Petraeus tells Haaretz: U.S. image as war-weary
emboldens the enemy
With legitimate state authorities unraveling in
the Mideast, the big winners are ISIS and Al-Qaida, as well as Iran, the former
CIA director says. But even with chaos in the region, Israel should institute
confidence-building measures vis-a-vis the Palestinians.
When David Howell Petraeus was writing his doctoral
thesis at Princeton University, on how the lessons of the Vietnam War shaped
the relations between the military and civilian echelons in Washington, he came
across a remark by his father-in-law, who also happened to be superintendent of
West Point Military Academy when Petraeus was at the outset of his U.S. Army
career there. “Those who ordered the meal,” retired General William A. Knowlton
reminded young officers in 1985, about that war, “were not there when the
waiter brought the check.”
Petraeus, of Dutch extraction, a scholar-soldier-spy
– the last term a reference to his short stint as CIA director under President
Barack Obama (2011-2012) – went on after his studies to lead troops in Iraq,
devise the American doctrine on counterinsurgency, and assume command in three
4-star positions including Central Command (CENTCOM). Along the way, he also
developed strong ties with such Israeli military figures former Israel Defense
Forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and former head of Military Intelligence
Amos Yadlin, who now directs the Institute for National Security Studies, in
Tel Aviv. Later this month, Petraeus will appear at the annual conference of
the INSS.
In an extensive interview with Haaretz, Petraeus
sounded skepticism about a moderate turn in Iran’s regional policies and the
chances for a successful final push by the Obama administration in the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute. He has praise for both the Palestinian security
services and for former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad – as
of now, a very long shot to succeed President
Mahmoud Abbas – and compliments the outgoing chief of the Mossad,
Tamir Pardo, and his predecessor, Meir Dagan.
Based on your vast military and intelligence
experience, how would you rank Russia, China, ISIS and Iran when it comes to
serious security threats to world and regional stability?
“I don’t believe that it is particularly useful to
‘rate’ threats to national security in order of precedence or priority. In
truth, we face a number of significant challenges, and each of these needs to
be understood on its own terms. Beyond that, we do not have the luxury of
picking and choosing among them, as some would like to do – or of appearing to
elevate one region of the planet at the expense of others. We live in a world
where we must combat non-state actors, like the Islamic State, that have
genocidal and totalitarian ambitions, while simultaneously countering
nation-states that have hegemonic ambitions and that seek to overturn key
tenets of the existing international order, like the Iranian government and
Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
“The Middle East is unique in that all of these
threats are present in this region, they are intertwined, and failure to manage
them here has been shown to have consequences not just for the region, but for
the rest of the world.
“The basic challenge in the Middle East is the
unraveling of legitimate state authority in a number of countries across a
significant swath of territory, and this in turn has precipitated a violent
struggle for power and control over these spaces. These are struggles between
rival elements within the failed states and ungoverned spaces whose future is
seen as being up for grabs, but these struggles also draw in external powers
from within the region and beyond, powers that are pursuing their own rivalries
and dreams of dominance.
“Unfortunately, the chief beneficiaries of this
dynamic so far have been the most radical and ruthless forces in the Middle
East – groups like the Islamic State and Al-Qaida, on the one side, and the
Iranian regime, on the other.
“What is also common among all of these challenges is
that they are creating unprecedented demand for U.S. leadership and involvement
across the world. Whether fairly or not, I think there is a perception in a
variety of geographies today that the U.S. over the past few years –
particularly after the frustrations of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars – has been
weary of war; and, in turn, this has probably emboldened some actors to try
their luck at challenging the international order. It is going to be very important
for the U.S. to address this problem and to restore a sense of certainty and
confidence – among friends and foes alike – in America’s security commitments.”
Do you believe that for the next 10-15 years,
while Iran is being monitored for any violations, that its nuclear weapons
program will for all practical purposes be dormant and that this period can be
used to pursue a bold American – and Israeli – strategy vis-a-vis the various
domestic forces in the Iranian system?
“I think it would be a significant mistake to assume
that the Iranian nuclear program will be dormant under the JCPOA [the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon with Iran last summer]. Perhaps the
Iranians really will adhere to their obligations under the agreement. But if they
do so, it will be among the few times in a quarter-century that they haven’t
tried to cheat on their nuclear commitments.
