie, it would be strange if current
international law, which accords so many safeguards to civilians in times of
war and peace, sanctioned a just-shy-of-genocidal policy. Indeed, seemingly
cognizant that such a legal standard was a tad too lax (14)—not to mention
cruel, coming from an esteemed former Israeli Supreme Court justice—the Report
simultaneously purports that even if the law kicks in not just for starvation but
also for the less stringent condition of hunger, and even if the Israeli siege
did induce hunger, it wasn’t a deliberate policy to induce hunger, which is
what makes denial of food legally culpable: “The Commission found no evidence ...
that Israel is trying to deprive the population of the Gaza Strip of food.” (15)
Yet, if the foreseeable and inevitable consequence of the Israeli siege was to
cause hunger, it is hard to make out how the punitive outcome was mere
happenstance and not Israel’s intention. Or put otherwise, for want of trying
to cause hunger Israel was awfully good at it.
Just as it exonerates Israel of denying Gazans food,
so the Report exonerates Israel of denying Gazans other “objects essential for
the survival of the civilian population.” It acknowledges that Israel blocks
entry of construction materials but justifies this policy on the ground
that—according to “intelligence information”—Hamas might use them for “military
purposes.” The Report makes short shrift of the possibility that the motive
behind this ban might be to punish the people of Gaza: “It is clear that the
restrictions were not imposed in order to prevent the use of these materials by
the civilian population.” (16) One searches in vain however for proof to
support this confident assertion.
The Report paradoxically contends both that Israel
denied entry of essential objects such as construction materials, if for alleged
security reasons, and that there was “no evidence” Israel denied entry of such
essential objects. (17) Again, the Report states that “no evidence was
presented ... that Israel prevents the passage of medical supplies apart from
those included in the list of materials whose entry into the Gaza Strip is
prohibited for security reasons.” (18) But that Israeli list included,
according to the World Health Organization, “vital medical supplies”—i.e., “X-ray
machines, electronic imaging scanners, laboratory equipment and basic items,
such as elevators for hospitals.” (19) If Israel was depriving Gazans of “vital
medical supplies,” then it was denying them “objects essential” to their
“survival.” The Report also paradoxically contends both that, for security
reasons, Israel had denied entry of essential objects, and that, apparently without
jeopardizing its security, Israel allowed entry of many of these same objects after
the flotilla attack evoked international outrage. (20) It might finally be
noticed that the Report never explains why respected human rights and
humanitarian organizations—in what appears to be a vast conspiracy— signaled a
humanitarian crisis in Gaza when none existed.
LETHAL WEAPONS
The Report also finds that whatever hardships Gazans
did endure as a result of the Israeli siege constituted “collateral” damage
that was “proportional” to the military objective of degrading Hamas’s military
capabilities. (21) The Report occasionally hints that the purpose of the siege
went beyond achieving a strictly or narrowly military objective, but it is
emphatic that the blockade did not target the civilian population. (22) In one of
its expansive formulations, the Report states that the Israeli siege had “two
goals: a security goal of preventing the entry of weapons, ammunition and
military supplies into the Gaza Strip ... , and a broader strategic goal of
‘indirect economic warfare,’ whose purpose is to restrict the Hamas’s economic
ability as the body in control of the Gaza Strip to take military action against
Israel.” (23) It further concludes that Israel was not guilty of inflicting
“collective punishment” because “there is nothing in the evidence ... that
suggest[s] that Israel is intentionally placing restrictions on goods for the
sole or primary purpose of denying them to the population of Gaza.” (24)
Yet, if the intent of the Israeli siege was to target
Hamas’s military capabilities, and not to harm Gaza’s civilian population, surely
it is cause for wonder why Israel severely restricted entry of goods “not
considered essential for the basic subsistence of the population,” and why it
allowed passage of only a “humanitarian minimum”—a benchmark that was
arbitrarily determined, not sanctioned by international law, and in fact fell below
Gaza’s minimal humanitarian needs. (25) It is also cause for puzzlement why
Israeli officials kept repeating privately that “they intended to keep the
Gazan economy on the brink of collapse without quite pushing it over the edge.”
(26)
Although replete with repetitions and minutiae on
arcane points of law, the Report is notably silent on exactly what items Israel
interdicted allegedly in order to thwart Hamas’s offensive capabilities. The
seemingly endless list of verboten items included inter alia sage, coriander,
ginger, jam, halva, vinegar, nutmeg, chocolate, fruit preserves, seeds and
nuts, biscuits, potato chips, musical instruments, notebooks, writing
implements, toys, chicks and goats. (27) “The purpose of the economic warfare
in the Gaza Strip,” the Report avers, was “to undermine the Hamas’s ability to
attack Israel and its citizens. The nonsecurity related restrictions on the
passage of goods—such as the restrictions upon certain food products—are a part
of this strategy.” (28) Who can doubt the offensive potential of chips and chicks?
(29)
Neither the facts nor the legal reasoning presented
in the Report refute the consensus opinion that Gaza was experiencing a
humanitarian crisis; that the Israeli siege was causing the humanitarian
crisis; that Israel was deliberately causing this humanitarian crisis; that the
Israeli siege therefore constituted a form of collective punishment; and that
therefore the siege and Israel’s resort to force against the flotilla to
prolong the siege were illegal.
SLANTED SOURCES
The second half of the Report presents a
reconstruction of the events that climaxed in the killing of nine passengers
aboard the Mavi Marmara by Israeli commandos. The Report clears Israel of legal
culpability for the violence and deaths. Instead it pins responsibility on a
cadre of passengers who allegedly plotted and armed themselves in advance to
kill Israelis, while the lethal use of force by the Israeli commandos is said
to have constituted justifiable self-defense.
On all fundamental points the Report reaches
conclusions diametrically contrary to those of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission led
by eminent international jurists. (30) Without access to the evidence on which
each side based its conclusions, a third party is hard-pressed to definitively
decide between them. Nonetheless it is possible to render a reasonable opinion
on whose findings are more plausible.
Before scrutinizing the principal points of
contention, the sources on which the Report is based merit preliminary comment.
The government resolution mandating the Turkel Commission excused “IDF [Israel
Defense Forces] soldiers” from testifying before it. (31) The Report
accordingly had to rely on “soldiers’ statements [that] were only documented in
writing and submitted to the Commission.” (32) The commando testimonies are
deemed “credible and trustworthy” because the soldiers “gave detailed
information, used natural language, and did not appear to have coordinated
their versions.” (33) It puzzles what evidentiary value should be attached to
the written submissions’ “natural language”—although it is true that the
commandos did appear naturally to call everyone who crossed their paths on the
Mavi Marmara a “terrorist” (34)—and how the Commission could determine whether
or not the commandos coordinated beforehand their written submissions.
The Report states that “the soldiers’ accounts were
examined meticulously, cross-referenced against each other.” (35) Is it so
far-fetched that the soldiers amongst themselves also “examined meticulously,
cross-referenced” their respective statements prior to submitting them? In fact
it is not even clear that protocol proscribed such prior coordination. The
Report does make clear however that the soldiers knew in advance that they
would not suffer judicial penalties for perjured testimony, or even undergo
rigorous interrogation: “The soldiers were not put on notice that their rights
were implicated when giving their statements and they did not undergo
cross-examination.” (36) In general the Commission invested great faith in the
testimony of Israeli civilian and military officials, although respected
Israeli commentators have ridiculed their record of truth-telling. (37)
Except for the oral testimony of two Israeli
Palestinians, mostly sketchy and unsigned statements extracted by Israeli jailers
and military intelligence from the flotilla detainees before their release, and
a book publication by one of the Turks on board the Mavi Marmara, (38) the
Report did not benefit from the input of the passengers and crew. After their
release passengers and crew asserted that the statements and signatures were given
under extreme physical and emotional duress, while the secretly filmed footage
of interrogations had been distorted by editing. (39) The Report alleges that
due to the non-cooperation of others it was “compelled to rely mainly on
testimonies and reports of Israeli parties.” (40) It does not explain however
why unsworn testimonies of Israeli commandos constituted credible evidence
whereas comparable eyewitness testimonies of numerous passengers accessible in
the public domain did not. (41) In addition Amnesty International observed that
although “the Commission invited flotilla participants to testify, it appeared to
make only half-hearted attempts to secure their testimony, and made no effort
to utilize the extensive eyewitness testimony collected by the International
Fact-Finding Mission.” (42)
Let us now examine the main areas of dispute.
Who initiated the
violence?
The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission concluded that as
Israeli speedboats “approached” the Mavi Marmara they were “firing ... non-lethal
weaponry onto the ship, including smoke and stun grenades, tear gas and
paintballs,” and possibly “plastic bullets,” and, “minutes after” this initial
Israeli assault was repelled by passengers, Israeli helicopters moved in,
opening fire with “live ammunition ... onto the top deck prior to the descent
of the soldiers.” (43)
The Report presents an altogether different picture.
It does acknowledge that the rules of engagement allowed for “use of force ...
required to fulfill the mission, i.e., stopping the vessels,” albeit its use
“must be minimal” and “as a last resort.” It also acknowledges that operational
orders allowed that “before the stage of taking control of the vessels ... ,
the force commander was permitted to employ various measures to stop the vessels,
including firing ‘skunk bombs’ ... forcing the vessels to change their course
or stop by means of ... firing warning shots into the air and ‘white lighting’
(blinding using a large projector).” At the very least, then, Israeli
operational planning did not outright prohibit initiating force. But on the
basis of “closed door testimony of the Chief of Staff” the Report concludes
that “in practice, no use was made of these measures.” (44)
The Report finds that Israeli speedboats approached
the Mavi Marmara peacefully, and only after they “encountered resistance” did
Israeli commanders allow the firing of paintball guns and use of stun grenades.
(45) Besides Israeli testimonies the Report cites video recordings. It is
impossible sight unseen to evaluate the video evidence, although one wonders
why Israel didn’t make it available after release of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission’s
conclusions in order to discredit them. Also, although the Report records the
precise times when passengers resorted to force against the speedboats, (46) it
does not record the times when the speedboats resorted to supposedly
“retaliatory” force. In a typical non-sequitur the Report, attempting to refute
“suggestions that the IHH [Insani Yardim Vakfi] activists were acting in
self-defense,” states: “In seeking to capture and board the ship, the Israeli
forces had to respond to the violence offered first by the IHH. This is evident
from the magnetic media that shows the extreme levels of violence used against
the IDF’s soldiers.” (47) But footage of passengers resorting to “extreme
levels of violence” does not corroborate that they initiated the violence.
The Report also concludes that live ammunition was
not fired from Israeli helicopters that subsequently moved in. It does
acknowledge however that stun grenades were thrown down from the helicopters
before the commandos hit the deck. It states that the helicopters did not use
live ammunition because “the accurate use of firearms from a helicopter
requires both specific equipment and specially trained personnel, with which
the helicopters were not equipped.” (48) But if the purpose of the firepower
had been—like the stun grenades—to terrorize the passengers and clear the deck
before the commandos rappelled on board, the necessity of it being precisely
accurate is unclear, while it perplexes that no one among Israel’s elite fighting
unit was a trained marksman.
The decision to intercept the flotilla in the dead of
night appears to belie the Report’s version of what happened. The Report states
that Israel launched its operation at 4:26 a.m. because—according to the
Israeli Chief of Staff—“during such an operation, there is a great advantage to
operating under the cover of darkness.” (49) But why? The Report repeatedly
emphasizes that “throughout the planning process” Israeli authorities at all
levels anticipated that “the participants in the flotilla were all peaceful
civilians” and “seem not to have believed that the use of force would be
necessary.” They “had expected” the commandos to meet “at most, verbal
resistance, pushing or punching,” “relatively minor civil disobedience,” “some
pushing and limited physical contact.” The Report quotes the commandos themselves
testifying that “we were expected to encounter activists who would try to hurt
us emotionally by creating provocations on the level of curses, spitting ...
but we did not expect a difficult physical confrontation”; “we were expected to
encounter peace activists and therefore the prospect that we would have to use
weapons or other means was ... nearly zero probability.” (50)
But if it didn’t expect forceful resistance, why
didn’t Israel launch the operation in broad daylight, indeed, bringing in tow a
complement of journalists who could vouch for its nonviolent intentions? An
operation launched in the blackness of night would appear to make sense only if
Israel wanted to sow panic and confusion as a prelude to and retrospectively to
justify a violent assault, and in order to obscure from potential witnesses its
method of attack. In the planning of such an operation there clearly was “great
advantage to operating under the cover of darkness.”
A premeditated decision to violently assault the Mavi
Marmara would also explain the intricate and ramified preparations that engaged
the gamut of Israel’s political, military and intelligence agencies, including
the “Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense,” the “senior political-security
echelon and persons with experience in these fields,” the “Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Public Security, the
Ministry of Justice, IDF officers and public relations personnel”; (51) why it
“decided that the command level would be very senior, including the Commander of
the Navy himself”; (52) why it imposed a “communications blackout” on the flotilla;
(53) and why it deployed the elite Special Forces unit Shayetet 13 trained for
lethal combat rather than a routine police unit trained to quell civil
resistance. The Report states that “Special Forces trained teams are often used
when a boarding is anticipated to be ‘opposed,’ or ‘non-compliant.’” (54) But
surely anticipated “curses, spitting” of passengers didn’t require deployment
of Israel’s elite fighting unit. It also states that Special Forces were used
because of the “specialized training” needed “for fast-roping onto the deck of
a ship at night,” (55) but that still leaves the question why the assault was
launched at night.
It might be wondered why ex post facto Israel was so emphatic
that it didn’t anticipate violent resistance. Couldn’t it just as easily have
alleged that, although committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, it did
expect violence, which was why the operation was launched before daybreak and
so much planning was invested in it? The reason however is not hard to find. If
the commandos had been primed for a violent confrontation, then what happened
truly was, as Israeli commentators rued, a “disgraceful fiasco” and “national
humiliation.” (56) The only alibi they could fabricate was that the violence
took them off guard. Indeed, one of the more entertaining aspects of the Report
is the commandos’ tales of derring-do plainly designed to restore the IDF’s
heroic image and elevate national morale:
•
Soldier no. 1 tells how “ten people jumped onto
me and began brutally beating me from every direction, using clubs, metal rods
and fists”; how “a number of attackers grabbed me by my legs and my torso and
threw me over the side to the deck below”; how “I fractured my arm, and a mob
of dozens of people attacked me and basically lynched me—including pulling off my
helmet, strangling me, sticking fingers into my eyes to gouge them out of their
sockets, pulling my limbs in every direction, striking me in an extremely harsh
manner with clubs and metal rods, mostly on my head”; how “I took an extremely
harsh blow directly to my head from a metal rod .... A lot of blood began streaming
down my face from the wounds to my head”; how after his apprehension by
passengers the “only thing” the ship’s medic did was to “wipe the blood from my
forehead” although he had a “very deep scalp wound and a fractured skull” (that
later required 14 stitches); and how—despite excruciating blows and gushing
blood, fractured arm and fractured skull—he managed to break free of one of the
guards, “I jabbed my elbow into his ribs and jumped into the water .... As soon
as I reached the water, I dove underneath, so that they would not be able to
hit me from the ship. I took off my shirt while diving and swimming, and I
intended to swim and dive rapidly in a ‘zigzag’ to escape from the enemy on the
ship. After my first dive, I rose to the water’s surface and I saw a ...
speedboat” which rescued him after he swam “rapidly” towards it, and then “I
picked up an M-16 rifle ... and I began shooting ... because I was concerned that
the mob on the ship wanted to abduct soldier no. 4 back into the ship, and I
wanted to deter them.”
•
Soldier no. 3 tells how “I was struck with metal
poles and rocks ... I fel[t] a very strong blow to the neck from behind”; how
“people ... hit me with full force with poles and clubs”; how “a mob of people
around me are hitting me with many blows, mainly towards my head”; how “I
continue to take very strong blows to the abdomen”; how “I am fighting with all
my strength until a certain stage when they manage to get me over the side of
the boat. I am holding onto the side, with my hands, and hanging from the side ....
[T]he people from above me are hitting my hands and a second group of people is
pulling me from below by grabbing my legs”; how “I am lying on the deck, there
are many people above me, one of the people jumps on me and I feel a sharp pain
in the lower abdomen ... and I realize that I’ve been stabbed ... during this
stage I’m taking many blows, including from clubs”; how after his apprehension
by passengers the only assistance he receives from the ship’s medic is a “gauze
pad,” although “I am bleeding massively, that is, I am losing a lot of blood,
and I can tell that part of my intestines are protruding ... I also notice a
deep cut in my left arm, from which I’m also losing a great quantity of blood.
I also feel blood flowing from my nose into my mouth”; how “they tied my hands
and feet with rope. They station a person above me who is holding a wooden pole
.... He beats me with the wooden pole”; how “as a result of the loss of blood,
I started to become groggy”; and how—despite excruciating blows (fracturing his
nose and tearing a tendon in his finger) and gushing blood, stab wounds and
protruding intestines—he manages to escape, “I run to the side of the ship,
jump into the water from a height of 12 meters, and start swimming toward our
boats.” (58)
It would appear that Israelis have watched a few too
many Rambo flicks.
Did Islamic “activists” plot and arm themselves to
murder Israelis?
The Report finds that passengers aboard the Mavi
Marmara— the “hardcore group” of which consisted of about 40 “IHH activists” (59)—had
plotted “to resist with force,” (60) even to commit murder, before embarkation
and that they sought out martyrdom. “I have no doubt,” an Israeli commander of
the operation quoted by the Report avers, “that the terrorists on the vessel planned,
organized, foresaw the events, and planned to kill a soldier.” (61) “It is
evident,” the Report concludes, “that the IHH organized and planned for a
violent confrontation with the Israeli military forces,” “the IHH had a
preexisting plan to violently oppose the Israeli boarding,” and that “a number
of IHH activists took part in hostilities from a planning and logistical perspective
well before the arrival of the Israeli armed forces.” (62)
The Report finds that, unlike the overwhelming
majority of “relatively moderate” (63) passengers, IHH activists “boarded the Mavi
Marmara separately and without any security checks,” and thus were able to
smuggle on an arsenal of weapons to execute their murderous plot. (64) Before
proceeding, it should be noted that the Turkish government emphatically insists
that not once but twice “all crew members and passengers were subjected to ...
stringent x-ray checks as well as customs and passport controls .... All
personal belongings and cargo were also thoroughly inspected and cleared ....
[T]he cargo contained no arms, munitions or other material that would
constitute a threat.” (65)
The Report’s inventory of the “combat equipment
apparently brought on board by the flotilla participants” included “150
protective ceramic vests ... , 300 gas masks ... , communication devices,
optical devices (several night vision goggles and a few binoculars), 50
slingshots of various kinds, 200 knives, 20 axes, thousands of ball bearings
and stones, disk saws, pepper sprays, and smoke flares.” (66) This cache of
“combat equipment,” “concentration of weaponry” and “extensive equipment which was
brought on board” to implement the plot (67) appears in a somewhat less
sinister light when the Report notes elsewhere that the “kitchens and the cafeterias
on the ship” contained “a total of about 200 knives,” and the ship’s “fire-extinguishing
equipment” included “about 20 axes.” (68) It flabbergasts that the obvious
correlations escaped—or did they?—the Commission’s notice.
The Report “did not find that the evidence point[s]
conclusively to the fact” that the IHH activists brought firearms aboard the
Mavi Marmara. (69) But, if they plotted a “violent confrontation” with one of
the world’s most formidable military powers, and if they could freely carry on
board the weapons of their choosing, it is cause for wonder why the most lethal
implements they thought to bring along were slingshots and glass marbles.
Truly, these shaheeds were meschugge. The Report notes that just before the
Israeli operation began, the Islamic extremists “improvised” weapons such as
iron rods and wooden clubs. (70) It apparently never occurred to the Commission
to ask why the Islamists didn’t bring on board firearms and why they waited
until the last minute before fabricating makeshift weapons if they were already
hell-bent on committing bloody murder “well before the arrival of the Israeli
armed forces.”
The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission “found no evidence that
any of the passengers used firearms ... at any stage.” (71) But, whereas the
Report finds no proof that the passengers brought firearms with them, it still
concludes that “members of the IHH activists used firearms against Israeli
forces” (72)—presumably seized from the commandos—wounding two of them. Although
stating that it consulted “medical documents regarding the injuries to the
soldiers,” (73) the Report does not cite hospital records documenting the
commandos’ alleged bullet wounds but instead cites a statement submitted by the
IDF and the oral testimony of the Chief of Staff. (74) In the case of non-bullet
wounds incurred by the commandos, however, the Report does cite hospital
records. (75) Be that as it may, the alleged bullet wounds could just as easily
have been inflicted by other Israeli commandos. The Report itself acknowledges
that “the melee on board the Mavi Marmara, especially during the initial stages
on the roof, was a situation of considerable confusion.” (76) In fact, one of
the commandos allegedly hit by a bullet initially thought his wound resulted “from
the Israeli forces.” (77) It might be recalled that almost half the Israeli
combat fatalities during the Gaza invasion were caused by “friendly fire.” (78)
The Report enumerates three grounds for its conclusion that passengers used firearms:
“physical evidence of gunshot wounds”—which doesn’t speak to the point of
origin of the gunshots; “statements of numerous soldiers”—which are as credible
as their Rambo fantasies; and “the fact that IHH activists had access to captured
IDF” weapons—which proves nothing. (79)
It might be wondered why the Report finds on the
basis of such flimsy evidence that the passengers used firearms against the
commandos. The Report itself provides the answer. While it maintains that the
commandos’ resort to lethal force would have been justified even if the
passengers did not shoot at them, (80) the Report goes on to say that “the use
of firearms by IHH activists is an important factor” because it “significantly heightened
the risk posed to the soldiers and their perception of that risk,” and
“establishing the level of threat that the Israeli soldiers believed they were
facing is a factor in the assessment as to whether their response was
proportionate.” (81) In other words, for the Report to definitively conclude
that the commandos’ resort to lethal force was legally justifiable, it had to find
evidence that the passengers used firearms against them: the evidentiary finding
followed perforce from the predetermined conclusion.
The Report quotes the harrowing accounts by the
captured commandos of the Islamists’ murderous ambitions. Soldier no. 1 testified
that “the terrorist group wanted to attack me and kill me.” Soldier no. 3 testified
that they were “crazed” and “very eager to kill us. They tried to strangle me
and soldier no. 4. The hate in their eyes was just burning,” “This attempt to strangle
me was made several times.” (82) The Report also highlights that the cadre of
Islamic killers were “very large and strong men, approximately ages 20-40,”
“very big and heavy,” (83) and that “some of those activists also expressed
their wish to be ‘shaheeds.’” (84)
The obvious question is why didn’t this mob of burly homicidal
shaheeds manage to kill any of the captured commandos? Quoting the commandos,
the Report’s unfazed response is that the peaceniks on board—“older men and women
who showed restraint,” “non-violent peace activists”— came to the commandos’
rescue: “The terrorist group wanted to attack me and kill me, while the
moderate group tried to protect me”; “There were two groups there, the one
which tried to kill us and ... the ones who prevented the extreme group from
killing us.” (85) In other words, the crazed jihadists were stopped dead in
their tracks by Grannies for Peace and the Birkenstock Brigade.
Did the Israeli commandos
use lethal force only as a last resort?
“The conduct of the Israeli military and other
personnel towards the flotilla passengers was not only disproportionate to the
occasion,” the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission concluded, “but demonstrated levels of
totally unnecessary and incredible violence. It betrayed an unacceptable level
of brutality.” (86) Contrariwise, the Report concludes that the commandos exercised
maximum restraint and used lethal force only as a last resort.
The Report
states that during Israeli preparations for the interception “special attention”
was paid “to the value of human life,” and that “all of the persons involved”
evinced a “high level of awareness ... of the need to carry out the operation without
any injuries to the participants of the flotilla”; that either the rules of
engagement or operational orders, or both of them, stipulated that “if force
had to be used, it had to be exercised gradually and in proportion to the
resistance met, and only after examining alternatives to prevent deterioration
of the situation,” that “the only case in which [use of] lethal weapons was
permitted was in self-defense—to remove a real and imminent danger to life,
when the danger cannot be removed by less harmful means,” and that “there should
be no use of force at a person who has surrendered or has ceased to constitute a
threat”; that “the training and preparation of the soldiers leading up to the
operation was very thorough, with a particular emphasis on the use of
less-lethal weapons,” and that “the default position was to use less-lethal
weapons until an opposing threat forced the use of the lethal options”; that at
an operational briefing it was stated that “‘opening fire should only take place
in a life threatening situation, to neutralize the person presenting the
danger,[’] but nonetheless, ‘where possible, the benefit of doubt should be
given’”; that even after “shooting” could be heard on the Mavi Marmara, “the
Shayetet 13 commander refused to give approval for shooting ‘in order to
prevent deaths among the participants of the flotilla’”; and that “the IDF
soldiers made considerable use of graduated force”— i.e., “firing at the legs
and feet of a person”—“during the operation, with soldiers switching repeatedly
between less-lethal and lethal weapons” even after passengers allegedly used firearms
against them. (87)
The Israeli commandos were so solicitous of the
passengers’ well-being, according to the Report, that following the bloody
confrontation, “some IDF wounded only received treatment after the treatment of
wounded flotilla participants,” while the Commander of the Takeover Force testified
that he risked “danger to my people aboard the vessel” in order to “evacuate
the wounded [passengers] from the vessel, despite their lack of desire to be
evacuated, in order to save their lives.” (88) The Report concludes that “the
IDF personnel acted professionally in the face of extensive and unanticipated
violence” and did not “overreact.” (89)
The manner of death of the nine passengers (90)
aboard the Mavi Marmara appears to belie the Report’s version of what happened.
The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission concluded that “the circumstances of the killing
of at least six of the passengers were in a manner consistent with an
extra-legal, arbitrary and summary execution.” (91) The Report recounts the findings
of an “external examination” by Israeli doctors according to which all of the
passengers suffered multiple bullet wounds and five were shot in the neck or
head; for example—quoting the Israeli examination—“Body no. 2” contained
“bullet wounds on the right side of the head, on the right side of the back of
the neck, on the right cheek, underneath the chin, on the right side of the back,
on the thigh. A bullet was palpated on the left side of the chest,” while “Body
no. 9” contained “bullet wounds in the area of the right temple/back of the
neck, bullet wound in the left nipple, bullet wound in the area of the
scalp-forehead on the left side, bullet wound on the face (nose), bullet wound
on the left torso, bullet wound on the right side of the back, two bullet wounds
in the left thigh, two bullet wounds as a result of the bullet passing through
toes four and five on the left foot.” (92)
The Report does not attempt to square the gruesome
facts of these passengers’ deaths with its conclusion that the commandos exercised
maximum restraint. The closest it comes is passing mention in another context,
and not referring specifically to the dead passengers, that “in some instances,
numerous rounds were fired either by one soldier or by more than one soldier to
stop an IHH activist who was a threat to the lives of themselves or other
soldiers.” (93) In fact the Report is curiously uncurious about the passengers’
deaths, which are blandly dispatched in just two of the Report’s nearly 300
pages. (94) The Report cites the chilling testimony of Israeli commandos on every
scratch they incurred, yet it includes not a single word on how, despite
allegedly taking every possible precaution and exercising every conceivable
restraint, the commandos came to kill nine passengers, shooting nearly all of
them multiple times. (95) Perhaps the Commission forgot—“forgot”?—to request information
on their deaths (96) or the commandos forgot— “forgot”?—to mention them in
their statements. Neither possibility speaks very highly to the Report’s
credibility.