“That is why it is so important for the United States
and our allies to use the JCPOA to pursue the most robust possible inspections
and verification, and for us also to signal clearly to the Iranians that any
violations – especially on the margins of the deal, which is where such
activity will inevitably begin – will prompt a very firm and credible response.
I am, in fact, concerned that the Iranians have already been trying, with some
success, to deter us from holding them to their obligations, by threatening to
walk away from the JCPOA, when we are the ones who need to be in the business
of deterring them from cheating.
“Regardless of Iran’s nuclear behavior, we must also
recognize that the practical effect of the JCPOA will be to bolster Iran’s
capability to pursue its hegemonic ambitions, as Tehran comes out from under
sanctions, reintegrates with the global economy, and receives more revenue (and
$50 billion-$100 billion in frozen assets) – at least a portion of which are
going to be used to bolster the Iran Revolutionary Guards Quds Force and
regional proxies like Lebanese Hezballah, Shi’ite militias in Iraq, Palestinian
terrorist groups, and the Houthi [rebels] in Yemen. It is unfortunate that this
will happen at a moment when, for a variety of reasons, the region is already
particularly susceptible to Iranian power projection. The second element of our
strategy, therefore, must be to intensify our efforts to counter Iran’s
expansionism and to empower those elements in the region that can serve as a
bulwark against Tehran.
“There are some who argue that, because we are at war
with the Islamic State, Iran therefore becomes our natural ally, because it is
also battling the Islamic State. I strongly disagree. Sometimes the enemy of
your enemy is still your enemy, and I believe that is the case in this
situation. In fact, we must recognize that it has been Iranian expansionism
that has helped fan the flames of Sunni extremism – whether by enabling Bashar
Assad’s campaign of slaughter in Syria or backing sectarian elements in Iraq or
Yemen. That is why, at the same time that we step up our campaign to combat the
Islamic State, we also need a reinvigorated effort to counter and roll back
Iran’s malign activities across the region.
“More broadly, we in the United States face a very
fundamental question concerning our role in the Middle East, namely: What will
be our relationship with Iranian power? Do we seek to balance and counter it,
or should we seek to accommodate and partner with it, in the hope of exercising
some kind of moderating influence over it? My own view is that the former is
the right approach – but I am not sure the U.S. has adequately clarified its
approach to this question.
“Finally, as I testified to the Senate Armed Services
Committee several months ago, it is very important that the White House and
Congress together state that Iran will never be allowed to enrich uranium to
weapons grade. Nothing will reassure our allies and partners in the region more
than such a statement of national policy, backed up by maintaining the
capabilities and readiness of the military forces needed to implement such a
policy if necessary.”
‘Strategic dead end’
How important is a solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to Middle East stability? What outline do you see
for such a solution?
“I think it is increasingly clear that the old
notion that the path to peace and stability in the Middle East runs through a
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is mistaken. (And I acknowledge
that I was one of those who shared that notion until a few years ago.) There
are multiple interlocking conflicts unfolding across the region right now – and
to be blunt, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is peripheral to all of them. Those
who suggest that, if peace were to break out tomorrow between Israelis and
Palestinians, such a development would stabilize, say, Syria or Libya or Iraq,
are simply detached from reality.
“That said, I do think that the status quo between
the Israelis and Palestinians is deeply problematic for Israelis and
Palestinians, and it should be a source of concern for Israel’s friends and
supporters. The question is, of course: What can realistically be done about
it?
“I think we also need to be very clear that –
whatever the frustrations and disappointments of the current situation – there
is simply no excuse or rationalization for terrorism, nor for moral equivalence
between those who set out to kill innocent civilians and those trying to
prevent attacks. Beyond that, clearly, incitement and glorification of violence
against civilians constitute a moral and strategic dead end. This is, frankly,
a lesson that should have been learned long ago.
“As for what to do, I am skeptical [of the idea] that
a peace deal is within reach if only the U.S. makes another big, public
diplomatic push for it. It seems to me that, for a number of reasons, the stars
just aren’t in alignment for meaningful negotiations right now. Instead, it
might be more productive to explore other, quieter steps that might be taken to
stabilize the situation, prevent it from worsening, and perhaps begin to
achieve some positive momentum on the ground. To that end, I think that some of
the confidence-building measures put forward are worth serious consideration.