The Report states that “the Commission has examined each
instance of the use of force reported by the IDF soldiers in their
testimonies,” but it doesn’t bother to mention whether these testimonies
included the killings of any of the nine passengers. (97) It also states that
“the Commission examined 133 incidents in which force was used ... which were
described by over 40 soldiers ... [and] also includes a few incidents that were
depicted on the available relevant magnetic media and that did not correspond
to the soldiers’ testimonies,” (98) but it doesn’t bother to mention whether
the magnetic media captured the killings of any of the passengers. In addition,
whereas the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission requested the Turkish autopsy reports, the
Turkel Commission apparently did not. (99) The bottom-line is that, although it
was the killings of the nine passengers on the Mavi Marmara that sparked the
international outcry, the Report contains not a single syllable on how any of
them died. The nearest it comes is a vague allusion buried in a footnote quoting
a commando that he “fired 2-3 rounds to the center of mass and below and one
round to the head (the soldier testified that after firing the last round the
IHH personal [sic] fell and he ceased fire).” (100)
It might finally be worth noting an odd paradox in
the Report’s central conclusions: the shaheeds plotted and armed themselves to
kill Israelis but didn’t even manage to kill those in their custody, whereas
the Israelis took every precaution and exercised every restraint not to kill
anyone but ended up killing nine persons.
Lest it be thought that Israel was unmoved by the
passengers’ ordeal, the Report duly records that a military court sentenced a
corporal to five months in prison for stealing a laptop computer, two camera
lenses and a compass. (101)
In the preface to the Report, the members of the
Turkel Commission— including a former Supreme Court justice, a former director-general
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a former president of a distinguished
scientific institute, a respected professor of law, and a foreign observer who
won the Nobel peace prize—state that “we took upon ourselves jointly and as
individuals the difficult and agonizing task of ascertaining the truth.” The
U.S. Department of State praised the investigation that culminated in the
Report as “credible and impartial and transparent,” and the document itself as
“independent.” (102) Regrettably, neither the factual information nor the legal
analysis in the Report casts illumination on what happened on the fateful
morning of 31 May 2010 when Israel launched an assault on the Gaza Freedom
Flotilla. But the Report does cause one to wonder how any self-respecting
individual could have signed off on such rubbish.
What a tangled web we weave when first we practice to
deceive.
Sir Walter Scott
NOTES
Epigraph
1. Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies from Operation Cast Lead, Gaza 2009 (Jerusalem: June 2009), p. 46 (ellipsis in
original).
Chapter one
1. “Answers to Questions” (1 June 1947), in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Ahmedabad), v. 88, p. 48.
2. Less than one percent of Palestine was set aside
for an international zone (Corpus
separatum) incorporating Jerusalem.
3. Sara Roy, The
Gaza Strip: The political economy of de-development (Washington, D.C.:
1995), pp. 3–5; for the distinctiveness of Israel’s economic policy in Gaza,
see ibid., chapter 5.
4. Benny Morris, Israel’s
Border Wars, 1949–1956 (Oxford: 1993), pp. 407– 9. Morris documents that
until the Israeli raid on Gaza the “overriding concern” of Egypt “in its
relations with Israel was to avoid sparking IDF attacks”: “Egypt generally
sought tranquility along its border with Israel.” However, “from some point in
1954” IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan “wanted war, and periodically, he hoped
that a given retaliatory strike would embarrass or provoke the Arab state attacked
into itself retaliating, giving Israel cause to escalate the shooting until war
resulted.” The “policy of trapping Nasser into war was hammered out between
[David] Ben-Gurion and Dayan,” its rationale being that “because Israel could
not afford to be branded an aggressor, war would have to be reached by a
process of gradual escalation, to be achieved through periodic, large-scale
Israeli retaliatory attacks in response to Egyptian infractions of the
armistice.” When “Egypt refused to fall into the successive traps set by
Dayan,” Israel colluded with Great Britain and France to attack Egypt outright.
(ibid., pp. 85, 178–79, 229– 30, 271–72, 279–80, 427, 428)
5. Benny Morris, Righteous
Victims: A history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881–2001 (New York:
2001), pp. 340–43, 568.
6. Ann Mosely Lesch, “Gaza: History and Politics,” in
Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler, Israel,
Egypt, and the Palestinians: From
Camp David to intifada (Bloomington: 1989), pp. 230–32.
7. Morris, Righteous
Victims, pp. 561, 580, 587, 591, 599.
8. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab tragedy (New York: 2006), pp. 191, 211.
9. Andy Levy-Ajzenkopf, “Sharansky on Tour Promoting
Identity, Freedom,” Canadian Jewish News
(1 July 2008).
10. Graham Usher, “The Politics of Internal Security:
The PA’s new intelligence services,” Journal
of Palestine Studies (Winter 1996), p. 28; The B’Tselem Human Rights Report (Spring 1994).
11. Shlomo Ben-Ami, interview on Democracy Now!, Transcript (14 February 2006); Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A critical analysis of Israel’s security and foreign policy (Ann
Arbor: 2006), p. 476; cf. ibid., p. 493.
12. Yossi Beilin, The
Path to Geneva: The quest for a permanent
agreement, 1996–2004 (New York: 2004), pp. 52–53, 219–26; Clayton E.
Swisher, The Truth About Camp David
(New York: 2004), p. 402.
13. Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 671.
14. Ben-Ami, Scars
of War, p. 267; cf. Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The war over Israel’s settlements in the
occupied territories, 1967-2007 (New York: 2007), pp. 412-15.
15. More than 400 Palestinians including 85 children
were killed while five Israeli soldiers were killed (one because of friendly fire)
during “Summer Rains” and “Autumn Clouds.” A total of 33 Palestinian children were
killed while one Israeli civilian was killed in just five days during “Hot
Winter.” Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, Bearing
the Brunt Again: Child rights
violations during Operation Cast Lead (September 2009), pp. 8, 18–19.
16. Benny Morris, “Israeli President Shimon Peres Reflects
on His Mentor, His Peace Partner, and Whether the State of Israel Will
Survive,” Tablet (26 July 2010).
17. Amira Hass, Drinking
the Sea at Gaza: Days and nights in a land
under siege (New York: 1996), p. 9.
18. Sara Roy, Failing
Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
(London: 2007), pp. 327–28. See also Galia Golan, Israel and Palestine: Peace plans from Oslo to disengagement
(Princeton: 2007), p. 119 (“strategically the idea [of the disengagement plan]
may have been to jettison the Gaza Strip, with all its human as well as
security problems, while solidifying Israel’s hold over the majority of the
West Bank”).
19. Human Rights Watch, “‘Disengagement’ Will Not End
Gaza Occupation” (29 October 2004). HRW’s World
Report 2006 reiterated this position:
In August and September 2005, Israel unilaterally
withdrew approximately eight thousand settlers, along with military personnel and
installations, from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern
West Bank near Jenin. While Israel has since declared the Gaza Strip a “foreign
territory” and the crossings between Gaza and Israel “international borders,”
under international humanitarian law (IHL), Gaza remains occupied, and Israel
retains its responsibilities for the welfare of Gaza residents. Israel maintains
effective control over Gaza by regulating movement in and out of the Strip as
well as the airspace, sea space, public utilities and population registry. In
addition, Israel declared the right to re-enter Gaza militarily at any time in
its “Disengagement Plan.” Since the withdrawal, Israel has carried out aerial
bombardments, including targeted killings, and has fired artillery into the
northeastern corner of Gaza.
For a detailed legal analysis, see Gisha (Legal
Center for Freedom of Movement), Disengaged
Occupiers: The legal status of Gaza
(Tel Aviv: January 2007). The U.N. Human Rights Council Mission chaired by Richard
Goldstone affirmed that Israel “exercised effective control over the Gaza
Strip” and that “the circumstances of this control establish that the Gaza
Strip remains occupied by Israel” (Report
of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (25
September 2009), paras. 187, 276–79).
20. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (Cambridge: 2009), p. 277.
21. Israeli-Palestinian
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip (Washington, D.C.: 1995), pp. 92–96, 314. For analysis of
Oslo II, see Norman G. Finkelstein, Image
and Reality of the Israel-Palestine
Conflict (New York: 1995; expanded second paperback edition, 2003), chapter
7.
22. A border dispute over a tiny triangle of land was
resolved later in Egypt’s favor by international arbitration.
23. International Crisis Group, Tipping Point? Palestinians and the
search for a new strategy (April 2010), p. 2.
24. “Israel Army’s West Bank Presence ‘Lowest in 20
Years,’” AFP (28 November 2010).
25. B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories), Land
Grab: Israel’s settlement policy in
the West Bank (Jerusalem: May 2002). “One of the most important
‘achievements,’” of the Oslo Accord for Israel, and “of which Rabin was proud,”
was “the exclusion of specific language freezing settlement construction in the
period of the interim arrangement” (Beilin, Path
to Geneva, p. 278).
26. Jimmy Carter, Palestine
Peace Not Apartheid (New York: 2006), pp. 159–60 (“The Palestinians
accepted the Road Map in its entirety, but the Israeli government announced
fourteen caveats and prerequisites, some of which would preclude any final peace
talks”); Golan, Israel and Palestine,
p. 90 (“Although officially accepting the Road Map, Israel submitted to the
Americans a list of fourteen reservations, some of them of a nature that could
significantly cripple implementation of the plan”). See also Henry Siegman,
“Hamas: The last chance for peace,” New
York Review of Books (27 April 2006).
27. I will return to this point below.
28. “Cast Lead” refers to a line in a Hanukkah song.
29. Gideon Levy, “ Goldstone’s Gaza Probe Did Israel
a Favor,” Haaretz (2 October 2009).
30. For background and analysis, see Mouin Rabbani,
“Birth Pangs of a New Palestine,” Middle
East Report Online (7 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/a2bu6l).
31. International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business (April 2009), p. 21; see ibid., pp. 27–28,
for the postinvasion ceasefire terms.
32. Report of
the Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza: No safe place. Presented to
the League of Arab States (30 April 2009), para. 411(3). The Committee was
chaired by eminent South African legal scholar John Dugard. On a related note,
the Committee observed:
Had the IDF wanted to completely destroy the tunnels
[under the southern border of Gaza] this would have been relatively easy to
achieve. They are easily discernible and given the IDF’s aerial surveillance
capability, they must have been aware of the exact location of the tunnels.
However, it was clear to the Committee they had not all been destroyed during
the conflict. In the Committee’s view this raises questions about the Israeli
claim that it acted in self-defense against the smuggling of weapons through the
tunnels. (ibid., para. 394)
33. B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories), Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories: 2008 annual report (Jerusalem: 2009).
34. For Israeli settlement expansion, see esp.
B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories), By Hook and by Crook:
Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank (Jerusalem: July 2010). It
reported that since 1993 the number of illegal Jewish settlers in the West Bank
(including East Jerusalem) had doubled to one half million and that Israel had
expropriated nearly half of West Bank land for the settlements. For Israel’s
gross misallocation and wanton destruction of Palestinian water resources, see
esp. Amnesty International, Troubled Waters:
Palestinians denied fair access to water (London: October 2009). For
violations of Palestinian human rights resulting from Israel’s discriminatory settlement
and water policies in the West Bank, see Human Rights Watch, Separate and Unequal: Israel’s
discriminatory treatment of Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian
territories (New York: 2010).
35. “Opening Remarks by Former U.S. President Jimmy
Carter to the 2006 Human Rights Defenders Policy Forum” (23 May 2006; http://tinyurl.com/cgu5u2).
36. David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,” Vanity Fair (April 2008); Paul McGeough,
Kill Khalid: The failed Mossad
assassination of Khalid Mishal and the rise of Hamas (New York: 2009), pp.
349–82. See also International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Hamas Coup in
Gaza” (June 2007).
37. McGeough, Kill
Khalid, p. 377.
38. Ed O’Loughlin, “Hopeless in Gaza,” Sydney Morning Herald (23 June 2007).
39. Human Rights Watch, “Donors Should Press Israel
to End Blockade” (1 March 2009).
40. United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Gaza
Humanitarian Situation Report—The
Impact of the Blockade on the Gaza Strip: A human dignity crisis (15
December 2008).
Chapter two
1. Gideon Levy, “The Time of the Righteous,” Haaretz (9 January 2009).
2. Ethan Bronner, “In Israel, A Consensus That Gaza
War Is a Just One,” New York Times
(13 January 2009). “In the context of almost unanimous support of the operation
by the Israeli public,” the Association for Civil Rights in Israel noted,
“tolerance of any dissent was minimal” (The
State of Human Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories: 2009 report
(Jerusalem: December 2009), p. 6).
3. Gideon Levy, on Democracy Now! (29 December 2008; www.democracynow.org/2008/12/29/israeli_attacks_
kill_over_310_in).
4. Richard Wilson, “Incomplete or Inaccurate
Information Can Lead to Tragically Incorrect Decisions to Preempt: The example
of OSIRAK,” paper presented at Erice, Sicily (18 May 2007, updated 9 February 2008;
http://tinyurl.com/d76399). See also Richard Wilson, “A Visit to the Bombed
Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq,” Nature
(31 March 1983), and comments of Wayne White, Former Deputy Director, Near East
and South Asia Office, State Department, in “Fift y-third in the Capitol Hill
Conference Series on U.S. Middle East Policy” (20 June 2008; http://tinyurl.com/cqoggh).
For a typically ill-informed recent commentary, see Norman Podhoretz, Why Are Jews Liberals? (New York: 2009),
p. 194 (“if not for this spectacular military operation, Saddam Hussein would
shortly thereafter have developed a nuclear arsenal”).
5. Ethan Bronner, “Israel Reminds Foes That It Has
Teeth,” New York Times (29 December
2008).
6. Benny Morris, “Why Israel Feels Threatened,” New York Times (30 December 2008).
7. Gideon Levy, “Twilight Zone: Waiting for the all
clear,” Haaretz (30 April 2009).
8. Benny Morris, Righteous
Victims: A history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881–2001 (New York:
2001), p. 686.
9. Ami Gluska, The
Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, armed forces and
defence policy 1963–1967 (New York: 2007), pp. 74–76, 80, 94–100, 103–6,
114–18.
10. Norman G. Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (New York: 1995;
expanded second paperback edition, 2003), pp. 134–37, for the alleged threat
posed by Egypt (Johnson at p. 135); for the blockade of the Straits of Tiran,
see ibid., pp. 137–40 (Eban at p.
139).
11. “Memorandum for the Record” (1 June 1967), Foreign Relations of the United States,
1964–1968, vol. 19, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 (Washington, D.C.:
2004).
12. Tom Segev, 1967:
Israel, the war, and the year that transformed the Middle East (New York:
2007), p. 293, my emphasis.
13. “Memorandum from the President’s Special
Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson” (4 June 1967), Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1964–1968.
14. Zeev Maoz, Defending
the Holy Land: A critical analysis of Israel’s security and foreign policy
(Ann Arbor: 2006), p. 89.
15. Matthew Kalman, “Israel Set War Plan More Than a
Year Ago,” San Francisco Chronicle
(21 July 2006).
16. William Arkin, Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 2007), pp.
xxv–xxvi, 54, 135, 147–48.
17. Ibid.,
pp. xxi, 25, 64.
18. Andrew Exum, Hizballah
at War: A military assessment (Washington Institute for Near East Policy:
December 2006), pp. 9, 11–12.
19. The Reut Institute, Building a Political Firewall against Israel’s Delegitimization (Tel Aviv: March 2010), para. 35.
20. Benny Morris, “A Second Holocaust? The Threat to
Israel” (2 May 2008; www.mideastfreedomforum.org/de/node/66). As the Israeli government
in late 2009 and early 2010 again threatened to attack Iran, Morris did
reprises of his 2008 performance and again conjured apocalyptic scenarios if
the U.S. did not back an Israeli attack. Benny Morris, “ Obama’s Nuclear
Spring,” Guardian (24 November 2009);
Benny Morris, “When Armageddon Lives Next Door,” Los Angeles Times (16 April 2010).
21. Yaron London, “The Dahiya Strategy” (6 October
2008; www.ynet news.com/articles/0,7340,L-3605863,00.html). Gabriel Siboni,
“Disproportionate Force: Israel’s concept of response in light of the Second Lebanon
War,” Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) (2
October 2008). Giora Eiland, “The Third Lebanon War: Target Lebanon,” Strategic Assessment (November 2008). Amos Harel, “Analysis: IDF plans to use
disproportionate force in next war,” Haaretz
(5 October 2007). Joseph Nasr, “Israel Warns Hezbollah War Would Invite
Destruction,” Reuters (2 October
2008).
22. London, “Dahiya Strategy.” Attila Somfalvi, “
Sheetrit: We should level Gaza neighborhoods” (2 October 2008;
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3504922,00.html).
23. “Israeli General Says Hamas Must Not Be the Only
Target in Gaza,” IDF Radio, Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0600 gmt (26 December 2008),
BBC Monitoring Middle East; Tova Dadon, “Deputy Chief of Staff: Worst still
ahead,” ynetnews.com (29 December
2008; http://tinyurl.com/crwdbw); “B’Tselem to Attorney General Mazuz: Concern
over Israel targeting civilian objects in the Gaza Strip” (31 December 2008; http://
tinyurl.com/8gxwox); Report of the United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (25 September 2009),
para. 1204. Hereafter: Goldstone Mission Report. I passed on an earlier
version of my book manuscript to members of the Goldstone Mission during its
investigative phase. The final Report of
the Mission also made extensive reference to the Dahiya strategy. For more on
the Dahiya strategy and the quote from Channel 10 News, see Public Committee
Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), No
Second Thoughts: The changes in the Israeli Defense Forces’ combat doctrine in
light of “Operation Cast Lead” (Jerusalem: November 2009), pp. 20–28.
24. Seumas Milne, “Israel’s Onslaught on Gaza is a
Crime That Cannot Succeed,” Guardian
(30 December 2008); Shay Fogelman, “Shock and Awe,” Haaretz (31 December 2010).
25. Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead”: 22 Days of death and destruction (London:
July 2009), p. 47.
26. Reuven Pedatzur, “The Mistakes of Cast Lead,” Haaretz (8 January 2009).
27. Morris, “Why Israel Feels Threatened”; Matt M. Matthews,
“The Israeli Defense Forces Response to the 2006 War with Hezbollah,” Military Review (July-August 2009), p.
45.
28. B. Michael, “Déjà Vu in Gaza,” ynetnews.com (29 December 2008; http://tinyurl.com/d2r2v4).
29. Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, Bearing the Brunt Again: Child rights
violations during Operation Cast Lead (September 2009), p. 28; Human Rights
Watch, Precisely Wrong: Gaza civilians killed by Israeli drone-launched missiles (30
June 2009), pp. 14–17. HRW found that “no Palestinian fighters were active on
the street or in the immediate area just prior to or at the time of the attack”
on the college students.
30. International Crisis Group, Ending the War in Gaza (5 January 2009), p. 18.
31. Asa Kasher, “Operation Cast Lead and Just War
Theory,” Azure (Summer 2009), p. 51;
Asa Kasher, “A Moral Evaluation of the Gaza War,” Jerusalem Post (7 February 2010).
32. Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, “Israel and Hamas
Are Both Paying a Steep Price in Gaza,” Haaretz
(10 January 2009); Ari Shavit, “Analysis: Israel’s victories in Gaza make up
for its failures in Lebanon,” Haaretz
(12 January 2009); Guy Bechor, “A Dangerous Victory,” ynetnews.com (12 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/c7gn7e). Looking
back a year later, Harel recalled that the Gaza invasion “was considered to be
an effective remedy to the failures of the 2006 Second Lebanon War” (Amos
Harel, “Israel Stuck in the Mud on Internal Gaza Probe,” Haaretz (30 January 2010)).
33. Thomas L. Friedman, “Israel’s Goals in Gaza?,” New York Times (14 January 2009). See also Thomas L. Friedman, “War,
Timeout, War, Time ... ,” New York Times
(25 June 2010).
34. Human Rights Watch, Why They Died: Civilian casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 war (New York: 2007), pp. 5, 14, 40–41,
45–46, 48, 51, 53.
35. Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for army and defense
policy (Carlisle, PA: 2008), pp. 43–45.
36. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Pawns: Laws of war violations and the use of weapons on the
Israel-Lebanon border (New York:
1996); Maoz, Defending the Holy Land,
pp. 213–14, 224–25, 252; Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A short history
(Princeton: 2007), pp. 77, 86.
37. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The changing face of terrorism
(London: 2004), pp. 167–68.
38. Human Rights Watch, Civilians Under Assault: Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Israel in the 2006 war (New York: 2007), p. 100.
HRW asserts that Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israeli civilians were not
retaliatory but provides no supporting evidence.
39. Yair Evron, “Deterrence: The campaign against
Hamas,” Strategic Assessment
(February 2009), p. 81; International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business (April 2009), p. 19n198.
40. International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business, pp. 7–8.
41. Gideon Levy, “The IDF Has No Mercy for the Children
in Gaza Nursery Schools,” Haaretz (15
January 2009).
42. Glenn Greenwald, “Tom Friedman Offers a Perfect
Definition of ‘Terrorism,’” Salon.com
(14 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/axu88g).
43. “Memorandum for the Record” (17 November 1968),
n. 13, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1964–1968.
44. International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business, p. 19.
45. Noam Chomsky, The
Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Boston:
1983), chapter 3; Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond
Chutzpah: On the misuse of anti-Semitism and the abuse of history (Berkeley:
2005; expanded paperback edition, 2008), pp. 337–41.
46. The relevant portion of the resolution varies
slightly from year to year. I am quoting from the 2009 text (A/64/L.23).
47. Final
Communiqué of the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign
Ministers (Session of Solidarity and Dialogue), Khartoum— Republic of the
Sudan (25–27 June 2002). It should also be noted that Iran has consistently
voted with the majority in the annual U.N. General Assembly resolution.
48. Robin Shepherd, A State Beyond the Pale: Europe’s problem with Israel (London:
2009), p. 205.
49. For details and analysis, see Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, pp. xxi–xxii, 227–70.
50. Ibid.,
p. 200.
51. See also ibid.,
pp. xxii–xxiii, 349–51.
52. “Human Rights Watch Urges Attention to Future of
Palestinian Refugees” (21 December 2000; www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/12/21/human-rights-watch-urges-attention-future-palestinian-refugees);
“Israel, Pales tinian Leaders Should Guarantee Right of Return as Part of
Comprehensive Refugee Solution” (21 December 2000;
www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/12/21/israel-palestinian-leaders-shouldguarantee-right-return-part-comprehensive-refugee-).
Amnesty International, The Right to
Return: The Case of the Palestinians.
Policy Statement (London: 29 March 2001).
53. Norman G. Finkelstein, Dennis Ross and the Peace Process: Subordinating Palestinian rights to
Israeli “needs” (Washington, D.C.: 2007).
54. Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid, Hamas: Ideological rigidity and political flexibility, United States Institute of
Peace Special Report (Washington, D.C.: June 2009), pp. 2–4. See also Khaled
Hroub, “A ‘New Hamas’ through Its New Documents,” Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer 2006), Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, religion, violence
(New York: 2008), pp. 205–6, 236–37, Jerome Slater, “A Perfect Moral Catastrophe:
Just War philosophy and the Israeli attack on Gaza,” Tikkun, March–April 2009 (a longer and fully footnoted version of
this article is posted on www.Tikkun.com), subsection headed “A political settlement
with Hamas?,” and Henry Siegman, “US Hamas Policy Blocks Middle East Peace,” Noref Report (September 2010). Hamas’s
political evolution retraced the PLO’s, in which the call for a state in the
whole of Palestine was superseded by a “phased” liberation of Palestine
starting with a state in the West Bank and Gaza, and finally acquiescence in a
two-state settlement (Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, violence, and coexistence (New York:
2006), pp. 108–10). Any Palestinian movement seriously vying for political influence
cannot but eventually come to terms with the exigency of a strong international
consensus favoring a two-state settlement.
55. Mouin Rabbani, “A Hamas Perspective on the
Movement’s Evolving Role: An interview with Khalid Mishal, Part II,” Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer 2008).
56. Gianni Perrelli, “Con Israele non sarà mai pace”
(Interview with Khalid Mishal), L’espresso
(26 February 2009; http://tinyurl.com/clcw8q).
57. Jimmy Carter, We
Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A plan that
will work (New York: 2009), pp. 137, 177. See also Nidal al-Mughrabi,
“Hamas Would Honor Referendum on Peace with Israel,” Reuters (1 December 2010).
58. Khaled Hroub, Hamas:
Political thought and practice (Washington, D.C.: 2000), p. 44 (see also
ibid., p. 254); Sherifa Zuhur, Hamas and
Israel: Conflicting strategies of group-based politics (Carlisle, PA:
2008), pp. 29–31 (this study was published by the Strategic Studies Institute
of the U.S. Army War College). See also Gunning, Hamas in Politics, pp. 19–20.
59. “What Hamas Wants,” Mideast Mirror (22 December 2008).
60. Benny Morris, One
State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict (New Haven:
2009), pp. 166, 174–75, 204n5.
61. “Transcript: Netanyahu Speech on Israel-Palestine,”
enduringamerica.com (14 June 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/y8hdq89); “Address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to
the United Nations General Assembly General Debate—64th Session,” mfa.gov.il (24 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yacovms).
62. John Dugard, Recognition
and the United Nations (Cambridge: 1987), p. 62.
63. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Cabinet
Communiqué” (12 September 2010; http://tinyurl.com/269x552).
64. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 181 (II), Future Government of Palestine (29
November 1947), Part I, A/3.
65. Ibid.,
Part I, B/10(d), C/Chapter 2.2. See also A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: A study of United
Nations practice (Leiden: 1973), p. 219.
66. Association for Civil Rights in Israel, State of Human Rights 2009, pp. 2,
15-23. See also Asher Arian et al.,
Auditing Israeli Democracy:
Democratic values in practice (Jerusalem: 2010), pp. 138-39, and David Kretzmer,
The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (Boulder, CO: 1990). For
inequality between Israeli Jews and Arabs in the socioeconomic sphere
(education, social welfare, health, employment and housing), see Ali Haider,
ed., The Equality Index of Jewish and
Arab Citizens in Israel: The Sikkuy
report 2007 (Jerusalem-Haifa: 2008).
67. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Remarks by
PM Netanyahu to the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations” (20
September 2010; http://tinyurl.com/355vmhw).
68. Asher Arian et al., Auditing Israeli Democracy: Between the state and civil society (Jerusalem: 2008), pp. 40, 43-44.
69. Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace: Finding a new direction for America
in the Middle East (New York: 2009), p. 16.
70. “Talk with Norman Cliff” (29 June 1946), in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Ahmedabad), v. 84, p. 385, “Speech at
Prayer Meeting” (10 June 1947), in ibid.,
v. 88, pp. 123–26, “Speech at Prayer Meeting” (5 July 1947), in ibid., v. 88, p. 281; see also “Answers
to Questions” (23 September 1946), in ibid.,
v. 85, p. 367, “A Talk” (7 May 1947), in ibid.,
v. 87, p. 426, “Speech at Prayer Meeting” (7 May 1947), in ibid., v. 87, pp. 432–33, “A Letter” (2 June 1947), in ibid., v. 88, p. 63, “Speech at Prayer
Meeting” (11 June 1947), in ibid., v.
88, p. 134, “Speech at Prayer Meeting” (24 June 1947), in ibid., v. 88, p. 204, “Speech at Prayer Meeting” (28 July 1947), in
ibid., v. 88, p. 452, “Speech at
Prayer Meeting” (30 July 1947), in ibid.,
v. 88, p. 466, “Interview with Randolph Churchill” (30 August 1947), in ibid., v. 89, p. 118.
71. Scham and Abu-Irshaid, Hamas, p. 7 (emphasis in original); Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Hamas, p. xxiii.
72. Article 3 of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty
delineates “the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law” binding on both parties; in particular, “They
recognize and will respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence”; “They recognize and will respect each other’s right to
live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries”; “They will
refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each
other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.” Article 2
of the Jordanian-Israeli treaty essentially repeats the “provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law”
delineated in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, v.
1: Emergence of conflict in Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Wars and Peace
Process (Ardsley, NY: 2005), pp. 873-87, 892-912.
73. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Behind the
Headlines: The resumption of direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians”
(1 September 2010; http://tinyurl.com/24zfqza).
74. Dan Izenberg, “Aharon Barak: W. Bank is occupied
territory,” Jerusalem Post (25 June
2009). See also Shlomo Avineri, “It’s Enough to Recognize Israel’s Legitimacy,”
Haaretz (8 October 2010).
75. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Remarks by
Prime Minister Netanyahu at the State Department” (2 September 2010; http://tinyurl.com/2a3aaxq);
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Remarks by PM Netanyahu to the Conference
of Presidents.”
76. Chapter 4.1 of the Partition Resolution barred
modification of the non-discriminatory clauses “without the assent of the
General Assembly of the United Nations.”
77. Official Records of the Second Session of the
General Assembly, Supplement No. 11, United
Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly, Vol.
III, Annex A—Oral Evidence Presented at Public Meetings, pp. 50, 54; but
cf. pp. 21, 22.
78. Zuhur, Hamas
and Israel, pp. ix, 14.
79. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at
the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement (December 2008), pp. 2, 6,
7. See also point (3) of “Defense Minister Barak’s Discussions ...” (29 August
2008), WikiLeaks. According to Egyptians who brokered the ceasefire, it
provided for an immediate cessation of armed hostilities; a gradual lifting of
the economic blockade that, after ten days, would allow for the passage of all
products, except materials used in the manufacture of projectiles and explosives;
and negotiations after three weeks for a prisoner exchange and the opening of
Rafah crossing (see International Crisis Group, Ending the War in Gaza, p. 3; Carter, We Can Have Peace, pp. 137– 38). After the abortive coup against
Hamas in June 2007, Israel severely restricted entry of goods “not considered
essential for the basic subsistence of the population.” It allowed passage of
only a “humanitarian minimum”—a benchmark that was arbitrarily determined, not sanctioned
by international law, and in fact fell below Gaza’s minimal humanitarian needs.
When the June 2008 ceasefire went into effect, Israel permitted only a
“slightly increased” movement of supplies into Gaza. Gisha (Legal Center for
Freedom of Movement), Red Lines Crossed:
Destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure
(August 2009), pp. 11, 13, 41-42, 45-46, 50; see also Gisha, “Israel Reveals
Documents Related to the Gaza Closure Policy” (21 October 2010).
80. Richard N. Haass and Martin Indyk, “Beyond Iraq:
A new U.S. strategy for the Middle East,” and Walter Russell Mead, “Change They
Can Believe In: To make Israel safe, give Palestinians their due,” in Foreign Affairs (January–February 2009).
81. The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, Annual Assessment 2008 (Jerusalem: 2008), p. 27.
82. Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah’s Speech Delivered at the Central Ashura Council, 31 December 2008.
83. Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Hamas, p. 14.
84. Chomsky, Fateful
Triangle, chapters 3, 5.
85. Yehuda Lukacs, ed., The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A documentary record, 1967–1990 (Cambridge: 1992), pp. 477–79.
86. Yehoshaphat Harkabi, Israel’s Fateful Hour (New York: 1988), p. 101.
87. Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas
of Security: Politics, strategy and the
Israeli experience in Lebanon (Oxford: 1987), pp. 20–23, 50–54, 67–70,
87–89, 100–1, 105–6, 113, 143, 294n46. Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The abduction of Lebanon (New York: 1990), pp.
197, 232. In his recent history of the “peace process,” Martin Indyk, former
U.S. ambassador to Israel, provides this capsule summary of the sequence of
events just narrated: “In 1982, Arafat’s terrorist activities eventually
provoked the Israeli government of Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon into a
fullscale invasion of Lebanon” (Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An intimate account of American peace diplomacy in the
Middle East (New York: 2009), p. 75).
88. Saed Bannoura, “ Livni Calls for a Large Scale
Military Offensive in Gaza,” IMEMC & Agencies (10 December 2008; http://tinyurl.com/chqtk7).
89. Uri Blau, “IDF Sources: Conditions not yet
optimal for Gaza exit,” Haaretz (8
January 2009); Barak Ravid, “Disinformation, Secrecy, and Lies: How the Gaza offensive
came about,” Haaretz (28 December 2008).
90. Nancy Kanwisher, Johannes Haushofer, and Anat
Biletzki, “Reigniting Violence: How do ceasefires end?,” Huffington Post (6 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/dfujv3). See
also Johannes Haushofer, Anat Biletzki, and Nancy Kanwisher, “Both Sides
Retaliate in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
(4 October 2010), which found that Palestinian violence—far from being random
and senseless—“reveals a pattern of retaliation: (i) the firing of Palestinian
rockets increases sharply after Israelis kill Palestinians, and (ii) the
probability (although not the number) of killings of Israelis by Palestinians
increases after killings of Palestinians by Israel.”
91. Slater, “A Perfect Moral Catastrophe” (subsection
headed “A ceasefire”). To prove that Hamas is driven by murderous ideology
rather than pragmatism and “legitimate grievance,” Ross and Makovsky point to
its rocket attacks after Israel’s 2005 Gaza redeployment:
During Hamas’s rise to power (January 2006 to April
2008), more than 2,500 rockets were launched from Gaza, landing in Israeli
cities and villages. Israel no longer occupies Gaza, but the 245 rockets have
largely continued—under Hamas’s control. Some say that the rockets are a
response to Israeli retaliation. But it is easy to disprove this. If there were
no rockets, the odds are very high that Israel would have no reason to
retaliate. Even during periods without retaliation, the rocket fire has
continued. (Myths, Illusions and Peace,
p. 255; cf. ibid., pp. 138–39, 243, 252)
Having restored the factual record, their proof is
easy to disprove: leaving aside that Israel continued to occupy and then
imposed an illegal blockade on Gaza, it was Israel, not Hamas, that
“overwhelmingly” broke the ceasefires.
92. Zvi Bar’el, “Crushing the Tahadiyeh,” Haaretz (16 November 2008); Uri Avnery,
“The Calculations behind Israel’s Slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza,” redress.cc (2 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/a6pzlx).
93. Amnesty International annual report 2009 entry
for Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories; see also Human Rights Watch,
Rockets from Gaza: Harm to civilians from Palestinian armed groups’ rocket attacks
(New York: August 2009), p. 2.
94. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Six Months,
p. 3.
95. “Hamas Wants Better Terms for Truce,” Jerusalem Post (21 December 2008); Bradley Burston, “Can the First Gaza War
Be Stopped before It Starts?,” Haaretz
(22 December 2008). Diskin told the Israeli cabinet that Hamas would renew the
truce if Israel lift ed the siege of Gaza, stopped military attacks, and
extended the truce to the West Bank.
96. “Gaza Residents ‘Terribly Trapped,’” BBC News (4 November 2008; www.bbc.co.uk).
97. Gisha, Red
Lines, pp. 5, 26, 33.
98. Sara Roy, “If Gaza Falls... ,” London Review of Books (1 January 2009).
99. International Crisis Group, Ending the War in Gaza, pp. 3, 10–11.
100. Burston, “Can the First Gaza War.”
101. Khalid Mishal, “This Brutality Will Never Break
Our Will to Be Free,” Guardian (6
January 2009).
102. It was not the first time Israel sought to
provoke Hamas after it mooted a modus vivendi.
Two Israeli academic authorities on Hamas recalled that in September 1997, just
days before an abortive Israeli assassination attempt on Khalid Mishal,
“Jordan’s King Hussein delivered a message from the Hamas leadership to
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In it Hamas suggested opening an
indirect dialogue with the Israeli government, to be mediated by the king, toward
achieving a cessation of violence, as well as a ‘discussion of all matters.’
But the message was ignored or missed and, in any case, became irrelevant
following the attempt” on the Hamas leader’s life (Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Hamas, p. 72; see also Paul
McGeough, Kill Khalid: The failed
Mossad assassination of Khalid Mishal and
the rise of Hamas (New York:
2009), esp. pp. 141, 146, 226).
Chapter three
1. Anthony H. Cordesman, The “Gaza War”: A strategic analysis
(Washington, D.C.: 2 February 2009; “Final Review Draft ”).
2. Cordesman currently holds the Arleigh A. Burke
Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is
a national security analyst for ABC News.
3. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. ii. He allowed only that Israel might have unjustifiably hit
“some” civilian targets “like an UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency]
school where 42 Palestinians died.” These civilian targetings rated a
two-sentence mention in his 92-page report. “There is no evidence that any
abuses of the other narrow limits imposed by [the] laws of war occurred,” he
continued, “aside from a few limited cases,” and the “only significant incident
that had as yet emerged was the possible misuse of 20 phosphorus shells in
built up areas in Beit Lahiya.” (ibid., pp. 63–64)
4. Ibid.,
p. ii.
5. The ensuing exposition is limited narrowly to
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law resulting
directly from Operation Cast Lead. Some human rights reports also documented indirect
violations, such as Hamas repression of Fatah members in Gaza and Palestinian
Authority repression of Hamas members in the West Bank, as well as Israel’s
repression of dissent in Israel and the West Bank and its failure to provide
air-raid shelters for Bedouins in southern Israel.
6. Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead”: 22 Days of death and destruction (London: July 2009), p. 4. Although the
Goldstone Mission reported that it was “faced with a certain reluctance by the
persons it interviewed in Gaza to discuss the activities of the armed groups,”
it concluded that Palestinian testimonies could be vetted for accuracy:
Taking into account the demeanor of witnesses, the
plausibility of their accounts and the consistency of these accounts with the
circumstances observed by it and with other testimonies, the Mission was able
to determine the credibility and reliability of those people it heard.... The final
conclusions on the reliability of the information received were made taking all
of these matters into consideration, cross-referencing the relevant material and
information, and assessing whether, in all the circumstances, there was sufficient
information of a credible and reliable nature for the Mission to make a finding
in fact.” (Report of the United Nations
Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (25 September 2009), paras. 35,
170–71, 440, hereafter: Goldstone Mission Report)
The somewhat discrepant experiences of Amnesty and
the Goldstone Mission might be accounted for by the higher profile of the
Mission, which prompted greater intrusion by Hamas and greater circumspection by
the population.
7. The State of Israel, The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and
legal aspects (July 2009), para. 34.
8. Ibid.,
p. 52n139.
9. Ibid.,
paras. 22, 25.
10. Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 1107–64 passim.
11. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, paras. 161, 174–75, 192.
12. Lorenzo Cremonesi, “Così i ragazzini di Hamas ci
hanno utilizzato come bersagli,” Corriere
della Sera (21 January 2009); “Palestinians Confirm Hamas War Crimes,
Refute Gaza Death Toll,” Israel Today
(22 January 2009). See below for death toll figures of human rights
organizations and Israel.
13. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, paras. 200–2.
14. Uzi Benziman, “Until Proved Otherwise,” Haaretz (18 June 2006). B. Michael, “Of
Liars and Hunters,” Yediot Ahronot (3
September 2005); B. Michael, “Stop the Lying!,” Yediot Ahronot (5
September 2008).
15. Kenneth Roth, “The Incendiary IDF,” Human Rights Watch (22 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/ddchkd).
16. Ben Wedeman, “Group Accuses Israel of Firing
White Phosphorus into Gaza,” CNN (12
January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/7rtcxt); Robert Marquand and Nicholas
Blanford, “Gaza: Israel under fire for alleged white phosphorus use,” Christian Science Monitor (14 January
2009).
17. B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories), “Military Rejects Horrific Results of Use
of White Phosphorus in Operation Cast Lead” (21 May 2009). See also Dinah PoKempner,
“Valuing the Goldstone Report,” Global
Governance 16 (2010), p. 149.
18. Amira Hass, “In the Rockets’ Red Glare,” Haaretz (15 January 2009).
19. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” pp. 20, 27.
20. Ibid.,
pp. 20–27 passim, 42–57 passim.
21. Ibid.,
p. 22.
22. B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories), “Suspicion: Bombed truck carried oxygen
tanks and not grad rockets” (31 December 2008; http://tinyurl.com/8scpfo).
23. Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong: Gaza civilians killed by Israeli drone-launched
missiles (30 June 2009), pp. 17–21.
24. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” pp. 58, 62.
25. Ibid., p. 58; Amos Harel, “Israel: Two-thirds of
Palestinians killed in Gaza fighting were terrorists,” Haaretz (13 February 2009); Yaakov Katz, “IDF: World duped by
Hamas’s false civilian death toll figures,” Jerusalem
Post (15 February 2009).
26. William Arkin, Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 2007), p. 74.
27. Human Rights Watch, Why They Died: Civilian casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 war
(New York: 2007), pp. 76, 79; Mitchell Prothero, “Hizbollah Builds Up Covert
Army for a New Assault against Israel,” Observer
(27 April 2008); Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated
Israel; Part 2, Winning the Ground War,” Asia
Times (13 October 2006).
28. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” pp. 1–3.
29. Ibid.,
pp. 1, 10.
30. Ibid.,
p. 2.
31. Ibid.
32. Duncan Kennedy, “A Context for Gaza,” Harvard Crimson (2 February 2009).
33. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” pp. 16–17.
34. Ibid.,
p. 63.
35. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, paras. 6, 8, 84, 115, 222–23.
36. Amos Harel, “What Did the IDF Think Would Happen
in Gaza?,” Haaretz (27 March 2009).
37. Amos Harel, “Testimonies on IDF Misconduct in
Gaza Keep Rolling In,” Haaretz (22
March 2009).
38. Amos Harel, “IDF Officer: ‘It will take many
years to restore’ bombwracked Gaza,” Haaretz
(7 January 2009).
39. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, para. 232.
40. Amos Harel, “Shooting and Crying,” Haaretz (19 March 2009); Anshel Pfeffer,
“Gaza Soldiers Speak Out,” Jewish Chronicle (5 March 2009); Breaking the
Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies from
Operation Cast Lead, Gaza 2009 (Jerusalem: June 2009), pp. 20, 22, 24, 27,
29, 30, 50, 51, 56, 62, 72. The Goldstone Mission Report denied the army premise that Palestinian civilians would
have already fled areas under Israeli assault (para. 522); on this point, see
also Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), No Second Thoughts: The changes
in the Israeli Defense Forces’ combat doctrine in light of “Operation Cast
Lead” (Jerusalem: November 2009), pp. 18–19.
41. Harel, “What Did the IDF Think.”
42. Donald Macintyre, “Israeli Commander: ‘We rewrote
the rules of war for Gaza,’” Independent
(3 February 2010); Anshel Pfeffer, “IDF Officer: Gaza civilians risked to
protect Israel troops during war,” Haaretz
(3 February 2010).
43. Margaret Coker, “Gaza’s Isolation Slows
Rebuilding Efforts,” Wall Street Journal
(5 February 2009); United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), The Humanitarian Monitor
(January 2009); Ethan Bronner, “Amid the Destruction, a Return to Life in
Gaza,” New York Times (25 January 2009); United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Tough Times For University Students in Gaza”
(26 March 2009; http://tinyurl.com/dkzepl); Reporters Without Borders, Operation “Cast Lead”: News control as
military objective (February 2009); Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, Bearing the Brunt Again: Child rights violations during Operation Cast Lead
(September 2009), pp. 10, 62, 81; Amnesty International et al., Failing Gaza: No rebuilding, no recovery, no
more excuses (December 2009), p.
9; United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Satellite Image Analysis in Support to the United Nations Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict (31 July 2009), p. ii; Gisha (Legal Center for
Freedom of Movement), Red Lines Crossed:
Destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure (August 2009), pp. 5-6, 19, 27.
Between the destruction inflicted during the invasion and Israel’s expansion of
its “buffer zone” in Gaza after the invasion, nearly half of Gaza’s
agricultural land had been put out of production a year later. For the most
comprehensive analysis of the destruction wrought by the Israeli attack and its
enduring consequences, see United Nations Development Program, Gaza, Early Recovery and Reconstruction
Needs Assessment—One Year After (2010).
44. Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 50, 913–941. The Mission concluded that the “only
purpose” of the attack “was to put an end to the production of flour in the
Gaza Strip,” and “destroy the local capacity to produce flour.” Israel
subsequently sought to defend its attack on the flour mill (State of Israel, Gaza Operation and Investigations: An update
(January 2010), pp. 41-44), but critical evidence belied the Israeli version of
what happened (Anshel Pfeffer, “U.N. Insists Israel Bombed Flour Mill during
Cast Lead,” Haaretz (4 February
2010); Human Rights Watch, “I Lost
Everything”: Israel’s unlawful destruction of property during Operation Cast
Lead (New York: January 2010), pp. 5, 83-86). Still, Israel stuck to its
original story (Gaza Operation
Investigations: Second update (July 2010), paras. 141-45). One year after
the invasion Israel continued to block cement deliveries to rebuild the flour mill
(Amnesty International et al., Failing
Gaza, p. 6).
45. Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,” p. 62; Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 51, 942–61 (the Mission
concluded that “this constituted a deliberate act of wanton destruction not
justified by any military necessity”).
46. United Nations Development Program, Gaza, Early Recovery, p. 67.
47. Amir Mizroch, “Analysis: Grappling with
Goldstone,” Jerusalem Post (18
September 2009); see also Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel Gaza FAQ:
Goldstone Mission” (http://tinyurl.com/yar9daq).
48. In a report issued a year and a half after the
invasion Israel alleged, predictably, that the chicken coops were destroyed
“for reasons of military necessity” (Gaza
Operation Investigations: Second update, paras. 122-29).
49. Human Rights Watch, “I Lost Everything,” p. 7.
50. Amnesty International et al., Failing Gaza, p. 7; Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel’s
New Hard Line on Hizbollah,” DefenseNews (31
May 2010).
51. Amnesty International et al., Failing Gaza, p. 7; Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Developments in
the economy of the occupied Palestinian territory (7 August 2009), para.
20.
52. Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,” p. 66; see also Human Rights Watch, Rockets from Gaza: Harm to civilians from Palestinian armed groups’
rocket attacks (New York: August 2009), pp. 2, 20, reporting that a
synagogue, school, and kindergarten were damaged; see also Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 1659–61.
53. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, p. 17n27.
54. Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies, pp. 26, 59, 60, 85, 101.
55. Uri Blau, “Dead Palestinian Babies and Bombed Mosques—IDF
Fashion 2009,” Haaretz (20 March
2009).
56. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, para. 71.
57. Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies, pp. 69, 83.
58. Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,” p. 55.
59. Report of
the Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza: No safe place. Presented to
the League of Arab States (30 April 2009), paras. 300, 372–87. (Hereafter: Dugard Committee Report.) See also Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 53, 351,
1004, 1207, 1319.
60. Human Rights Watch, “I Lost Everything,” pp. 1, 41, 44.
61. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, para. 445.
62. International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business (April 2009), p. 2. Apparently referring
to this same zone, Amnesty reported that it “looked as if it had been wrecked
by an earthquake” (Operation “Cast Lead,”
p. 61).
63. Human Rights Watch, “I Lost Everything,” p. 4.
64. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. 49.
65. Amos Harel, “IDF Probe: Cannot defend destruction
of Gaza homes,” Haaretz (15 February
2009). On the massive destruction of Palestinian dwellings Amnesty reported:
Many of the houses destroyed during Operation “Cast
Lead” had been raided or temporarily taken over by Israeli soldiers during incursions
in recent years. It is unlikely that Hamas or other Palestinian groups would
have located their command centers, rocket manufacturing workshops or weapons
stores in the areas most accessible [to] and most easily overrun by Israeli
troops....
The fact that the soldiers used [antitank
mines]—which required them to leave their tanks, walk between buildings and
enter houses in order to place the explosive charges inside the houses along
the supporting walls—indicates that they felt extremely confident that there
were no Palestinian gunmen inside or around the houses. It also indicates their
confidence that there were no tunnels under the houses which gunmen could use to
capture them, and that the houses were not booby-trapped. (Operation “Cast Lead,” p. 56)
The Goldstone Mission Report divided the house destruction chronologically: “a first
phase of extensive destruction of housing for the ‘operational necessity’ of
the advancing Israeli forces in these areas was followed by a period of
relative idleness on the part of the Israeli bulldozers and explosives
engineers. But during the last three days, aware of their imminent withdrawal,
the Israeli armed forces engaged in another wave of systematic destruction of
civilian buildings” (paras. 990–1004, 1323). The Al Mezan Center for Human
Rights reported that “at least 1,732 shelters” were destroyed “after the end of
hostilities when they had come under Israel’s effective control, [which]
indicates that they could no longer be military objectives or near any other
legitimate military targets, and should therefore have been respected as
civilian objects” (Al Mezan, Bearing the
Brunt, pp. 80–94). On a related point, HRW noted the absence of any
evidence that “explosive booby-traps planted by Palestinian armed groups or
secondary explosions caused by weapons stored by these armed groups were
responsible for any significant amount of the damage seen in Gaza” (Human
Rights Watch, “I Lost Everything,” p.
18).
66. Goldstone Mission Report, para. 1205; International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business, p. 19.
67. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. 18.
68. Both the Israeli press releases cited by
Cordesman, “Gaza War,” pp. 24, 26, and State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, p. 61n161, para. 234, alleged secondary
explosions only in the cases of two mosques targeted respectively on 31
December 2008 and 1 January 2009. In a document issued long after the Gaza
assault, Israel conjured a secondary explosion in a mosque attacked on 13
January 2009 (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat from the Gaza Strip: The main findings of
the Goldstone Report versus the
factual findings (March 2010), p. 157).
69. The Goldstone Mission Report cautiously concluded, “Although the situations investigated
by the Mission did not establish the use of mosques for military purposes or to
shield military activities, the Mission cannot exclude that this might have
occurred in other cases” (paras. 36, 464–65, 486, 497, 822–43, 1953). In a pair of articles, B’Tselem executive director Jessica
Montell alleged that the Goldstone Report
was insufficiently critical of Hamas because it “ignored” evidence
contradicting its tentative conclusion on Hamas’s use of mosques for military
purposes. Despite repeated requests and a protracted correspondence, however,
Montell was unable to substantiate her allegation. Jessica Montell, “A
Time for Soul-Searching,” Jerusalem Post (30 September 2009); Jessica Montell,
“The Goldstone Report on Gaza,” Huffington
Post (1 October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/ykgfqkw).
70. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, pp. 143-44.
71. Gaza
Operation Investigations: Second update, para. 69.
72. Hanan Chehata, “Exclusive MEMO Interview with
Colonel Desmond Travers,” Middle East
Monitor (23 January 2010). The targeted mosques were also allegedly
“frequented” by senior Hamas officials (Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat,
pp. 147-48)—which almost certainly meant that Israel surveilled them.
73. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, p. 146; Al Mezan Center for Human Rights
database. It might also be supposed that Hamas placed weapons in mosques because
Hamas wanted to demonize Israel by luring it to target them, but such
speculation would be hard to square with the fact that Hamas was also said to
have hidden the weapons in mosques
(Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, pp. 147, 152, 158).
74. Alan Dershowitz, The Case against the Goldstone Report: A study in evidentiary bias
(www.alandershowitz.com/goldstone.pdf),
pp. 4, 39-41.
75. Dugard Committee Report, paras. 349–53, 498, 502; see also Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,” p. 15.
76. Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies, p. 70.
77. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, p. 179.
78. Dugard Committee Report, para. 347.
79. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, pp. V, 193-94.
80. United Nations Development Program, Gaza, Early Recovery, p. 26.
81. Goldstone Mission Report, para. 1273.
82. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, para. 158; see also Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, p. 185.
83. Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 54, 61, 1180, 1182, 1185–91, 1891; Cordesman, “Gaza War,” p. 18.
84. Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,” p. 55.
85. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. 17.
86. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, paras. 8, 17, 24, 138, 141, 154, 262–65.
87. Dugard Committee Report, para. 13 of Executive Summary; paras. 283– 299, 467–68,
483, 490. On a related note the Committee observed:
In order to provide a meaningful warning by
telephone, the IDF would have to be aware not only of the telephone numbers of
the residents of Gaza, but more importantly of the numbers of the residents in
a particular building or area. The Committee is not aware of how the IDF
managed to obtain and confirm this information when the majority of telephones
in Gaza are mobile or cell phones and are not associated with a particular
address or location, and when the utility of advising someone to vacate on their
mobile phone requires knowledge of their actual location. (ibid., para. 293;
see also ibid., para. 467)
For a “clearly documented and large-scale case,
reported in real time, that the IDF only paid lip service regarding the
warnings to civilians to minimize damage,” see PCATI, No Second Thoughts, pp.
17–18. See also Human Rights Watch, White
Flag Deaths: Killings of Palestinian Civilians during Operation Cast Lead
(New York: August 2009), p. 5, Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 37, 501–2, 511, 515, 531–42 (the Mission allowed
that the warnings might have been effective in “some” instances), and
PoKempner, “Valuing the Goldstone Report,” p. 152.
88. Jeremy Bowen, “Gaza Stories: Israeli minister,”
interview with Meir Sheetrit, BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7878711.stm;
Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,” pp. 3, 50–51. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, reported “more than
165,000 phone calls warning civilians to distance themselves from military
targets” (paras. 8, 264), while the IDF’s most senior legal advisor alleged
that “more than 250,000” calls were made. Yaakov Katz, “Security and Defense: Waging
war on the legal front,” Jerusalem Post
(18 September 2009).
89. Laurie R. Blank, “The Application of IHL in the
Goldstone Report: A critical commentary,” Yearbook
of International Law 12 (2009), pp. 47-48.
90. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, paras. 86, 266.
91. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. 64. 92. Ibid., p. 37.
93. OCHA, Humanitarian
Monitor. See also Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,”
pp. 51–53.
94. Hazem Balousha and Chris McGreal, “Tanks,
Rockets, Death and Terror: A civilian catastrophe unfolding,” Guardian (5 January 2009).
95. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. 64.
96. Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 72, 317, 1297, 1315; see also para. 1299 for Israeli
misrepresentation of the amounts and types of humanitarian provisions it
allowed into Gaza.
97. Human Rights Watch, “Choking Gaza Harms
Civilians” (18 February 2009); United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian
Coordinator” (10–16 March 2009). See also Amira Hass, “Israel Bans Books, Music,
and Clothes from Entering Gaza,” Haaretz
(17 May 2009).
98. Amnesty International et al., Failing Gaza, pp. 3, 6, 10, 12.
99. U.N. News Center, “Opening Remarks at Press
Conference” (20 January 2009).
100. U.N. General Assembly, Letter dated 4 May 2009 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council: Summary by the
Secretary-General of the report of the United Nations Headquarters Board of
Inquiry into certain incidents in the Gaza Strip between 27 December 2008 and
19 January 2009 (15 May 2009), A/63/855-S/2009/250, paras. 10–28,
46–67, 77–84, 97, 100, 107. Opting to bar public scrutiny of the actual report,
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released only a summary of the board’s findings.
101. Barak Ravid, “ Peres Tells Ban: Israel will
never accept UN Gaza probe,” Haaretz
(7 May 2009); Barak Ravid, “ Barak: IDF did not mean to shoot at UN facilities
in Gaza,” Haaretz (5 May 2009).
102. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. 66.
103. After the invasion ended on 18 January, Israel
opened a “humanitarian clinic” at the Erez crossing, but by this time the
medical emergency had passed and Palestinian officials ignored the clinic,
believing—as did many others, including Physicians for Human Rights-Israel—that
it was an Israeli publicity stunt. On 28 January Israel announced the closure
of the clinic due to the absence of patients. See Physicians for Human
Rights-Israel, “Ill Morals”: Grave
violations of the right to health during the Israeli assault on Gaza (March
2009), pp. 23, 51. I am grateful to Mahmoud AbuRahma of the Al Mezan Center for
Human Rights-Gaza for clarifying these details.
104. Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, Holding Health to Ransom: GSS interrogation and extortion of Palestinian patients at Erez crossing (August 2008).
105. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, para. 274.
106. Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, “Ill Morals.”
107. Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, “Yet Another
Child Casualty Due to Israel’s Closure Policies” (Gaza: 18 March 2009).
108. “Gaza: ICRC demands urgent access to wounded as
Israeli army fails to assist wounded Palestinians” (8 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/dgq7xh).
109. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. 64.
110. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, para. 274.
111. B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories), Guidelines
for Israel’s Investigation into Operation Cast Lead, 27 December 2008–18
January 2009 (Jerusalem: 8 February 2009), p. 14.
112. Al Mezan, Bearing
the Brunt, p. 32.
113. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. 65.
114. B’Tselem, Guidelines,
p. 16. See also Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond
Chutzpah: On the misuse of anti-Semitism and the abuse of history (Berkeley:
2005; expanded paperback edition, 2008), pp. 128–30.
115. Human Rights Watch, Why They Died, p. 160.
116. Jan McGirk, “Gaza’s Health and Humanitarian
Situation Remains Fragile,” Lancet (4
February 2009); Amnesty International et al., Failing Gaza, p. 11.
117. Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, “Ill Morals.”
118. Sebastian Van As et al., Final Report: Independent fact-finding mission into violations of human
rights in the Gaza Strip during the period 27.12.2008—18.01.2009 (Brussels:
April 2009).
119. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, p. 164.
120. Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,” p. 43 (see also Amnesty International annual
report 2010 entry for Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
(London), p. 183); Goldstone Mission Report,
paras. 36, 466–74, 487.
121. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, paras. 7, 23, 131, 141, 154–55, 163, 171– 80,
260–61, 370–80 (emphasis in original); see also Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, pp. V, 163-77
(this document also cited a “Fatah-affiliated website”). Benny Morris, “Derisionist
History,” New Republic (28 November
2009). The Magen David Adom testimony is cited in Goldstone Mission Report, para.
473.
122. United Nations Development Program, Gaza, Early Recovery, p. 20.
123. Gaza
Operation Investigations: Second update, para. 69.
124. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” pp. 8–9. 125. Ibid., p. 27.
126. Ibid.,
pp. ii, 1, 15–16, 18, 19, 28, 38, 40, 57.
127. Ibid.,
pp. 15ff.
128. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, paras. 4, 59, 73–82 (photograph at para. 81; my
emphasis); see also Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, pp. 6-7, 45-55, 76-78.
129. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” pp. 10, 16, 28, 39, 42.
130. Ibid.,
pp. 27, 57.
131. Ibid.,
p. 41; Reuven Pedatzur, “The War That Wasn’t,” Haaretz (25 January 2009).
132. Pedatzur, “War That Wasn’t.”
133. International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business, pp. 2, 21 (see also ibid., pp. 8n82,
19); Amnesty International, Operation
“Cast Lead,” p. 56.
134. Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies, pp. 25, 36, 47, 54, 60, 68, 71, 77, 80, 90.
135. Goldstone Mission Report, para. 459.
136. Dugard Committee Report, para. 214.
137. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, pp. 7, 52, 104.
138. Moshe Halbertal, “The Goldstone Illusion: What
the U.N. report gets wrong about Gaza—and war,” New Republic (6 November 2009). In a notorious 2002 political
assassination of a Hamas leader, Israel killed 14 Palestinian civilians, nine
of them children, after dropping a oneton bomb in the middle of a densely
populated Gazan neighborhood (see Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, pp. 105–6). Yet in Halbertal’s cynical rendering,
echoing the Israeli chief of staff, “the collateral deaths were not only
unintentional, they were not even foreseeable” because “the innocent people who
were killed lived in shacks in the backyard of the building, which, in aerial
photographs, looked like storage units.”
139. I return to this point in the next chapter.
140. Palestinian Center for Human Rights, “Confirmed
Figures Reveal the True Extent of the Destruction Inflicted upon the Gaza
Strip” (12 March 2009); Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, “Cast Lead Offensive in
Numbers” (2 August 2009); “B’Tselem’s Investigation of Fatalities in Operation
Cast Lead” (9 September 2009); B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories), Human
Rights Review, 1 January 2009-30 April 2010 (Jerusalem: June 2010), p. 5;
Al Mezan, Bearing the Brunt, p. 16;
Amnesty International et al., Failing
Gaza, p. 7. In February 2009 the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported, on the basis of data from the
Palestinian Ministry of Health, “1,440 Palestinians dead, of whom 431 are
children and 114 are women,” noting that “the rise in the number of casualties
is due to the delay in people officially registering the deaths of family
members from the conflict” (“Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian
Coordinator, 3-5 February 2009”). Israeli officials alleged that total Palestinian
deaths came to 1,166 of whom at least 60 percent were “terrorists.” The
discrepancy in the ratio of Palestinian combatant to civilian deaths partly
results from disagreement on the proper classification of Gazan police. See Shay
Fogelman, “Shock and Awe,” Haaretz
(31 December 2010). The broad consensus of human rights organizations was that
these police should overwhelmingly be classified as civilians because they did
not take a direct part in hostilities and were not members of Palestinian armed
groups. The overall veracity of Israeli figures could be tested on the basis of
the “under 16” sub-classification. Whereas Israel alleged that 89 Palestinians
under age 16 were killed, B’Tselem reported that 252 Palestinians under 16 were
killed and that it “has copies of birth certificates and death certificates
along with other documents regarding the vast majority of the minors who were
killed.” For a critical analysis of Israeli casualty figures, see PCATI, No Second Thoughts, pp. 9–11. The study showed that Israel abruptly altered
the figures it tabulated for Palestinian deaths, and it concluded that “the
casualty estimates provided by other sources (around 1,400 killed) are more
credible than those provided by the IDF Spokesperson.” Even the largely apologetic
U.S. Department of State 2009 Human
Rights Report put the number of dead “at close to 1,400 Palestinians,
including more than 1,000 civilians” (http://tinyurl.com/yhddnjt). Hamas
originally alleged that only 48 of its fighters had been killed during the
Israeli invasion, but abruptly upped the figure to several hundred in the face
of accusations that the people of Gaza “had paid the price” of its reckless
decisions. Netanyahu seized on Hamas’s politically inflated death toll as vindication
of the Israeli allegation that a high percentage of Gazan casualties were
“Hamas terrorists.” “Hamas Confirms Losses in Cast Lead for First Time,” Jerusalem Post (1 November 2010); Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PM Netanyahu Addresses the General Assembly of the
Jewish Federation of North America” (8 November 2010; http://tinyurl.com/2e3vngq).
141. Human Rights Watch, Rockets from Gaza.
142. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, paras. 42–46; see also Asa Kasher, “Operation
Cast Lead and Just War Theory,” Azure
(Summer 2009), pp. 52–53. The Goldstone Mission Report regrettably adopted this line of argument (paras. 110, 1598,
1901).
143. Goldstone Mission Report, para. 545.
144. Kasher, “Operation Cast Lead,” p. 70.
145. “8 Cast Lead IDF Heroes Get Decorated,” Jerusalem Post (16 December 2009).
146. Bowen, “Gaza Stories.”
147. Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, “War
and Peace Index— February 2009.” For the calculation behind the Israeli
leadership’s decision not to topple Hamas, see International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business, pp.
25–26n252.
148. Gideon Levy, “Everyone Agrees: War in Gaza was a
failure,” Haaretz (12 March 2009).
149. International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business, p. 21.
150. Kennedy, “Context for Gaza.”
151. Harel, “What Did the IDF Think”; Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies, p. 88.
152. Leon Wieseltier, “Something Much Darker,” New Republic
(8 February 2010). See also Petra Marquardt-Bigman, “The Warped Mirror: Andrew
Sullivan’s ‘pulverization of Gazans,’” JPost.com
(14 February 2010; http://tinyurl.com/32slzn3). The offending phrase was used by
former New Republic editor Andrew Sullivan, who denounced the Israeli attack.
153. Arik Diamant and David Zonsheine, “Talk to
Hamas,” Guardian (15 February 2010).
154. Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire: Israel’s unlawful use of white phosphorus in Gaza (New York: March 2009), pp. 1–6, 39,
60. See also Al Mezan, Bearing the Brunt,
pp. 42–45.
155. Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong, pp. 4, 6, 12. The Israeli dronelaunched missiles
killed at least 513 persons, including 116 children (Al Mezan, Bearing the Brunt, pp. 37–42).
156. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” p. 11.
157. Ibid.,
p. 68.
158. Ibid.,
pp. 11, 32.
159. Kim Sengupta and Donald Macintyre, “Israeli
Cabinet Divided over Fresh Gaza Surge,” Independent
(13 January 2009); PCATI, No Second Thoughts,
p. 28.
160. Adrian Blomfield, “Israeli Opposition Leader
Tzipi Livni ‘Cancels London Visit over Prosecution Fears,’” Daily Telegraph (14 December 2009); Herb
Keinon, “Miliband ‘Shocked’ at Livni’s Warrant,” Jerusalem Post (15 December 2009); Daniel Edelson, “Livni: We must
do what’s right for us,” ynetnews.com
(15 December 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yb8oqtf).
161. International Crisis Group, Ending the War in Gaza (5 January 2009), p. 19; International
Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business, p. 19.
162. Guy Bechor, “Israel Is Back,” ynetnews.com (19 February 2010; http://tinyurl.com/yjqtuwc).
163. Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies, pp. 68–69.
164. Kasher, “Operation Cast Lead,” pp. 64–67.
165. Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer, “Israel:
Civilians & combatants,” New York
Review of Books (14 May 2009; emphasis in original).
166. Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 1886–87.
Chapter four
1. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat from the Gaza
Strip: The main findings of the Goldstone Report versus the factual findings
(March 2010), p. IV.
2. Anthony H. Cordesman, The “Gaza War”: A strategic analysis
(Washington, D.C.: 2 February 2009; “Final Review Draft ”), pp. 10, 19–23 passim,
36, 42, 44, 63–66 passim; The State of Israel, The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and
legal aspects (July 2009), paras. 23, 119, 154 (emphasis in original), 170,
186–89, 223–28 (see also Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, pp. 110-42, 195-261); Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead”: 22 Days of death and
destruction (London: July 2009), pp. 3–4, 47–50, 64, 74–77. For human
rights investigations echoing Amnesty’s finding that some Hamas militants
fought in built-up areas but did not use Palestinian civilians as human
shields, see Human Rights Watch, “Letter to EU Foreign Ministers to Address
Violations between Israel and Hamas” (16 March 2009), Human Rights Watch, Rockets from Gaza: Harm to civilians from
Palestinian armed groups’ rocket attacks (New York: August 2009), pp. 22,
24, Report of the United Nations
Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (25 September 2009), paras. 35,
452, 475, 482–88, 494, 1953 (hereafter: Goldstone
Mission Report); for human
rights organizations and IDF testimony corroborating Israel’s use of human
shields, see National Lawyers Guild, Onslaught:
Israel’s attack on Gaza & the rule of law (New York: February 2009),
pp. 14–15, Human Rights Watch, White Flag
Deaths: Killings of Palestinian Civilians during Operation Cast Lead (New
York: August 2009), pp. 11–12, Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies from Operation Cast Lead, Gaza 2009
(Jerusalem: June 2009), pp. 7–8, 107, Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 55, 1032–1106, Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, Bearing the Brunt Again: Child rights
violations during Operation Cast Lead (September 2009), pp. 52–59. In a
pair of articles B’Tselem executive director Jessica Montell contrarily alleged
that Hamas did engage in human shielding, but she was unable to provide any
supporting evidence despite repeated requests and a protracted correspondence.
Jessica Montell, “A Time for Soul-Searching,” Jerusalem Post (30 September 2009); Jessica Montell, “The Goldstone
Report on Gaza,” Huffington Post (1
October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/ykgfqkw).
3. Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer, “Israel:
Civilians & combatants,” New York
Review of Books (14 May 2009).
4. Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace: Finding a new
direction for America in the Middle East (New York: 2009), pp. 7, 128, 137,
153–54, 244, 247, 252. In a comparable distortion Beverley Milton-Edwards and
Stephen Farrell, Hamas: The Islamic
resistance movement (Malden, MA: 2010), reported that “on 19 December 2008,
six months to the day after it began its ceasefire, Hamas ended it” (p. 298).
5. Colonel Richard Kemp CBE, “International Law and
Military Operations in Practice,” Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs (18 June 2009).
6. Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,” p. 7; for details, see ibid., pp. 11ff. See also Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 459, 653–703.
7. Amnesty International, Operation “Cast Lead,” pp. 1, 24; for details, see ibid., esp. pp. 24–27. See also
Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 704–885.
8. Human Rights Watch, White Flag Deaths, pp. 2, 4, 10–15.
9. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, para. 213.
10. Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 802, 810–11.
11. Amos Harel, “IDF in Gaza: Killing civilians,
vandalism, and lax rules of engagement,” Haaretz
(19 March 2009); Amos Harel, “Shooting and Crying,” Haaretz (19 March 2009); Amos Harel, “Testimonies on IDF Misconduct
in Gaza Keep Rolling In,” Haaretz (22
March 2009); Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’
Testimonies, pp. 21–23, 75, 88, 89.
12. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, para. 213; Asa Kasher, “A Moral Evaluation of
the Gaza War,” Jerusalem Post (7
February 2010).
13. Alan Dershowitz, The Case against the Goldstone Report: A study in evidentiary bias
(www.alandershowitz.com/goldstone.pdf),
pp. 7, 11, 21, 22; Robert L. Bernstein, “Human Rights in the Middle East,” UN Watch
(10 November 2010; http://tinyurl.com/325zoal);
Lawrence Wright, “Captives: A report on the Israeli attacks,” New Yorker
(9 November 2009), pp. 55, 59.
14. Anshel Pfeffer, “Israel Claims Success in the PR
War,” Jewish Chronicle (31 December 2008); Hirsh Goodman, “Analysis: The effective
public diplomacy ended with Operation Cast Lead,” Jerusalem Post (5
February 2009).
15. Cordesman, “Gaza
War,” pp. 31–32, 68.
16. Bradley Burston, “Why Does the World Media Love
to Hate Israel?,” Haaretz (23 March
2009); Shlomo Avineri, “What Was the Computer Thinking?,” Haaretz (18 March 2009). Heeding such counsel, Israel in its official
brief avoided mentioning Operation Cast Lead apart from a parenthetical
reference to “the ‘Gaza Operation,’ also known as ‘Operation Cast Lead’” (Operation in Gaza, para. 16).
17. Dominic Waghorn, “They Kept Us Out and Israeli Officials
Spun the War,” Independent (25
January 2009); Lisa Goldman, “Eyeless in Gaza,” Forward (16 January 2009).
18. Ethan Bronner, “Israel Puts Media Clamp on Gaza,”
New York Times (6 January 2009); Reporters Without Borders, Operation “Cast Lead”: News control as
military objective (February 2009).
19. Human Rights Watch, “Israel: End Ban on Human
Rights Monitors” (Jerusalem: 22 February 2009); Human Rights Watch, White Flag Deaths, p. 7.
20. State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, para. 288.
21. Barak Ravid, “Group that Exposed ‘IDF Crimes’ in
Gaza Slams Israel Bid to Choke OffIts Funds,” Haaretz (26 July 2009); Barak Ravid, “Israel Targets U.K. Funding
of Group that Exposed ‘IDF Crimes’ in Gaza,” Haaretz (29 July 2009); Barak Ravid, “Israel Asks Spain to Stop
Funding Group that Reported ‘IDF Crimes’ in Gaza,” Haaretz (2 August 2009).
22. Amos Harel, “Analysis: Can Israel Dismiss Its Own
Troops’ Stories from Gaza?,” Haaretz (19
March 2009).
23. Amira Hass, “Time to Believe Gaza War Crimes
Allegations,” Haaretz (24 March
2009).
24. Gideon Levy, “IDF Ceased Long Ago Being ‘Most
Moral Army in the World,’” Haaretz (22
March 2009).
25. Dershowitz, The
Case, p. 27.
26. Levy, “IDF Ceased.”
27. Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies, p. 5.
28. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI),
No Second Thoughts: The changes in the
Israeli Defense Forces’ combat doctrine in light of “Operation Cast Lead” (Jerusalem:
November 2009), p. 29.
29. Association for Civil Rights in Israel, The State of Human Rights in Israel and the
Occupied Territories: 2009 report (Jerusalem: December 2009), p. 52; see
also ibid., p. 50, “Israel
intentionally and deliberately bombed government buildings and civilian
institutions in Gaza.”
30. Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 1889–90.
31. Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies, pp. 16, 55, 56–57, 73, 86, 92, 93.
32. Harel, “Shooting and Crying.”
33. Ethan Bronner, “A Religious War in Israel’s
Army,” New York Times (22 March
2009).
34. Breaking the Silence, Soldiers’ Testimonies, pp.
18, 20, 46, 60, 85; cf. ibid., pp. 47
(“massive fire”), 48 (“fired like crazy”), 67 (“I never knew such firepower.
They were using every weapon I know”), 76 (“In general, everything that could fire,
did”).
35. See Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the misuse
of anti-Semitism and the abuse of history (Berkeley: 2005; expanded
paperback edition, 2008), pp. 316–19.
36. Anshel Pfeffer and Amos Harel, “IDF Ends Gaza
Probe, Says Misconduct Claims Are ‘Rumors,’” Haaretz (30 March 2009).
37. Anshel Pfeffer, “ Barak: Gaza probe shows IDF
among world’s most moral armies,” Haaretz
(23 April 2009); State of Israel, Operation
in Gaza, para. 284; Human Rights Watch, “Israeli Military Investigation Not
Credible” (23 April 2009); Amnesty International, “Israeli Army Probe Lacks
Credibility and Is No Substitute for Independent Investigation” (23 April
2009); Goldstone Mission Report,
paras. 1832, 1961.
38. Yaakov Katz, “Security and Defense: Waging war on
the legal front,” Jerusalem Post (18
September 2009). A “common Israeli solution” when accused of massive crimes,
Amira Hass observes, is to focus on and then trivialize a lesser crime in order
that “everything else can be denied.” Amira Hass, “The One Thing Worse Than
Denying the Gaza Report,” Haaretz (17
September 2009).
39. Human Rights Watch, “Israel: Soldiers’ Punishment
for Using Boy as ‘Human Shield’ Inadequate” (26 November 2010).
40. “U.K. Officer Slams ‘Pavlovian’ Criticism of IDF after
Gaza War,” Haaretz (22 February
2010).
41. Amnesty International, Fueling Conflict: Foreign arms supplies to Israel/Gaza (London: 23
February 2009).
42. Amnesty International, Broken Lives: A year of intifada (London: 2001); Human Rights
Watch, Razing Rafah: Mass home demolitions in the Gaza Strip (New
York: 2004).
43. Stephen Zunes, “ Obama and Israel’s Military:
Still arm-in-arm,” Foreign Policy in
Focus (4 March 2009).
44. Anti-Defamation League, “Amnesty International
Report on Gaza Conflict ‘Pernicious and Biased’” (23 February 2009).
Chapter five
1. Norman G. Finkelstein, The Rise and Fall of Palestine: A personal account of the intifada
years (Minneapolis, MN: 1996).
2. “Who’s Afraid of Finkelstein?,” Haaretz (27 May 2008).
3. Lawrence Wright, “Captives: A report on the
Israeli attacks,” New Yorker (9
November 2009), p. 52.
4. See Chapter 2.
Chapter six
1. “Israel’s Revealing Fury towards EU,” Financial Times (13 December 2009).
2. “Poll Shows Dip in American Voters’ Supporting
Israel,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency
(16 June 2009).
3. Andrew England and Vita Bekker, “Criticism of
Israel’s Conduct Mounts,” Financial Times
(10 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/8kyhoa).
4. The Reut Institute, Building a Political Firewall against Israel’s Delegitimization (Tel
Aviv: March 2010), para. 120 (pp. 62, 65).
5. I use the term Nazi
holocaust to denote the actual historical event, and The Holocaust to denote the ideological instrumentalization of that
event. See Norman G. Finkelstein, The
Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the exploitation of Jewish suffering
(New York: 2000; second expanded paperback edition, 2003), p. 3 and chapter 2.
6. See Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the misuse of anti-Semitism and the abuse of
history (Berkeley: 2005; expanded paperback edition, 2008), chapters 1–3.
7. George Gilder, The
Israel Test (Minneapolis, MN: 2009), pp. 4, 13, 15, 22, 32, 36, 41, 42, 92,
109, 136, 168–73, 239, 240. According to Gilder, the real tragedy of the Nazi
holocaust was that it deprived humanity of the “unique virtues and genius of
its victims ... , depleting the entire species of intellectual resources that
will be critical to survival on an ever-threatened planet. Ironically, the rest
of the world suffers far more than Jews from this loss of wealth-creating
entrepreneurs and inventors” (ibid.,
pp. 41, 234).
8. Robin Shepherd, A State Beyond the Pale: Europe’s problem with Israel (London:
2009), pp. 37, 47, 55–56, 68, 69, 70, 76, 80, 101, 104, 105, 116, 131–38, 156,
166, 212–14, 218–19, 222–25, 228–33, 237–38, 252. For a detailed critique of
Dershowitz’s book, see Finkelstein, Beyond
Chutzpah, part two.
9. The handful of dissenting voices emanated from the
marginal Left. See Isaac Deutscher, The
Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays (New York: 1968), pp. 126–52; Maxime
Rodinson, Israel: A settler-colonial
state? (New York: 1973; originally published in Les Temps Modernes in 1967); Noam Chomsky, Peace in the Middle East?: Reflections on justice and nationhood (New
York: 1974).
10. Peter Beaumont, “Israel Outraged as EU Poll Names
It a Threat to Peace,” Guardian (2
November 2003).
11. WorldPublicOpinion.Org Staff, World Public Opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict (1 July 2008).
12. BBC World Service Poll (6 February 2009). It
notes that “most polling occurred before Israel undertook its military
operation in Gaza.”
13. “Second Thoughts about the Promised Land,” Economist (11 January 2007).
14. Martin Hodgson, “British Jews Break Away from
‘Pro-Israeli’ Board of Deputies,” Independent
(5 February 2007); Ben Weinthal, “German Jews Feud over Criticizing Israel,” Forward (9 March 2007); Ben Cubby,
“Jewish Coalition Calls for Open Debate on Palestine,” Sydney Morning Herald (6 March 2007).
15. Gallup polls covering the period 1996–2005
(www.pollingreport.com/israel2.htm); Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Constrained Internationalism: Adapting to
new realities (2010), pp. 60, 71.
16. “America’s Place in the World 2005: Opinion
leaders turn cautious, public looks homeward,” Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press (17 November 2005), p. 97 (polls covering the period
1978–2005); Robert Ruby, “A Six-Day War: Its aftermath in American public
opinion” (30 May 2007; http://tinyurl.com/yz7jqha);
Jodie T. Allen and Alec Tyson, “The U.S. Public’s Pro-Israel History,” Pew Research Center Publications (19
July 2006); Gallup polls covering the period 1997– 2007 (www.pollingreport.com/israel.htm).
17. Gallup polls covering the period 1998–2003
(www.pollingreport.com/israel2.htm); “Opportunities for Bipartisan Consensus:
What both Republicans and Democrats want in U.S. foreign policy,” PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll (18 January
2005); Andrew Kohut, “American Views of the Mideast Conflict,” New York Times (14 May 2002); “Growing Majority
of Americans Oppose Israel Building Settlements” (29 April 2009; http://tinyurl.com/cfsgwo); Chicago
Council on Global Affairs, Constrained
Internationalism, pp. 56, 72.
18. USA Today/Gallup polls covering the period
2001–2006 (www.pollingreport.com/israel.htm);
The Harris Poll, May–August 2002, The Harris Poll, April–July 2002; Newsweek
Poll, 25–26 April 2002 (www.pollingreport.com/israel2.htm).
In fact nearly half of Israelis
believe that U.S. policy favors Israel too much (Allen and Tyson, “The U.S.
Public’s Pro-Israel History”).
19. WorldPublicOpinion.Org Staff, World Public Opinion.
20. “Poll: Americans support cutting aid to Israel,” Reuters (12 April 2002).
21. The Harris Poll, April–July 2002; ABC News.com
Poll, 3–7 April 2002 (www.pollingreport.com/israel2.htm).
22. “Israel’s Increased Isolation,” Issue #308 (Washington, D.C.: 19 January
2007; http://tinyurl.com/yeayesg). See
also Amiram Barkat, “Jewish Leaders Concerned by Trend to Delegitimize Israel,”
Haaretz (10 July 2007).
23. Anti-Defamation League, “American Attitudes
towards Israel, the Palestinians and Prospects for Peace in the Middle East: An
Anti-Defamation League survey” (19 October 2007).
24. ABC/Washington
Post Poll (3–6 August 2006); Los
Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll (28
July–1 August 2006); USA Today/Gallup Poll (21–23 July 2006; www.pollingreport.com/israel.htm);
“Zogby Poll: U.S. should be neutral in Lebanon war” (17 August 2006; http://tinyurl.com/y99y86z).
25. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Constrained Internationalism, pp. 18, 59, 71.
26. The Amman Call: Issued at WCC International Peace
Conference, “Churches Together for Peace and Justice in the Middle East” (18–20
June 2007; http://tinyurl.com/ya479wl);
Toya Richards Hill, “GA Overwhelmingly Approves Israel/Palestine Resolution”
(21 June 2006; http://tinyurl.com/ycmeh99);
“United Methodists Urged to Divest from 20 Companies Supporting in a Significant
Way Israel’s Occupation of Palestinian Land” (21 June 2007; http://tinyurl.com/ybusx68); “Seeking
a Just Peace in the Middle East, Synod Adopts Economic Leverage Resolution” (5
July 2005; http://tinyurl.com/yb4zj6p).
27. Steven M. Cohen, “Poll: Attachment of U.S. Jews
to Israel falls in past 2 years,” Forward
(4 March 2005).
28. American Jewish Committee, 2007 Annual Survey of American
Jewish Opinion (6 November–25 November 2007); Theodore Sasson et al., Still Connected: American Jewish attitudes about Israel (August 2010), p.
9; “Second Thoughts,” Economist
(“long run”). See also M. J. Rosenberg, “Another Kiss of Death,” Haaretz (25 April 2008). For criticism
of the Sasson study’s optimistic spin on the poll data, see Steven Cohen’s comments
in Gal Beckerman, “Survey Says Young Jews Do Care about Israel,” Forward (10 September 2010).
29. 2006 Annual
Survey of American Jewish Opinion, conducted for the American Jewish Committee
by Synovate (25 September–16 October 2006); Anthony Weiss, “Attachment to
Israel Declining among Young American Jews,” Forward (5 September 2007); “Study: US Jews distance themselves
from Israel,” Reuters (6 September
2007; http://tinyurl.com/2f9y2y). For
the actual 2007 study, see Steven M. Cohen and Ari Y. Kelman, Beyond Distancing: Young adult American Jews
and their alienation from Israel (Andrea and Charles Bronfman
Philanthropies: 2007). See also Michael Paulson, “Push on to Bolster Israel’s Image:
Calls for reaching out in new ways to young Jews,” Boston Globe (26 September 2008). The 2010 Brandeis University poll
found that about one quarter of Jews under 44 felt “very much” connected to Israel
(Sasson et al., Still Connected, p. 11).
30. Zeev Bielski, “Guaranteeing Our Future,” ynetnews.com (3 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/ygp9yxw).
31. CJP-Jewish Boston Connected, Israel Advocacy Strategic Planning Subcommittee Final Report
(February 2008), pp. 15–16; see also Abe Selig, “U.S. Professors: Support for
Israel eroded,” Jerusalem Post (29
June 2009).
32. Lily Galili, “Tiffs at the Family Table,” Haaretz (5 January 2002); see also The
Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, Annual
Assessment 2008 (Jerusalem: 2008), p. 35.
33. “America’s Place,” pp. 6, 11, 74.
34. Tony Judt, “Israel: The alternative,” New York Review of Books (23 October 2003).
35. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The
Israel Lobby,” London Review of Books
(23 March 2006).
36. Jimmy Carter, Palestine
Peace Not Apartheid (New York: 2006).
37. Mark Lilla and Richard Sennett, “The Case of Tony
Judt: An open letter to the ADL,” New
York Review of Books (16 November 2006), and “A Statement in Support of
Open and Free Discussion about U.S. and Israeli Foreign Policy and Against
Suppression of Speech,” Archipelago (n.d.;
http://tinyurl.com/yaguewd).