“Beyond those, arguably one of the rare success
stories of the last decade was the development of the Palestinian security
forces. Are there further actions that can be taken to reinforce and
expand on that kind of institution-building in the West Bank – supporting the
growth of responsible Palestinian state structures and promoting economic
opportunities that can significantly improve day-to-day life for Palestinians and
give real meaning and substance to the state that hopefully will emerge on that
territory one day? Perhaps so. In addition, there certainly are individuals,
like former Prime Minister Fayyad, within Palestinian society who are pushing
for reform and economic development, and they deserve greater support than they
have received.”
Should Israel be kept in EUCOM [the U.S.
military’s European Command] or moved to CENTCOM, along with the Palestinian
Authority? Does the current Unified Command Plan make sense, when Egypt and
Jordan are in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility, but the Gaza Strip, the West
Bank and Israel are not?
“This is an interesting question, and one that we
have looked at periodically over the years. In truth, regardless of where the
lines between the different U.S. combatant commands are drawn, there will
always be difficult divisions of the sort you describe, as there are in any
military campaign, as well.
“My personal instinct is that, rather than rejigging
the map, the better response is to prioritize strong functional coordination
and cooperation among the combatant commands. That is what we attempted to do
when I was commander of CENTCOM. In truth, as you know, the original reason
that Israel was in the so-called Area of Responsibility, or AOR, of EUCOM
rather than CENTCOM was, in a way, to firewall the Israel-U.S. military
relationship. The concern was that, if the military commander who had
responsibility for the Arab states also had responsibility for Israel, there
might be the temptation to make decisions about Israel through the prism of our
relations with our Arab partners – or pressure for this kind of linkage.
“Although I think the risk of this is significantly
lower today – not least because Israel is, ironically, in alignment with many
of those Arab neighbors on the key threats facing the region – I think it is
probably still wisest to maintain the current arrangement. (It is worth noting
the EUCOM is responsible for Turkey, as well, even though a number of the
forces under the operational control of CENTCOM for the fight against ISIS are
based there.)”
You have studied civil-military relations in
Washington and in the field from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan. Are there any
permanent lessons, or are times changing and personal and societal factors
transforming this issue?
“As the saying goes, history doesn’t necessarily
repeat itself, but it often rhymes. When you look at the national security
experience of the United States over the past 60 or 70 years, since the end of
World War II and arguably before, you do see some recurring themes and
patterns. Indeed, even in the quarter-century of our military involvement with
Iraq – from Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 up until the present day – we
can see this.
“One such pattern is that the U.S. all too often sets
an ambitious military objective, engages in a furious debate about whether we
are succeeding or not, and then finds itself largely unprepared for the
consequences when we do in fact achieve the objective. That was arguably what
happened in Iraq in 1991 after we kicked Saddam [Hussein] out of Kuwait, again
in 2003 after we overthrew his regime in Baghdad, and, in a sense, after the
Surge of 2007-2008; in each case, there was a failure to consolidate and
capitalize on the gains we achieved. I worry now, in fact, that we are at risk
of repeating this mistake with respect to the Islamic State – as we focus so
much on defeating the group militarily and not enough on what comes after it in
Iraq, in Syria, and in the other locations where we are focusing on IS
affiliates.
“A second pattern is that we often struggle and
stumble – whether in Vietnam or in the current crises across the Middle East –
when the problem we are facing requires neither a purely military or diplomatic
approach, but a strategy that closely integrates elements of both (and of other
elements as well). That is part of what I think we got right during the Surge
of 2007-2008 – when my great civilian wingman, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and I
made the conscious decision to establish a fully integrated civil-military
campaign plan and sought to achieve unity of effort in all that we did.
Unfortunately, such an approach is more often the exception than the rule. In
part, this is because our national security institutions are simply not
designed to function that way, and thus, in the absence of very strong
leadership from the very top, and/or unconventional personalities at the
working level, such integration often doesn’t materialize.”
Next in the Oval Office
As you view the 2016 presidential election and the
trends in American politics and demography, how much does it really matter to a
foreign country such as Israel whether the next occupant of the Oval Office is
a Democrat or a Republican? Is there not a basic continuity in U.S. national
security and international relations, which after the campaign rhetoric calms
down reverts to the center?
“Let me stipulate up front that I consider myself
non-partisan: I am neither in the Democratic nor the Republican camp. Both
parties have produced leaders I admire, and, in my view, leaders of both
parties have also committed their share of blunders. I am also a declared
‘non-combatant’ in the presidential race: I am happy to talk to responsible,
internationalist candidates from both sides of the aisle, and I think a number
of the contenders would be very capable commanders-in-chief.
“I agree with you that there is often a basic
continuity in U.S. national security policy; that is true to a greater extent
than either party is eager to admit. That said, it is my strongly held belief –
based on both my study of history and my personal experiences – that
individuals matter a great deal in history. Particularly on the toughest
national security decisions we face, as with the Surge in Iraq under President
Bush or the nuclear negotiations with Iran under President Obama, the
importance of the president – and his or her convictions, personality, and
worldview – should not be underestimated. In short, leaders do matter. And that
is particularly true of the leader of the United States.
“Our next president is likely to inherit an
unprecedented number of competing national security crises – from Europe to
Asia to the Middle East – the solutions to which are anything but obvious. For
that reason, this year’s election will have far-reaching consequences not just
for America, but for the world. Given that, in one form or another, I think
change is coming to our national security policy in January 2017.”
As a professional what is your view of the Israeli
intelligence and special operations community? Specifically as an army
general-turned-director of Central Intelligence, what were the distinctive
features of the Mossad? Is it better for such an agency to be headed by a
senior military officer, such as retired Maj. Gen. Meir Dagan, whose term of
duty ended just prior to your assuming your position at CIA, or a career Mossad
official like Tamir Pardo, your counterpart?
“There is deep, well-deserved respect for Israeli
national security institutions, their leaders, and their members – and these
institutions include Mossad, Shin Bet and of course the IDF. I am among those
who have enormous respect for those institutions – and, in my case, that
respect is founded on years of partnership with key leaders of these extraordinary
organizations. In that regard, both Meir Dagan and Tamir Pardo were exceptional
leaders of Mossad and great partners for their American counterparts – and I’m
thus agnostic as to the proper path to the head of such an important
organization.
“I recognize that, over the last few years, some
differences and disagreements between the leaders of Israel and the U.S. have
been in the spotlight. And I am keenly aware of voices in both countries that
have argued that our two countries are pulling farther apart. In my view, at a
time when civilization itself is under siege from forces that wish to tear down
the world we have helped to build, we would be wise to take a step back and
focus on the big picture. The simple reality is that Israel and the United States
are long-standing friends and allies in an increasingly dangerous world – and
we ought to treat each other as such.
“From an American perspective, Israel has
proven itself to be an exceptionally capable, resourceful and valuable ally to
the United States in a very important and treacherous region. We share many
fundamental interests, and we face enemies that wish to do both countries harm.
“Just as importantly, we share core values and we
therefore wrestle with many of the same questions – about how to keep our
people safe from the forces of terrorism that seek our destruction while
preserving our respective democratic freedoms, rule of law, and respect for
fundamental and eternal human rights, which define who we are.”
With the rise of cyber-warfare and the spread of
digital data emanating from countless sources, is HUMINT [human intelligence]
as important a discipline as it used to be? How do you practice tradecraft
against tough nuts such as Islamic State?
“The explosive growth of the digital realm has
changed the practice of intelligence in countless ways, not only with respect
to cybersecurity, tradecraft and surveillance issues, but also with the
increase in prominence of so-called big data and open-source intelligence. Some
of the best analytic products, for instance, now derive from information
collected on publicly available social media platforms, rather than through
clandestine means.
“That said, just as the rise of satellite technology
and fixed-line telephones in an earlier era didn’t eliminate the need for
HUMINT, I don’t think the current changes in technology will either. To the
contrary, I would caution strongly against those who think technology can
reduce the importance of the human element in intelligence or national security
more broadly. If anything, I think the human factor carries even more
importance today, in the face of challenges like the Islamic State and Russian
unconventional warfare, than it did in the days when the most pressing and
sensitive task was to count Soviet nuclear warheads or tanks. So HUMINT will
rightly still be regarded as extraordinarily important by those seeking
insights into the thinking and intentions of those who wish us ill.”
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