38. James Traub, “Does Abe Foxman Have an
Anti-Anti-Semite Problem?,” New York
Times (14 January 2007).
39. Ezra HaLevi, “Exclusive: Jimmy Carter interceded
on behalf of Nazi SS guard,” israelnationalnews.com
(18 January 2007).
40. Deborah Lipstadt, “ Jimmy Carter’s Jewish
Problem,” Washington Post (20 January
2007).
41. Philip Weiss, “ Jimmy Carter’s Book Stirs a
Critical Debate,” American Conservative
(26 February 2007); David Abel and James Vaznis, “ Carter Wins Applause at Brandeis,”
Boston Globe (24 January 2007). See also Hinda Mandell, “Brandeis Students at
Odds over Israel,” Boston Globe (8
May 2008), reporting the student senate’s vote to not congratulate Israel on
its sixtieth anniversary.
42. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 2007).
43. Orly Halpern, “ Foxman, Wiesel Upbraid Israel for
Pace of Peace Effort,” Forward (18
May 2007).
44. An Israeli foreign ministry assessment of eight
hours of coverage across international broadcast media reported that Israeli
representatives got 58 minutes of airtime while the Palestinians got only 19
minutes. Rachel Shabi, “Special Spin Body Gets Media on Message, Says Israel,” Guardian (2 January 2009).
45. Ben Quinn and Matthew Weaver, “Tens of Thousands
in London Protest Gaza Offensive,” Guardian
(3 January 2009); “Cities across the World Become Platform for Hundreds of
Thousands of Protesters against Gaza Fighting,” Daily Mail (11 January
2009; http://tinyurl.com/7tk754); “Tens
of Thousands Demonstrate for and against Israel,” Spiegel Online International (12 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/csk2zf).
46. “Jewish Canadians Concerned about Suppression of
Criticism of Israel,” straight.com
(16 March 2009; http://tinyurl.com/defpu9);
Deborah Summers, “George Galloway Banned from Canada,” Guardian (20 March 2009); Alexander Panetta, “Jewish Group Proud of
Role in Barring ‘Hater’ Galloway,” Canadian
Press (25 March 2009); Robert Fisk, “Galloway a Victim of Canada’s Baffling
Approach to Fighting Terror,” Independent
(1 April 2009); Rosie DiManno, “Canada’s Leaders Swoon over Israel,” Toronto Star (1 June 2009); David Moltz,
“Second Guessing a Conference,” Inside
Higher Ed (11 June 2009); Linda
McQuaig, “Harper’s Extremism is Showing,” Toronto
Star (3 November 2009); Gerald Kaplan, “Stephen Harper and the Jewish Question,”
Globe and Mail (11 December 2009); Les
Whittington, “Furor Grows over Anti-Semitism Charge,” Toronto Star (19 December 2009). Canada’s largest media empire,
CanWest Global Communications, is controlled by members of the Asper family,
who have historically been prominent “supporters” of Israel and mobilized their
empire on Israel’s behalf (see Peter C. Newman, Izzy: The passionate life and turbulent
times of Izzy Asper, Canada’s media mogul (Toronto: 2008), pp. 248–54; Marc
Edge, Asper Nation: Canada’s most dangerous
media company (Vancouver: 2007), pp. 131–51, 173–76, 188– 89, 199–204).
47. “Two-In-Five Canadians Criticize Israel’s
Military Actions in Gaza,” AngusReid Strategies
(22 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/c9egko); Adrian Morrow, “CUPE Union Votes
for Academic Boycott of Israel,” Toronto
Star (22 February 2009; http://tinyurl.com/bpnbk2).
48. Amnesty International, “Gaza: World’s Leading
Investigators Call for War Crimes Inquiry” (16 March 2009).
49. Yael Branovsky, “Report: Gaza war reverses drop
in anti-Semitism,” Haaretz (15
January 2009); “Europe Fears Spike in Anti-Semitism over Gaza,” ynetnews.com (7 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/dcd7oq).
50. Anti-Defamation League, “ADL Leader: Gaza war unleashed
‘pandemic of anti-Semitism’” (12 February 2009; http://tinyurl.com/c9vc9m).
51. Abraham H. Foxman, Never Again? The Threat of the New Anti-Semitism (San Francisco:
2003), p. 4.
52. Finkelstein, Beyond
Chutzpah, chapters 2–3.
53. Anti-Defamation League, “ADL Survey in Seven
European Countries Finds Anti-Semitic Attitudes Steady” (10 February 2009; http://tinyurl.com/blzx2w).
54. Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, Annual Assessment 2008, p. 40.
55. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Anti-Semitism: Summary overview of the
situation in the European Union
2001–2008 (February 2009). The quality of this publication can be gleaned
from the fact that the only authority it cites on anti-Semitism is the German professional
anti-anti-Semite Henryk Broder (p. 24), who wrote an unctuous preface for the
German edition of Alan Dershowitz’s The Case
for Israel.
56. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the
Increase in Europe (September 2008).
57. Finkelstein, Beyond
Chutzpah, pp. 81–85.
58. The Coordination Forum for Countering
Anti-Semitism, Anti-Semitism in the Wake
of Operation Cast Lead (January 2009).
59. Reut Institute, Building a Political Firewall, para. 39.
60. Ali Fathollah-Nejad, “German Media Censorship on
Gaza?,” Global Research (22 January
2009).
61. Assaf Uni, “Poll: Most Germans say country has no
special ties with Israel,” Haaretz (5
May 2008); “Most Germans Feel No Responsibility for Israel,” Spiegel Online International (5 May
2008; http://tinyurl.com/cuybho); “Germans Divided on Feelings towards Israel,
Poll Shows,” Deutsche Welle (14
January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/cdv73t); Benjamin Weinthal, “Poll: Israel is
‘aggressive,’ Germany has no obligation toward it,” Jerusalem Post (15 January 2009); “Global Views of United States
Improve While Other Countries Decline,” BBC
World Service Poll (18 April
2010).
62. Gideon Levy, “Has Anyone in Israel Asked Why the
Swedes Hate Us?,” Haaretz (14 March
2009).
63. International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business (April 2009), p. 20; “Nine Nations Agree
on Plan to Stem Arms Flow to Gaza,” Reuters
(14 March 2009).
64. “Letter by Prominent British Jews on Israel’s War
on Gaza,” Guardian (10 January 2009);
“South African Jews Condemn the Israeli Attack on Gaza,” sashrip.org (11 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/dxw9bu).
65. Antony Lerman, “Rise of the Moderates,” Guardian (6 February 2009).
66. Peter Beaumont, David Smith and Ben Quinn,
“Leading British Jews Call on Israel to Halt ‘Horror’ of Gaza,” Observer (11 January 2009).
67. For full text and video, see http://tinyurl.com/bh4k4s.
68. Jean-Moïse Braitberg, “Effacez le nom de mon
grand-père à Yad Vashem” (Open letter to the president of Israel), Le Monde
(29 January 2009).
69. Fathollah-Nejad, “German Media Censorship.”
70. Emily Mathieu, “Jewish Women Arrested in Toronto
Consulate Protest,” Toronto Star (8
January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/clkfk 7); Tom Godfrey, “Security Alert for
Jewish Community,” Toronto Sun (8
January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/d425u9).
71. Andrew West and Jonathan Pearlman, “Australian
Jews Protest against Israel’s Action,” Sydney
Morning Herald (6 January 2009).
72. Stephen Zunes, “Virtually the Entire
Dem-Controlled Congress Supports Israel’s War Crimes in Gaza,” Alternet (13 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/dy4rff).
73. Max Blumenthal, “Why Aren’t More Americans
Dancing to Israel’s Tune?,” maxblumenthal.com
(5 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/d45c7m).
74. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Why Israel Can’t Make Peace
with Hamas,” New York Times (14 January
2009).
75. See Chapter 2.
76. Rabbi Marvin Hier, “Gaza Residents Must Learn
That Charity Begins at Home,” New York
Daily News (1 February 2009).
77. Mouin Rabbani, “Human
Rights Watch Goes to War,” normanfinkelstein.com
(1 February 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yjte9pj).
78. “Americans Closely Divided over Israel’s Gaza Attacks,”
Rasmussen Reports (31 December 2008);
“Modest Backing for Israel in Gaza Crisis,” Pew
Research Center (13 January 2009).
79. “Exchange between Bill Moyers and Abraham Foxman
of the Anti-Defamation League,” pbs.org
(16 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/8bdu46); Alan Dershowitz, “The Moral
Blindness of Some ‘Religious Leaders,’” Jerusalem
Post blog (“Double Standard Watch”) (4 February 2009); Eric Alterman, “The
Defamation League,” The Nation (28
January 2009).
80. “Time Running Out for a Two-State Solution?,” 60 Minutes (25 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/avpjr8).
81. George E. Bisharat, “Israel is Committing War
Crimes,” Wall Street Journal (10
January 2009).
82. Roger Cohen, “The Dominion of the Dead,” New York Times (8 January 2009); Roger Cohen, “Middle East Reality Check,” New York Times (9 March 2009). Cohen
subsequently penned another series of equally iconoclastic columns, “From
Tehran to Tel Aviv,” “The Fierce Urgency of Peace,” and “Israel Cries Wolf” (23
March 2009, 26 March 2009, 9 April 2009). For the furious reaction to one of Cohen’s
columns, see Paul Harris, “Jewish Writer Raises a Storm in America with His
Report from a ‘Tolerant’ Iran,” Guardian
(29 March 2009).
83. Andrew Sullivan, “Aliens,” Atlantic blog (“The Daily Dish”) (4 January 2009); Andrew Sullivan,
“Proportionality and Terror,” Atlantic blog (“The Daily Dish”) (5 January
2009).
84. Philip Slater, “A Message to Israel: Time to stop
playing the victim role,” Huffington Post
(7 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/7tve6p).
85. City Council, Policy Order Resolution (12 January
2009; http://tinyurl.com/cy557y).
86. Raphael Ahren, “For First Time, U.S. Professors
Call for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel,” Haaretz (29 January 2009).
87. J Street
National Survey of American Jews (28 February–8 March 2009; http://tinyurl.com/d6hayn).
88. M. J. Rosenberg, “Post-Gaza Sea Change,” Israel Policy Forum (30 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/ak9urk); “D.C. Rally for
Israel Attracts 1,000,” Jewish Telegraphic
Agency (7 January 2009).
89. Eric Fingerhut, “Liberals Push Criticism of
Israel’s Gaza Strikes,” Jewish Telegraphic
Agency (30 December 2008); James D. Besser, “Fresh Rift Emerges over War
Response,” Jewish Week (7 January
2009); J Street, “Gaza: Ceasefire now!” (n.d.; http://tinyurl.com/d24zhe).
90. Gil Hoffman, “J Street Not Promoting Goldstone
Tour,” Jerusalem Post (19 November
2009). J Street’s “statement of principles” calls for “creation of a viable
Palestinian state as part of a negotiated twostate solution, based on the 1967
borders with agreed reciprocal land swaps”—a formula that, depending on the
details, could point to a just settlement based on the international consensus
or to a Palestinian Bantustan dominated by Israel. On the genesis of J Street,
see Gershom Gorenberg, “A Liberal Israel Lobby,” American Prospect (April 2008), “New ‘Pro Israel, Pro Peace’
Political Group Launches: J Street hopes to prod Washington MidEast policy
towards center,” motherjones.com (15 April
2008; http://tinyurl.com/3vb2mr), Shmuel Rosner, “New Jewish-American Lobby
Wants to Provide an Alternative to AIPAC,” Haaretz
(16 April 2008), Gary Kamiya, “Taking Back the Debate Over Israel,” Salon.com (29 April 2008), James Traub,
“The New Israel Lobby,” New York Times
Magazine (9 September 2009).
91. American Jews for a Just Peace, “Open Letter to
Israeli Soldiers from Jews around the World” (4 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/7lcrdw);
http://jewssayno.wordpress.com; www.nyc.indymedia.org/or/2009/01/103022.html.
92. Michael Walzer, “On Proportionality,” New Republic (8 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/93azy7).
93. Alan M. Dershowitz, “Hamas’ Dead Baby Strategy,” Washington Times (16 January 2009); Alan
M. Dershowitz, “Israel’s Policy Is Perfectly ‘Proportionate,’” Wall Street Journal (2 January 2009).
94. Martin Peretz, “The Truth about Gaza,” New Republic blog (“The Spine”) (1
January 2009).
95. Michelle Sieff, “Gaza and After: An interview
with Paul Berman,” Z Word (March
2009; http://tinyurl.com/cz3ght); Philip Weiss, “ Paul Berman Says Gaza Assault
May Have Been Necessary to Avert ‘Genocide,’” Mondoweiss (26 February 2009; http://tinyurl.com/cjln6b).
96. Philip Weiss, “New Yorker’s Silence Is Further Evidence That Establishment Opinion
Is Paralyzed by Gaza,” Mondoweiss (6
January 2009). Shortly after the invasion ended, the New York Review ran a short piece by Roger Cohen,
“Eyeless in Gaza,” and then a letters exchange between Cohen and David A.
Harris of the American Jewish Committee (12 February 2009, 26 March 2009).
97. Jeet Heer, “Israel Struggles with Youth Wing of
the Diaspora,” National Post (9
January 2009).
98. Martin Peretz, “The ‘Juicebox Mafia’ on Gaza,” New Republic
blog (“The Spine”) (29 December 2008).
99. Ezra Klein, “Israel, Wrong” (28 December 2008; http://tinyurl.com/77de9e).
100. Adam Horowitz, “Benny Morris Leaves Out the
Hallmarks of Zionism: Expansionism and militarism” (30 December 2008; http://tinyurl.com/d5ec8b);
see also his “Jews are Soul-Searching About Madoff— What About Gaza?,” Huffington Post (31 December 2008; http://tinyurl.com/8qzjg9).
101. Matthew Yglesias, “Why They Fight” (1 January
2009; http://tinyurl.com/dz9c38).
102. Dana Goldstein, “The Idea of Israel,” danagoldstein.typepad.com (7 January 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/cdgb92).
103. Glenn Greenwald, “Both Parties Cheerlead Still
More Loudly for Israel’s War” (8 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/7a2ky8);
Glenn Greenwald, “Increasing Evenhandedness in the Middle East” (30 January
2009; http://tinyurl.com/cljyjn); Glenn Greenwald, “ Jeffrey Goldberg’s
Gasping, Dying Smear Tactics” (20 February 2009; http://tinyurl.com/bpljck).
104. The lobby prevailed, but, having exposed its
crude and defamatory tactics, the victory might have been Pyrrhic. See Robert
Dreyfuss, “Is the Israel Lobby Running Scared?,” Huffington Post (16 March 2009; http://tinyurl.com/dd74do); Philip
Weiss, “The Israel Lobby Gets Its Man—And Tips Its Hand,” American Conservative (23 March 2009); John Mearsheimer, “The Lobby
Falters,” London Review of Books (26 March
2009); Nathan Guttman, “The Pro-Israel Lobby—‘Alive, Well, and Bipartisan?,’” Haaretz (25 March 2009).
105. Jon Stewart, “Strip Maul,” Daily Show (5 January 2009; transcript at http://tinyurl.com/dghj4q).
106. Elizabeth Redden, “On Israel, Shifted Ground,” Inside Higher Ed (6 March 2009; http://tinyurl.com/ag8t8r). Samuel
Freedman, “In the Diaspora: Suspended agitation,” Jerusalem Post (19 March
2009).
107. Mitchell Bard and Gil Troy, “Delegitimization of
Israel: ‘Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions’” (December 2009; http://tinyurl.com/2fozsz3).
108. Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, Annual Assessment 2008, p. 13.
109. Anna Baltzer, Witness in Palestine: A Jewish American
woman in the Occupied Territories (Boulder, CO: 2007). Her web site is www.AnnaInTheMiddleEast.com.
Chapter seven
1. “Speech at Prayer Meeting” (14 April 1947), in The Collected
Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Ahmedabad), v. 87, p. 281.
2. Report of
the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (25 September
2009), paras. 1, 151. Hereafter: Goldstone Mission Report.
3. Ibid., paras. 144, 162; Bill
Moyers, Journal (23 October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yllft94). For the
extended correspondence between Goldstone and the Government of Israel, see
Goldstone Mission Report, Annex II,
pp. 434–50; see also Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site, “The
Goldstone Mission—FAQ” (http://tinyurl.com/yjvunox).
4. For a critical but ultimately positive assessment
of the Report by “recognized experts”
in the relevant bodies of international law, see Report of an Expert Meeting which Assessed Procedural Criticisms Made
of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (The Goldstone
Report) (London: 27 November 2009). The experts concluded that the Goldstone Report “was very far from being
invalidated by the criticisms [directed at it]. The Report raised extremely serious issues which had to be addressed.
It contained compelling evidence on some incidents.”
5. Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 63, 1213–14.
6. Ibid., paras.
1215, 1892.
7. Ibid.,
paras. 1208, 1884.
8. Ibid.,
para. 1893.
9. Ibid.,
para. 1898. Goldstone afterwards recalled that although initially fearful of
traveling to Gaza—“I had nightmares about being kidnapped. You know, it was
very difficult, especially for a Jew, to go into an area controlled by
Hamas”—he was “struck by the warmth of the people that we met and who we dealt
with in Gaza” (Moyers, Journal).
10. Goldstone Mission Report, paras. 46, 50, 60, 937, 961, 987, 1006, 1171– 75, 1935.
11. Ibid.,
paras. 75, 1334–35, 1936. The fact finding committee chaired by Goldstone’s
distinguished South African colleague John Dugard went somewhat further. It
concluded that during Israel’s “heinous and inhuman” attack it was culpable for
war crimes such as “indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians,”
“killing, wounding and terrorizing civilians,” “wanton destruction of
property,” and the bombing and shelling of hospitals and ambulances and
obstructing the evacuation of the wounded. It further found that Israel was
guilty of crimes against humanity including the intentional and “reckless” killing
of civilians, “mass killings—‘extermination’—in certain cases,” and
“persecution.” It did not however hold Israel culpable for the crime of
genocide: “the main reason for the operation was not to destroy a group, as
required for the crime of genocide, but to engage in a vicious exercise of
collective punishment designed either to compel the population to reject Hamas
as the governing authority of Gaza or to subdue the population into a state of
submission.” Still, it found that “individual soldiers may well have had such
an intent and might therefore be prosecuted for this crime.” Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Committee
on Gaza: No safe place. Presented to the League of Arab States (30 April
2009), paras. 20, 22–23, 25–30 of Executive Summary; paras. 405, 485–91,
496–98, 500–4, 506–10, 519–20, 526–29, 540–47, 554–58, 572–73. Hereafter: Dugard Committee Report.
12. Goldstone Mission Report, para. 1895.
13. Ibid.,
paras. 108, 1691, 1953. The Dugard Committee held Hamas and other militant
Palestinian groups culpable for war crimes such as “indiscriminate and
disproportionate attacks on civilians” and “killing, wounding and terrorizing
civilians,” although it entered the caveat that “there are a number of factors
that reduce their moral blameworthiness but not their criminal responsibility,”
among them, “Palestinians have been denied their right to self-determination by
Israel and have long been subjected to a cruel siege by Israel,” “the scale of
Israel’s action,” and “the great difference in both the weapons capability of
the opposing sides and the use of their respective weaponry” (Dugard Committee Report, paras. 21, 24, 35 of Executive
Summary; paras. 457, 484, 495, 499, 575–77).
14. Dinah PoKempner, general counsel of Human Rights
Watch, noted that it was “hardly surprising” that the space devoted to Hamas
was “fairly brief because there is little factual dispute about whether the Gaza
authorities tolerated firing of rockets onto Israel’s civilian areas, and no
legal ambiguity to discuss” (“Valuing the Goldstone Report,” Global Governance 16 (2010), p. 153).
15. Moyers, Journal.
16. “Hungry Like the Wolfowitz,” Georgetown Voice (6 November 2003).
17. “What Women Should Do in a Difficult Situation”
(4 September 1932), in Collected Works of
Mahatma Gandhi, v. 51, pp. 18–19, “Discussion with Mahadev Desai” (4
September 1932), in ibid., v. 51, pp.
24–25, “Discussion with B. G. Kher and Others” (15 August 1940), in ibid., v. 72, p. 388, “Discussion with
Bharatanand” (2 September 1940), in ibid.,
v. 72, p. 434, “Message to States’ People” (1 October 1941), in ibid., v. 74, p. 368, “Speech at Prayer
Meeting” (5 November 1947), in ibid.,
v. 89, p. 481.
18. “Speech at Goalundo” (6 November 1946), in ibid., v. 86, p. 86.
19. See Chapter 2.
20. “Israel has bureaucratically and logistically effectively
split and separated not only Palestinians in the occupied territories and their
families in Israel, but also Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and those in the
rest of the territory and between Gazans and West Bankers/Jerusalemites” (Goldstone
Mission Report, para. 205).
21. The Report makes passing mention in this context
of “the right of return for refugees” (ibid.,
paras. 92, 1509).
22. Ibid.,
paras. 206–7.
23. “In the opinion of the Mission, a line has been
crossed, what is fallaciously considered acceptable ‘wartime behavior’ has
become the norm. Public support for a more hard-line attitude towards
Palestinians generally, lack of public censure and lack of accountability all combine
to increase the already critical level of violence against the protected
population” (ibid., para. 1440).
24. “The Mission notes the very high number of Palestinians
who have been detained since the beginning of the occupation (amounting to 40
percent of the adult male population ...) according to a practice that appears
to aim at exercising control, humiliating, instilling fear, deterring political
activity and serving political interests” (ibid.,
para. 1503).
25. “The Mission is ... concerned by the reports of
coercion and torture during interrogations, trials based on coerced confessions
or secret evidence, and the reportedly systematic and institutionalized
illtreatment in prisons. The Mission is particularly alarmed at the arrest and
detention of hundreds of young children, and the rise in child detention during
and following the Israeli military operations in Gaza. The ill-treatment of
children and adults described to the Mission is disturbing in its seemingly
deliberate cruelty” (ibid., paras.
1504–5).
26. Ibid., paras. 1535–37. The Mission explicitly
stated that it “considers East Jerusalem part of the Occupied Palestinian
Territories” (ibid., p. 369n1062).
27. Ibid.,
para. 1546.
28. “The extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, including land confiscation and house demolitions in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly, amounts to a grave breach ... of the Fourth Geneva Convention” (ibid., para. 1946).
29. “Insofar as movement and access restrictions, the
settlements and their infrastructure, demographic policies vis-à-vis Jerusalem
and ‘Area C’ of the West Bank, as well as the separation of Gaza from the West
Bank, prevent a viable, contiguous and sovereign Palestinian State from
arising, they are in violation of the jus cogens right to selfdetermination” (ibid., para. 1947).
30. Ibid.,
para. 1876.
31. Ibid., paras.
127, 1857, 1975.
32. Ibid.,
para. 1969.
33. Ibid.,
paras. 128, 1873, 1971(b).
34. Ibid.,
paras. 1971–74. The Report explicitly called on Israel to “release Palestinians
who are detained in Israeli prisons in connection with the occupation.”
35. Amira Hass, “The One Thing Worse Than Denying the
Gaza Report,” Haaretz (17 September
2009), Gideon Levy, “Disgrace in the Hague,” Haaretz (17 September 2009), Gideon Levy, “ Goldstone’s Gaza Probe Did
Israel a Favor,” Haaretz (1 October
2009), Yitzhak Laor, “The National Choir,” Haaretz
(22 September 2009), Yitzhak Laor, “Turning Off the Lights,” Haaretz (7 October 2009), Zeev
Sternhell, “A Permanent Moral Stain,” Haaretz
(25 September 2009), Larry Derfner, “A Wake-up Call from Judge Goldstone,” Jerusalem Post (16 September 2009),
Larry Derfner, “Our Exclusive Right to Self-Defense,” Jerusalem Post (7 October 2009), Larry Derfner, “Some Victims We
Are,” Jerusalem Post (28 October
2009). Both the head of the dovish Meretz party and Haaretz editorials called
on the Israeli government to set up a commission of inquiry. Gil Hoffman and
Haviv Rettig Gur, “Oron Calls for Israeli Cast Lead Probe,” Jerusalem Post (18 September 2009), “A Committee
of Inquiry is Needed,” Haaretz (18
September 2009), “Only an External Probe Will Do,” Haaretz (3 October 2009), “Israel’s Whitewash,” Haaretz (28 January 2010).
36. “Statement by President Shimon Peres: ‘ Goldstone
Mission Report is a mockery of history,’” mfa.gov.il
(16 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/y9yxzpa); Shuki Sadeh, “ Peres:
Goldstone is a small man out to hurt Israel,” Haaretz (12 November 2009).
37. Barak Ravid and Natasha Mozgovaya, “Netanyahu
Calls U.N. Gaza Probe a ‘Kangaroo Court’ Against Israel,” Haaretz (16 September 2009).
38. “Rights Council to Debate Gaza War,” Aljazeera.net (15 October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/ykfjth3);
Barak Ravid, “Israel Slams Goldstone ‘Misrepresentations’ of Internal Probes
into Gaza War,” Haaretz (7 February
2010).
39. Barak Ravid, “Israel Prepares to Fight War Crimes
Trials after Goldstone Gaza Report,” Haaretz
(20 October 2009); Barak Ravid, “Israel to Set Up Team to Review Gaza War
Probe,” Haaretz (26 October 2009).
Zeev Sternhell, “With a Conscience That Is Always Clear,” Haaretz (30 October 2009). Reacting to Netanyahu’s proposal Goldstone
observed that “It seems to me to contain an implicit acceptance that they broke
the law that now is, and that’s why it needs to be changed” (Moyers, Journal).
40. Rebecca Anna Stoil and Tovah Lazaroff, “EU to
Debate Goldstone Report,” Jerusalem Post
(24 February 2010).
41. “ Dershowitz: Goldstone is a traitor,” Jerusalem Post (31 January 2010).
42. Hoffman and Gur, “Oron Calls”; Donald Macintyre,
“Israelis Hit Back at U.N. Report Alleging War Crimes in Gaza,” Independent (17 September 2009); Ravid
and Mozgovaya, “Netanyahu Calls.”
43. Shalhevet Zohar, “ Peres: Goldstone report mocks
history,” Jerusalem Post (16
September 2009); Dore Gold, “The Dangerous Bias of the United Nations Goldstone
Report,” U.S. News & World Report (24 March 2010).
44. Michael Oren, “U.N. Report a Victory for Terror,”
Boston Globe (24 September 2009); Michael Oren, “Address to AJC” (28 April
2010; http://tinyurl.com/37xngbo); Michael B. Oren, “Deep Denial: Why the
Holocaust still matters,” New Republic
(6 October 2009). For critical analysis of Oren’s scholarship, see Norman G.
Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the
Israel-Palestine Conflict (New York: 1995; expanded second paperback
edition, 2003), pp. 184-98.
45. Gideon Levy, “Israel’s Attacks Will Lead to Its
Isolation,” Haaretz (22 October
2009).
46. “We’ll Defend Ourselves by Any Means,” Jerusalem Post (21 September 2009);
Yaakov Katz, “Security and Defense: Waging war on the legal front,” Jerusalem Post (18 September 2009); Amos
Harel, “IDF: UN Gaza report biased, radical and groundless,” Haaretz (20 September 2009).
47. “Goldstoned,” Jerusalem
Post (16 September 2009); “The ‘Goldstoning’ of Israel,” Jerusalem Post (2 February 2010); David
Landau, “The Gaza Report’s Wasted Opportunity,” New York Times (20
September 2009).
48. Israel Harel, “Venom and Destruction,” Haaretz (18 September 2009); Israel
Harel, “Don’t Establish an Investigative Panel,” Haaretz (1 October 2009); Jack Khoury, “ Goldstone Tells Obama:
Show me flaws in Gaza report,” Haaretz
(22 October 2009).
49. Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of
Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Antisemitism
Worldwide 2009 (2010; www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/), pp. 29, 37, 39.
50. Gerald Steinberg, “From Dreyfus to Goldstone,” Canadian Jewish News (19 November 2009).
51. “Israel’s Jewish Public: Goldstone report biased
against IDF,” ynetnews.com (18
October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yh36quh).
52. Asher Arian et al., Auditing Israeli Democracy: Democratic values in practice (Jerusalem:
2010), pp. 88, 133, 173.
53. Yehezkel Dror, “Why Israel Should Have Cooperated
with Goldstone on Gaza,” Haaretz (21
September 2009).
54. Uri Avnery, “UM-Shmum, UM-Boom,” Gush Shalom (19 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/m32fwl).
Maya Sela, “Amos Oz: Hamas responsible for outbreak of Gaza violence,” Haaretz (30 December 2008); David
Grossman, “Is Israel Too Imprisoned in the Familiar Ceremony of War?,” Haaretz (30 December 2008).
55. Max Boot, “The Goldstone Report,” Commentary blog (“Contentions”) (16
September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yadfro6); John Bolton, “Israel, the U.S. and
the Goldstone Report,” Wall Street
Journal (20 October 2009).
56. “ Wiesel: If Ahmadinejad were assassinated, I
wouldn’t shed a tear,” Haaretz (9
February 2010), “I Wouldn’t Cry If He Was Killed,” Jerusalem Post (9 February 2010).
57. Alan M. Dershowitz, “ Goldstone Investigation
Undercuts Human Rights,” Jerusalem Post
blog (“Double Standard Watch”) (17 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/m27byk);
Alan Dershowitz, “Goldstone Criticizes UN Council on Human Rights,” Huffington Post (22 October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yjqmx4s);
Alan M. Dershowitz, “ Goldstone Backs Away from Report: The two faces of an
international poseur,” Jerusalem Post
blog (“Double Standard Watch”) (15 October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yhqec6o); “
Dershowitz: Goldstone is a traitor,” Jerusalem
Post; Josh Nathan-Kazis, “Dershowitz
Explains Critical Goldstone Remark,” Forward
(3 February 2010); Tehiya Barak, “Judge Goldstone’s Dark Past,” ynetnews.com (6 May 2010; http://tinyurl.com/27h4nde).
58. Alan Dershowitz, The Case against the Goldstone Report: A study in evidentiary bias
(www.alandershowitz.com/goldstone.pdf).
59. Bernard-Henri Lévy, “It’s Time to Stop Demonizing
Israel,” Haaretz (8 June 2010);
Joshua Muravchik, “ Goldstone: An exegesis,” World Affairs (May/June 2010). Muravchik also made the astonishing
claim that Goldstone never asked witnesses to Israeli attacks “whether a Palestinian
gunman was nearby.” In fact every account of an Israeli attack in the Goldstone
Report includes testimony bearing on
the presence of Palestinian fighters in the vicinity. See also Jeffrey Goldberg,
“J Street, Down the Rabbit Hole,” Atlantic
blog (30 September 2010), falsely alleging that “ Goldstone’s work [was]
heavily reliant on Hamas for uncorroborated information.”
60. Moyers, Journal.
61. Eric Fingerhut, “AIPAC Condemns Goldstone
Report,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency
(17 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/y8rkgwo).
62. American Jewish Committee, “Letter to Secretary
Clinton Urges Condemnation of Goldstone Report” (23 September 2009; http://tinyurl
.com/ya4bqqz).
63. “Rice: ‘Serious concerns’ about the Goldstone
Report,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency
(17 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yakxdlv).
64. Nathan Guttman, “Israel, U.S. Working to Limit
Damage of Goldstone Report,” Haaretz
(27 September 2009).
65. Laura Rozen, “State on Goldstone Report: ‘Deeply
concerned,’” Politico (18 September
2009; http://tinyurl.com/kj4tz5); Barak Ravid and Shlomo Shamir, “PA Pushing
for UN to Act on Goldstone ‘War Crime’ Findings,” Haaretz (1 October 2009); Shlomo Shamir, “U.N. Human Rights Chief
Endorses Goldstone Gaza Report,” Haaretz
(23 October 2009).
66. U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report (http://tinyurl. com/yhddnjt).
67. House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South
Asia, “Ackerman Blasts Goldstone Report as ‘Pompous, Tendentious, One-sided
Political Diatribe’” (16 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yhs9ckd).
68. Khoury, “ Goldstone Tells Obama”; “Goldstone
Dares US on Gaza Report,” Aljazeera.net
(22 October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yg6zafm); Human Rights Watch, “U.N.: U.S.,
E.U. Undermine Justice for Gaza Conflict” (1 October 2009).
69. “H. RES. 867, 111th Congress” (23 October 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/yhu3c7e); Natasha Mozgovaya and Barak Ravid, “U.S. House
Backs resolution to Condemn Goldstone Gaza Report,” Haaretz (5 November 2009); Nima Shirazi, “ Goldstonewalled! U.S.
Congress endorses Israeli war crimes,” MRzine
(12 November 2009; http://tinyurl.com/y8kenjd).
70. “ Goldstone Sends Letter to Berman, Ros-Lehtinen
Correcting Factual Errors in HR 867, Which Opposes UN Fact Finding Report on
Gaza,” uruknet.info (29 October 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/y8kvt5m). After Goldstone submitted his rebuttal, one of the
resolution’s sponsors entered some cosmetic revisions in it. Spencer Ackerman,
“Berman Puts New Language into Anti-Goldstone Resolution,”
washingtonindependent.com (3 November 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yaonaa6). J Street called for a “better, balanced resolution” than the
House draft , but one that still would “urge the United States to make clear
that it will use its veto to prevent any referral of this matter to the
International Criminal Court.” “J Street Position on H.Res. 867” (30
October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yd8u4za).
71. An administration official initially stated in
private that the U.S. would block U.N. action on the report, but the White
House subsequently repudiated the statement. “U.S. Pledges to Quash Goldstone
Recommendations,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency (22 September 2009); “White House:
Official ‘misspoke’ on Goldstone report,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency (23 September 2009); Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff,
“Israel Demands PA Drop War Crimes Suit at The Hague,” Haaretz (27 September 2009).
72. Howard Schneider and Colum Mynch, “U.N. Panel
Defers Vote on Gaza Report,” Washington
Post (3 October 2009), Amira Hass, “PA Move to Thwart Goldstone Gaza Report
Shocks Palestinian Public,” Haaretz
(4 October 2009).
73. “The Human Rights Situation in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem” (A/HRC/RES/S-12/1) (16 October
2009). It was gleefully reported by many of Goldstone’s critics that he
disapproved of the resolution. The allegation was a half truth and a whole lie:
Goldstone disapproved of the first draft version but it was modified after he
expressed reservations and he approved of the final version that was voted on (Moyers,
Journal).
74. United Nations General Assembly, “Follow-up to
the Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict”
(A/64/L. 11) (2 November 2009). Shlomo Shamir, “U.N. General Assembly Adopts Goldstone
Report,” Haaretz (6 November 2009).
75. Shlomo Shamir, “Israel: U.N. ‘detached from
reality’ for adopting Goldstone report,” Haaretz
(6 November 2009); “FM: UNGA vote shows Israel has moral majority,” Jerusalem Post (6 November 2009).
76. United Nations General Assembly, Follow-up to the Report of the United Nations
Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General
(A/64/651; 4 February 2010).
77. United Nations General Assembly, “Follow-up to
the Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict
(II)” (A/64/L.48; 23 February 2010). The low vote count was probably due to a
snowstorm that day.
78. “European Parliament Resolution of 10 March 2010
on Implementation of the Goldstone Recommendations on Israel/Palestine”
(P7_TAPROV(2010)0054); Leigh Phillips, “Despite Heavy Lobbying, EU Parliament Endorses
Goldstone Report,” euobserver.com (10
March 2010; http://euobserver.com/9/29650); “EU Parliament Backs Goldstone Report,”
Jerusalem Post (10 March 2010).
79. State of Israel, Gaza Operation Investigations: An update (January 2010); State of
Israel, Gaza Operation Investigations:
Second update (July 2010). To boost the credibility of Israeli
investigations, the January 2010 “update” noted that during the second intifada
“there were 1,467 criminal investigations into alleged misconduct by IDF
soldiers, leading to 140 indictments against soldiers for alleged crimes committed
against the Palestinian population. Of these indictments, as of December 2008,
103 defendants were convicted and ten cases are still pending” (para. 68). It
omitted mention, however, that although thousands of Palestinian civilians not
involved in combat were killed during the second intifada, only five Israeli
soldiers were held criminally liable for only four of these civilian deaths and
not a single Israeli soldier was convicted on a murder or manslaughter charge
for the death of a Palestinian civilian; they were all convicted for “offenses
of negligence.” Yesh Din, Exceptions:
Prosecution of IDF soldiers during and after the second intifada (Tel Aviv:
September 2008), pp. 19-20. A complementary study looked at the prosecution of
Israeli settlers for criminal activity against Palestinians. It found that “at
least 522 separate incidents of violence by Israeli settlers against
Palestinians were reported in 2005.” In two of these incidents, five
Palestinians were killed, and in 89 of them one or more Palestinians were
injured. Nonetheless, more than 90 percent of all the files, and 79 percent of
the assault files, in which the investigation was completed were “closed
without indictments being submitted.” Yesh Din, A Semblance of Law: Law enforcement upon Israeli civilians in the West
Bank (Tel Aviv: June 2006), pp. 6, 26, 91-93. Another study found that in
the decade following the outbreak of the first intifada (1987-1997) 1,318
Palestinians were killed, yet only 19 Israeli soldiers were convicted of
homicide, and that for the period 2006-9 “a soldier who kills a Palestinian not
taking part in hostilities is almost never brought to justice for his act.”
B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories), Void of Responsibility:
Israel military policy not to investigate killings of Palestinians by soldiers (Jerusalem:
September 2010), pp. 7-8, 53.
80. Gaza
Operation Investigations: An update, paras. 100, 108, 137; Gaza Operation Investigations: Second update,
paras. 10, 11, 37, 46, 60, 73, 74, 94, 102.
81. Amos Harel, “MESS Report: Gaza war probes are
changing Israel’s defiant ways,” Haaretz
(22 July 2010).
82. Gaza
Operation Investigations: Second update, para. 105.
83. Ibid.,
paras. 150-56.
84. After the initial update Haaretz editorialized that the Israeli investigations were “not
persuasive that enough has been done to reach the truth,” but in a subsequent
editorial Haaretz validated the
second round of investigations and implied that it was time to close the book on
the Goldstone Report. “Israel Is
Being Evasive Again,” Haaretz (1
February 2010); “Thanks to the Critics,” Haaretz
(27 July 2010). Both Amnesty and Human Rights Watch wholly dismissed the first round
of investigations, while HRW stated after the second update that although “some
results” had been achieved the Israeli investigations still “fall far short of
addressing the widespread and serious allegations of unlawful conduct during
the fighting.” Amnesty International, “Latest Israeli Response to Gaza
Investigations Totally Inadequate” (2 February 2010); Human Rights Watch, “Military Investigations Fail Gaza War Victims”
(7 February 2010); Human Rights Watch, “Wartime Inquiries Fall Short” (10
August 2010).
85. UN News Service, “UN Rights Chief Unveils Members
of Independent Probe into Gaza Conflict” (14 June 2010).
86. Report of
the Committee of Independent Experts in International Humanitarian and Human
Rights Laws to Monitor and Assess Any Domestic, Legal or Other Proceedings
Undertaken by Both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Side, in the
Light of General Assembly Resolution 64/254, Including the Independence, Effectiveness,
Genuineness of These Investigations and Their Conformity with International
Standards (21 September 2010). The Israel lobby defamed the eminent German jurist
who chaired the committee, eventually forcing his resignation. Benjamin
Weinthal and Jonny Paul, “ Dershowitz: Goldstone followup commission head a
‘bigot,’” Jerusalem Post (2 November
2010); Benjamin Weinthal, “Tomuschat, Head of Goldstone Follow-up Committee, Resigns,”
Jerusalem Post (3 December 2010).
87. Report of
the Committee, paras. 42, 55.
88. Ibid.,
para. 101.
89. Ibid.,
paras. 40, 83. The committee reported that Israel convicted one soldier for the
crime of looting, while a Hamas submission gave “examples of criminal
proceedings ... , including a case where a number of defendants were convicted
and imprisoned.”
90. Amnesty International, “Time for International
Justice Solution for Gaza Conflict Victims” (23 September 2010).
91. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat from the Gaza
Strip: The main findings of the Goldstone Report versus the factual findings
(March 2010).
92. Ibid.,
p. 69.
93. Ibid.,
pp. IV, 8, 73, 80. Whereas a prior publication of the Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center had reported that Hamas was “careful to maintain
the ceasefire,” and sought to “enforce the terms of the arrangement on the
other terrorist organizations” (see Chapter 2), in this document it is alleged
that the ceasefire was “systematically and repeatedly violated by Hamas,” and
Hamas “made no effective effort to impose the lull” on the other “terrorist
organizations.” Still, its own graphs showed that just one rocket and one
mortar were fired at Israel in October 2008 and it did concede that “the first five
months of the lull were relatively quiet” (ibid.,
pp. 74, 79).
94. Ibid.,
p. IV.
95. Ibid.,
pp. 3, 35 (cf. Goldstone Mission Report,
paras. 1345-72).
96. Ibid.,
pp. 95, 97 (cf. Goldstone Mission Report,
paras. 1604-6, 1610-36, 1647-74, 1682-91; the Report stated that “the impact on [Israeli] communities is greater
than the numbers of fatalities and injuries actually sustained” (para. 1647)).
97. Ibid.,
pp. VIII, 57 (cf. Goldstone Mission Report,
paras. 1687-91). The document faulted the Goldstone Report for referring to “Palestinian armed groups” instead of
explicitly implicating Hamas, but the Report reciprocally referred to “Israeli
armed forces.”
98. Ibid.,
p. 120 (cf. Goldstone Mission Report,
paras. 475-98).
99. Ibid.,
pp. 315, 321-22 (cf. Goldstone Mission Report,
paras. 352-63). The document also indulged the baseless speculation that
Palestinian families seeking “financial compensation” might have reported
deaths from “natural causes” as invasion-related (ibid., p. 322).
100. Ibid.,
p. 318 (cf. Goldstone Mission Report,
para. 144: whereas Israel refused to cooperate with the Goldstone Mission,
“senior members of the Gaza authorities ... extended their full cooperation and
support to the Mission”).
101. Ibid.,
p. 196.
102. Hoffman and Gur, “Oron Calls”; Eitan Haber, “In
Wake of Goldstone Report, Israel Must Launch Battle for Its Image,” ynetnews.com (17 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/y85me4a).
103. Richard Falk, “The Goldstone Report: Ordinary
text, extraordinary event,” Global
Governance 16 (2010), p. 173. A member of the Goldstone Mission noted “some
300” human rights investigations on the Gaza attack, which were “remarkable in
the unanimity of their findings against the IDF actions” (Desmond Travers,
“Operation Cast Lead: Legal and doctrinal asymmetries in a military operation,”
Irish Defense Forces, Cosantoir Review
(2010), p. 10). Some critics alleged that the Goldstone Report was more
“vicious” than the human rights reports that preceded it (see Ethan Bronner,
“Israel Poised to Challenge a U.N. Report on Gaza,” New York Times (23 January 2010)), but the contention lacked
credibility. In fact the Goldstone Report
was in crucial respects the most cautious and conservative of the human rights
reports on Gaza: whereas HRW explicitly denoted Israel’s use of white
phosphorus in civilian areas a “war crime,” the Goldstone Report did not; whereas the Dugard Committee Report concluded that “individual soldiers” might have been guilty
of genocide, the Goldstone Report did
not; and whereas Amnesty recommended a comprehensive arms embargo on Israel
(and Hamas), the Goldstone Report did
not.
104. Moyers, Journal;
“Will Goldstone’s Gaza Report Prove Him Just a Naive Idealist?,” Haaretz (23 September 2009); “‘My Father
is a Zionist, Loves Israel,’” Jerusalem
Post (16 September 2009); “Goldstone’s Daughter: My father’s participation
softened U.N. Gaza report,” Haaretz
(16 September 2009); “Tikkun Interview with Judge Richard Goldstone” (1 October
2009; http://tinyurl.com/yhg3cfk).
105. Anshel Pfeffer, “ Goldstone: Holocaust shaped
view on war crimes,” Haaretz (18
September 2009).
106. Levy, “Disgrace.”
107. Guttman, “Israel, U.S. Working”; Yaakov Katz,
“Mandelblit: Israel Right Not to Cooperate with Goldstone,” Jerusalem Post (16 September 2009); Herb
Keinon and Tovah Lazaroff, “‘UNHRC Vote May Affect Moscow Parley,’” Jerusalem Post (19 October 2009); Roni
Sofer, “Minister Edelstein: Goldstone report anti-Semitic,” ynetnews.com (25 January 2010; http://tinyurl.com/ydzwrwm);
“U.K. Officer Slams ‘Pavlovian’ Criticism of IDF after Gaza War,” Haaretz (22 February 2010).
108. Amir Mizroch, “Analysis: Grappling with
Goldstone,” Jerusalem Post (18
September 2009); Amir Mizroch, “What South African Jews Think of Richard
Goldstone,” Jerusalem Post (1 October 2009); R. W. Johnson, “Who
is Richard Goldstone?,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (20 October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yha38ed); Ashley Rindsberg,
“U.N.’s Goldstone Sent 13-Year-Old Boy to Prison for Protesting Apartheid,” Huffington Post (19 November 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yefdang);
Dershowitz, “ Goldstone Investigation.” It must nonetheless be said that in
interviews and statements after the report was published Goldstone seemingly
backpedaled from its more damning conclusions and downplayed the extent of
Israeli crimes; see, e.g., Richard Goldstone, “Justice in Gaza,” New York Times (17 September 2009),
Richard Goldstone, “Who’s Being Unfair?,” Jerusalem Post (21 September 2009),
Gal Beckerman, “ Goldstone: ‘If this was a court of law, there would have been
nothing proven,’” Forward (16 October
2009), “Tikkun Interview with Judge Richard Goldstone.”
109. Harold Evans, “A Moral Atrocity,” Guardian (20 October 2009).
110. Moyers, Journal.
111. Aluf Benn, “In Wake of U.N. Gaza Probe, How Can
Israel Go to War Again?,” Haaretz (16
September 2009); Ari Shavit, “Watch Out for the Goldstoners,” Haaretz (8 October 2009). See also
Gideon Levy, “ Peres, Not Goldstone, Is the Small Man,” Haaretz (15 November 2009), and The Reut Institute, Building a Political Firewall against
Israel’s Delegitimization (Tel Aviv: March 2010), paras. 40, 106.
112. “PM: Israel faces the ‘Goldstone threat,’” Jerusalem Post (23 December 2009).
113. Barak Ravid and Anshel Pfeffer, “Israel Seeks
Obama Backing on Gaza Probe,” Haaretz
(26 September 2009).
114. Yotam Feldman, “ICC May Try IDF Officer in Wake
of Goldstone Gaza Report,” Haaretz
(24 September 2009); Raphael Ahren, “Israeli Soldiers from South Africa Feel
Heat of Prosecution Drive in Old Country,” Haaretz
(22 November 2009).
115. “Livni reportedly cancels U.K. visit, fearing
arrest,” Haaretz (16 December 2009);
Danna Harman, “Belgian Lawyers to Charge Barak and Livni for War Crimes,” Haaretz (23 June 2010).
116. Assaf Gefen, “Are We Hiding Something?,” ynetnews.com (8 February 2010; http://tinyurl.com/34zuvux).
117. Larry Derfner, “Yasher Koah, Judge Goldstone,” Jerusalem Post (22 April 2010).
118. “Opening Statement by Avrom Krengel, Chairman of
the SAfr Zionist Fed, delivered at meeting with Judge Richard Goldstone” (4 May
2010; http://tinyurl.com/3axsw6y).
119. Goldstone Mission Report, para. 1973(b). Ironically, Israel itself criticized the Goldstone Report for asserting that Shalit should
be classified a POW (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat, p.
66n49).
120. Tom Gross, “ Goldstone’s Death Sentences for
Blacks: Just following orders,” Mideast
Dispatch Archive (10 May 2010). M. J. Rosenberg, “The ‘Get Goldstone’
Campaign,” MEDIAMATTERS Action Network
(10 May 2010).
121. Alan Dershowitz, “Legitimating Bigotry: The
legacy of Richard Goldstone,” Hudson New
York (7 May 2010; http://tinyurl.com/38mqnmc); see also Ilan Evyatar and
David Horowitz, “‘We Are Not Done With Goldstone,’” Jerusalem Post (21 May
2010), where Dershowitz labels him an “opportunist” reminiscent of “Nazi war
criminals.... Many of them served as judges.”
122. Sasha Polakow-Suransky, “Gold Stones, Glass
Houses,” Foreign Policy (10 May
2010).
123. Sasha Polakow-Suransky, The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s secret relationship with apartheid
South Africa (New York: 2010), pp. 80, 92. While sanctimoniously denouncing
apartheid in public, Peres forged and then nurtured at critical junctures the
Israeli alliance with South Africa, and both he and Rabin supported this
collaboration right through the last years of the apartheid regime.
124. Abe Selig, “ Goldstone Stripped of Honorary
Hebrew U Governorship,” Jerusalem Post
(5 June 2010).
125. E. B. Solomont, “Attorney Seeks to Bar Goldstone
from U.S.,” Jerusalem Post (14 May
2010).
126. Goldstone Mission Report, para. 1193. The caveat in the accompanying footnote also
merits quotation: “The reference to relatively focused operations here should
not be misunderstood as an indication that all such actions were acceptable in
terms of distinction and proportionality. It is merely a comparative
reference.”
127. The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, Annual Assessment 2008 (Jerusalem:
2008), p. 33. For recent data testifying to the liberalism of American Jews
assembled by a hostile critic, see Norman Podhoretz, Why Are Jews Liberals? (New York: 2009), pp. 252–68. Fully 78 percent
of the Jewish vote went for Barack Obama, 25 points higher than what he scored
among the electorate as a whole (53 percent), 35 points higher than what he
scored among white voters (43 percent), 33 points higher than what he scored
among Protestant voters (45 percent), 24 points higher than what he scored
among Catholic voters (54 percent), and even 11 points higher than what he
scored among Hispanic voters (67 percent); only African-Americans voted for
Obama as a group in larger numbers than Jews (95 percent).
128. Daniel Levy, “Israel Must Now Heal Itself,” Guardian (18 September 2009).
129. Roane Carey, “The Goldstone Report on Gaza,” Nation blog (“The Notion”) (25 September
2009; http://tinyurl.com/ybdwd4m). An occasional word critical of Israel and
supportive of Goldstone could however be found; see, e.g., James Carroll, “A
Time of Reckoning,” Boston Globe (21
September 2009). (Although not Jewish himself Carroll often writes on Jewish
themes from a philo-Semitic perspective.)
130. Rabbi Brant Rosen, “ Alan Dershowitz and the Politics
of Desperation,” Huffington Post (28
May 2010; http://tinyurl.com/28rhmbp).
131. Benn, “In Wake of U.N. Gaza Probe.”
132. Amos Harel, “IDF vs. Goldstone: PR ‘commando’
explains war against Hamas to Americans,” Haaretz
(13 November 2009).
133. Antony Lerman, “Judge Goldstone and the
Pollution of Argument,” Guardian (15
September 2009).
134. Among others, left-wing
Israeli lawyers Felicia Langer and Lea Tsemel and Hebrew University chemistry
professor Israel Shahak.
135. Amnesty International, Combating Torture (London: 2003), section 2.2. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881–2001
(New York: 2001), pp. 341–43, 568, 587, 600–1; Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the war, and
the year that transformed the Middle East (New York: 2007), pp. 475, 517.
136. In its 1979 “Report and Recommendations ... to
the Government of the State of Israel” (London: September 1980) Amnesty merely
stated that “there is sufficient prima
facie evidence of ill-treatment of security suspects in the Occupied
Territories ... to warrant the establishment of a public inquiry,” while in its
influential study Torture in the Eighties
(London: 1984), Amnesty cautiously signaled having “continued to receive
reports of ill-treatment” in Israeli prisons of “some Palestinians from the
Occupied Territories arrested for security reasons” (pp. 233–34).
137. Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the misuse of
anti-Semitism and the abuse of history (Berkeley: 2005; expanded paperback
edition, 2008), pp. 144ff.
138. Chris McGreal, “Israel ‘Personally Attacking
Human Rights Group’ after Gaza War Criticism,” Guardian (13 November 2009).
139. Adam Horowitz and Philip Weiss, “Israel vs.
Human Rights,” Nation (30 September
2009).
140. Joshua Mitnick, “Rights Groups under Fire for
Scrutiny of Israel’s Conduct of Gaza War,” Christian
Science Monitor (3 February 2010). Dan Izenberg, “Cabinet Backs Bill to
Register NGOs Funded by Foreign States,” Jerusalem
Post (15 February 2010); Donald Macintyre, “The New McCarthyism Sweeping
Israel,” Independent (13 February
2010); Abe Selig, “‘Goldstone Report Was Our Smoking Gun,’” Jerusalem Post (18 February 2010).
141. Asher Arian et al., Auditing Israeli Democracy: Democratic
values in practice (Jerusalem: 2010), p. 128; Nathan Jeffrey, “Kadima Bill:
NGOs that assist in war crime accusations should be illegal,” Forward (12 May 2010). But compare the
Israel Democracy Institute survey finding that “a solid majority (66%) of the
general public in Israel oppose the statement that there should be a law to
shut down media that criticize government policy too harshly” (p. 151).
142. B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories), Human
Rights Review, 1 January 2009-30 April 2010 (June 2010), pp. 5-7, 11-12.
See also the disingenuous statements by B’Tselem executive director Jessica
Montell quoted in the endnotes to Chapters 3 and 4.
143. Barbara Plett, “Legal Row over Gaza Report
Intensifies,” BBC News (6 November
2009).
144. Gerald Steinberg, “Isolating Israel through
Language of Human Rights,” Jerusalem Post
(30 August 2009); Shavit, “Watch Out for the Goldstoners.”
145. 27 April 2010 (http://tinyurl.com/39ur3jh).
146. 11 March 2010 (http://tinyurl.com/2aqlhze).
147. Peter Berkowitz, “The Goldstone Report and
International Law,” Policy Review
(August/September 2010).
148. “NGO Monitor’s International Advisory Board Call
for Review of HRW,” ngo-monitor.org
(14 October 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yj7e32m); “ Wiesel, Dershowitz: Human
Rights Watch Reform Needed,” ynetnews.com
(29 September 2009; http://tinyurl.com/yj4geht); NGO Monitor, Experts or Ideologues? A systematic analysis
of Human Rights Watch’s focus on
Israel (Jerusalem: September 2009).
149. McGreal, “Israel ‘Personally Attacking.’” For
the targeting of Israelibased human rights organizations, see NGO
Monitor/Institute for Zionist Strategies, Trojan
Horse: The impact of European government funding for Israeli NGOs
(Jerusalem: November 2009).
150. Robert L. Bernstein, “Rights Watchdog, Lost in
the Mideast,” New York Times (20
October 2009). For Human Rights Watch’s reply, see Kenneth Roth, “Human Rights
Watch Applies Same Standards to Israel, Hamas,” Haaretz (27 October 2009); see also Scott MacLeod, “Bashing Human
Rights Watch,” Los Angeles Times (30
October 2009). For Kemp, see Chapter 4.
151. Benjamin Birnbaum, “Human Rights Watch Fights A
Civil War over Israel,” New Republic
(27 April 2010).
152. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010 (New York: 2010), p. 511.
153. Human Rights Watch, “Jordan: Restaurant owner
ousts Israelis” (7 December 2010).
154. Mahatma Gandhi, The Essential Writings, edited and with an introduction and notes
by Judith M. Brown (Oxford: 2008), p. 349.
155. “Speech at Delhi Provincial Political
Conference” (2 July 1947), Collected Works
of Mahatma Gandhi, v. 88, p. 263.
Epilogue
1. “The Rubble That Was Gaza,” World Food Program News (25 January 2009; http://tinyurl.com/27xk5cy).
See also European Commission, Damage
Assessment and Needs Identification in the Gaza Strip, Final Report (March
2009), pp. xv, 93.
2. Desmond Travers, “Operation Cast Lead: Legal and
doctrinal asymmetries in a military operation,” Irish Defense Forces, Cosantoir
Review (2010), pp. 10-12.
3. Oxfam, “Gaza Weekly Update” (30 May-5 June 2010);
Human Rights Watch, “Israel: Full, impartial investigation of flotilla killings
essential” (31 May 2010); World Health Organization, “Medical Supplies Blocked from
Entering Gaza” (1 June 2010); International Committee of the Red Cross, “Gaza
Closure: Not another year!” (14 June 2010).
4. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement by
Prime Minister Netanyahu: ‘No love boat’” (2 June 2010); Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, “PM Netanyahu’s Statement before the Turkel Commission” (9 August
2010).
5. Bernard-Henri Lévy, “It’s Time to Stop Demonizing
Israel,” Haaretz (8 June 2010). See
also Gideon Levy, “In Response to Bernard-Henri Lévy,” Haaretz (10 June 2010).
6. Danny Ayalon, “The Flotilla Farce,” Wall Street Journal (29 July 2010).
7. Tom Gross, “A Nice New Shopping Mall Opened Today
in Gaza: Will the media report on it?,” Mideast
Dispatch Archive (17 July 2010; http://tinyurl.com/32ejzxa).
8. Sara Roy, “Gaza: Treading on shards,” Nation (1 March 2010).
9. Bernard Goldstein, Five Years in the Warsaw Ghetto (Edinburgh: 2005), pp. 77-78.
10. See Chapter 2.
11. See Chapter 4. Notes for page 162 291
12. The salient legal points are these: (1) In its
July 2004 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice stated that, “as
regards the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, the Court observes
that the existence of a ‘Palestinian people’ is no longer in issue”; that the
Palestinian people’s “rights include the right to self-determination”; and that
“Israel is bound to comply with its obligation to respect the right of the
Palestinian people to selfdetermination” (Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, paras. 118, 149); (2) The territory of the self-determination
unit within which this right of the Palestinian people is to be exercised
“clearly includes the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza” (John Dugard, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967 (21
January 2008; A/HRC/7/17), para. 49); (3) International law prohibits use of
military force “by an administering power to suppress widespread popular
insurrection in a self-determination unit,” while “the use of force by a non-State
entity in exercise of a right of self-determination is legally neutral, that
is, not regulated by international law at all,” and “assistance by States to
local insurgents in a self-determination unit may be permissible” (James
Crawford, The Creation of States in
International Law, second edition (Oxford: 2006), pp. 135-37, 147). See
also Heather A. Wilson, International Law
and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford: 1988), pp.
135-36, concluding that the law “is still not agreed upon” as regards the right
of national liberation movements to use force, although “the trend ... since
1960 ... has been toward the extension of the authority to use force to
national liberation movements,” while “the use of force to deny the free
exercise of a people’s right to selfdetermination is contrary to the principles
of international law,” and A. Rigo Sureda, The
Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: A study of United Nations
practice (Leiden: 1973), pp. 331, 343-44, 354, concluding that “since 1965,
the General Assembly has ... started to call upon states to help dependent
peoples to achieve self-determination with moral and material assistance,” and
“The fact that the Security Council has never expressly condemned the guerrilla
activities of the Palestinians can be interpreted as an implied recognition of
their right to recover at least the territories from which they were displaced
in the June 1967 hostilities, and to do so by the use of force if necessary”;
(4) It might be argued that the applicable norms of belligerent occupation
significantly differ in that “belligerent occupation is not designed to win the
hearts and minds of the local inhabitants: it has military—or
security—objectives and its foundation is the ‘power of the bayonet,’” and
concomitantly that the civilian population in an occupied territory does not
have the right to forcibly resist an occupying power (Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent
Occupation (Cambridge: 2009), paras. 80, 218). The Israel-Palestine conflict
would appear however to be one of those “situations in which belligerent
occupation and wars of national liberation overlap” (Wilson, International Law, p. 20), while the
right of self-determination is a peremptory norm of international law from which
no derogation is permissible (Crawford, Creation,
pp. 99-102, Sureda, Evolution, p.
353; see also International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences, paras. 88, 156)—thereby limiting the ambit of
the law of belligerent occupation, in particular its strictures on use of
force, in hybrid situations.
13. Gideon Levy, “Operation Mini Cast Lead,” Haaretz (1 June 2010).
14. Arun Gupta, “How the U.S. Corporate Media Got the
Israel Flotilla Catastrophe So Wrong,” AlterNet
(16 June 2010).
15. Israeli vilification focused on Mavi Marmara passengers belonging to the
sponsoring Turkish group Insani Yardim Vakfi(IHH), which was alleged to be a
terrorist organization or accused of having close links with terrorist
organizations. See Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Conspicuous among the Passengers and Organizations
Aboard the Mavi Marmara Were Turkish and Arab Islamic Extremists Led by IHH
(26 September 2010), paras. 2, 9, 11. But in the Israeli information packet
distributed just before the commando assault, IHH was benignly described as “a
Turkish pro-Palestinian human rights organization with a strong Muslim
orientation ... which provides humanitarian relief into areas of war and conflict.”
Military Strategic Information Section, International Military Cooperation Department,
Strategic Division, Israel Defense Forces, “Free Gaza Flotilla” (27 May 2010).
16. Ronen Medzini, “ Peres: World always against us,”
ynetnews.com (3 June 2010; http://tinyurl.com/4uw6quw);
Ahiya Raved, “ Peres: Soldiers were beaten for being humane,” ynetnews.com (1 June 2010; http://tinyurl.com/4bq9nk3).
17. Giles Tremlett, “Gaza Flotilla Attack: Israeli
ambassador to Madrid tries to play down deaths,” Guardian (4 June 2010).
18. Maayana Miskin, “Poll: Israelis support flotilla
raid, Gaza blockade, PM and IDF,” Arutz
Sheva (11 June 2010). See also the articles by Amira Hass, Neve Gordon and
Ilan Pappé, in Moustafa Bayoumi, ed., Midnight
on the Mavi Marmara: The attack on the Gaza freedom flotilla and how it changed
the course of the Israel/Palestine conflict (New York: 2010).
19. Hana Levi Julian, “Medal for Israeli Commando for
Valor on Mavi Marmara?,” Arutz Sheva (6 June 2010).
20. Adam Horowitz, “Internet Killed the Hasbara
Star,” Mondoweiss (8 June 2010); Max
Blumenthal, “The Israeli Media’s Flotilla Fail,” in Bayoumi, ed., Midnight, pp. 186-90.
21. Caroline Glick, “Ending Israel’s Losing Streak,” Jerusalem Post (1 June 2010).
22. Zvi Mazel, “Peace Activists? More Like ‘Peace’
Militants,” Jerusalem Post (1 June 2010); Hirsh Goodman, “The
Source of Failure: Israel’s public diplomacy and the intelligence community,” Institute for National Security Studies
(9 June 2010); Alex Fishman, “Israel Losing the War,” ynetnews.com (20 June 2010; http://tinyurl.com/2c4l4xz).
23. The Reut Institute, The Gaza Flotilla: A collapse of Israel’s political firewall
(August 2010), para. 27.
24. Danny Ayalon, “Public Relations Battle Is a
Marathon, Not a Sprint,” Jerusalem Post
(8 June 2010).
25. Antony Lerman, “Israeli PR Machine Won Gaza
Flotilla Media Battle,” Guardian (4
June 2010).
26. The most authoritative legal analysis is a
document prepared by an investigative mission mandated by the U.N. Human Rights
Council, Report
of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of
International Law, Including International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law,
Resulting from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying
Humanitarian Assistance (27 September 2010).
(Hereafter: Report of the Fact-Finding
Mission) The mission was headed up by a retired Judge of the
International Criminal Court and included the former Chief Prosecutor of the
United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone. It concluded that “the
blockade was inflicting disproportionate damage upon the civilian population in
the Gaza Strip and as such the interception could not be justified and
therefore has to be considered illegal” (para. 53); “one of the principal motives
behind the imposition of the blockade was a desire to punish the people of the
Gaza Strip for having elected Hamas. The combination of this motive and the effect
of the restrictions on the Gaza Strip leave no doubt that Israel’s actions and
policies amount to collective punishment as defined by international law”
(para. 54).
27. The passengers initially used water hoses to
repel the assault, which the International Maritime Organization has
“recommended as a means to prevent an attempted boarding by pirates and armed robbers”
(Report of the Fact-Finding Mission,
p. 25n68).
28. The most comprehensive collection and analysis of
media accounts is Richard Lightbown’s unpublished manuscript, The Israeli Raid of the Freedom Flotilla 31
May 2010: A review of media sources (31 August 294 Notes for page 165 2010).
For a Turkish reconstruction of what happened, see Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH), Palestine Our Route, Humanitarian Aid Our
Load: Flotilla campaign summary report (n.d.). See also Friends of Charities Association, Timeline &
Inconsistencies Report Relating to the Gaza-Bound Freedom Flotilla Attack May
31, 2010 (Washington, D.C.: October 2010).
29. International Crisis Group, Turkey’s Crises over Israel and Iran
(8 September 2010), p. 6; Ron Friedman, “IDF: Flotilla supplies unnecessary,” Jerusalem Post (2 June 2010); Report of the Fact-Finding Mission, paras. 55-58, 88-89, 109.
30. Uri Avnery, “A Crime Perpetrated by Order of the
Government of Israel and the IDF Command,” Gush
Shalom (31 May 2010).
31. Report of
the Fact-Finding Mission, paras. 112-14. A semi-official Israeli publication
did not dispute that “gas, stun, and smoke grenades were fired from the
[Israeli] boats” immediately as they approached the Mavi Marmara, while a largely apologetic New York Times reconstruction conceded that “the crack of an
Israeli sound grenade and a hail of rubber bullets from above were supposed to
disperse activists” before the commandos hit the deck of the Mavi Marmara. Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center, Preparations Made by
IHH for Confrontation with the IDF and the Violence Exercised by That
Organization’s Operatives (15 September 2010), para. 11; Sabrina Tavernise
and Ethan Bronner, “Days of Planning Led to Flotilla’s Hour of Chaos,” New York Times (4 June 2010).
32. One passenger on the Mavi Marmara had apparently been convicted and served prison time
for his involvement in the 1996 hijacking of a Russian ferry boat. (The
hijackers were demanding the release of Chechen prisoners.)
33. Hugh Pope, “Erdogan is Not the Bogeyman,” Haaretz
(18 June 2010); International Crisis Group, Turkey’s
Crises, p. 7; Report of the Fact-Finding
Mission, para. 129. The passengers had to break into medical supplies
earmarked for Gaza in order to treat the wounded.
34. “Is it really conceivable,” Henry Siegman
rhetorically asked in Haaretz, “that Turkish activists who were supposedly paid
ten thousand dollars each would bring that money with them on board the ship knowing
they would be taken into custody by Israeli authorities?” (“Israel’s Greatest
Loss: Its moral imagination,” Haaretz
(11 June 2010)).
35. Report of
the Fact-Finding Mission, paras. 101, 116, 165. Israel has not produced any
evidence substantiating its claim that passengers fired live ammunition at the
commandos, while its public statements on this point have been riddled with
inconsistencies and contradictions (ibid., p. 26n70).
36. Ibid.,
paras. 125-26.
37. Robert Booth, “Gaza Flotilla Activists Were Shot
in Head at Close Range,” Guardian (4
June 2010); Report of the Fact-Finding
Mission, paras. 118, 120, 170. About 50 passengers suffered injuries.
Israel reported nine commandos injured, three seriously.
38. Report of
the Fact-Finding Mission, paras. 264-65 (cf. paras. 167-72). Another of its
conclusions merits full quotation:
The Mission is not alone in finding that a deplorable
situation exists in Gaza. It has been characterized as “unsustainable.” This is
totally intolerable and unacceptable in the 21st century. It is amazing that
anyone could characterize the condition of the people there as satisfying the
most basic of acceptable standards. The parties and the international community
are urged to find the solution that will address all legitimate security
concern[s] of both Israel and the people of Palestine both of whom are equally
entitled to “their place under the heavens.” The apparent dichotomy in this
case between the competing right of security and the right to a decent living
can only be resolved if old antagonisms are subordinated to a sense of justice
and fair play. One has to find the strength to pluck from the memory rooted sorrows
and to move on. (para. 275)
In a 29 September 2010 resolution (A/HRC/15/L.33) the
U.N. Human Rights Council voted to “endorse the conclusions” contained in this report
by a vote of 30 in favor, 1 against and 15 abstentions. Although the U.S. cast
the sole negative vote, in its verbal explanation the American representative
did not dispute the report’s findings (http:// tinyurl.com/24rxfo9). I examine
the official Israeli report on the Mavi Marmara
in an appendix to this book.
39. “Netanyahu ‘Salutes’ Commandos Who Raided Gaza
Flotilla,” Haaretz (26 October 2010).
40. Hanan Greenberg, “Dogs to Be Used in Next
Flotilla Raid,” ynetnews com (7
October 2010; http://tinyurl.com/2cjhlxa).
41. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, According to Well-Documented Information,
Seven of the Nine Turks Killed in the Violent Confrontation Aboard the Mavi
Marmara Had Previously Declared Their Desire to Become Martyr[s] (Shaheeds) (13 July 2010).
42. “Speech at Bulsar” (29 April 1930), in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi
(Ahmedabad), v. 43, pp. 327-28.
43. Jonathan Ferziger and Calev Ben-David, “Gaza
Situation ‘Unsustainable,’ Clinton Says as Ship Approaches,” Bloomberg Businessweek (1 June 2010);
United Nations Department of Public Information, “Security Council Condemns
Acts Resulting in Civilian Deaths during Israeli Operation against Gaza-Bound
Aid Convoy, Calls for Investigation, in Presidential Statement” (31 May 2010).
See also Bernard Kouchner, Franco Frattini and Miguel Angel Moratinos, “Averting
Another Gaza,” New York Times (10 June 2010), “EU Strongly Condemns
Gaza Flotilla Attack,” EurActiv.com
(2 June 2010), and Yossi Lempkowicz, “Gaza Flotilla: EU Parliament calls for
international inquiry and end to blockade,” European
Jewish Press (17 June 2010).
44. International Crisis Group, “Flotilla Attack the
Deadly Symptom of a Failed Policy” (31 May 2010).
45. Robert H. Serry (U.N. Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process), “Briefing to the Security Council on the Situation
in the Middle East” (15 June 2010), citing a United Nations Development Program
survey.
46. State of Israel, The Civilian Policy towards the Gaza Strip (June 2010), Appendix B;
State of Israel, “Briefing: Israel’s new policy towards Gaza” (5 July 2010).
47. Gisha (Legal Center for Freedom of Movement),
“Unraveling the Closure of Gaza” (7 July 2010).
48. United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), The Humanitarian
Monitor (July 2010), p. 8. For a comprehensive report on the history,
current impact and legal ramifications of Israel’s closure policy in Gaza, see
Palestinian Center for Human Rights, The
Illegal Closure of the Gaza Strip: Collective punishment of the civilian
population (December 2010).
49. Amnesty International et al., Dashed Hopes: Continuation of the Gaza blockade
(30 November 2010). Israel dismissed the report as “biased and distorted” (Dan
Izenberg, “Int’l Groups Say Israel Not Living Up to Gaza Promises,” Jerusalem Post (30 November 2010). See
also Gisha (Legal Center for Freedom of Movement), “Facts behind MFA Report on
‘Easing’ of Gaza Closure” (20 September 2010). In late December 2010 Gisha
reported that apart from “narrow exceptions” Israel “continued to ban the
entrance of steel, gravel and cement to Gaza,” while “small limited export has
begun in the past weeks” (“Reconstructing the Closure,” December 2010).
50. J CALL (European Jewish Call for Reason), “Call
for Reason” (2 May 2010); “Unconditional Support for Israel ‘Is Dangerous,’ Say
Leading European Jews,” Guardian (2
May 2010); Haviv Rettig Gur, “J Call Founder Denies Placing Onus on Israel
Alone,” Jerusalem Post (4 May 2010).
51. Roland Schatz, “Israel Suffering from Poor Media
Image: Image of Israel in international tv news,” Media Tenor International
(9 July 2010).
52. BBC World Service, “Global Views of United States
Improve While Other Countries Decline” (18 April 2010).
53. Uri Avnery, “A Flash of Lightning,” Gush Shalom (19 June 2010; http:// tinyurl.com/25d5k85).
54. Secretary-General, Office of the Spokesperson,
“Secretary-General’s Press Conference” (31 May 2010); “The Elders Condemn
Israeli Attack on Gaza Relief Ships” (31 May 2010; http://tinyurl.com/26oqfzb).
55. Hlengiwe Nhlabathi, “SA Recalls Ambassador to
Israel,” Mail and Guardian (3 June 2010); “Ecuador Recalls Envoy; Chavez:
Israel a Murderer,” ynetnews.com (3
June 2010; http://tinyurl.com/26pw8zt).
56. “South Korea Protesters
Greet Peres with Cries of ‘Killer,’” Haaretz
(10 June 2010); “Thousands Demonstrate across the World against Israel’s
Gaza Flotilla Raid,” Haaretz (5 June
2010).
57. “40% of Norwegians: Ban Israeli products,” ynetnews.com (2 June 2010; http://tinyurl.com/29ud3y3);
“Norway Calls for Boycott on Arms to Israel,” Swedish Wire (1 June 2010).
58. “Thousands Demonstrate,” Haaretz; Danna Harman, “Thousands of Anti-Israel Protesters Take to
Streets across Europe,” Haaretz (6
June 2010); Daniel Levy, “A Glimpse of the Future,” Haaretz (11 June 2010); Danna Harman, “Belgian Lawyers to Charge
Barak and Livni for War Crimes,” Haaretz
(23 June 2010).
59. Barak Ravid, “OECD Entrance Is ‘Seal of
Approval,’ Netanyahu Says,” Haaretz
(10 May 2010); Lamis Andoni, “The Myth of Israeli Morality,” Aljazeera.net (5 June 2010).
60. Attila Somfalvi, “Report: Holland’s sympathy for
Israel in decline,” ynetnews.com (18 May
2010; http://tinyurl.com/2dqnwua).
61. Barak Ravid, “U.S. Support for Israel is
Decreasing, New Poll Shows,” Haaretz
(18 August 2010).
62. “Israel Is Lost at Sea,” Financial Times (31 May 2010). It also pertinently observed:
Hamas engages in terrorism and fires occasional
rockets into Israel but it is an example of that rarest of Middle Eastern
species: a popularly elected government. It has also signed up to the 2002
comprehensive peace offer by the Arab League and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference. If it is a bluff, it is one Israel has yet to call. That is
what this is ultimately about. Israel’s government has been pretending it is
ready to negotiate for peace, but that there is no one to negotiate with on the
other side. The attack on the blockade-busters lays bare the country’s slide into
contempt for international law, intolerance of dissent and willful sabotage of
viable representation for Palestinians.
63. Jonny Paul, “UK’s Largest Union Calls for Israel Boycott,”
Jerusalem Post (8 June 2010); Jonny
Paul, “Britain’s Largest Academic Union Cuts Ties with Histadrut,” Jerusalem Post (2 June 2010).
64. Methodist Conference Agenda 2010, Justice for Palestine and Israel, Final Report (July 2010), p.
222, section 7.4.1. A parenthetical statement noted that “some Methodists would
advocate a total boycott of Israeli goods until the Occupation ends.”
65. “‘Pixies’ Cancel Tel Aviv Show,” Jerusalem Post (6 June 2010); “Musicians
Welcome Here,” Jerusalem Post (7 June
2010).
66. David Horowitz, “Editor’s Notes: Drift ing away
from Israel,” Jerusalem Post (29 July
2010).
67. “‘Israel Feels More and More Isolated,’” Spiegel Online International (4
June 2010); Patrick Donovan, “ Merkel ‘Disconcerted’ over Deaths Aboard Aid Ship
Off Gaza,” Bloomberg Businessweek (31
May 2010); “German Parliament Expected to Pass Motion Urging Israel to End Gaza
Blockade,” Haaretz (1 July 2010);
Benjamin Weinthal, “Germany Smacks Israel with Critical Resolution on Flotilla
Raid,” Weekly Standard (6 July 2010).
68. Avnery, “Flash of Lightning.” Avnery excluded
Germany from his generalization that “the sense of guilt has disappeared in all
countries.” In fact, as the July 2010 Israel Project poll and others before it
have shown, Germany is at most a partial exception to the rule (see Chapter 6).
69. Natasha Mozgovaya, “Obama: Jews’ outlook on the
future should be a lesson to all Americans,” Haaretz (28 May 2010).
70. “ Obama Supports U.N. Call for Investigation of
Flotilla Incident,” America.gov (1
June 2010).
71. United States Mission to the United Nations,
“Remarks by Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Deputy Permanent U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, at an Emergency Session of the Security Council” (31 May
2010). Vice-President Joseph Biden defended the legitimacy of the commando raid
on the grounds that Israel was ready to transfer the supplies to Gaza if the flotilla
had unloaded them at an Israeli port. In a bizarre sequence of non-sequiturs
Biden alternately asserted that Israel was blocking passage of supplies such as
building materials and that the flotilla could have “easily brought” them in.
Natasha Mozgovaya, “Biden: Israel right to stop Gaza flotilla from breaking
blockade,” Haaretz (2 June 2010);
Richard Adams, “Gaza Flotilla Raid: Joe Biden asks ‘So what’s the big deal
here?,’” Guardian blog (2 June 2010).
72. “Bipartisan Group of 87 Senators, Led by Reid and
McConnell, Send Letter to President Obama in Support of Israel’s Right to
Self-Defense,” Democrats.senate.gov
(23 June 2010; http:// tinyurl.com/3435lyl); Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives, “Dear Mr. President” (29 June 2010; http://tinyurl .com/2b2td5e).
See also “Congress Shows Israel Support,” Jerusalem
Post (9 June 2010).
73. Nathan Guttman, “Push to Sanction Backers of Gaza
Flotilla Gains Steam in U.S.,” Forward
(16 June 2010).
74. “Chuck Schumer: ‘Strangle’ them economically,” Huffington Post (11 June 2010). See also
Juan Cole, “Schumer’s Sippenhaftung,” Informed
Comment blog (12 June 2010).
75. Jeremy W. Peters, “Reporter Retires after Words
about Israel,” New York Times (7 June
2010).
76. Leslie H. Gelb, “Israel Was Right,” Daily Beast (31 May 2010).
77. “Israel and the Blockade,” New York Times (1 June 2010).
78. Roger Cohen, “The Forgotten American,” New York Times (26 July 2010). For
earlier critical commentary of his, see Chapter 6.
79. Nicholas Kristof, “The Two Sides of a Barbed-Wire
Fence,” New York Times (1 July 2010);
Nicholas Kristof, “Burrowing through a Blockade,” New York Times (4 July 2010); Nicholas Kristof, “In Israel: The
noble vs. the ugly,” New York Times
(8 July 2010).
80. Philip Weiss, “‘Huff po’ Reflects Staggering
Shift in Liberal American Discourse,” Mondoweiss
(3 June 2010).
81. “U.S. General: Israeli-Palestinian conflict
foments anti-U.S. sentiment,” Haaretz
(17 March 2010).
82. Shimon Shiffer, “Biden: You’re jeopardizing
regional peace,” Yediot Ahronot (11
March 2010).
83. See Chapter 3.
84. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel As a Strategic
Liability?,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies (2 June 2010).
85. Rebecca Anna Stoil, “Dagan: Israel less of a
strategic asset for U.S.,” Jerusalem Post
(1 June 2010).
86. “Poll: 49% of Americans blame pro-Palestinian
activists for flotilla deaths,” Haaretz
(8 June 2010).
87. “Hasbarapocalypse—Leaked Frank Luntz Memo:
Israeli public diplomacy in US on Flotilla failed dismally,” Coteret (5 July 2010; http://tinyurl.com/36c4nmm).
88. Ravid, “U.S. Support.”
89. “Evergreen State College Students Vote to Divest
from Illegal Occupation of Palestine” (n.d.) (http://tinyurl.com/2cbr8s2); Mike
Elk, “Around the World, Dockworkers Blockade Israeli Ships,” In These Times (4 August 2010).
90. Presbyterian Church (USA), “Breaking Down the Walls—From the Middle East Study Committee”
(n.d.; http://tinyurl.com/2949slh). See N. H. Gordon, “The Missing ‘Plea for
Justice,’” Counterpunch (16 July 2010)
for criticism of the document’s limitations.
91. Theodore Sasson et al., Still Connected: American Jewish attitudes about Israel (August
2010), p. 20. See also Rebecca Anna Stoil, “US Jews Pro Obama, Oppose
Concessions,” Jerusalem Post (18
April 2010).
92. Shlomo Avineri, “What’s Happening to Diaspora
Jews?,” Haaretz (10 May 2010).
93. Sasson et al., Still Connected, pp. 6, 14. Forty-six percent “strongly agreed”
with the Israeli version while 45 percent only “somewhat” or “halfway” agreed
with the Israeli version (9 percent “somewhat” or “strongly” agreed with the
Turkish version). Confirming the theses argued in this book, the poll also
found that “political ideology... was a major factor, with conservative
respondents much more likely to blame the activists,” and “blaming Israel ...
increases with secular educational attainment” (ibid., p. 16).
94. American Jewish Committee, “AJC Condemns ‘Free
Gaza’ Flotilla for Provoking Tragic Violence” (31 May 2010); World Jewish
Congress, “World Jewish Congress Statement Regarding Israeli Operation Aboard
the ‘Gaza Freedom Flotilla’” (1 June 2010); Anti-Defamation League, “ADL Calls
Flotilla to Gaza a Deliberate Provocation against Israel” (31 May 2010).
95. Gal Beckerman, “Reactions to Raid on Flotilla a
Rorschach Test for American Jews,” Forward
(2 June 2010).
96. Americans for Peace Now, “APN Deeply Dismayed by
Israeli Raid on Gaza Flotilla” (31 May 2010); Jeremy Ben-Ami, “In Wake of
Flotilla Tragedy, J Street Urges Strong US Leadership to End Conflict Now” (31
May 2010) (but compare J Street’s more cautious subsequent statement “J Street
on the Gaza Flotilla and Its Aftermath,” n.d.).
97. Alan Dershowitz, “Another Rush to Judgment,” Jerusalem Post (1 June 2010); Alan M. Dershowitz, “Israel’s Actions Were
Entirely Lawful Though Probably Unwise,” Hudson
New York (1 June 2010); Alan M. Dershowitz, “Singling Out Israel for
‘International Investigation,’” Hudson
New York (3 June 2010).
98. Elie Wiesel, “The ‘Activists’ Wanted Violence,” Daily News (7 June 2010).
99. John Podhoretz, “Look What Israel Didn’t Do
Wrong,” New York Post (3 June 2010;
emphasis in original); Elliott Abrams, “Joining the Jackals,” Weekly Standard
(2 June 2010); Charles Krauthammer, “Those Troublesome Jews,” Washington Post (4 June 2010; emphasis in original).
100. Andrew Sullivan, “Israel Derangement Syndrome,” Atlantic blog (“The Daily Dish”) (4 June
2010). See Chapter 6 for Sullivan’s conversion.
101. Jonathan Mark, “Just Torpedo the Next Flotilla,”
Jewish Week (4 June 2010).
102. Michael Walzer, “The Need for Something Better,”
Dissent (3 June 2010); Asaf
Shtull-Trauring, “It Might Have Been Wise to Look the Other Way,” Haaretz (13 June 2010). See Chapters 3,
4, 6, for Walzer’s apologetics on the Gaza invasion. After the commando raid
Walzer advised that Israel imitate Colin Powell’s “smart sanctions” which the U.S.
imposed on Iraq after the initial “blockade did affect the living standard of
ordinary Iraqis.” The latter phrase of Walzer is a wondrous euphemism for the
U.S.-British sanctions regime that killed between a half million and a million
Iraqi children. See Joy Gordon, Invisible
War: The United States and the Iraq sanctions (Cambridge: 2010).
103. Leon Wieseltier, “Operation Make the World Hate
Us,” New Republic (3 June 2010).
104. Peter Beinart, “The Failure of the American
Jewish Establishment,” New York Review of
Books (10 June 2010).
105. See Chapter 6.
106. Peter Beinart, “Israel’s Indefensible Behavior,”
Daily Beast (1 June 2010).
107. Daniel Luban, “No Direction Home,” Tablet (3 June 2010).
108. Rabbi Bruce Warshal, “As Israel Isolates Itself
from the World,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel
(8 June 2010).
109. Matthew Yglesias, “Gaza,” Yglesias blog (31 May
2010); Joe Klein, “The Israeli Attack,” Swampland
blog (31 May 2010); Glenn Greenwald, “Israel Attacks Aid Ship, Kills At Least
10 Civilians,” Salon.com (31 May 2010).
110. M. J. Rosenberg, “Lying about the Gaza Flotilla
Disaster,” Huffington Post (2 June
2010).
111. Adi Gold interview with David Remnick, Yediot Ahronot Friday Political Supplement (24 December 2010; http://tinyurl.com/28r2hfg).
112. Ben Knight, “Claim and Counterclaim after Deadly
Flotilla Raid,” ABC News (1 June
2010).
113. Nahum Barnea, “The Test of the Result,” Yediot Ahronot (1 June 2010); Ben
Kaspit, “It’s Not Enough to Be Right,” Maariv
(1 June 2010); Amos Harel, “Straight into the Trap,” Haaretz (1 June 2010); Mordechai Kedar, “A War for World’s Future,”
ynetnews.com (31 May 2010;
http://tinyurl.com/2bzf5qb); Mickey Bergman, “The IDF Soldiers Were Sent on a
Mission That Defies Logic,” Huffington
Post (1 June 2010); Yaakov Katz,
“Duped,” Jerusalem Post (4 June 2010).
Flotilla passengers anticipated that “if we fail to stop, they will probably
knock out our propellers or rudders, then tow us somewhere for repair” (Henning
Mankell, “Flotilla Raid Diary,” in Bayoumi, ed., Midnight, p. 22).
114. Katz, “Duped”; Ahiya Raved, “20 People Threw Me
from Deck,” ynetnews.com (1 June
2010; http://tinyurl.com/3y5nerf); “Israel Navy’s Gaza Flotilla Probe ‘Finds
Planning, Intel Flaws,’” Haaretz (20
June 2010); “Army Inquiry Slams Flotilla Raid’s Planning,” ynetnews.com (8 July 2010; http://tinyurl.com/2dzefhe); Tavernise
and Bronner, “Days of Planning.”
115. “Gaza: From blockade to bloodshed,” Guardian (1 June 2010).
116. The Entebbe raid was a hostage-rescue operation
carried out by elite Israeli commandos at Entebbe airport in Uganda on 4 July
1976.
117. Uzi Mahnaimi and Gareth Jenkins, “Operation
Calamity,” Sunday Times (6 June
2010).
118. Doron Rosenblum, “Israel’s Commando Complex,” Haaretz (4 June 2010).
119. Scott Wilson, “Israel Says Free Gaza Movement
Poses Threat to Jewish State,” Washington
Post (1 June 2010), quoting Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli ambassador to
the U.S.; “ Eiland: Flotilla was preventable,” Jerusalem Post (23 July 2010).
120. “PM Netanyahu’s Statement.” The Turkish
government did however actively discourage IHH from undertaking the voyage
(International Crisis Group, Turkey’s
Crises, p. 6).
121. Kedar, “A War.”
122. “Speech of Secretary-General Nasrallah on
Freedom Flotilla Attack” (4 June 2010).
123. Report of
the Fact-Finding Mission, paras. 76-77.
124. O9Beirut177 Date13/02/2009 05:56 Origin Embassy
Beirut Classification SECRET//NOFORM (WikiLeaks).
125. Amos Oz, “Israeli Force, Adrift on the Sea,” New York Times (1 June 2010).
126. “Israel Navy’s Gaza Flotilla Probe”; Ron Ben-Yishai,
“A Brutal Ambush at Sea,” ynetnews.com
(31 May 2010; http://tinyurl.com/238jw8g).
127. Merav Michaeli, “Nothing to Investigate:
Everyone knows what was wrong about the flotilla attack,” Haaretz (3 June 2010). For Israeli violence in places like Bil’in
“even when no violence on the part of the demonstrators preceded the IDF
actions,” see also Association for Civil Rights in Israel, The State of Human Rights in
Israel and the Occupied Territories: 2009
report (Jerusalem: 2009), p. 13.
128. International Crisis Group, Tipping Point? Palestinians and the search for a new strategy (26
April 2010), p. 28n226.
129. John J. Mearsheimer, “Sinking Ship,” American Conservative (1 August 2010).
130. Katz, “Duped.”
131. Kaspit, “It’s Not Enough”; David Horowitz,
“Analysis: The flotilla fiasco,” Jerusalem
Post (1 June 2010); Harel, “Straight into the Trap”; Charles Levinson and
Jay Solomon, “Israel’s Isolation Deepens,” Wall
Street Journal (3 June 2010).
132. Levy, “Operation Mini.”
133. Kaspit, “It’s Not Enough.”
134. Mahnaimi and Jenkins, “Operation Calamity.”
135. Barnea, “The Test of the Result.”
136. Noam Sheizaf, “Flotilla: New Mavi Marmara
pictures raise more questions regarding IDF attack,” Promised Land (6 June
2010; http://tinyurl.com/2aj4qrc).
137. Ken O’Keefe, “‘Soldiers Thought We Would Kill
Them,’” ynetnews.com (7 June 2010; http://tinyurl.com/25qbopw).
138. Reuven Pedatzur, “A Failure Any Way You Slice
It,” Haaretz (1 June 2010).
139. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Says One Israeli General:
‘Everybody thinks we’re bananas,’” theatlantic.com
(1 June 2010).
140. University of Maryland, in conjunction with
Zogby International, 2010 Arab Public
Opinion Poll. Forty-one percent responded that Israel’s power “has its
strengths and weaknesses.”
141. The breadth of Turkey’s rift with Israel should
not be exaggerated. The extensive commercial ties between the two countries
have to date not been touched. (Turkey is Israel’s biggest commercial partner nation
in the region.) In fact Israeli trade with Turkey rose by almost one third
during the first seven months of 2010, and the political crisis did not affect
Turkey’s purchase from Israel of unmanned surveillance planes. By August 2010
senior Turkish officials were expressing a “commitment to preserving warm
relations with Israel.” James Melik, “Gaza Flotilla: Israeli-Turkish trade ‘unaffected,’”
BBC News (2 June 2010); David Wainer and Ben Holland, “Turks in Tel
Aviv Show Business Binds Israel to Muslim Ally in Gaza Crisis,” Bloomberg News (14 July 2010); Dan
Bilefsky, “Turkey and Israel Do a Brisk Business,” New York Times (4 August 2010); “Israel Exports to Turkey Up 32 Pct
Despite Tensions,” AFP (19 August
2010); “Turkish Officials: We’re committed to preserving friendly Israel ties,”
Haaretz (26 August 2010); International
Crisis Group, Turkey’s Crises, p. 16.
See also Murat Dagli, “Turkey after the Flotilla,” in Bayoumi, ed., Midnight, pp. 197-204.
142. Avnery, “Flash of Lightning.” The prospects of a
Turkish-Iranian alliance and concomitant Turkish rift with its erstwhile
Western allies might be overblown. See International Crisis Group, Turkey’s Crises, pp. 10-11, 15.
143. Chris Patten, “To Avert Disaster, Stop Isolating
Hamas,” ft.com (28 July 2010).
144. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Address by
PM Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan University” (14 June 2009).
145. Yoni Cohen, “‘The Whole World Is against Us,’” Jerusalem Post (19 August 2010).
146. Levy, “Glimpse.”
147. Yoel Marcus, “How We Became a Night Unto the
Nations,” Haaretz (24 November 2009).
148. The Reut Institute, The Gaza Flotilla, para. 131.
149. See Chapter 2.
150. Abba Eban, An
Autobiography (New York: 1977), p. 383.
151. Daniel C. Kurtzer, “A Third Lebanon War,” Council on Foreign Relations (July 2010), pp. 2, 4.
152. Jeffrey White, If War Comes: Israel vs. Hizballah and its allies (September 2010), p. 41. The study was published by the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Israel lobby’s think tank.
153. Ibid.,
p. 11; for Israel’s war preparations, see ibid.,
pp. 6-18.
154. Yaakov Katz, “The Dahiya Doctrine: Fighting
dirty or a knock-out punch?,” Jerusalem
Post (28 January 2010); White, If
War Comes, pp. 10, 12, 35, 40. See
Chapter 2 for the Dahiya doctrine.
155. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel’s New Hard Line on
Hizbollah,” DefenseNews (31 May
2010); “Speech Delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah
Marking the Tenth Anniversary of the Resistance and Liberation Day” (25 May
2010).
156. White, If
War Comes, p. ix.
157. Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel, “MESS Report:
Israel exposes valuable intelligence to warn Hezbollah,” Haaretz (8 July 2010); Amos Harel, “Israel Stuck in the Mud on
Internal Gaza Probe,” Haaretz (30
January 2010). See also International Crisis Group, Drums of War: Israel and the “Axis of Resistance” (2 August 2010),
pp. 2n7, 19n128, 21n142.
158. Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the war in Lebanon (New York: 2008), p. 130. See
Chapter 2 for this questionable allegation.
159. Matti Friedman, “Underneath Lebanon, Israel Sees
Hidden Battlefield,” Associated Press
(14 August 2010).
160. International Crisis Group, Drums, p. 2n5.
161. Avi Issacharoff, “Will Hezbollah Go to War
against Israel to Avoid Civil Strife in Lebanon?,” Haaretz (2 December 2010).
162. “Q&A with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud
Barak,” Washington Post (26 July
2010). See also International Crisis Group, Drums,
pp. 4-5.
163. “Retired IDF General: Deterrence is our best
option against Hezbollah,” Haaretz
(16 December 2010); see also Giora Eiland, “Who’s the Real Enemy?,” ynetnews.com (24 July 2008; http://tinyurl.com/5rrsrp).
164. Ian S. Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron Wall:
Israel and ‘the Middle Eastern muck,’” Middle
East Policy (Fall 2008), p. 47.
165. Winograd
Commission Final Report (30 January 2008), paras. 13-15.
166. Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: 2008), pp. 25-26.
167. See Chapter 2.
168. Compare the graphs on pp. 74 and 100 of
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Hamas and the Terrorist Threat from the Gaza Strip: The main findings
of the Goldstone report versus the factual findings (March 2010).
169. “Resistance and Liberation Day” speech.
170. International Crisis Group, Trial by Fire: The politics of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(December 2010), p. 27.
171. Barak Ravid, “MI Chief: Tel Aviv may be target
in next war against Israel,” Haaretz
(21 November 2010).
172. Harel, “Israel Stuck”; White, If War Comes, p. 18n13.
173. White, If
War Comes, pp. 10, 18n11.
174. For the prospect of an Israeli strike on Lebanon
targeting or drawing in Syria and Iran, see International Crisis Group, Drums, pp. 5-11, and White, If War Comes, pp. 28-33.
175. White, If
War Comes, pp. 32, 35.
176. See Nasrallah’s “Resistance and Liberation Day”
speech.
177. David Horowitz, “Editor’s Notes: When the next
war comes,” Jerusalem Post (8 August
2010); White, If War Comes, pp. 9-10,
17.
178. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Constrained Internationalism: Adapting to
new realities (2010), pp. 7, 20-21, 55-56, 72.
179. “Thanks to the Critics,” Haaretz (27 July 2010).
180. Amos Harel, “MESS Report: Gaza war probes are
changing Israel’s defiant ways,” Haaretz
(22 July 2010).
181. United Nations General Assembly, Second Follow-Up to the Report of the United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General
(11 August 2010; A/64/890).
182. A 27 September 2010 Human Rights Council
resolution (A/HRC/15/l.34), which passed by a vote of 27 in favor, 1 against (United
States), and 19 abstentions, called on its Committee of Independent Experts to
submit yet another report for the Council’s sixteenth session (in March 2011)
assessing Israeli and Palestinian investigations of violations of international
law during the Gaza invasion. (See Chapter 7 for the earlier findings of this
committee.) The Palestinian delegate and Arab states joined in sponsoring this resolution
while the U.S. voted against it “because Israel had the ability to conduct
credible investigations and serious self-scrutiny,” making “further follow-up
of the Goldstone report by United Nations bodies ... unnecessary and
unwarranted” (“Human Rights Council Takes Up Human Rights Situation in Palestine
and other Occupied Arab Territories,” 27 September 2010). An Amnesty
International statement criticized the Council’s “seriously flawed resolution” that
“fails to establish a clear process for justice” and “amounts to a betrayal of
the victims,” and called on the Council to refer the matter to the
International Criminal Court for consideration (“Human Rights Council Fails
Victims of Gaza Conflict,” 30 September 2010). For Human Rights Watch’s
comparable criticism of the Goldstone report’s “slow death” and the Palestinian
Authority’s complicity, see Jared Malsin, “Whither Goldstone? Did the PA kill
the UN’s Goldstone report?,” Foreign
Policy (27 October 2010).
183. “Q&A with Israeli Defense Minister.”
184. Charly Wegman, “Israel Picks Gaza War Commander
as New Military Chief,” AFP (5
September 2010).
185. Raji Sourani, “1,000 Days,” in Bayoumi, ed., Midnight, p. 147.
186. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel to
Participate in UN Panel on Flotilla Events” (2 August 2010).
187. It was merely “tasked with reviewing the reports
of national investigations” into the assault. U.N. News Centre, “UN Chief
Announces Panel of Inquiry on Gaza Flotilla Incident” (2 August 2010). This panel
was separate and distinct from the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission appointed by the
Human Rights Council that was quoted earlier.
188. International Federation for Human Rights, “FIDH
Deeply Concerned by the Composition of UN Panel of Inquiry into the Flotilla
Events” (6 August 2010); Colombia Support Network, “A Failed Presidency? A New
Beginning?” (4 August 2010; http://tinyurl.com/2abja6x).
189. Shlomo Shamir, “ Livni Tells UN to Mind Its Own
Business over Flotilla Probe,” Haaretz (6
October 2010).
190. Avnery, “Crime Perpetrated.” See also David
Grossman, “The Gaza Flotilla Attack Shows How Far Israel Has Declined,” Guardian (1 June 2010).
191. E. B. Solomont, “IAEA Presses for Nuke-Free
Mideast,” Jerusalem Post (12 May
2010).
192. Haneen Zoabi, “Freeing Gaza; Liberating
Ourselves,” in Bayoumi, ed., Midnight,
p. 71.
193. Nicolas Pelham, “Hamas Back Out of Its Box,” Middle East Report Online (2 September
2010).
194. “John Ging: Conditions in Gaza have not changed
since Israel declared it would ease the blockade,” Middle East Monitor (11 November 2010). Ging is the Gaza-based
director of operations for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).
195. Sally Belfrage, Freedom Summer (New York: 1965), p. 130.
196. Norman G. Finkelstein, Resolving the Israel-Palestine Conflict: What we can learn from Gandhi,
forthcoming.
197. James Foreman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries (New York: 1972), pp. 311-12.
198. Charles Levinson, “Israel’s Foes Embrace New
Resistance Tactics,” Wall Street Journal
(2 July 2010).
199. B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories), By
Hook and by Crook: Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank (Jerusalem:
July 2010); Human Rights Watch, Separate and
Unequal: Israel’s discriminatory treatment of Palestinians in the occupied
Palestinian territories (New York: 2010).
200. Mouin Rabbani, “Israel and the World: A turning
point?,” Middle East International
(11 June 2010).
201. Juliane von Mittelstaedt, “Israeli Settlement
Construction Booms Despite Ban,” Spiegel
Online International (3 September 2010). See also Hagit Ofran, “Eight
Months into the Settlement Freeze,” Peace
Now website (August 2010), Matti Friedman, “Israeli FM Pushes for New Settlement
Construction,” Associated Press (6
September 2010).
202. Dror Etkes, “Settlement Freeze? It Was Barely a
Slowdown,” Haaretz (28 September
2010).
203. See Chapter 2.
204. Dinstein, International
Law, p. 238, para. 570.
205. See Chapter 2.
206. “ Netanyahu Offers Settlement Freeze in Return
for Recognition as Jewish State, Palestinians Say No,” Haaretz (11 October 2010); Michael B. Oren, “An End to Israel’s
Invisibility,” New York Times (13
October 2010).
207. Akiva Eldar, “ Netanyahu Asking Palestinians to
Cede Right of Return,” Haaretz (12
October 2010). See also Shimon Shiffer, “The Derailer,” Yediot Ahronot (12 October 2010).
208. Yitzhak Benhorin, “US Backs PM: Israel is Jewish
State,” ynetnews.com (10 October
2010; http://tinyurl.com/2cdz5jo).
209. Ethan Bronner and Mark Landler, “A 90-day Bet on
Mideast Talks,” New York Times (14
November 2010).
210. “Remarks of Hillary Rodham Clinton at the
Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy Seventh Annual
Forum” (10 December 2010). For a full Israeli withdrawal not jeopardizing
Israel’s security, see Martin van Creveld, “Israel Doesn’t Need the West Bank to
Be Secure,” Forward (24 December
2010).
211. “Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace
Process,” Council of the European Union
(13 December 2010).
212. European Former Leaders Group (EFLG), “Letter to
the President of the European Council” (2 December 2010).
213. United Nations, “The Secretary-General—Press
Conference” (17 December 2010).
214. “The Elders: We need peace in the Middle East,
not just process” (13 December 2010).
Appendix 1
1. “Hamas Letter to Obama,” Institute for Public Accuracy (8 June 2009; www.commondreams.org/newswire/2009/06/08-2).
Appendix 2
1. Public Commission to
Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, The Turkel Commission Report, Part One (January 2011). Hereafter: Turkel
Report. Shortly after publication of
the Turkel Report, the Turkish government released the findings of its own
investigation, Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, Report on the Israeli Attack on the Humanitarian Aid Convoy to Gaza on
31 May 2010 (February 2011). Hereafter: Turkish Report.
2. Turkel Report,
para. 16.
3. Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the misuse of anti-Semitism and the abuse of
history (Berkeley: 2005; expanded paperback edition, 2008), chapter 4. The
first suicide attack during the second intifada occurred in March 2001.
4. Turkel Report,
para. 1.
5. See Chapter 1. The Turkel Report does mention Israeli strikes against Gaza further on (paras.
16, 18), but deems them retaliatory (Israel “responded”), whereas in actuality
conflict pauses between Israel and the Palestinians were “overwhelmingly”
broken by Israel (see Chapter 2).
6. Turkel Report,
p. 48n143, paras. 45-47.
7. Ibid.,
para. 19.
8. See Chapter 2.
9. Turkel Report,
para. 72.
10. Ibid.,
para. 73.
11. Ibid.,
para. 71.
12. Ibid.,
para. 72, citing definition of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (see also ibid., para. 76).
13. Ibid.,
paras. 76, 77.
14. See ibid.,
para. 90, for murky acknowledgment that international law prohibits sieges
causing not only starvation (“hunger blockade”) but also “less extreme
instances” of “suffering” (cf. ibid.,
p. 102n363).
15. Ibid.,
para. 76 (my emphasis).
16. Ibid.,
para. 79.
17. Ibid.,
paras. 80, 90.
18. Ibid.,
para. 82.
19. See Epilogue.
20. Turkel Report,
paras. 19, 68, 97. The Report also
repeatedly states that breaching the blockade was unnecessary because Israel
conveyed beforehand to the flotilla its willingness to deliver “humanitarian” supplies
on board the vessels to Gaza. But the Report also makes clear that
“humanitarian” supplies did not
include prohibited items on board such as cement and other construction
materials. See ibid., paras. 3, 27,
110, 113, 149, 198.
21. The international humanitarian law principle of
proportionality states that even a clear military object cannot be targeted if
the risk of harm to civilians or civilian infrastructure is larger than the
anticipated military advantage. See Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict
(Cambridge: 2004), pp. 119ff.
22. Turkel Report,
paras. 50, 63.
23. Ibid.,
para. 67.
24. Ibid.,
para. 106 (emphasis in original).
25. See Chapters 1, 2 and Epilogue.
26. “Cashless in Gaza?,” WikiLeaks (3 November 2008; http://tinyurl.com/2wfdrdp).
27. Gisha (Legal Center for Freedom of Movement), Partial List of Items Prohibited/Permitted
in the Gaza Strip (May 2010).
28. Turkel Report,
para. 91.
29. At one point the Turkel Report seems to concede that Israel restricted passage of foodstuffs
“used solely for civilian needs” (para. 91), but then justifies this policy
(albeit with caveats) by invoking the U.S.-U.K. genocidal sanctions on Iraq
(ibid., paras. 92-93). For the Iraqi sanctions, see esp. Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq
sanctions (Cambridge: 2010).
30. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate
Violations of International Law, Including International Humanitarian and Human
Rights Law, Resulting from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships
Carrying Humanitarian Assistance (27 September 2010). Hereafter: Report of
the Fact-Finding Mission.
31. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Government
Establishes Inde pendent Public Commission” (14 June 2010).
32. Turkel Report,
para. 237.
33. Ibid.,
para. 236.
34. The Turkel Report
notes (p. 157n533) the exception of one commando who called his assailants
“activists.”
35. Ibid.,
para. 236.
36. Ibid.,
para. 237.
37. See Chapter 3.
38. Turkel Report,
paras. 9, 237, pp. 211n736, 212n737. It cites the testimony of one Israeli
Palestinian but only to discredit it by citing the testimony of another Israeli
Palestinian (ibid., para. 144). It also
cites critical testimony of the Mavi Marmara’s captain during interrogation but
only to peremptorily dismiss it on the basis of contrary testimony by an
Israeli aerial lookout (ibid., paras.
125, 203).
39. Turkish Report,
pp. 40-42, 44, 47, 108.
40. Turkel Report,
paras. 9, 237.
41. For a sampling of these testimonies, see Moustafa
Bayoumi, ed., Midnight on the Mavi
Marmara: The attack on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla and how it changed the course
of the Israel/Palestine conflict (New York: 2010), part 1. Exceptionally,
the Turkel Report makes passing
reference at the end of a long footnote to a Haaretz interview with one of the passengers
(pp. 202-3n703).
42. Amnesty International, “Israeli Inquiry into Gaza
Flotilla Deaths No More Than a ‘Whitewash’” (28 January 2011). Although the
U.N. Fact-Finding Mission failed to secure the cooperation of the Israeli government,
it did make extensive use of the available public testimony before the Turkel
Commission, whereas the Turkel Report
makes no mention let alone use of the Fact-Finding Mission’s investigation.
43. Report of
the Fact-Finding Mission, paras. 112-14. The Mission referred to the
Israeli speedboats as zodiacs whereas the Turkel Report calls them Morenas.
44. Turkel Report,
para. 121.
45. Ibid.,
para. 128.
46. Ibid.,
para. 130.
47. Ibid.,
para. 200.
48. Ibid.,
para. 230.
49. Ibid.,
para. 174.
50. Ibid.,
paras. 132, 180, 213, 243, 244, p. 149n518. The Turkel Report states that “in
the strategic discussions prior to the operation, the possibility that firearms
might be present was mentioned,” but it had no practical consequences (ibid., p. 247n863, para. 243).
51. Ibid.,
paras. 115-22.
52. Ibid.,
para. 121.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.,
para. 182.
55. Ibid.,
para. 242.
56. See Epilogue.
57. Turkel Report,
paras. 133, 135, 140.
58. Ibid.,
paras. 133, 135, 140, p. 250n871.
59. Ibid.,
paras. 165, 192.
60. Ibid.,
para. 169.
61. Ibid.,
para. 167.
62. Ibid.,
paras. 196, 199, 201, 220.
63. Ibid.,
para. 136.
64. Ibid.,
paras. 165, 196.
65. Turkish Report,
pp. 15-16, 56, 113.
66. Turkel Report,
para. 165. The Turkel Report states
that “four bullet casings not used by the IDF were found on board” but “it
cannot be said with complete certainty that these were bullets fired from a non-IDF
weapon since it cannot be ruled out that these bullets somehow made their way
into the IDF ammunition” (ibid., p.
207n718). The Report also cites but
appears not to credit the testimony of one IDF officer that “he saw Molotov
cocktails which had been placed in orderly stacks” (ibid., para. 145).
67. Ibid.,
p. 211nn735, 736, para. 169.
68. Ibid.,
para. 167.
69. Ibid.,
para. 221.
70. Ibid.,
para. 167.
71. Report of
the Fact-Finding Mission, paras. 116, 165.
72. Turkel Report,
para. 222.
73. Ibid.,
para. 236.
74. Ibid.,
pp. 155n529, 157n531, para. 221.
75. Ibid.,
p. 250nn871, 873.
76. Ibid.,
para. 222.
77. Ibid.,
para. 221.
78. See Chapter 3.
79. Turkel Report,
para. 222.
80. Ibid.,
paras. 217-19.
81. Ibid.,
paras. 220, 223.
82. Ibid.,
paras. 135, 136, 140.
83. Ibid.,
paras. 136, 167.
84. Ibid.,
paras. 166, 168, 197.
85. Ibid.,
paras. 135, 136, 167, 190.
86. Report of
the Fact-Finding Mission, para. 264 (see also ibid., paras. 167, 169, 172).
87. Turkel Report,
paras. 119, 121, 140, 206, 223, 228, 229, 245.
88. Ibid.,
paras. 141, 142.
89. Ibid.,
paras. 239, 246.
90. One passenger has been in a coma since the attack
as a result of the wounds he sustained.
91. Report of
the Fact-Finding Mission, para. 170.
92. Turkel Report,
para. 155.
93. Ibid.,
para. 230.
94. Ibid.,
para. 155. The Turkel Report contains
a couple of other references to the nine deaths (ibid., paras. 143, 168).
95. The Turkish Report
states (pp. 27-28) that two passengers were “killed by a single gunshot wound.”
It perhaps omitted mention of their nonlethal bullet wounds. The Fact-Finding
Mission stated that all but one of the nine deceased suffered multiple bullet
wounds (see Epilogue).
96. In the section devoted to analyzing “the use of
force by IDF soldiers during the takeover operations,” the Turkel Report states (para. 236) that “the
Commission furnished written requests to IDF authorities seven times in order
to deepen and expand the inquiries that were conducted.”
97. Ibid.,
para. 233. It notes that the “detailed testimonies of the soldiers as well as
their analysis can be found in an annex to the report” that to date has not
been released (ibid., para. 235).
98. Ibid.,
para. 239.
99. The Turkel Report
states only that the Commission “did not have access to autopsy reports ...
because [of] the Turkish government’s request, immediately after the event,
that the Israeli government would not perform autopsies on the bodies of the
deceased” (para. 237). The Turkish autopsy reports concluded that “five of the
deceased were shot in the head at close range” (Turkish Report, pp. 26, 85, 114).
100. Turkel Report,
p. 261n929.
101. Ibid.,
para. 160.
102. U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing”
(24 January 2011; http://tinyurl.com/4ze4r2j).
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